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Dear Attorney-General
Equal recognition before the law and legal capacity for people with disability
On 23 July 2013, the Australian Law Reform Commission received Terms of
Reference to undertake a review of equal recognition before the law and legal capacity
for people with disability. On behalf of the Members of the Commission involved in
this Inquiry—including Graeme Innes AM, former Disability Discrimination
Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission, and in accordance with the
Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996—I am pleased to present you with the
Final Report on this reference, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth
Laws (ALRC Report 124, 2014).
Yours sincerely,
Professor Rosalind Croucher
President
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Terms of Reference
Review of equal recognition before the law and legal capacity
for people with disability
I, Mark Dreyfus QC MP, Attorney-General of Australia, having regard to:
· the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to
which Australia is a party and which sets out:
o rights for people with disability to recognition before the law, to legal
capacity and to access to justice on an equal basis with others, and
o a general principle of respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy,
including freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of
persons, and
· Australian Governments’ commitment to the National Disability Strategy, which
includes ‘rights protection, justice and legislation’ as a priority area for action.
REFER to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) for inquiry and report,
pursuant to s 20(1) of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth):
· the examination of laws and legal frameworks within the Commonwealth
jurisdiction that deny or diminish the equal recognition of people with disability
as persons before the law and their ability to exercise legal capacity, and
· what if any changes could be made to Commonwealth laws and legal
frameworks to address these matters.
For the purposes of the inquiry, equal recognition before the law and legal capacity are
to be understood as they are used in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: including to refer to the rights of people with disability to make decisions
and act on their own behalf.
Scope of the reference
In undertaking this reference, the ALRC should consider all relevant Commonwealth
laws and legal frameworks that either directly, or indirectly, impact on the recognition
of people with disability before the law and their exercise of legal capacity on an equal
basis with others, including in the areas of:
· access to justice and legal assistance programs
· administrative law
· aged care
· anti-discrimination law
· board participation
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· competition and consumer law
· contracts
· disability services and supports
· electoral matters
· employment
· federal offences
· financial services, including insurance
· giving evidence
· holding public office
· identification documents
· jury service
· marriage, partnerships, intimate relationships, parenthood and family law
· medical treatment
· privacy law
· restrictive practices
· social security
· superannuation, and
· supported and substituted decision making.
The review should also have particular regard for the ways Commonwealth laws and
legal frameworks affect people with disability who are also children, women,
Indigenous people, older people, people in rural, remote and regional areas, people
from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex people.
The purpose of this review is to ensure that Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks
are responsive to the needs of people with disability and to advance, promote and
respect their rights.  In considering what if any changes to Commonwealth law could
be made, the ALRC should consider:
· how laws and legal frameworks are implemented and operate in practice
· the language used in laws and legal frameworks
· how decision making by people with impairment that affects their decision
making can be validly and effectively supported
· presumptions about a person’s ability to exercise legal capacity and whether
these discriminate against people with disability
· use of appropriate communication to allow people with disability to exercise
legal capacity, including alternative modes, means and formats of
communication such as Easy English, sign language, Braille, and augmentative
communications technology
· how a person’s ability to independently make decisions is assessed, and
mechanisms to review these decisions
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· the role of family members and carers and paid supports such as legal or non-
legal advocates in supporting people with disability to exercise legal capacity for
themselves – both in relation to formal and informal decisions and how this role
should be recognised by laws and legal frameworks
· safeguards – are the powers and duties of decision making supporters and
substituted decision makers effective, appropriate and consistent with
Australia’s international obligations
· recognition of where a person’s legal capacity and/or need for supports to
exercise legal capacity is evolving or fluctuating (where a person with disability
may be able to independently make decisions at some times and circumstances
but not others or where their ability to make decisions may grow with time
and/or support), including the evolving capacity of children with disability, and
· how maximising individual autonomy and independence could be modelled in
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks.
In conducting this inquiry, the ALRC should also have regard to:
· initiatives under the National Disability Strategy, including the National
Disability Insurance Scheme and other services and supports available to people
with disability, and how these should/could interact with the law to increase the
realisation of people with disability’s recognition before the law and legal
capacity
· how Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks interact with State and
Territory laws in the areas under review, contemporaneous developments and
best practice examples within the States and Territories, and
· international laws and legal frameworks that aim to ensure people with disability
are accorded equal recognition before the law and legal capacity on an equal
basis with others, including international work to implement the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disability.
Consultation
In undertaking this reference, the ALRC should identify and consult with relevant
stakeholders, particularly people with disability and their representative, advocacy and
legal organisations, including through accessible formats, but also families and carers
of people with disability, relevant Government departments and agencies in the
Commonwealth and States and Territories, the Australian Human Rights Commission,
and other key non-government stakeholders.
Timeframe
The Commission should provide its report to the Attorney-General by August 2014.
Dated 23 July 2013
Mark Dreyfus
Attorney-General
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Recommendations
3. National Decision-Making Principles
Recommendation 3–1 Reform of Commonwealth, state and territory laws
and legal frameworks concerning individual decision-making should be guided by the
National Decision-Making Principles and Guidelines (see Recommendations 3–2 to
3–4) to ensure that:
· supported decision-making is encouraged;
· representative decision-makers are appointed only as a last resort; and
· the will, preferences and rights of persons direct decisions that affect their lives.
Principle 1: The equal right to make decisions
All adults have an equal right to make decisions that affect their lives and to have those
decisions respected.
Principle 2: Support
Persons who require support in decision-making must be provided with access to the
support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in decisions that
affect their lives.
Principle 3: Will, preferences and rights
The will, preferences and rights of persons who may require decision-making support
must direct decisions that affect their lives.
Principle 4: Safeguards
Laws and legal frameworks must contain appropriate and effective safeguards in
relation to interventions for persons who may require decision-making support,
including to prevent abuse and undue influence.
Recommendation 3–2 Support Guidelines
(1)  General
(a)  Persons who require decision-making support should be supported to participate
in and contribute to all aspects of life.
(b)  Persons who require decision-making support should be supported in making
decisions.
(c)  The role of persons who provide decision-making support should be
acknowledged and respected—including family members, carers or other
significant people chosen to provide support.
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(d) Persons who require decision-making support may choose not to be supported.
(2)  Assessing support needs
In assessing what support is required in decision-making, the following must be
considered:
(a)  All adults must be presumed to have ability to make decisions that affect their
lives.
(b)  A person must not be assumed to lack decision-making ability on the basis of
having a disability.
(c)  A person’s decision-making ability must be considered in the context of
available supports.
(d) A person’s decision-making ability is to be assessed, not the outcome of the
decision they want to make.
(e)  A person’s decision-making ability will depend on the kind of decisions to be
made.
(f)  A person’s decision-making ability may evolve or fluctuate over time.
Recommendation 3–3 Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines
(1) Supported decision-making
(a) In assisting a person who requires decision-making support to make decisions, a
person chosen by them as supporter must:
(i) support the person to express their will and preferences; and
(ii)  assist the person to develop their own decision-making ability.
(b)  In communicating will and preferences, a person is entitled to:
(i)  communicate by any means that enable them to be understood; and
(ii)  have their cultural and linguistic circumstances recognised and respected.
(2) Representative decision-making
Where a representative is appointed to make decisions for a person who requires
decision-making support:
(a)  The person’s will and preferences must be given effect.
(b)  Where the person’s current will and preferences cannot be determined, the
representative must give effect to what the person would likely want, based on
all the information available, including by consulting with family members,
carers and other significant people in their life.
(c)  If it is not possible to determine what the person would likely want, the
representative must act to promote and uphold the person’s human rights and act
in the way least restrictive of those rights.
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(d) A representative may override the person’s will and preferences only where
necessary to prevent harm.
Recommendation 3–4 Safeguards Guidelines
(1)  General
Safeguards should ensure that interventions for persons who require decision-making
support are:
(a)  the least restrictive of the person’s human rights;
(b)  subject to appeal; and
(c)  subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring and review.
(2)   Support in decision-making
(a)  Support in decision-making must be free of conflict of interest and undue
influence.
(b)  Any appointment of a representative decision-maker should be:
(i)  a last resort and not an alternative to appropriate support;
(ii)  limited in scope, proportionate, and apply for the shortest time possible;
and
(iii) subject to review.
4. Supported Decision-Making in Commonwealth Laws
Recommendation 4–1 A Commonwealth decision-making model that
encourages supported decision-making should be introduced into relevant
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks in a form consistent with the National
Decision-Making Principles and Recommendations 4–2 to 4–9.
Recommendation 4–2 The objects and principles provisions in
Commonwealth legislation concerning decision-making by persons who require
decision-making support should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles.
Recommendation 4–3 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks
should include the concept of a supporter and reflect the National Decision-Making
Principles in providing that:
(a)   a person who requires decision-making support should be able to choose to be
assisted by a supporter, and to cease being supported at any time;
(b)  where a supporter is chosen, ultimate decision-making authority remains with
the person who requires decision-making support; and
(c) supported decisions should be recognised as the decisions of the person who
required decision-making support.
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Recommendation 4–4 A supporter assists  a person who requires support  to
make decisions and may:
(a)  obtain and disclose personal and other information on behalf of the person, and
assist the person to understand information;
(b)  provide advice to the person about the decisions they might make;
(c)  assist the person to communicate the decisions; and
(d)  endeavour to ensure the decisions of the person are given effect.
Recommendation 4–5 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks
should provide that supporters of persons who require decision-making support must:
(a)  support the person to make decisions;
(b)  support the person to express their will and preferences in making decisions;
(c)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial, and cultural wellbeing
of the person;
(d)  act honestly, diligently and in good faith;
(e)  support the person to consult, as they wish, with existing appointees, family
members, carers and other significant people in their life in making decisions;
and
(f)  assist the person to develop their own decision-making ability.
For the purposes of paragraph (e), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to include
existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or organisation
who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship of the person, or is
a person formally appointed to make decisions for the person.
Recommendation 4–6 Relevant Commonwealth legislation should include
the concept of a representative and provide for representative arrangements to be
established that reflect the National Decision-Making Principles.
Recommendation 4–7 A representative assists a person who requires
support to make decisions or, where necessary, makes decisions on their behalf and
may:
(a)  obtain and disclose personal and other information on behalf of the person, and
assist the person to understand information;
(b)  provide advice to the person about the decisions that might be made;
(c)  communicate the decisions; and
(d)  endeavour to ensure the decisions made are given effect.
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Recommendation 4–8 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks
should provide that representatives of persons who require decision-making support
must:
(a)  support the person to make decisions or make decisions on their behalf
reflecting their will and preferences;
(b)  where it is not possible to determine the will and preferences of the person,
determine what the person would likely want based on all the information
available;
(c)  where (a) and (b) are not possible, consider the person’s human rights relevant
to the situation;
(d)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural wellbeing
of the person;
(e)  act honestly, diligently and in good faith;
(f)  consult with existing appointees, family members, carers and other significant
people in their life in making decisions; and
(g) assist the person to develop their own decision-making ability.
For the purposes of paragraph (f), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to include
existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or organisation
who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship of the person, or is
a person formally appointed to make decisions for the person.
Recommendation 4–9 The appointment and conduct of representatives
should be subject to appropriate and effective safeguards.
Recommendation 4–10 The Australian and state and territory governments
should develop mechanisms for sharing information about appointments of supporters
and representatives, including to avoid duplication of appointments and to facilitate
review and monitoring.
Recommendation 4–11 The Australian Government should ensure that
persons who require decision-making support, and their supporters and representatives
are provided with information and guidance to enable them to understand their
functions and duties.
Recommendation 4–12 The Australian Government should ensure that
employees and contractors of Commonwealth agencies who engage with supporters
and representatives are provided with information, guidance and training in relation to
the roles of supporters and representatives.
5. The National Disability Insurance Scheme
Recommendation 5–1 The objects and principles in the National Disability
Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) should be amended to ensure consistency with the
National Decision-Making Principles.
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Recommendation 5–2 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013
(Cth) and NDIS Rules should be amended to include provisions dealing with
supporters consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
Recommendation 5–3 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013
(Cth) and NDIS Rules should be amended to include provisions dealing with
representatives consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
Recommendation 5–4 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013
(Cth) should be amended to incorporate provisions dealing with the process and factors
to be taken into account by the CEO of the National Disability Insurance Agency in
appointing representatives. These provisions should make it clear that the CEO’s
powers  are  to  be  exercised  as  a  measure  of  last  resort,  with  the  presumption  that  an
existing state or territory appointee will be appointed, and with particular regard to the
participant’s will, preferences and support networks.
Recommendation 5–5 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013
(Cth) should be amended to provide that, before exercising the power to appoint a
representative, the CEO of the National Disability Insurance Agency may make an
application to a state or territory guardianship or administration body for the
appointment of a person with comparable powers and responsibilities. The CEO may
then exercise the power to appoint that person as a representative under the NDIS Act.
6. Supporters and Representatives in Other Areas of
Commonwealth Law
Recommendation 6–1 The Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)
should be amended to include provisions dealing with supporters and representatives
consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
Recommendation 6–2 The Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) should be amended to
include provisions dealing with supporters and representatives consistent with the
Commonwealth decision-making model.
Recommendation 6–3 The Personally Controlled Electronic Health
Records Act 2012 (Cth) should be amended to include provisions dealing with
supporters and representatives consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making
model.
Recommendation 6–4 The Australian Information Commissioner should
develop guidelines consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model
describing the role of supporters and explaining how ‘APP entities’ should recognise
the role of supporters in assisting people to exercise their rights under the Privacy Act
1988 (Cth).
Recommendation 6–5 The Australian Bankers’ Association should
encourage banks to recognise supported decision-making. To this end, the ABA should
issue guidelines, reflecting the National Decision-Making Principles and recognising
that:
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(a)  customers should be presumed to have the ability to make decisions about
access to banking services;
(b)  customers may be capable of making and communicating decisions concerning
banking services, where they have access to necessary support;
(c)  customers are entitled to support in making and communicating decisions; and
(d)  banks should recognise supporters and respond to their requests, consistent with
other legal duties.
7. Access to Justice
Recommendation 7–1 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)  should  be  amended  to
provide that a person cannot stand trial if the person cannot be supported to:
(a)  understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make
in the course of the proceedings;
(b)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make decisions in the course of
the proceedings;
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; or
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way.
Recommendation 7–2 State and territory laws governing the consequences
of a determination that a person is ineligible to stand trial should provide for:
(a)  limits on the period of detention that can be imposed; and
(b)  regular periodic review of detention orders.
Recommendation 7–3 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth),
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth)
should provide that a person needs a litigation representative if the person cannot be
supported to:
(a)  understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make
in conducting proceedings, including in giving instructions to their legal
practitioner;
(b)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make those decisions;
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process; or
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way.
Recommendation 7–4 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth),
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth)
should provide that litigation representatives must:
(a)   support the person represented to express their will and preferences in making
decisions;
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(b)  where it is not possible to determine the will and preferences of the person,
determine what the person would likely want based on all the information
available;
(c)  where (a) and (b) are not possible, consider the person’s human rights relevant
to the situation; and
(d)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural wellbeing
of the person represented.
Recommendation 7–5 Federal courts should develop practice notes
explaining the duties that litigation representatives have to the person they represent
and to the court.
Recommendation 7–6 The Law Council of Australia should consider
whether the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules and Commentary should be amended
to provide for a new exception to solicitors’ duties of confidentiality where:
(a)  the solicitor reasonably believes the client is not capable of giving lawful, proper
and competent instructions; and
(b)  the disclosure is for the purpose of: assessing the client’s ability to give
instructions; obtaining assistance for the client in giving instructions; informing
the court about the client’s ability to instruct; or seeking the appointment of a
litigation representative.
Recommendation 7–7 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)  should  be  amended  to
provide that a person is not ‘competent to give evidence about a fact’ if the person
cannot be supported to:
(a)  understand a question about the fact; or
(b)  give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact.
Recommendation 7–8 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)  should  be  amended  to
provide that a person who is ‘competent to give evidence about a fact’ is not competent
to give sworn evidence if the person cannot understand that he or she is under an
obligation to give truthful evidence, and cannot be supported to understand.
Recommendation 7–9 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)  should  be  amended  to
provide that a witness who needs support is entitled to give evidence in any appropriate
way that enables them to understand questions and communicate answers.
Recommendation 7–10 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)  should  be  amended  to
provide that a witness who needs support has the right to have a support person present
while giving evidence, who may act as a communication assistant; assist the person
with any difficulty in giving evidence; or provide the person with other support.
Recommendation 7–11 Federal courts should develop bench books to
provide judicial officers with guidance about how courts may support persons with
disability in giving evidence.
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Recommendation 7–12 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should provide that a person is qualified to serve on a jury if, in the circumstances of
the trial for which that person is summonsed, the person can be supported to:
(a)  understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make
in the course of the proceedings and jury deliberations;
(b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make these decisions;
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the jury’s decision-making process; or
(d)  communicate the person’s decisions to the other members of the jury and to the
court.
Recommendation 7–13 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should be amended to provide that the trial judge may order that a communication
assistant be allowed to assist a juror to understand the proceedings and jury
deliberations.
Recommendation 7–14 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should be amended to provide that communication assistants, allowed by the trial judge
to assist a juror, should:
(a)   swear an oath or affirm to faithfully communicate the proceedings or jury
deliberations; and
(b)  be permitted in the jury room during deliberations without breaching jury
secrecy principles, providing they are subject to and comply with requirements
for the secrecy of jury deliberations.
Recommendation 7–15 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should provide for offences, in similar terms to those under ss 58AK and 58AL of the
Act, in relation to the soliciting by third parties of communication assistants for the
provision of information about the jury deliberations, and the disclosure of information
by communication assistants about the jury deliberations.
8. Restrictive Practices
Recommendation 8–1 The Australian Government and the Council of
Australian Governments should take the National Decision-Making Principles into
account in developing the national quality and safeguards system, which will regulate
restrictive practices in the context of the National Disability Insurance Scheme.
Recommendation 8–2 The Australian Government and the Council of
Australian Governments should develop a national approach to the regulation of
restrictive practices in sectors other than disability services, such as aged care and
health care.
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9. Electoral Matters
Recommendation 9–1 The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) should
be amended to repeal:
(a) s 93(8)(a), which provides that a person of ‘unsound mind’ who is ‘incapable
of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment or voting’ is not
entitled to have their name on the electoral roll or to vote in any Senate or
House of Representatives election; and
(b) s 118(4), which relates to objections to enrolment on the basis that a person
is of ‘unsound mind’.
Recommendation 9–2 State and territory governments should repeal
‘unsound mind’ provisions in their electoral legislation and make other changes
consistent with those recommended by the ALRC with respect to the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).
Recommendation 9–3 Section 245 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 (Cth) on compulsory voting should be amended to provide that it is a ‘valid and
sufficient reason’ for not voting if a person cannot:
(a)  understand information relevant to voting at the particular election;
(b)  retain that information for a sufficient period to make a voting decision;
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of voting; or
(d) communicate their vote in some way.
Recommendation 9–4 The Australian Electoral Commission should provide
Divisional Returning Officers with guidance and training, consistent with the National
Decision-Making Principles, to help them determine if a person with disability has a
valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote.
Recommendation 9–5 Section 234(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 (Cth) should be amended to provide that if any voter satisfies the presiding
officer that he or she is unable to vote without assistance, the presiding officer shall
permit a person chosen by the voter to assist them with voting.
Recommendation 9–6 The Australian Electoral Commission should provide
its officers with guidance and training, consistent with the National Decision-Making
Principles, to improve support in enrolment and voting for persons who require support
to vote.
Recommendation 9–7 The Australian Electoral Commission should
investigate methods of maintaining the secrecy of votes of persons who require support
to vote.
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10. Review of State and Territory Legislation
Recommendation 10–1 State and territory governments should review laws
and legal frameworks concerning individual decision-making to ensure they are
consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth
decision-making model. In conducting such a review, regard should also be given to:
(a)  interaction with any supporter and representative schemes under Commonwealth
legislation;
(b)  consistency between jurisdictions, including in terminology;
(c)  maximising cross-jurisdictional recognition of arrangements; and
(d)  mechanisms for consistent and national data collection.
Any review should include, but not be limited to, laws with respect to guardianship and
administration; consent to medical treatment; mental health; and disability services.
11. Other Issues
Recommendation 11–1 Sections 23(1)(iii) and 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the Marriage
Act 1961 (Cth) should be amended to remove the references to ‘being mentally
incapable’ and instead provide that ‘real consent’ is not given if ‘a party did not
understand the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony’.
Recommendation 11–2 The Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for
Marriage Celebrants should be amended to reflect the removal of the reference to
‘mental incapacity’ in the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and to provide further guidance on
determining whether or not a person can ‘understand the nature and effect of the
marriage ceremony’.
Recommendation 11–3 Sections 201F(2), 915B and 1292(7)(b) of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) should be amended to remove references to ‘mental
incapacity’, ‘being incapable, because of mental infirmity’ and ‘mental or physical
incapacity’. Instead, the provisions should state that a person is not eligible to act in the
roles of director, auditor or liquidator, or a financial services licence holder, if they
cannot be supported to:
(a)   understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make
in performing the role;
(b)   retain that information to the extent necessary to make those decisions;
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; or
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way.
Recommendation 11–4 The Australian Government should review and
replace provisions in Commonwealth legislation that require the termination of
statutory appointments by reason of a person’s ‘unsound mind’ or ‘mental incapacity’.
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Towards supported decision-making in Australia
1.1 This Inquiry is about ensuring people with disability have an equal right to make
decisions for themselves. It is about respecting people’s dignity, autonomy and
independence, while supporting them to make their own decisions, where such support
is needed. This reflects an important movement away from
viewing persons with disabilities as ‘objects’ of charity, medical treatment and social
protection towards viewing persons with disabilities as ‘subjects’ with rights, who are
capable of claiming those rights and making decisions for their lives based on their
free and informed consent as well as being active members of society.1
1.2 The Inquiry commenced in July 2013, the same month in which a pilot of the
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in Australia was initiated, representing
‘a new way of providing community linking and individualised support for people with
permanent and significant disability, their families and carers’.2 The objective of the
NDIS is to provide persons with disability with greater choice and control over the
disability services and support they receive.
1 United Nations Enable-Secretariat for the CRPD, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
<www.un.org/disabilities>.
2 Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, One Big Difference to
Lots of Lives: An Introduction to DisabilityCare Australia (2013) 3.
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1.3 The Terms of Reference required the Australian Law Reform Commission
(ALRC) to consider ‘how maximising individual autonomy and independence could be
modelled in Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks’.3 The ALRC considers this
can best be achieved by setting out principles and guidelines that can be used as a
template for specific reforms. These principles and guidelines can be applied to
Commonwealth and state and territory laws—in particular, guardianship and
administration laws.
National Decision-Making Principles
1.4 The ALRC recommends that the reform of relevant Commonwealth, state and
territory laws should be consistent with the following National Decision-Making
Principles:
Principle 1: The equal right to make decisions
All adults have an equal right to make decisions that affect their lives and to
have those decisions respected.
Principle 2: Support
Persons who require support in decision-making must be provided with access
to the support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in
decisions that affect their lives.
Principle 3: Will, preferences and rights
The will, preferences and rights of persons who may require decision-making
support must direct decisions that affect their lives.
Principle 4: Safeguards
Laws and legal frameworks must contain appropriate and effective safeguards in
relation to interventions for persons who may require decision-making support,
including to prevent abuse and undue influence.
1.5 These principles reflect the paradigm shift signalled in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) to recognise people with
disabilities as persons before the law and their right to make choices for themselves.
The emphasis is on the autonomy and independence of persons with disability who
may require support in making decisions—their will and preferences must drive
decisions that they make, and that others make on their behalf.
1.6 These four general principles reflect the key ideas and values upon which the
ALRC’s approach is based. They are drawn from the CRPD, other international
models, stakeholder submissions and the work of other bodies and individuals. They
are not prescriptive, and are of general application.
1.7 The principles are supported by three sets of guidelines. The principles and
guidelines are discussed in Chapter 3.
3 Terms of Reference (emphasis added).
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A Commonwealth decision-making model
1.8 To encourage supported decision-making at a Commonwealth level, the ALRC
recommends a new model (the Commonwealth decision-making model) based on the
positions of ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’. These terms are also part of building a
new lexicon for supported decision-making. The role of both supporters and
representatives is to assist persons who need decision-making support to make
decisions in relevant areas of Commonwealth law.
1.9 In Chapter 4, the ALRC makes recommendations about amending the objects or
principles provisions in relevant Commonwealth legislation; the appointment,
recognition, role and duties of supporters and representatives; and appropriate and
effective safeguards.
The National Disability Insurance Scheme
1.10 The NDIS represents a significant new area of Commonwealth responsibility
and expenditure with respect to persons with disability in Australia. In Chapter 5, the
ALRC recommends that the Commonwealth decision-making model be applied to the
NDIS, which already incorporates elements of supported decision-making. This will
require some amendment of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)
(NDIS Act) and Rules to provide for legal recognition of supporters and
representatives, including provisions for their appointment, removal and associated
safeguards.
1.11 The Chief Executive Officer of the National Disability Insurance Agency should
retain the power to appoint a ‘representative’ for a participant as a measure of last
resort. There are circumstances where the exercise of this power is necessary—in the
absence of a Commonwealth guardianship tribunal or equivalent body—to ensure that
persons with disability are properly supported in the relation to the NDIS.
1.12 There should be a presumption that an existing state or territory appointed
decision-maker with comparable powers and responsibilities should be appointed as an
NDIS representative, and amendments to the legislation governing state and territory
decision-makers may be necessary to facilitate this.
1.13 In the light of the shift towards a supported decision-making model, the ALRC
also recommends that the Australian Government provide guidance and training in
relation to decision-making and the NDIS.
Supporters and representatives in other areas of Commonwealth law
1.14 The Commonwealth decision-making model may also be applied to other
existing legislative schemes in Commonwealth laws that already contain a decision-
making mechanism or make some provision for supporters and representatives—
however described.
1.15 As discussed in Chapter 6, these schemes concern individual decision-making in
relation to social security, under the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth);
aged care, under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth); and eHealth records, under the
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth).
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1.16 The model might also be applied to individual decision-making in relation to
personal information under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the provision of banking
services.
1.17 In some of these areas, legislation should be amended to include provisions
dealing with supporters and representatives consistent with the Commonwealth
decision-making model. However, any reform needs to be proportionate to the
situation, and to the role of the supporter or representative. In relation to privacy and
banking, the ALRC recommends new guidelines to encourage supported decision-
making, rather than legislation.
1.18 One overarching issue is the interaction between Commonwealth decision-
making schemes and state and territory appointed decision-makers. In each area, the
interaction of Commonwealth supporters and representatives with state and territory
appointed decision-makers will have to be considered.
Access to justice
1.19 Chapter 7 deals with issues concerning decision-making and access to justice.
There are a range of Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks affecting persons with
disability involved in court proceedings, including as:
· defendants in criminal proceedings—the concept of unfitness to stand trial;
· parties to civil proceedings—the appointment and role of litigation
representatives;
· witnesses in criminal or civil proceedings—giving evidence as a witness, and
consenting to the taking of forensic samples; and
· potential jurors—qualification for jury service.
1.20 In each of these areas there are existing tests of a person’s capacity to exercise
legal rights or to participate in legal processes. The ALRC recommends that these tests
be reformed consistently with the National Decision-Making Principles. By providing
models in Commonwealth laws, the ALRC seeks to inform and provide a catalyst for
reform of state and territory laws.
1.21 An important theme is the tension between laws that are intended to operate in a
‘protective’ manner—for example, in order to ensure a fair trial—and increasing
demands for equal participation, in legal processes, of persons who require decision-
making support.
Restrictive practices
1.22 The term ‘restrictive practices’ refers to the use of interventions that have the
effect of restricting the rights or freedom of movement of a person in order to protect
them. Serious concerns have been expressed about inappropriate and under-regulated
use of restrictive practices in a range of settings in Australia.
1.23 Current regulation of restrictive practices occurs mainly at a state and territory
level. However, the Commonwealth, state and territory disability ministers endorsed
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the National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive Practices
in the Disability Service Sector (National Framework) in March 2014 to forge a
consistent national approach.
1.24 As discussed in Chapter 8, the National Framework is intended to reduce the use
of restrictive practices, including by informing the development of the NDIS quality
assurance and safeguards system. The ALRC recommends that the Australian
Government and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) incorporate aspects
of the National Decision-Making Principles in developing the NDIS system.
1.25 The ALRC also recommends that the Australian Government and COAG adopt
a similar, national approach to the regulation of restrictive practices in other relevant
sectors such as aged care and health care.
Electoral matters
1.26 Australia is obliged, under the CRPD, to guarantee that persons with disability
can ‘effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with
others, directly or through freely chosen representatives’, including the right and
opportunity to vote and be elected.4
1.27 In Chapter 9, the ALRC recommends that the ‘unsound mind’ provisions of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (the Electoral Act), which relate to
disqualification for enrolment and voting, be repealed. A new exemption to
compulsory voting based on a functional test consistent with the National Decision-
Making Principles should be enacted, so that a person who lacks decision-making
ability relating to voting is exempt from penalties arising from a failure to vote.
1.28 Where a person with disability requires assistance to vote, they should be
supported by all available means. The ALRC recommends that current provisions of
the Electoral Act concerning permissible support be broadened, and that the Australian
Electoral Commission (AEC) provide its officers with guidance and training to
improve support in enrolment and voting for persons with disability. As the right to a
secret vote is fundamental to the right to vote, but may be compromised by some forms
of support, the AEC should also investigate methods of maintaining the secrecy of
voting.
Review of state and territory legislation
1.29 This new approach to individual decision-making at the Commonwealth level
can also be used to guide law reform at the state and territory level. Reform at the state
and territory level is critical to the implementation of the CRPD because many
important areas of decision-making are governed by state and territory law—including
in relation to guardianship and administration, consent to medical treatment, mental
health and disability services.
4 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 29.
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1.30 The ALRC recommends that state and territory governments review their
legislation that deals with decision-making to ensure laws are consistent with the
National Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.
In Chapter 10, the ALRC discusses how, in conducting such a review, regard should be
given to:
· interaction with any supporter and representative schemes under Commonwealth
legislation;
· consistency between jurisdictions, including in terminology;
· maximising cross-jurisdictional recognition of arrangements; and
· mechanisms for consistent and national data collection.
Other issues
1.31 Chapter 11 deals with a number of other issues raised that are relevant to
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks that concern the exercise of legal capacity,
including in relation to:
· the common law relating to incapacity to contract;
· consumer protection laws;
· consent to marriage;
· the nomination of superannuation beneficiaries;
· acting in the role of a board member and in other corporate roles; and
· holding public office.
1.32 The ALRC recommends amendments to the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and
associated guidelines for marriage celebrants, and some provisions of the Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) to better reflect the National Decision-Making Principles. It also
recommends that the Australian Government should review and replace provisions in
Commonwealth legislation that require the termination of statutory appointments by
reason of a person’s ‘unsound mind’ or ‘mental incapacity’.
The law reform process
1.33 Law reform recommendations cannot be based upon assertion or assumption and
need to be built on an appropriate conceptual framework and evidence base.
Framing principles
1.34 The ALRC identified five framing principles for guiding the recommendations
for reform in this Inquiry: dignity; equality; autonomy; inclusion and participation; and
accountability. There was wide support by stakeholders for these principles, which are
reflected in the decision-making model that is developed in the Report.
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1.35 Dignity is one of the guiding principles of the CRPD5 and  is  recognised  in  a
number of other international human rights instruments.6 In Australia, the National
Disability Strategy (NDS) prioritised the concept of dignity in its principles.7 Similarly,
the Productivity Commission identified human dignity as ‘an inherent right’ of persons
with disability and suggested that dignity as a human being is linked to self-
determination, decision-making and choice.8
1.36 Equality is at the heart of the CRPD. The United Nations Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities stated that: ‘Equality before the law is a basic and
general principle of human rights protection and is indispensable for the exercise of
other human rights’.9 Similarly, art 5 prohibits all discrimination on the basis of
disability and requires States to promote equality, and arts 6 and 7 emphasise equality
for women and children. The NDS principles emphasise equality of opportunity, 10 and
a range of Commonwealth laws also protect the equality of people and proscribe
discrimination on the basis of disability—for example, the Disability Discrimination
Act 1992 (Cth).
1.37 Autonomy is a significant principle underlying the ability of persons with
disability to exercise legal capacity. It is enshrined in the general principles of the
CRPD and is a key principle of the NDS.11 The objects and principles of the NDIS also
reflect the notion of autonomy.12 This Inquiry has been informed by autonomy in the
sense of ‘empowerment’, not just ‘non-interference’.13 This  involves  seeing  an
individual in relation to others, in a ‘relational’ or ‘social’ sense, 14 and understanding
that connects with respect for the family as the ‘natural and fundamental group unit of
society’ that is entitled to protection by States Parties.15 Such a view sits comfortably
with a shift in emphasis towards supported decision-making, which ‘acknowledges that
5 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 3(a).
6 See, eg, Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  GA Res 217A (III),  UN GAOR, 3rd Sess, 183rd Plen
Mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened
for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 3 January 1976).
7 Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 22.
8 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)’ (30 Vol 1, 2004)
182.
9 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [1].
10 Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 22.
11 Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 22.
12 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 3, 4.
13 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 269–272. Donnelly draws, for example, on the work of
Joseph Raz, eg Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, 1986). See her discussion
particularly in ch 1, ‘Autonomy: Variations on a Principle’.
14 John Christman, ‘Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves’
(2004) 117 Philosophical Studies 143, 143.
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171
(entered into force 23 March 1976) art 23(1); Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for
Persons with Disabilities,  GA  Res  48,  UN  GAOR,  3rd  Comm,  48th  Sess,  Agenda  Item  109,  UN  Doc
A/RES/48/96 (20 December 1993) r 9.
30 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
individuals rely to a greater or lesser extent on others to help them make and give
effect to decisions’.16
1.38 Closely related to the principles of dignity and equality, the principles of
inclusion and participation are central to many contemporary perspectives on
disability, particularly a social model of disability. The social model emphasises that,
while ‘a person might have an impairment, their disability comes from the way society
treats them, or fails to support them’.17 Inclusion and participation are active values,
consistent with an approach to autonomy as empowerment. An emphasis on inclusion
has important consequences for education, workforce participation and economic
security, as people with disability are seen as ‘citizens with rights, not objects of
charity’.18 Further, one of the objects of the NDIS Act is to facilitate greater
community inclusion of people with a disability.19 The focus on supported decision-
making developed throughout the Report reflects the principle of inclusion and
participation.
1.39 The principle of accountability has a number of key components. The first is
the need for systemic and specific accountability mechanisms and safeguards.
‘Supporters’ who fulfil a supportive role in decision-making must be properly
accountable, as well as those who are appointed to make decisions on a person’s
behalf. Another important component is the accountability and responsibility of
persons with disability for their decisions, recognising that active participation involves
both responsibilities and risks.20
Building an evidence base
1.40 A major aspect of building the evidence base to support the formulation of
ALRC recommendations for reform is consultation, acknowledging that widespread
community consultation is a hallmark of best practice law reform.21 Under the
provisions of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth), the ALRC ‘may
inform itself in any way it thinks fit’ for the purposes of reviewing or considering
anything that is the subject of an inquiry.22
1.41 The process for each law reform project may differ according to the scope of the
inquiry, the range of stakeholders, the complexity of the laws under review, and the
period of time allotted for the inquiry. For each inquiry the ALRC determines a
consultation strategy in response to its particular subject matter and likely stakeholder
interest groups. The nature and extent of this engagement is normally determined by
the subject matter of the reference and the timeframe in which the inquiry must be
16 Piers Gooding, ‘Supported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for
Mental Health Law’ (2013) 20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 431, 435.
17 Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’ (July 2011) 54 Vol 1, 98.
18 Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 16.
19 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 3.
20 Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68.
21 B Opeskin, ‘Measuring Success’ in B Opeskin and D Weisbrot (eds), The Promise of Law Reform (2005),
202.
22 Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) s 38.
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completed under the Terms of Reference. While the exact procedure is tailored to suit
each inquiry, the ALRC usually works within an established framework, outlined on
the ALRC’s website.23
Community consultation
1.42 A multi-pronged strategy of seeking community comments was used. Two
consultation documents were released to facilitate focused consultations in stages
through the Inquiry. An Issues Paper was released on 15 November 2013 and a
Discussion paper on 22 May 2014.24
1.43 The Discussion Paper put forward 56 proposals and 16 questions to assist the
ALRC to develop its recommendations for reform. Both consultation papers and this
final Report were also released in an Easy English format.25
1.44 Two national rounds of stakeholder consultation teleconferences, meetings,
forums and roundtables were also conducted following the release of each of the
consultation documents.
1.45 The Terms of Reference for this Inquiry directed the ALRC to consult with
relevant stakeholders, particularly persons with disability and their representative,
advocacy and legal organisations, but also families and carers of people with disability,
relevant Commonwealth, states and territory departments and agencies, the Australian
Human Rights Commission, and other key non-government stakeholders. The many
individuals, departments, agencies and organisations consulted in the Inquiry are listed
at the end of the Report.
1.46 The ALRC received 156 submissions, a full list of which appears at the end of
the Report. Submissions were received from a wide range of people and agencies,
including: bodies representing persons with disability; courts; public guardians and
advocates; individuals; academics; lawyers; community legal centres; law societies and
representative groups; and Commonwealth and state government agencies.
1.47 The ALRC acknowledges the contribution of all those who participated in the
Inquiry consultation rounds and the considerable amount of work involved in preparing
submissions. This can have a significant impact in organisations with limited resources.
It is the invaluable work of participants that enriches the whole consultative process
and the ALRC records its deep appreciation for this contribution.
Appointed experts
1.48 In addition to the contribution of expertise by way of consultations and
submissions, specific expertise is also obtained in ALRC inquiries through the
establishment of Advisory Committees, panels, roundtables and the appointment by the
23 <www.alrc.gov.au/law-reform-process>.
24 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, Issues
Paper No 44 (2013) 41; Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in
Commonwealth Laws, Discussion Paper No 81 (2014).
25 Easy English is an accessible format that uses simple, everyday language and illustrations for people with
low English literacy.
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Attorney-General of part-time Commissioners. The Advisory Committee for this
Inquiry had 11 members, listed at the beginning of the Report. Two meetings were held
in Sydney on 3 October 2013 and 8 April 2014.
1.49 In this Inquiry the ALRC was able to call upon the expertise and experience of
Graeme Innes AM, Disability Discrimination Commissioner, who was appointed as a
part-time Commissioner specifically to assist the ALRC in this Inquiry. The Hon
Justice Berna Collier of the Federal Court of Australia contributed her experience as a
part-time Commissioner until October 2013 and thereafter on the Advisory Committee
for the Inquiry.
1.50 While the ultimate responsibility in each inquiry remains with the
Commissioners of the ALRC, the establishment of a group of experts as an Advisory
Committee, panel or roundtable and the enlisting of expert readers are invaluable
aspects of ALRC inquiries. These experts assist in the identification of key issues,
providing quality assurance in the research and consultation effort, and assisting with
the development of reform proposals. The ALRC acknowledges the significant
contribution made by the Advisory Committee in this Inquiry and expresses its
gratitude to them for voluntarily providing their time and expertise.
Implementation
1.51 Once tabled in the Australian Parliament, the Report becomes a public
document.26 ALRC reports are not self-executing documents. The ALRC is an advisory
body and provides recommendations about the best way to proceed—but
implementation is a matter for others. However, the ALRC has a strong track record of
having its advice followed. The Annual Report 2012–2013 records that 61% of ALRC
reports are substantially implemented and 28% are partially implemented, representing
an overall implementation rate of 89%.27
1.52 Quite apart from such statistics, an assessment of the contribution that law
reform work makes must have a long view. Law reform inquiries have a far bigger
impact than just the implementation of recommendations, some of which may occur
shortly  after  a  report  is  released,  some  many  years  later.  But  whether  or  not
recommendations are implemented, ALRC reports provide enormous value. Each
ALRC report provides not only a mapping of law as at a particular moment in time, but
in reviewing the submissions and consultations the reports also provide a snapshot of
opinion on the issues being considered—providing a considerable contribution to legal
history, and increasingly locating that within its particular social context at a given
time In making a submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, when the Committee conducted an inquiry into the ALRC over
26 The Attorney-General is required to table the report within 15 sitting days of receiving it: Australian Law
Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) s 23.
27 Australian Law Reform Commission, Annual Report 2011–2012 (ALRC Report 121), 24 and see
Appendix F.
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the summer of 2010–2011,28 the Federal Court of Australia said that the Court benefits
greatly from ALRC reports:
More  often  than  not,  an  ALRC  report  contains  the  best  statement  or  source  of  the
current law on a complex and contentious topic that can remain the case for decades
thereafter, whether or not the ALRC’s recommendations are subsequently
implemented.29
Outcomes
1.53 Australia was an active participant and leader in the development of the CRPD,
contributing greatly to the negotiations of the text of the Convention. Australia was
also one of the original signatories when it opened for signature on 30 March 2007.
1.54 The adoption by the Australian Government of the National Decision-Making
Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model set out in the Report will
provide the impetus for further reform of laws nationally to promote better compliance
with the CRPD.
1.55 The most difficult policy challenges in this area concern those who require the
most  support.  Where  a  person’s  will  and  preferences  are  difficult,  or  impossible  to
determine, they may need someone else to make decisions on their behalf. These hard
cases should not, however, be treated as a barrier to building law and legal frameworks
that move towards supported decision-making in practice, as well as in form.
1.56 Recent reviews and amendment of state and territory guardianship and
administration laws provide important directions for reform. In the Report, the ALRC
puts forward a model to encourage supported decision-making under Commonwealth
laws and to provide the catalyst towards further initiatives at the state and territory
level.
1.57 In adopting the model and leading its implementation federally, the Australian
Government can maintain its leadership in championing and implementing reforms for
persons with disability, ensuring their equal recognition before the law in accordance
with art 12 of the CRPD.
28 See the inquiry report: Australian Parliament, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References
Committee, Inquiry into the Australian Law Reform Commission (8 April 2011),
<www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Compl
eted%inquiries/2010-13/lawreformcommission>.
29 Ibid, Submission 22.

2. Conceptual Landscape—the Context for
Reform
Contents
Summary 35
International context 36
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 36
Other international instruments 39
Key concepts 40
The challenge of language 40
Definitions of disability 42
Recognition as ‘persons’ 42
‘Equal recognition’ 43
Legal capacity 44
Supported and substitute decision-making 47
The emergence of ‘substitute’ decision-making 49
Shift towards supported decision-making 51
Substitute decision-making and the CRPD 52
Implications for law reform 56
Summary
2.1 This chapter discusses the principles, language and theory behind debates about
decision-making processes that concern persons with disability. The ALRC considers
international human rights law and key concepts in the literature concerning disability
and issues of ‘capacity’. This provides the conceptual background to the ALRC’s
recommendations in this Report.
2.2 The ‘paradigm shift’ in approaches to persons with disability is discussed,
outlining the transition from ‘best interests’ approaches to ones that emphasise the will
and preferences of the individual in models of ‘supported’ decision-making. The
tensions around the meaning and application of art 12 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities1 (CRPD) are analysed in the
light of the historical development of decision-making models for people who may
require decision-making support. The ALRC identifies significant conceptual
confusion that is affecting the development of a focus on support and the
1 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
36 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
acknowledgement of the need, at times, for a person to act on behalf of another—
particularly in relation to what is called ‘substitute’ decision-making. In this context,
Australia’s Interpretative Declaration in relation to art 12 is considered.
2.3 The chapter concludes by summarising the implications for the paradigm shift
towards supported decision-making. This provides a prelude to Chapter 3, where the
ALRC sets out National Decision-Making Principles as the basis for modelling
supported decision-making in Commonwealth laws.
International context
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
2.4 The CRPD was the first binding international human rights instrument to
explicitly address disability. Australia was an active participant and leader in its
development, contributing greatly to the negotiations of the text of the Convention.2
Australia was also one of the original signatories when it opened for signature on 30
March 2007.3 Australia ratified the CRPD in July 2008 and the Optional Protocol in
2009. The CRPD entered into force for Australia on 16 August 2008,4 and the Optional
Protocol in 2009.5 The CRPD consolidates existing international human rights
obligations and clarifies their application to persons with disabilities.6 It does not create
new rights.
2.5 In addition to the general principles and obligations contained in the CRPD, 7 it
is art 12, ‘Equal recognition before the law’, that is of central importance in this
Inquiry. It underpins the ability of persons with disability to achieve many of the other
rights in the Convention. It recognises the right of persons with disability to enjoy legal
capacity ‘on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’ and contains five
paragraphs:
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition
everywhere as persons before the law.
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on
an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.
2 Evidence to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Hansard, Parliament of Australia, 16 June 2008, 3
(Peter Arnaudo).
3 Prior to the CRPD there were a number of non-binding standards specifically related to disability. See,
eg: Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, GA Res 2856, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 26th
Sess, UN Doc A/RES/2856 (20 December 1971); Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, GA Res
3447, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 30th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/3447 (9 December 1975); Standard Rules on
the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 48, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 48th
Sess, Agenda Item 109, UN Doc A/RES/48/96 (20 December 1993).
4 The CRPD entered into force on 3 May 2008, on receipt of its 20th ratification.
5 The Optional Protocol to the CRPD allows for the making of individual complaints to the Committee
about violations of the CRPD by States Parties.
6 Such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December
1966, UNTS171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
7 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) arts 3, 4.
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3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal
capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in
accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that
measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and
preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are
proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time
possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial
authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which
such measures affect the person’s rights and interests.
5. Subject to the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take all appropriate and
effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or
inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to have equal access to bank
loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit, and shall ensure that persons
with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.8
2.6 By ratifying the CRPD, Australia accepted the obligations to recognise that
persons with disability enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects
of life, and to take appropriate measures to provide persons with disability access to the
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.
2.7 Such international instruments do not become part of Australian law until
incorporated into domestic law by statute.9 However,  as  noted  by  the  High  Court  in
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, a convention can still assist with
the interpretation of domestic law:
The provisions of an international convention to which Australia is a party, especially
one which declares universal fundamental rights, may be used by the courts as a
legitimate guide in developing the common law. But the courts should act in this
fashion with due circumspection when the Parliament itself has not seen fit to
incorporate the provisions of a convention into our domestic law.10
2.8 Even when an international convention has been incorporated into domestic law,
its beneficial impact cannot be assumed. Adam Johnston observed that ‘the level of
adherence and/or enforcement can rely on many factors’:
The first of these can be political willingness, reflected in the resourcing of relevant
agencies. Domestic cultural norms can be important and the broad terms of many
conventions can leave much up to an individual reader’s interpretation as to what an
Article requires. Judicial views, the lobbying of interest groups and the public
credibility of international institutions can also play their part.11
8 Ibid art 12.
9 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286–8, 315. See also Kioa v
West (1985) 159 CLR 550.
10 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 288.
11 A Johnston, Submission 12.
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2.9 An  added  complexity  with  respect  to  the  implementation  of  the  CRPD  in
Australia is that guardianship and administration issues rest in state and territory law.
As the ACT Disability, Aged and Carer Advocacy Service (ADACAS) observed:
The realities of the Australian federal system are going to create significant challenges
for reform, particularly in the nexus between Commonwealth and state law.12
2.10 While implementation is clearly a multifaceted challenge, a document like the
CRPD can both reflect and propel shifts in thinking. Family Planning NSW
commented that the CRPD is ‘a powerful statement of what Australia and the world
believe are the fundamental rights of people with disability’;13 and ADACAS said that
the CRPD ‘represents a cultural, identity and legal shift’.14
2.11 The CRPD reflects a ‘social’ model of disability, which describes disability in
terms of the interaction between a person’s disability and the external world. As the
Preamble of the CRPD states:
Disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and
attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation
in society on an equal basis with others.15
2.12 Such an approach is in contrast to a ‘medical’ approach, in which a diagnosis or
categorisation of condition leads to particular consequences for individuals—for
example, the imposition of guardianship.16
2.13 The Office of the Public Advocate (Qld) said that the CRPD incorporates ‘a
contemporary approach to disability’:
· recognising that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from
the interaction between people with impairments and their surroundings as a
result of attitudinal and environmental barriers;
· the right and capacity of people with disability to make valued contributions to
their communities; and
· recognising that all categories of rights apply to people with disability, who
should therefore be supported to exercise those rights.17
2.14 As Professor Gwynnyth Llewellyn of the Centre for Disability Research and
Policy, University of Sydney, submitted: ‘defining disability as an interaction means
that “disability” is not an attribute of the person’.18
12 ADACAS, Submission 108.
13 Family Planning NSW, Submission 04.
14 ADACAS, Submission 29.
15 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) Preamble.
16 Terry Carney, ‘Guardianship, “Social” Citizenship and Theorising Substitute Decision-Making Law’ in
Israel Doron and Ann M Soden (eds), Beyond Elder Law (Springer,  2012)  1.  See  also  World  Health
Organisation and World Bank, ‘World Report on Disability’ (2011) 3–4; Piers Gooding, ‘Supported
Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for Mental Health Law’
(2013) 20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 431, n 3.
17 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
18 G Llewellyn, Submission 82.
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2.15 In addition to the general principles and obligations contained in the CRPD, 19
art 12 underpins the ability of persons with disability to achieve many of the other
rights under the Convention. It recognises the right of persons with disability to enjoy
legal capacity ‘on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’.20 Article 12 was of
central importance to this Inquiry.
2.16 By ratifying the CRPD, Australia accepted the obligation to recognise that
persons with disability enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects
of life and to take appropriate measures to provide persons with disability access to the
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. The CRPD also requires
that all measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and
effective safeguards to prevent abuse.21
Other international instruments
2.17 In addition to the CRPD, there are other international instruments of relevance
to this Inquiry. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the inherent
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all people and sets as a common
standard the protection of these rights by the rule of law.22 While the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) makes no specific reference to persons
with disability, it enshrines rights to life, physical integrity, liberty and security of the
person, equality before the law and non-discrimination.23 In addition, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights protects the right to work, social
security, family life, health, education and participation in cultural life;24 and  the
Convention on the Rights of the Child refers specifically to disability.25
2.18 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment (CAT)26 may also be relevant, as there have been suggestions that the use of
restrictive practices with respect to persons with disability might contravene the
CAT.27
19 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) arts 3, 4.
20 Ibid art 12.
21 Ibid art 12(4).
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess, 183rd Plen Mtg, UN
Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). As a non-binding declaration it does not have the same force as a
Convention, but forms part of the broader international human rights backdrop to this Inquiry.
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171
(entered into force 23 March 1976).
24 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).
25 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 2 September 1990) art 2.
26 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened
for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).
27 Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 63rd Sess, UN Doc A/63/175 (28 July 2008) 9.
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2.19 There are also a number of international instruments that specifically protect the
rights of women28 and Indigenous peoples,29 which are of relevance in considering
intersectional discrimination. All of these instruments are reflected in the articles of the
CRPD.
Key concepts
The challenge of language
2.20 This Inquiry tackled issues of great significance which contribute to the framing
of legal policy responses for persons with disability. The ALRC recognises the
importance of carefully defining terms and clarifying how certain concepts are being
described. The language concerning disability has shifted significantly over time, for
example:
· the distinction between ‘lunatics’ and ‘idiots’ in William Blackstone’s day in the
mid-18th century—‘[a]n idiot, or natural fool, is one that hath had no
understanding from his nativity’ and ‘[a] lunatic, or non compos mentis, is
one who hath had understanding, but by disease, grief, or other accident hath
lost the use of his reasons’;30
· the language of ‘unsound mind’ of the early 20th century, as evident for
example in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth);31
· the use of the terms ‘mentally retarded persons’ and ‘disabled persons’ in United
Nations Declarations of 1971 and 1975;32 and
· ‘persons with disabilities’ in the CRPD in 2007.
2.21 The legal historian Dr John Bennett remarked that ‘[f]or many centuries ... the
law of lunacy was regulated by principles and nomenclature of the Middle Ages’.33 As
words have become associated with negative connotations, or used pejoratively, a new
28 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature
18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981).
29 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg,
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007).
30 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) vol 1, 292, 294. ‘Lunatic’ was
derived from the Latin ‘luna’ or moon. As Louise Harmon explains, it embodied the idea that ‘like the
moon, the insanity of the lunatic waxed and waned. Even a lunatic who appeared permanently insane was
presumed potentially curable. He had once lived his life on equal mental footing with others, and there
was always that glimmer of hope that he would do so again’: Louise Harmon, ‘Falling off the Vine: Legal
Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment’ [1990] Yale Law Journal 1, 16.
31 For the historical background see, eg, R Croucher, ‘“An Interventionist, Paternalistic Jurisdiction”? The
Place of Statutory Wills in Australian Succession Law’ (2009) 32 University of New South Wales Law
Journal 674.
32 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, GA Res 2856, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 26th
Sess, UN Doc A/RES/2856 (20 December 1971); Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, GA Res
3447, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 30th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/3447 (9 December 1975).
33 John Bennett, A History of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Law Book Co, 1974) 125.
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lexicon has been developed.34 In its 1989 report, Guardianship and Management of
Property, the ALRC commented that
There is a problem of language when dealing with people with disabilities. Some
expressions which used to be common are no longer used by those working in the
field because they are regarded as having connotations which tend to lower the dignity
of people with disabilities.35
2.22 The ALRC therefore took an approach in that report which was to adopt usages
‘current among people who are disabled and those who work with them’.36
2.23 The present Inquiry takes place 25 years later and the language has shifted
further in the intervening years. In this Inquiry, the ALRC seeks to frame concepts and
choose terms in ways that reflect the framing principles—in particular that of ‘dignity’.
Consistent with the approach identified by the ALRC in 1989, words and terms should
not be used that tend to lower the dignity of people with disabilities. Even where terms
have an established usage,37 the ALRC considers that the development of a new
lexicon serves to signal the paradigm shift reflected in the CRPD—the purpose of
which is to ‘promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote
respect for their inherent dignity’.38 This Inquiry provided an opportunity to contribute
to that process.39 In  particular,  the  ALRC seeks  to  place  the  emphasis  in  law,  and  in
language, on support.
2.24 The ALRC acknowledges, however, that changes in language, as in law, of
themselves, do not effect change:
Changing laws and implementing new policies regarding legal capacity is only the
first step in realising the right to equal recognition before the law for people with
disability.40
2.25 What is needed is a shift in understanding and commitment—or as some express
it,  a  change  in  ‘culture’.  Such  a  view is  summed up  in  the  comments  by  ADACAS,
which said:
ADACAS fully supports the belief that effective change management requires the
development of a new lexicon, and the use of terminology such as fully supported
decision making contributes to that goal. Of course, there is a risk associated with a
sudden departure from traditional terminology. It may cause confusion at a time when
more onerous demands are possibly going to be imposed on supporters. We recognize
34 A similar shift is evident in relation to the terms applying to children born out of wedlock: from
‘bastards’, to ‘illegitimate’ to ‘ex-nuptial’.
35 Australian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship and Management of Property, Report No 52 (1989)
[1.3].
36 Ibid.
37 In the 1989 report the ALRC gave the following example: ‘The problem is complicated by the fact that
the medical profession has adopted some words as having reasonably precise meanings but the same
words are used differently by non-medical people or are regarded as inappropriate’: Ibid.
38 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 1.
39 Support for this approach is evident in, eg, ADACAS, Submission 29.
40 PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 136.
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that there are implementation issues, but it lays within the power of legislative drafters
to mitigate these impacts, possibly through the staged introduction of new
requirements. More importantly, a change of culture will not happen simply because
legislation is enacted. Intentional community development activities will need to be
undertaken to support the broad community to make the change to viewing people
with cognitive impairments as having capacity and being valid decision makers.41
Definitions of disability
2.26 ‘Disability’ may be defined in different ways and for different purposes.
Approaches to defining disability have also shifted over time—particularly from the
medical to a social approach. The CRPD does not include detailed definitions of
‘disability’ or ‘persons with disabilities’ in its definition section. Rather, art 1 states
that
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
2.27 For the purposes of this Inquiry, the ALRC is taking a broad encompassing
approach to definitions of disability, as reflected in the CRPD.42 This definition
includes: sensory, neurological, physical, intellectual, cognitive and psychosocial
disability.
2.28 The social approach to disability, reflected in the CRPD, requires a policy focus
on the person and their ability, with the support they require to interact with society
and their environment—placing the policy emphasis not on ‘impairment’ but on
‘support’. This approach informs the supported decision-making focus of the ALRC’s
recommendations in this Report.
Recognition as ‘persons’
2.29 The Terms of Reference require a consideration of the recognition of people
with disability ‘as persons before the law’.43 This  language  reflects  art  12(1)  of  the
CRPD, that ‘States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to
recognition everywhere as persons before the law’.
2.30 To be recognised ‘as persons’ is the first question in any consideration of legal
capacity. Historically, certain people have been denied recognition of their ability to
act in law, or to have ‘legal standing’, at all.44 Professor Bernadette McSherry explains
that,
at various times in different societies, certain groups have been viewed as not having
legal ‘personhood’ or standing. The extinction or suspension of legal standing,
41 ADACAS, Submission 108. See also PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 136.
42 Other definitions may be found in, eg, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Disability, Australia, 2009, Cat No
4446.0 (2011); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4(1).
43 The Terms of Reference are set out in full on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>.
44 For  example,  the  early  laws  of  marriage  in  the  common  law  treated  the  husband  and  wife  as  one:  the
wife’s legal personality merged with that of her husband. When the Statute of Wills 1540 granted the
power to devise real estate, an explanatory statute was passed in 1542 to clarify that this power did not
extend to married women; nor to infants and ‘lunatics’.
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sometimes referred to as ‘civil death’, was once seen as a necessary consequence of
conviction. Similarly, women, children under the age of majority and those with
mental and intellectual impairments have been and continue to be viewed in some
societies as not having legal standing.45
2.31 The shift in language from ‘disabled persons’ to persons or people ‘with
disability’ reflects an emphasis on personhood, rather than disability. It also reflects a
social model of disability.
2.32 In its General Comment on art 12 the United Nations Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) emphasised that ‘there are no circumstances
permissible under international human rights law in which a person may be deprived of
the right to recognition as a person before the law, or in which this right may be
limited’.46 In this Report, the ALRC recommends a model that emphasises ability and
support to exercise legal agency, consistent with a full recognition of personhood.
‘Equal recognition’
2.33 The Terms of Reference state that, for the purposes of this Inquiry, equal
recognition before the law and legal capacity are to be understood as they are used in
the CRPD, ‘including to refer to the rights of people with disability to make decisions
and act on their own behalf’. The concept of equality therefore emphasises independent
decision-making by persons with disability.
2.34 Professor Terry Carney stated that equality, in the sense used in art 12, ‘can be
variously formulated’:
It can be expressed as a purely formal concept (ie an ‘opportunity’) or in more
substantive terms, as an achievement of distributive equity. It can be conceived as a
universal right of citizenship for all, or as a special standard for particular groups
(such as the disabled aged). And it also raises notoriously complex issues about
respect for diversity and the right to make poor choices (the so-called ‘dignity of
risk’).47
2.35 The UNCRPD emphasised that the idea of equality reflected in art 12 is
essentially about the exercise of human rights: ‘[e]quality before the law is a basic and
general principle of human rights protection and is indispensable for the exercise of
other human rights’.48 Rather than providing additional rights, art 12 of the CRPD
‘simply describes the specific elements required to ensure the right to equality before
the law for people with disabilities on an equal basis with others’.49
45 McSherry, Bernadette, ‘Legal Capacity under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’
(2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 22, 23.
46 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [5].
47 Terry Carney, above n 16, 3. See also Terry Carney, ‘Participation and Service Access Rights for People
with Intellectual Disability: A Role for Law?’ (2013) 38 Journal of Intellectual and Developmental
Disability 59, 66.
48 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [1].
49 Ibid.
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2.36 The key element in equal recognition, as understood in the CRPD and the
discourse that has developed around it, is the embracing of a supported decision-
making paradigm so that persons with disability are acknowledged as having the right
to make decisions on an equal basis with others and are supported in exercising that
right. The linking of support with equality was made in some submissions. For
example, Hobsons Bay City Council said that
equality should also recognise that in some instances people with disabilities need to
be treated with equity in order to create equality. For example, needing additional
assistance with some elements of the law in order to fully participate.50
Legal capacity
2.37 Article 12(2) of the CRPD provides that ‘States Parties shall recognize that
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all
aspects of life’.
2.38 Capacity in a general sense refers to decision-making ability. Decisions may
cover a wide range of choices in everyday life. They may relate to personal matters,
financial and property matters, and health and medical decisions. The concept of legal
capacity in the CRPD contains two aspects: ‘legal standing’ and ‘legal agency’. Legal
standing is the ability to hold rights and duties—to be recognised as legal persons.
Legal agency is the ability to exercise these rights and duties to perform acts with legal
effects. Dr Mary Donnelly commented that
A presumption of agency underlies the liberal conception of autonomy. Our choices
are autonomous because they are, in a fundamental sense, our choices.51
2.39 The UNCRPD explains that ‘legal capacity to be a holder of rights entitles the
individual to the full protection of her rights by the legal system’.52
2.40 Legal capacity sets the threshold for individuals to take certain actions that have
legal consequences. For example, a range of transactions may involve an age threshold
as a benchmark of when a person is regarded as being able to act independently and
with binding effect—to have legal agency to make ‘legally effective choices’.53 Legal
capacity goes to the validity, in law, of choices and being accountable for the choices
made. As Carney states:
50 Hobsons Bay City Council, Submission 44.
51 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 24.
52 The right to recognition as a legal agent is also reflected in art 12(5) CRPD, which outlines the duty of
States Parties to ‘take all appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with
disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to have equal access to
bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit and shall ensure that persons with disabilities
are not arbitrarily deprived of their property: United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law,
2014 [11]. See also Bernadette McSherry, ‘Legal Capacity Under the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities’ (2012) 22 Legal Issues 23.
53 Terry Carney and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment—Tribunals and Popular Justice
(Federation Press, 1997) 3.
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Those who make the choice should be able to provide valid consent, and make
decisions for which they can be held accountable. They should, in short, be legally
competent.54
2.41 There are examples of tests of legal capacity—in terms of levels of
understanding for particular legal transactions—that have been developed through the
common law:55
Legal incapacity means that, in law, a person is not competent to enter into legal
transactions,  such  as  making  a  contract,  executing  a  will,  or  giving  a  legally-
recognised consent, for example to an operation.56
2.42 The common law starts from a presumption of legal capacity—‘the law’s
endorsement of autonomy’.57 Common law definitions of legal capacity are generally
invoked after the event, when a transaction is later challenged on the basis of a lack of
capacity (in the sense of agency) to rebut the presumption of legal capacity.58 They are
not a general starting point for action, but a retrospective focusing on the nature of the
transaction and the level of understanding required for legal agency. The common
law—including doctrines of equity—also includes protective doctrines for vulnerable
people, such as the doctrines concerning undue influence and unconscionable
transactions.59 Where a lack of the required level of understanding is proven in the
particular circumstances, the transaction may be set aside. Such doctrines focus on a
transaction and the circumstances surrounding it. They are decision-specific and
involve assessments of understanding relevant to the transaction being challenged.
Bruce Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython commented:
It is axiomatic that in some instances differences in capability will be recognised in
law. Lack of capacity is one [of] those instances, and is not inherently discriminatory
on the basis of disability.60
2.43 Capacity assessments have been made the trigger for formal arrangements for
decision-making support through, for example the appointment of guardians and
administrators, or the commencement of enduring powers of attorney. They are also
made in a range of health care decisions.
54 Ibid.
55 Contracts: Blomley v Ryan (1954) 99 CLR 362. Wills: Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549. See also
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) ch 7.
56 Australian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship and Management of Property, Report No 52 (1989)
[1.4].
57 Donnelly, above n 51, 93.
58 For example, in the context of wills, a person is presumed to have the legal capacity to make a will and it
is for those who challenge a testator’s capacity to bring evidence of incapacity: Bull v Fulton (1942) 66
CLR 295. The presumption of capacity arises if the will is rational on its face and is duly executed. See,
eg, Gino Dal Pont and Ken Mackie, Law of Succession (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013) ch 2. This was
expressed in the legal maxim ‘omnia praesumuntur rite et somemniter esse acta’: all acts are presumed to
have been done rightly and regularly.
59 See, eg, Dyson Heydon and Mark Leeming, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 8th ed, 2011) ch 14.
60 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
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2.44 The common law presumption is embodied in some guardianship legislation. 61
In the Commonwealth context, the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013
(Cth) includes an assumption of capacity:
People with disability are assumed, so far as is reasonable in the circumstances, to
have capacity to determine their own best interests and make decisions that affect
their own lives.62
2.45 Legal capacity is a different concept from ‘mental capacity’ and should not be
confused with it.63 The UNCRPD commented that the CRPD ‘does not permit
perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity to be used as justification for denying
legal capacity’.64
2.46 Stakeholders emphasised the distinction between legal capacity and mental
capacity. For example, People with Disability Australia, the Australian Centre for
Disability Law and the Australian Human Rights Centre commented that any proposal
for a uniform approach to legal capacity
must remove any notion that the assessment of mental capacity is also an assessment
of legal capacity, that assessing mental capacity is a mechanism through which to
limit legal capacity, and that the existence of a cognitive impairment creates a limit to
the exercise of legal agency. Concerns with the provisions in, and operation of,
legislation ... cannot be ameliorated or rectified without an acceptance of this
premise.65
2.47 This reflects two concerns: first, that legal capacity should not simply be
equated with mental capacity; and, secondly, that people with cognitive impairment
should not be assumed to have limited legal capacity, in the sense of being able to
exercise legal agency.
2.48 Similarly, stakeholders pointed to the danger of defining legal capacity on the
basis of disability—of those who have legal capacity; and those who have not. Such a
‘binary model’ does not reflect how legal capacity should be represented. Arnold and
Bonython submitted that
[Legal capacity] may be context-dependent, and fluctuate, rather than static and
permanent. In many instances, the primary focus of the law is not whether the
individual has a disability; rather, it considers whether that disability impairs the
individual’s ability to act as a legally recognized entity, with the powers and
obligations such recognition attracts. A person who is physically disabled, therefore,
is entitled to exactly the same presumption of capacity at law as someone without a
61 See, eg, Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 cl 1; Guardianship and Administration
Act 1990 (WA) s 4(3).
62 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 17A(1). See also Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK)
s 1, which addresses this explicitly by providing that individuals are assumed to have capacity to make
decisions unless otherwise established.
63 See, eg, the distinction between medical and legal perspectives in Terry Carney, above n 16.
64 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [12].
65 PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66.
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physical disability. ... For many disabled people, the question of capacity is no more
relevant to them than it is [to] the remainder of society.66
2.49 What is clearly not appropriate in the context of the CRPD is a disqualification
or limitation on the exercise of legal capacity because of a particular status, such as
disability. As National Disability Services remarked, ‘[t]he crux of the issue is seen in
historic legal frameworks that place constraints on the exercise of legal capacity based
solely on disability status’.67 The approach should therefore be on the support needed
to exercise legal agency, rather than an assumption or conclusion that legal agency is
lacking because of an impairment of some kind.
2.50 Even the word ‘capacity’ may carry some of the connotations of previous times.
‘Capacity’ is regularly confused with ‘legal capacity’, and ‘legal capacity’ is regularly
conflated with ‘mental capacity’. To avoid such confusion and to direct reform towards
supported decision-making, the ALRC uses the word ‘ability’68—and emphasises that
the focus should be on assessing how the individual can be supported to exercise their
ability.
Supported and substitute decision-making
2.51 In this Report, the ALRC recommends shifting away from ‘substitute decision-
making’ to ‘supported decision-making’. There is an important distinction between
them and it is the key issue in the discussion surrounding the meaning and effect of
art 12 of the CRPD. It is also the point at which most confusion has arisen.
2.52 Decision-making arrangements for persons with disability take many forms
along a spectrum, including:
· informal arrangements—usually involving family members, friends or other
supporters;
· formal pre-emptive arrangements—anticipating future loss of legal capacity
through appointment of a proxy, for example in enduring powers of attorney
(financial/property), enduring guardianships (lifestyle) and advance care
directives (health/medical);69 and
· formal arrangements—where a court or tribunal appoints a private manager or
guardian, or a state-appointed trustee, guardian or advocate to make decisions on
an individual’s behalf (guardians and administrators).70
66 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
67 National Disability Services, Submission 49. See also PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66.
68 Others talk about ‘capability’, such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. See discussion in Amita
Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the
Future’ (2006) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 429.
69 Sometimes referred to collectively as ‘living wills’. See, eg, Rosalind Croucher and Prue Vines,
Succession: Families, Property and Death (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2013) [4.3].
70 In some cases, such as emergency medical decisions, there are statutory hierarchies of those who may
authorise certain actions—‘generic lists of suitable proxies in the legislation’: Carney and Tait, above n
53, 4.
48 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
2.53 Formal arrangements may also include recognition of support by family, friends
or others—for example, where provision is made for the designation of a ‘nominee’ for
particular purposes.71 Banks may provide facilities for co-signing, allowing designated
others to conduct banking along with the account holder.
2.54 The formal appointment of guardians and administrators in Australia occurs
under state and territory laws. Guardians and administrators are vested with power to
make decisions on behalf of persons assessed to be unable to make decisions for
themselves.
2.55 In the literature discussing support for people who may require decision-making
assistance there is an evident tension in the way that the labels of ‘supported decision-
making’ and ‘substitute decision-making’ are used. The discourse around art 12, and
particularly the General Comment on art 12 when published as a draft in 2013,72 has
exacerbated this tension.
2.56 General Comments are provided by way of guidance and are different from
legally binding obligations as reflected in the CRPD itself. The Rules of Procedure of
the UNCRPD provide that it may prepare General Comments ‘with a view to
promoting its further implementation and assisting States Parties in fulfilling their
reporting obligations’.73 Some of the tension arising from the discussion about models
of decision-making is evident in the submissions made in response to the UNCRPD’s
General Comment on art 12.
2.57 Australia has set out its understanding about art 12 in one of three Interpretative
Declarations.74 In relation to art 12, Australia declared its understanding:
Australia recognizes that persons with disability enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis
with others in all aspects of life. Australia declares its understanding that the
Convention allows for fully supported or substituted decision-making arrangements,
which provide for decisions to be made on behalf of a person, only where such
arrangements are necessary, as a last resort and subject to safeguards.75
2.58 This Declaration was made in the light of the contentiousness of guardianship in
the discussions surrounding the development of the text of the CRPD and the criticism
of what was described as ‘substituted’ decision-making. A number of other countries
71 Eg, Centrelink ‘correspondence nominees’. See Ch 4.
72 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law,  2013. The final General Comments No 1 and
No 2 were adopted by the UNCRPD on 11 April 2014.
73 UNCRPD, Rules of Procedure (5 June 2014) r 47.
74 An ‘Interpretative Declaration’ is a unilateral statement made by a State or an international organisation,
in which that State or organisation purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of
certain of its provisions, outlining the State’s understanding of obligations under the CRPD, without
purporting to exclude or modify its legal effects: International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on
Reservations to Treaties (2011) [1.1]–[1.3].
75 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Declarations and Reservations (Australia), opened
for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). There were also
Interpretative Declarations in relation to arts 17 and 18.
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made similar declarations that the CRPD permits substitute decision-making in certain
limited circumstances and subject to appropriate safeguards.76
2.59 There are differing views about the effect of Australia’s Interpretative
Declaration, particularly in relation to the role of substitute decision-making. The
ALRC considers that this is driven by conceptual confusion that is impeding reform.
To appreciate the significance of this tension, and to provide the context for the
formulation of legal policy responses in this Inquiry, the following section explores
some key concepts and the emergence of the concepts of ‘supported’ and ‘substitute’
decision making.
The emergence of ‘substitute’ decision-making
2.60 Any discussion of substitute decision-making needs to distinguish two separate
issues: the first is the appointment of a person to act on behalf of another and the scope
of the person’s powers; the second is the standard by which that appointee is to act.
They are entirely separate points, but often confused. The appointee may be chosen by
the person themselves, or by a court or tribunal. The standard is the test by which any
decision-making by the appointee is to occur. To explain the distinction, it is
constructive to set out a little of the history.
2.61 Traditional guardianship laws have been described as exceedingly
paternalistic,77 protecting the estate of the person under protection, and not promoting
their autonomy, especially where plenary forms were used involving a complete
vesting of authority in another person. The disability rights movement of the 1960s led
to increasing pressure to move away from such models, championing a social, rather
than a medical, model of disability.78
The principles of new legislation were fairly consistent: the least restrictive option
(with guardianship as a last resort), promoting maximum autonomy, encouraging
habilitation and living as ‘normally’ as possible, and a preference for family over state
proxies. This meant keeping orders as short and limited as possible. Generally
‘private’ arrangements were to be preferred to public ones, and a ‘substituted
judgement’ principle was to be used rather than a ‘best interests’ one, where these
came into conflict.79
2.62 Such efforts sought to limit the scope of appointment of substitute decision-
makers, such as guardians, to achieve the ‘least restrictive option’. But they also
focused on the standard by which the appointee was to act: ‘best interests’ standards, as
suggested in this quote, were ones that preceded, and were to be contrasted with, a
‘substituted judgment’ approach. The ‘best interests’ principle was seen to reflect the
idea of ‘beneficence’—a dominant theme in medical ethics, in which the ‘primary
imperatives were for doing good for the patient, the avoidance of harm and the
76 Eg, Norway, Estonia and Canada: see Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department,
Submission 113.
77 Eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [6.95]–[6.96].
78 Ibid [2.8].
79 Carney and Tait, above n 53, 17–18. Citations omitted.
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protection of life’.80 A ‘best interests’ standard ‘requires a determination to be made by
applying an objective test as to what would be in the person’s best interests’. A
‘substituted judgment’ standard is ‘what the person would have wanted’,81 based for
example on past preferences. Substitute decision-making can therefore apply in two
broadly different ways—one involves an objective ‘best interests’ standard, the other
involves a focus on what the person wants or would have wanted (‘substituted
judgment’).
2.63 In a report in 1995, Robin Creyke described the emergence of a ‘common core
of principles’ to guide substitute decision-makers as ‘[o]ne of the most remarkable
developments in this area of law’. It involved an appreciation that disability
is not an absolute state and that individuals’ capacities to reason and to make
decisions continue, or can be developed, in some areas, albeit they are lost, or cannot
be exercised without assistance or training in others. This awareness, coupled with the
growing focus on people’s rights as individuals, led to the notion that the powers
given to substitute decision-makers should be restricted and tailored to the special
needs of the individual for whom assistance is needed.82
2.64 The ‘guiding philosophies’ that became ‘strongly entrenched in Australian laws
for guardians, financial managers or administrators’ by the 1990s were: the
presumption of competence; normalisation; the least restrictive option; respect for
autonomy; and fostering self-management.83 So when a ‘substitute’ was appointed to
act on behalf of another, their powers were to be restricted and the standard by which
they were to act was increasingly one of ‘substituted judgment’, based on what the
person would have wanted.
2.65 Even in a reformed context of being committed to advancing individuals’ rights,
however, ‘best interests’ standards were still retained, in language and in form. The
Australian Guardianship and Administration Council described the approach of state
and territory appointments as being ‘governed by three principles, variously
expressed’, that:
(a)  an appointment must promote as far as possible the person’s freedom of
decision and action (sometimes called the ‘least restrictive alternative’ or
‘autonomy’ principle); and
(b)  an appointment promotes the person’s best interests; and
(c)  the person’s wishes are given effect to, wherever possible.84
2.66 ‘Best interests’ and the person’s wishes are both used—a combination of
subjective and objective. Some ‘best interests’ standards have also been expressed in
terms of prioritising the wishes and preferences of the person. For example, the Mental
80 Donnelly, above n 51, 11. Donnelly refers to the Hippocratic Oath.
81 Explanatory Notes, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) [28].
82 R Creyke, Who Can Decide? Legal Decision-Making for Others, Aged and Community Care Service
Development and Evaluation Reports, No 19, Department of Human Services and Health, Aged and
Community Care Division (1995) 38.
83 Ibid 40.
84 AGAC, Submission 51.
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Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 4(6) requires a person making a determination of ‘best
interests’ to consider, ‘so far as is reasonably ascertainable’:
(a)  the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any
relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity),
(b)  the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had
capacity, and
(c)  the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.85
2.67 In addition, s 4(7) requires the decision-maker to take into account, ‘if it is
practicable and appropriate to consult them’, the views of:
(a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in
question or on matters of that kind,
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare,
(c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and
(d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court,
as to what would be in the person’s best interests and, in particular as to the matters
mentioned in subsection (6).
2.68 Of such a hybrid standard, Dr Mary Donnelly writes that it ‘attempts to mitigate
the consequences of a loss of capacity while staying within a best interests
framework’.86 The overall question is an objective one, but it is informed by past and
present wishes and the opinion of others as to what would be in the person’s best
interests.
Shift towards supported decision-making
2.69 By the second decade of the 21st century, the approach advocated is described
as ‘supported decision-making’, which places the person who is being supported at the
front of the decision-making process. The decision is theirs. As Carney summarises:
Supported decision-making encompasses a range of processes to support individuals
to exercise their legal capacity, and these consist of:
· effective communication, including in the provision of information and advice
to a person and through ensuring that a person is able to communicate their
decisions to others;
· spending time to determine a person’s preferences and wishes;
· informal relationships of support between a person and members of their social
networks;
· agreements or appointments to indicate that a relationship of support exists; and
· statutory relationships of support—whether through private or court/tribunal
appointment.87
85 A similar model is included, for example, in the Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA), pt 2 div 3, ‘Best interests
of a person’.
86 Donnelly, above n 51, 203. This approach, she writes, is ‘not without difficulties’: 203.
87 Carney, above n 47, 60.
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2.70 Supported decision-making emphasises the ability of a person to make
decisions, provided they are supported to the extent necessary to make and
communicate their decisions. It focuses on what the person wants.
2.71 In the context of developing—and championing—‘supported decision-making’,
however, ‘substitute’ is often equated with ‘guardianship’ and both are assumed to
represent a standard that is not consistent with the rights of persons with disability. The
fact that someone is appointed as a substitute becomes problematic of itself, rather than
focusing upon how the substitute is to act.
2.72 Interwoven in the discussion about ‘substitute’ and ‘supported’ decision-making
is a lack of conceptual clarity about the role that a person’s wishes and preferences play
when  another  acts  for  them  as  a  ‘substitute’  decision-maker;  and  the  role  that  a
‘supporter’ plays in assisting a person to make decisions. Conceptual confusion is also
exacerbated when models use ‘best interests’ language, but expressed in terms of
giving priority to the person’s wishes and preferences. Given the tensions around the
usage and understanding about ‘substitute’ decision-making—and the blurring between
‘substituted judgment’ and ‘substitute decision-making’—the ALRC considers that it
might be preferable to move away from this language altogether. The terms the ALRC
recommends are ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’ contained in the Commonwealth
decision-making model set out in this Report.
Substitute decision-making and the CRPD
2.73 An important issue to clarify is whether the CRPD permits substitute decision-
making  at  all,  or  in  what  form.  This  also  raises  the  questions  of  what  is  meant  by
substitute decision-making in the CRPD context, how is it different from supported
decision-making and what are the implications of this analysis in informing reform
recommendations.
2.74 The ALRC considers that the issue of the appointment of a person to act needs
to be clearly differentiated from the standard by which the appointee—or substitute—is
to act. The danger in analytical terms is to condemn the appointment of a person to act
on behalf of another simply by virtue of the appointment, presupposing that the
appointee will not act in a way that places the individual at the centre of the decision-
making process. The ALRC considers that much of the conceptual confusion lies in a
failure properly to distinguish these two things. As noted above, substitute decision-
making can apply an objective ‘best interests’ standard or can use a ‘substituted
judgment’ standard of what the person wants or would have wanted.
2.75 In its General Comment on art 12, finalised in April 2014,88 the UNCRPD said
that ‘support’ is a broad term—‘that encompasses both informal and formal support
88 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014.
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arrangements, of varying types and intensity’.89 It then spelled out its understanding of
the difference between a ‘support’ model and a ‘substitute’ one.
2.76 A supported model comprises ‘various support options which give primacy to a
person’s will and preferences and respect human rights norms’ and, while supported
decision-making regimes ‘can take many forms’, ‘they should all incorporate key
provisions to ensure compliance with article 12’.90 Supported decision-making
processes prioritise personal autonomy and recognise that individuals should be
empowered with information to make decisions—even bad ones (acknowledging the
dignity of risk).91
2.77 A substitute decision-making regime has different characteristics and can also
take many forms. The common defining elements, as understood by the UNCPRD, are
where
(i) legal capacity is removed from a person, even if this is just in respect of a single
decision; (ii) a substitute decision-maker can be appointed by someone other than the
person concerned, and this can be done against his or her will or (iii) any decision
made by a substitute decision-maker is based on what is believed to be in the
objective ‘best interests’ of the person concerned, as opposed to being based on the
person’s own will and preferences.92
2.78 The  General  Comment  was  prompted  by  what  the  UNCRPD  described  as  ‘a
general misunderstanding of the exact scope of the obligations of States Parties under
Article 12’.93 The UNCRPD suggested that substitute decision-making regimes should
be abolished and replaced by supported decision-making regimes and the development
of supported decision-making alternatives. Most importantly, the Committee
commented that ‘[t]he development of supported decision-making systems in parallel
with the retention of substitute decision-making regimes is not sufficient to comply with
Article 12’.94 What  is  required  is  ‘both the abolition of substitute decision-making
regimes and the development of supported decision-making alternatives’.95
2.79 The UNCRPD commented on Australia’s Interpretative Declaration in its
concluding observations on the initial report of Australia to the Committee in
September 2013. The Committee noted the referral to the ALRC of this Inquiry, but
expressed concern ‘about the possibility of maintaining the regime of substitute
decision-making, and that there is still no detailed and viable framework for supported
decision-making in the exercise of legal capacity’.96
89 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2013 [15].
90 Ibid [25].
91 Bernadette McSherry, above n 52, 26.
92 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [23].
93 Ibid [3].
94 Ibid [24]. Emphasis added.
95 Ibid. Emphasis added.
96 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of
Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its Tenth Session (2-13 September 2013)’ (United Nations,
4 October 2013) 9, [24].
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2.80 The ALRC acknowledges that there is considerable tension about what is
described as ‘substitute decision-making’. As noted above, the so-called ‘substitute
judgment’ approach was anchored in the will and preferences of the person—the
significant conceptual shift related to how the appointed substitute was to act, namely
away from an objective ‘best interests’ standard.
2.81 Stakeholders pointed to art 12(4) and its requirements of safeguards, implicitly
acknowledging measures that may be regarded as ‘substitute’ models. The Office of
the Public Advocate (SA) observed that the protections of art 12(4) ‘make sense as
protections for substitute decision making as a “measure relating to exercising
capacity”’.97 The  Centre  for  Rural  Regional  Law  and  Justice  and  the  National  Rural
Law and Justice Alliance noted that Australia’s Interpretative Declaration reflected this
safeguards approach in relation to substitute decision-making arrangements,
where decision-making support may extend to decisions being made by a third party
on behalf of the person with the impairment, but where such arrangements should be
put in place only when they are necessary in order to enable the exercise of legal
capacity and only where there are sufficient safeguards in place.98
2.82 While substitute decision-making models that reflect the constraints identified in
such comments may technically not be contrary to the CRPD, ‘[t]here is still
considerable debate over the significance of the [CRPD] for guardianship’.99 Is
‘guardianship’ compatible with the CRPD? Or is it rather a question of what kind of
guardianship (or whatever other label is used) is incompatible with it—namely, only
guardianship where decisions are made without reference to the wishes and preferences
of the person under protection?
2.83 Australia welcomed the initiative to clarify the scope of States Parties’
obligations under art 12 and noted ‘the Committee’s perception of a general failure of
States Parties to recognise that the human-rights based model of disability implies a
shift from the substitute decision making paradigm to one that is based on supported
decision-making’:
Australia acknowledges the importance of supporting decision-making where this is
possible, but considers that a human rights-based model of disability does not
preclude all substituted decision-making. Such decisions should only be made on
behalf of others where this is necessary, as a last resort, and subject to safeguards.100
2.84 Australia considered the discussion of art 12(1) and (4) ‘particularly helpful’, 101
but was critical of the characterisation of art 12(3) ‘as never permitting substituted
decision-making’,102 and that the General Comment did not acknowledge
97 Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. See, also, Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
98 Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission
20.
99 John Chesterman, ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian Social
Work 26, 31.
100  Australian Government, Submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Draft General Comment on Article 12 of the Convention–Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [5].
101  Ibid [8].
102  Ibid [5].
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Situations where no amount of support will assist, such as where a person may have a
severe cognitive or psychiatric impairment and is unable to understand, make or
communicate a decision. It is unfortunate that the complexities of this issue are not
acknowledged and discussed in the current draft.103
2.85 Australia reiterated the position under art 6 of the ICCPR, in cases of medical
emergency where a person is not able to consent to treatment, it is permissible to
provide such treatment where this is necessary for life-saving purposes.104
Australia considers the same principle to be relevant to persons with disabilities, and
that the exclusion of any form of substituted decision making in relation to persons
with disabilities would be incompatible with these other international human rights
obligations.105
2.86 Australia expressed concern that the draft General Comment was characterising
the entirety of art 12 ‘in absolute terms’,106 although art 12 itself is not expressed in this
fashion:
Australia considers that while it is important that the legal capacity of persons with
disabilities is respected to the fullest extent possible, there are circumstances in which
substituted decision-making may be the only available option. Australia considers that
guidance from the Committee on the most human rights compatible approach in
situations where a person does not have, either temporarily or permanently, the
capacity to make or communicate a decision, would be useful to States Parties.107
2.87 Australia argued that, in a number of respects, the draft General Comment
sought to extend the scope of art 12 beyond that of existing expressions of both
equality before the law and ‘legal capacity’ in international human rights law. It stated
that the most significant example of this is ‘the characterisation of art 12 as requiring
supported decision-making and not permitting substituted decision-making in any
circumstances’:
The statement that there are no circumstances permissible in which a person may be
deprived of the right to recognition as a person before the law, or to have this right
limited, relates to article 16 of the ICCPR, rather than article 12 of the Convention.
The ICCPR provides for this in article 4(2), which states that no derogation from that
right is permissible even in times of public emergency. The Convention does not
contain a similar provision. However, Australia accepts that this is applicable in
relation to article 12(1).108
2.88 Australia reiterated that it did not consider art 12 required the abolition of all
substitute decision-making regimes and mechanisms.109 Other States Parties expressed
similar concerns with the language of the draft General Comment.110
103  Ibid [9].
104  Ibid [11].
105  Ibid.
106  Ibid [13].
107  Ibid [16].
108  Ibid [21].
109  Ibid [24].
110  See submissions to the UNCRPD on the draft General Comment from, eg, Denmark, New Zealand and
Norway: Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 113.
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2.89 There are distinct threads in these responses. First, that an approach of
supporting decision-making is paramount; secondly, that any appointment of a person
to act on behalf of another should be limited, a last resort and subject to safeguards
compatible with human rights; and thirdly, that the CRPD does not prohibit the
appointment of a person to act on behalf of another. What is not clearly disentangled,
however, is separating the fact of an appointment in certain circumstances and how the
person  is  to  act.  Both  are  subsumed  in  the  argument  that,  in  some  limited
circumstances, ‘substitute decision making’ may be appropriate, without closely
interrogating what substitute decision-making means. The argument is therefore
expressed in terms of ‘supported’ versus ‘substitute’ decision-making.
2.90 The ALRC considers that the focus of analysis needs to be on how support is
translated into a principles-based model that may guide law reform. How should
support be articulated as the principal idea—consistent with the Convention and the
concerns of the UNCRPD? What is the standard by which supporters and anyone
appointed to act on behalf of another are to act? What is the standard to apply when the
will and preferences of a person are not evident and cannot be determined? What is a
human rights compatible approach? The standing and impact of Australia’s
Interpretative Declaration in relation to art 12 is relevant to these matters.
Implications for law reform
2.91 In September 2013, Australia appeared before the 10th session of the
UNCRPD.111 In its concluding observations, the UNCRPD recommended that
Australia review its Interpretative Declarations in order to withdraw them.112
2.92 The ALRC asked what impact the Interpretative Declaration regarding art 12
had on (a) the provision for supported or substitute decision-making arrangements; and
(b) the recognition of people with disability before the law and their ability to exercise
legal capacity.113 In  the  Discussion  Paper,  the  ALRC  suggested  that,  in  view  of
concerns identified by the UNCRPD and some stakeholders, the time was opportune to
review it, with a view to withdrawing it.114
2.93 The ALRC considers that the clear momentum is towards supported decision-
making and supporting the ability to communicate wishes and preferences with respect
to decision-making. Australia was a leader in advocating the CRPD and is well placed
to continue this role. The developments at the Commonwealth level, particularly
through the introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme and the decision-
making model recommended in this Report provide a template and a catalyst for
propelling reform federally. In such a context, the Interpretative Declaration may be
seen, perhaps, to be unnecessary.
111  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 10th Session of the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (12 November 2013).
112  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, above n 96.
113  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, Issues
Paper No 44 (2013) Question 1.
114  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposal 2–1.
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2.94 In its present form it may also be considered unclear or as representing an
overabundance of caution. While Interpretative Declarations can be modified at any
time,115 they may also be understood as essentially historical notes, marking a
government’s understanding at a particular time. As noted above, other States Parties
made similar declarations at the time.
2.95 In this context, the ALRC considered whether to recommend that the
Interpretative Declaration in relation to art 12 be withdrawn. Some would advocate this
because they see the Declaration as hindering ‘Australia’s reform efforts and its
continued leadership in the field of promoting equal recognition before the law for
persons with disabilities’.116 On the other hand, the Australian Government Attorney-
General’s Department submitted that ‘this focus on the Interpretative Declaration is
unhelpful, as of itself the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities has no effect in domestic law in the absence of laws or policies adopted by
the Australian Parliament’.117
2.96 Insofar as the Declaration is simply stating that there are occasions when a
person may be appointed to act on behalf of another—as a substitute—the ALRC
considers that this is a correct understanding of the CRPD. The ALRC also considers
that the UNCRPD was principally condemning a best interests approach, not a will and
preferences approach. As set out in Chapter 4, the ALRC uses the term ‘representative’
in such cases and sets out a standard which embodies the ‘will and preferences’
approach.
2.97 The ALRC concludes that there is an opportunity to send a clear message and to
provide conceptual clarity in place of any confusion, or negative messaging,118 arising
out of the Interpretative Declaration. If the Declaration remains as it is, or without
further explanation, it may be seen to create ‘a sense of complacency’;119 and may
‘substantially diminish Australia’s progress in disability rights and undermine its
position as a State committed to advancing the inclusion, participation and wellbeing of
people with disabilities, in our country and overseas’.120
2.98 However the ALRC acknowledges that there are many ways to do this—
regardless of whether the Declaration itself remains.121 For example, in Australia’s
115  International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (2011) [2.4.8].
116  Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130.
117  Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 113.
118  A point made in a number of submissions: eg, Disability Discrimination Legal Service Inc and
Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service Inc, Submission 115; Scope, Submission 88; Carers Alliance,
Submission 84; NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81; WWDA, Submission 58; National Disability
Services, Submission 49; Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36; Cairns Community
Legal Centre, Submission 30.
119  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
120  Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36.
121  The ALRC also acknowledges the comments of the Australian Government Attorney-General’s
Department that, where there are complaints under the Optional Protocol alleging violations of art 12, the
Interpretative Declaration provides the basis for responding in setting out the understanding of obligations
that Australia has accepted under the CRPD: Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department,
Submission 113.
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Initial Report to the UNCRPD greater clarification of Australia’s understanding of
obligations under art 12 were set out:
Australia strongly supports the right of persons with disabilities to legal capacity. In
some cases, persons with cognitive or decision-making disabilities may require
support in exercising that capacity. In Australia, substituted decision-making will only
be used as a measure of last resort where such arrangements are considered necessary,
and are subject to safeguards in accordance with article 12(4). For example,
substituted decision-making may be necessary as a last resort to ensure that persons
with disabilities are not denied access to proper medical treatment because of an
inability to assess or communicate their needs and preferences. Australia’s
interpretive declaration in relation to article 12 of the Convention sets out the
Government’s understanding of our obligations under this article. Australia’s
guardianship laws and the safeguards contained in them aim to ensure abuse,
exploitation and neglect does not occur, consistent with article 16 of the
Convention.122
2.99 The adoption by the Australian Government of the National Decision-Making
Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model set out in this Report will
provide impetus for the further reform of laws nationally to promote better compliance
with the CRPD.
2.100 Submissions revealed distinct, and at times conflicting, themes:
· ambiguity in the Declaration—particularly about the meaning of fully supported
or substitute decision-making arrangements;123
· concerns about the standard by which the person is to act, rather than about the
appointment of a representative in itself;124 and
· discomfort with the idea of ‘substitute decision-making’ altogether.125
2.101 The  ALRC  considers  that  the  crucial  issue  is  how  to  advance,  to  the  extent
possible, supported decision-making in a federal system—a matter also pointed out by
the UNCRPD in its concluding observations on Australia.126 This does not preclude the
appointment of another to act on behalf of a person, either by the person themselves
(such as by an advance directive or enduring power of attorney) or through an
institutional mechanism such as a court or tribunal. Insofar as the Interpretative
Declaration is asserting this, it is not incorrect as a matter of law, despite the somewhat
confusing terminology in which it is expressed. The focus, in policy terms, then falls
122 Australia’s Initial Report under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 3 December
2010 [55].
123  Disability Discrimination Legal Service Inc and Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service Inc,
Submission 115;  Centre  for  Rural  Regional  Law  and  Justice  and  the  National  Rural  Law  and  Justice
Alliance, Submission 20;  Office  of  the  Public  Advocate  (SA), Submission 17; Mental Health
Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
124  Disability Discrimination Legal Service Inc and Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service Inc,
Submission 115; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; B Arnold and
Dr W Bonython, Submission 38; NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33; Centre for
Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20.
125  F Beaupert, P Gooding and L Steele, Submission 123.
126  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, above n 96.
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on the limits surrounding the appointment of another to act in a person’s stead and also
upon the standard by which the person is to act. These are the safeguards central to art
12(4). The consequence, in a federal system in which guardianship laws are state
based, is to propel a critical evaluation of all decision-making models, by whatever
name.
2.102 There are also dangers in action that is not anchored in a strong conceptual
framework, and tested in implementation. The Caxton Legal Centre pointed out that
A number of writers comment that insufficient research has been done on both
supported decision making models and guardianship itself, and warn against inviting a
‘bricolage’ of experimental models resembling a ‘young child’s pocketful of melted
lollies  on  a  hot  summer’s  day’.127 The task is complex and highly nuanced and as
Terry Carney suggests, perhaps the best recommendation is to marshall the evidence
and debate which is the least imperfect of the policy options at the disposal of the
law.128
2.103 Two key policy issues are how far ‘support’ can really go without attracting
criticism of being a legal fiction;129 and the need to underpin change in practice by
evidence.
2.104 The policy impetus is clearly away from models that, in substance, form or
language, appear as ones that are not reflective of the individual as decision-maker,
based on their wishes and preferences to the greatest extent possible. Although some
have queried whether reformed law will have the desired effect in practice, and may be
understood by stakeholders as ‘little different from its predecessor’, a shift to supported
decision-making has great ‘symbolic significance’:130
It can be argued that at the very least a shift towards supported decision making sends
two important symbolic messages regarding: (i) rejection of avoidable paternalism;
and (ii) repositioning the state as an adjunct to (or facilitator of) civil society.131
2.105 The issue for policy reform, and law reform, is how to express this in a way that
clearly reflects the paradigm shift in approach and thinking to the levels of support
needed for those who require decision-making support. In this respect there is force in
the UNCRPD’s observations about a lack of a ‘detailed and viable framework for
supported decision-making in the exercise of legal capacity’.132 As  the  Caxton  Legal
Centre submitted:
The task is a tremendous one. The greatest challenges to ensuring equality before the
law and the exercise of legal capacity for persons with disability involve the political
will to endorse change to reflect consistency with a social model of disability, to
provide sufficient education to the entire community, to stakeholders including all
127  Citing Terry Carney and Fleur Beaupert, ‘Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges Balancing Law,
Services and Civil Society in Advancing CRPD Supported Decision-Making’ (2013) 36 University of
New South Wales Law Journal 175, 177.
128  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. Citing Terry Carney, above n 16, 15. Carney and Beaupert, above n
118, 177. Carney and Beaupert, above n 117, 177.
129  Harmon, above n 30. See also Donnelly, above n 51, 185–187.
130  Carney, above n 47, 62.
131  Terry Carney, above n 16, 12.
132  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, above n 96, [24].
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levels of employment and management, and to institutions and to implement the
supply side and demand side reforms to ensure that supported decision making can
effectively operate.133
2.106 Legal and policy reform must also include consideration of when ‘it is not
practicable to determine the will and preferences of an individual’.134 It  is  in  such
cases, where the appointment of someone to make decisions is needed, that the
standard by which they act and the nature of their appointment become the critical
focus. As Denmark urged, in its response to the Draft General Comment on art 12,
Above all, the general comment should take into account that there will be
individuals, such as those who are unconscious, who are living in a persistent
vegetative state, have very advanced dementia, or have the most profound intellectual
disabilities, who will not be in a position to understand that there is a decision to be
made, the nature of that decision, or the consequence of any apparently expressed will
or preference. If substitute care and treatment decisions are not made for these
individuals, they will run the risk of being exploited, neglected, or even left to die. To
assume that no one would ever require someone else to make a decision on their
behalf would against this background not only be flagrantly wrong but ultimately
irresponsible.135
2.107 In other words, some system of appointment of others to act is a necessary
human rights backstop. The Offices of the Public Advocate (South Australia and
Victoria) identified the danger that an ‘overemphasis’ on a person’s autonomy may be
‘to the detriment of protection for people who need guardianship as a rights enhancing
mechanism’.136 They argued that ‘guardianship, properly done, is a positive use of state
power that enhances the inclusion and legal personhood of the represented person’.137
2.108 Such concerns were also expressed by the NSW Council for Intellectual
Disability:
Even with a comprehensive national strategy there will continue to be a need for a
backstop of a substitute or fully supported decision-making system. In the absence of
such a system, there will be no way to resolve many situations:
· in which people with intellectual disability are being neglected, abused,
exploited or overprotected on an ongoing basis and are unable to recognise these
breaches of rights or and assert themselves in responding to the breaches.
· in which there are disputes within families or between families and service
providers or others about what decisions should be made about where a person
should live, about health care or services or other lifestyle decisions.138
133  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
134  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [21].
135  Denmark, Submission No 19 to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft
General Comment on Article 12 of the Convention–Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014.
136  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95. Emphasis added.
137  Ibid. Emphasis added. ‘Guardians need to be properly resourced and the person’s wishes must be
paramount in all decisions’.
138  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.
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2.109 The need for support, and appropriate policy responses, is likely to increase as
Australia’s population ages.139 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria observed
that, as Australia’s population is ageing, both the number of older people and their
proportion of the population are increasing:
It has been estimated that in the 30 years from 2007, the number of Australians aged
over  65  years  will  more  than  double,  increasing  from  2.7  to  6.3  million  and  will
constitute 24% of the population. An increase in the incidence of age-related
disability, in particular dementia, is expected to accompany the ageing of the
population. The ageing population together with the rising incidence of dementia
amongst that population has led to a concerning rise in applications for guardianship
and administrative appointments outside the more traditional scope of intellectual
disabilities.140
2.110 Where institutional mechanisms of support cannot be avoided, ‘new priorities,
processes and language’ are needed.141 The legal and policy issues must focus on key
questions:
· When is it appropriate to appoint someone to act on behalf of another?
· What test is used to determine when this should happen?
· What should this be called?
· What standard should guide the actions of a person appointed to act on another’s
behalf?
· What accountability mechanisms need to be in place?
2.111 These questions necessarily focus on guardianship laws and the impact of the
CRPD in moulding future reforms. As Barbara Carter observed:
Guardianship is the ‘elephant in the room’ of Art 12 and the debate continues to rage
about whether guardianship is allowable under the Convention. This debate is
effectively stymying considered discussion of how the Convention, in its totality
should be implemented in domestic guardianship legislation.142
2.112 John Chesterman suggests that
What is clear is that the Convention obliges countries to use guardianship as little as
possible, and to limit as much as possible the powers that guardians have. Moreover,
the Convention obliges us to utilise other processes, particularly now supported
decision-making, wherever possible. In this way, the Convention is promoting some
degree of uniformity, and will continue to do so as jurisdictions review their
guardianship systems.143
139  Demographic shifts were outlined in the ALRC’s report: Australian Law Reform Commission, Access All
Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws, Report No 120 (2013) ch 2.
140  Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120. See also NSW Council for Intellectual
Disability, Submission 131; Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
141  ADACAS, Submission 29.
142  Barbara Carter, ‘Adult Guardianship: Human Rights or Social Justice?’ (2010) 18 Journal of Law and
Medicine 143, 145.
143  Chesterman, above n 99, 31.
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2.113 The ALRC considers that the focus of reform initiatives needs to be towards
providing greater clarity around the expectations of persons with disability, their
families and carers, and the courts and tribunals involved in appointing those to assist
in decision-making where it is required. The policy pressure is clearly towards
establishing and reinforcing frameworks of support in law and legal frameworks, and
through funding of support models. The momentum is also towards building the ability
of those who may require support so that they may become more effective and
independent decision-makers.
2.114 There will also be a need for thorough research. The Caxton Legal Centre
submitted that
models of supported decision making need to be thoroughly researched and evaluated
particularly given the implications of profound change—the paradigm shift—across
institutions, agencies, services and the community generally. The suggestion has been
made that there is little evaluative research into the efficacy and acceptability of
guardianship systems, and this too should be remedied. At the very least, guardianship
should not continue on the basis of ‘business as usual’. And as a number of writers
have observed, legislative change without equal attention to supply side and demand
side reforms, including adequate resourcing of free legal services for persons with
disability, will only be as useful as the paper it is printed on.144
2.115 For many, resourcing is a key issue:
There is no escaping the reality that realising the right to equal recognition before the
law for  all  people  in  our  community  requires  resourcing  from the  grassroots  up,  as
well as the top down.145
2.116 The most difficult policy challenges in this area concern those who require the
most support—where a person’s will and preferences are difficult, or impossible to
determine and they need someone else to make decisions on their behalf. These hard
cases should not, however, be treated as a barrier to building law and legal frameworks
that signal the paradigm shift of the CRPD towards supported decision-making in
practice, as well as in form.
144  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
145  PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 136.
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3.1 In this chapter the ALRC recommends a set of National Decision-Making
Principles and accompanying Guidelines to provide the first part of the modelling in
Commonwealth laws required under the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry. These
Principles should guide reform of Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks and the
review of state and territory laws.
3.2 The National Decision-Making Principles identify four central ideas in all recent
law reform work on capacity. These are that:
· everyone has an equal right to make decisions and to have their decisions
respected;
· persons who need support should be given access to the support they need in
decision-making;
· a person’s will and preferences must direct decisions that affect their lives; and
· there must be appropriate and effective safeguards in relation to interventions
for persons who may require decision-making support.
3.3 The Principles reflect the paradigm shift signalled in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities1 (CRPD) to recognise people with
disabilities as persons before the law and their right to make choices for themselves.
1 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
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3.4 The emphasis is on the autonomy and independence of persons with disability
who may require support in making decisions—their will and preferences must drive
decisions that they are supported in making, and that others may make on their behalf.
The National Decision-Making Principles provide a conceptual overlay, consistent
with the CRPD, for a Commonwealth decision-making model that encourages
supported decision-making.
National Decision-Making Principles
Recommendation 3–1 Reform of Commonwealth, state and territory
laws and legal frameworks concerning individual decision-making should be
guided by the National Decision-Making Principles and Guidelines (see
Recommendations 3–2 to 3–4) to ensure that:
· supported decision-making is encouraged;
· representative decision-makers are appointed only as a last resort; and
· the will, preferences and rights of persons direct decisions that affect their
lives.
Principle 1: The equal right to make decisions
All adults have an equal right to make decisions that affect their lives and to
have those decisions respected.
Principle 2: Support
Persons who require support in decision-making must be provided with access
to the support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in
decisions that affect their lives.
Principle 3: Will, preferences and rights
The will, preferences and rights of persons who may require decision-making
support must direct decisions that affect their lives.
Principle 4: Safeguards
Laws and legal frameworks must contain appropriate and effective safeguards in
relation to interventions for persons who may require decision-making support,
including to prevent abuse and undue influence.
3.5 The National Decision-Making Principles are four general principles that reflect
the key ideas and values upon which the ALRC’s approach in relation to legal capacity
is based. They are distinct from the framing principles for the Inquiry as a whole
(dignity, equality, autonomy, inclusion and participation, and accountability), but
reflect and are informed by those principles.
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3.6 The National Decision-Making Principles provide a conceptual overlay at a high
level. They are drawn from the CRPD, other international models, stakeholder
submissions and the work of other bodies and individuals. They are not prescriptive,
and are of general application. The Principles are supported by three sets of Guidelines.
3.7 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider ‘how maximising
individual autonomy and independence could be modelled in Commonwealth laws and
legal frameworks’.2 The  focus  of  the  Inquiry  is  on  the  ‘ability  to  exercise  legal
capacity’ and equal recognition before the law of people with disability. The ALRC
considers this can best be achieved by setting up an overall framework of principles
and guidelines that can then be used as the template for specific reforms—both in
Commonwealth areas of responsibility included in the Terms of Reference; and at state
and territory level, in review of guardianship and related regimes.
3.8 The National Decision-Making Principles3 were strongly supported by
stakeholders. The ACT Disability, Aged and Carer Advocacy Service (ADACAS), for
example, said that the Principles ‘provide a sound basis for legislative change’.4 The
Queenslanders with Disability Network (QDN) submitted that
The National Decision-Making Principles and Guidelines developed by the ALRC are
a major step forward in creating a unified, progressive approach to empowering
people with disability.5
3.9 The National Decision-Making Principles will provide the basis for national
consistency and ‘could play an important role in creating a framework for reform’ of
Commonwealth, state and territory laws concerning decision-making by persons who
may require support.6 National Disability Services (NDS) supported the
establishment of clearly articulated ‘national decision-making principles’ to guide
reform of all Commonwealth, state and territory laws and legal frameworks that affect
decision-making of people with disability. This appears to be the most effective
strategy for building a more coherent approach to legal capacity. It should, over time,
reduce the inconsistency and unnecessary administrative hurdles across different
jurisdictions or areas of life that currently face people with disability, their families
and service providers.7
3.10 The NDS emphasised the importance of the Commonwealth taking the lead in
implementing change, and encouraged incremental implementation:
The process of change should roll out slowly, providing opportunities for learning
along the way. As indicated by the [ALRC], the Commonwealth may put into practice
the various changes prior to states and territories. This will represent a useful
opportunity to evaluate the practical ramifications. Similarly, the areas of law that
have a clear role in addressing support for legal capacity, such as the National
2 Terms of Reference (emphasis added).
3 As set out in the Discussion Paper: Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and
Disability in Commonwealth Laws, Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Ch 3.
4 ADACAS, Submission 108.
5 Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
6 Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129.
7 National Disability Services, Submission 92.
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Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) Act, the Evidence Act and guardianship laws,
may do the detailed work to develop specific legal solutions. These can then be more
easily modified or adopted in other areas of law such as electoral, contract, banking
and consumer protection.8
3.11 The adoption of the National Decision-Making Principles will provide a crucial
starting point for change:
The proposed principles should achieve a shift in practice to help embed the right of
every adult to make their own decisions and to be provided with the support necessary
to  do  so.  They  will  also  help  to  ensure  that  any  decision  made  for  a  person  with
disability is directed by their will, preferences and rights. This shift will have different
practical implications in the various relevant areas of law.9
The equal right to make decisions
Principle 1: The equal right to make decisions
All adults have an equal right to make decisions that affect their lives and to
have those decisions respected.
3.12 The principal idea in any discussion of legal capacity is that adults have the right
to make decisions for themselves. This is frequently expressed in terms of a
presumption of legal capacity, which may be rebutted if circumstances demonstrate
that the requisite level of capacity is lacking in that context.
3.13 Stakeholders supported the emphasis on the right to make decisions. Some
wanted the statement to retain the form of a presumption;10 others that it should go
further. A number of stakeholders also stated that it should be recognised that there are
circumstances in which a person may not be able to exercise such a right for
themselves—and where another may need to be appointed to act on their behalf.
3.14 In this Report, the ALRC adopts the paradigm shift evident in the language of,
and discourse around, the CRPD. The ALRC considers that it is necessary to place the
emphasis on the right of citizens to make decisions, rather than on the qualification
intrinsic in a presumption. The conceptual difficulty in starting with a presumption of
legal capacity as an overarching principle is that it already contains a binary
classification—of those who have legal capacity, and those who do not.
3.15 This is not to suggest that legal agency may never be found to be lacking—for
example through the application of common law doctrines about legal capacity when
invoked in reviewing transactions. Nor is it meant to suggest that a person may never
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
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be appointed to act on behalf of another in making decisions. The ALRC agrees with
many stakeholders on these points.11
3.16 The ALRC considered whether the principle should be expressed as applying
more broadly than just to adults. The Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC)
used ‘adult’ in its formulations of principle,12 but the Victorian Law Reform
Commission (VLRC) considered such a principle could have application to young
people who are able to satisfy the Gillick ‘mature minor’ test endorsed by the High
Court in Marion’s Case.13 The ALRC has sought to avoid confusion in the first
principle by confining it to adults. Decision-making principles dealing with children
involve a ‘best interests’ standard—a standard deliberately not used in this Inquiry. 14
3.17 This does not mean that the National Decision-Making Principles could not have
a broader application, but only that for the purposes of this Inquiry the ALRC has
limited the expression to adults—at least as a starting point for reform. The remaining
Principles are expressed in terms of ‘persons’.
Support
Principle 2: Support
Persons who require support in decision-making must be provided with access
to the support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in
decisions that affect their lives.
3.18 Decision-making principles should ask what decision-making support is needed
so that people can exercise an equal right to make decisions. The emphasis must be on
developing supported decision-making if the paradigm shift is to become a reality.
3.19 Support is the central theme in the CRPD. The Terms of Reference require the
ALRC to consider:
· ‘how decision making by people with impairment that affects their decision
making can be validly and effectively supported’; and
· ‘the role of family members and carers and paid supports ... in supporting people
with disability ... and how this role should be recognised by law and legal
frameworks’.
11 Disability Discrimination Legal Service Inc and Villamanta Disability Rights Legal Service Inc,
Submission 115; Max Jackson and Margaret Ryan, Submission 101; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA
and Vic), Submission 95; AGAC, Submission 91; B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38; NSW
Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the
National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20. See Ch 2.
12 See Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Final Report
R67 (2010) ch 4 (The General Principles).
13 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) 92; Secretary,
Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 CLR 218.
14 See Ch 2.
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3.20 There are two elements: how a person can be supported in their decision-
making; and how the law can give recognition to those who are providing the support.
The ALRC’s approach is to place the person requiring decision-making support at the
forefront—as the decision-maker—and to recognise the position of ‘supporters’ in law,
both through a mechanism of recognition set out in relevant Commonwealth laws, and
by including supporters in information flows in certain situations. The ‘supporter’
model is discussed in Chapter 4.
3.21 The National Decision-Making Principles and Guidelines reflect a spectrum of
decision-making, from fully independent to supported decision-making, including
where  a  person  needs  someone  else  to  make  decisions  on  their  behalf  as  a
‘representative’. They are underpinned by a conceptualisation of autonomy as
empowerment, noted in Chapter 1.
3.22 National Decision-Making Principle 2 (the Support Principle) expresses the
concept of support at a high level.15 The emphasis is on the person as a decision-maker
who may require support to exercise their legal capacity—and not as a person with an
impairment affecting their decision-making. Such language reflects art 12(3) of the
CRPD:
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.
3.23 The Support Principle is not prescriptive as to by whom, and how, the support
may be given. The Principle reflects a ‘general recognition that the focus must now
move from the challenges facing a person with disability to the supports that should be
provided to enable them to make decisions and exercise their legal capacity’.16
3.24 The Support Principle includes recognition of communication support.17 It also
reflects some of the general principles contained in the National Disability Insurance
Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act)—for example, that persons with disability ‘should
be supported to participate in and contribute to social and economic life to the extent of
their ability’.18
3.25 Stakeholders strongly endorsed this principle. The Centre for Disability Law and
Policy, National University of Ireland, Galway (CDLP Galway) said that the proposal
sought to realise the declaration by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) that ‘supported decision-making must be
15 Compare the formulation by the VLRC that people ‘with impaired decision-making ability should be
provided with the support necessary for them to make, participate in and implement decisions that affect
their lives’: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 21(c). See
also the QLRC formulation, ‘the adult’s right to be given any necessary support and access to information
to enable the adult to make or participate in decisions affecting the adult’s life’: Queensland Law Reform
Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Final Report R67 (2010) rec 7–14(d).
16 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
17 Compare, eg, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta) s 2(b); Victorian Law Reform
Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 21(g).
18 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 4(2).
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available to all’.19 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria (Justice Connect)
agreed, stating:
We strongly support the proposal to introduce a decision making principle that a
person who may require support in decision-making must be provided with the
support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in decisions that
affect their lives.20
3.26 In practice, problems may arise from a lack of available supporters. Justice
Connect observed:
While it is always preferable for family members and friends with a longstanding
relationship and knowledge of the person’s wishes and preferences to act as a
supporter or representative, there will be instances where a person has no such support
available. One of the key risk factors of elder abuse is isolation. In our experience,
many vulnerable older people do not have family members or friends willing to take
up the role of supporter or representative.
It is in these situations that Kirby J suggests that ‘independent, dispassionate, neutral
and professional public office holders can be especially useful and even necessary’.21
3.27 Justice Connect submitted that in order for a support principle to be meaningful,
it would be ‘necessary for the Commonwealth to provide funding to a new or existing
body to provide assistance to people requiring decision-making support in the absence
of available alternatives’. It said that, ideally, an independent body would be provided
with sufficient resources and funding to employ suitably qualified people to take on the
role ‘equivalent to the operation of OPA/State Trustees in the Victorian jurisdiction,
and other similar bodies in different states and territories’.22
3.28 In situations where a person does not have access to support, the state or
territory may need to intervene by appointing someone to act as a supporter or
representative. The review of state and territory guardianship and administration laws
to ensure they are consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and the
Commonwealth decision-making model is discussed in Chapter 10.
Support Guidelines
Recommendation 3–2 Support Guidelines
(1)  General
(a)  Persons who require decision-making support should be supported to
participate in and contribute to all aspects of life.
19 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130.
20 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
21 Ibid. Referring to Holt v Protective Commissioner (1993) 31 NSWLR 227.
22 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120. Justice Connect added that volunteer
support programs could also be an option, if funding does not support the establishment of a new body.
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(b)  Persons who require decision-making support should be supported in
making decisions.
(c)  The role of persons who provide decision-making support should be
acknowledged and respected—including family members, carers or other
significant people chosen to provide support.
(d) Persons who may require decision-making support may choose not to be
supported.
(2)  Assessing support needs
In assessing what support is required in decision-making, the following must be
considered.
(a)  All adults must be presumed to have ability to make decisions that affect
their lives.
(b)  A person must not be assumed to lack decision-making ability on the
basis of having a disability.
(c)  A person’s decision-making ability must be considered in the context of
available supports.
(d) A person’s decision-making ability is to be assessed, not the outcome of
the decision they want to make.
(e)  A person’s decision-making ability will depend on the kind of decisions
to be made.
(f)  A person’s decision-making ability may evolve or fluctuate over time.
3.29 The ALRC’s approach recognises supported decision-making. This goes beyond
general statements about the importance of support in the lives of persons with
disability, to recommendations for a Commonwealth decision-making model under
which supporters can be recognised in law. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is very
strong support for legal models that reflect supported decision-making norms and
aspirations.
3.30 The Support Guidelines reflect the Inquiry’s framing principles of dignity,
autonomy, and inclusion and participation. They are consistent with the general
principles of the NDIS Act, that people with disability should be supported to:
· exercise choice, including in relation to taking reasonable risks;23 and
· receive reasonable and necessary supports, including early intervention
supports.24
23 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 4(4). The principle is focused on choice ‘in the
pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery of their supports’, which is the focus of the NDIS.
24 Ibid s 4(5).
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3.31 The Support Guidelines reflect the ALRC’s approach that assumptions about the
extent of decision-making support should not be based on a person’s disability. As one
stakeholder commented, ‘[a]ssumptions should ... not be made that a person with
physical disability will require supported decision-making or substitute decision
making assistance’.25
Paragraph (1)
3.32 Paragraph (1)(a) is framed broadly and applies beyond support in decision-
making. The OPA (SA and Vic) suggested that it ‘confuses the concept of decision-
making support with support for participation and contributing to society, which may
require a wider range of support services’.26 The ALRC acknowledges this concern,
but considers the provision sits appropriately within the aspirational framework of the
National Decision-Making Principles.
3.33 The purpose of support is to enhance the ability of people to make decisions and
exercise choice and control—as decision-makers. That control includes the choice to
have a supporter and choose the supporter, or to decline support. Stakeholders
suggested that the latter needs to be made clear,27 and this is incorporated in
paragraph (1)(d).
3.34 The ALRC’s model includes formal recognition of supporters in
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks. Paragraph (1)(c) of the Support Guidelines
reflects this and is consistent with the NDIS Act’s general principle that: ‘the role of
families, carers and other significant persons in the lives of people with disability is to
be acknowledged and respected’.28 None of this detracts from the vital and continuing
role that informal support plays in the lives of persons with disabilities. The model is
designed to provide a channel for formal validation of such support, where the person
chooses it, consistent with the Terms of Reference. Paragraph (1)(c) embraces both
informal and formal support.
3.35 A ‘supporter’ is distinguished from a ‘representative’. Where a person is being
supported in decision-making, the decision is their own, but made with support. Where
a representative is appointed, the decision is made on behalf of the person, but
involving the person to the greatest extent possible. How supporters and
representatives are to act is considered in Chapter 4. The Support Guidelines reflect the
recognition of family members, carers or other significant people as supporters at a
high level. How they are recognised and how they may act is discussed in Chapter 4.
Paragraph (2)
3.36 The second paragraph of the Support Guidelines reflects an approach to
assessing the support needed to exercise legal agency that is functional (ability to make
the particular decision in question), not outcomes-based (the result or wisdom of the
25 Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32.
26 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
27 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130; F Beaupert, P Gooding and L Steele,
Submission 123; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; AGAC, Submission 91.
28 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 4(12).
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decision), or status-based (because of a condition). A functional approach of this kind
‘seeks to maximise the circumstances in which the right of autonomy is protected’.29
3.37 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider ‘presumptions about a
person’s ability to exercise legal capacity’ and ‘how a person’s ability to independently
make decisions is assessed’. The ALRC considers that assessments of ‘ability to
exercise legal capacity’ need to be refocused, by making the primary inquiry about the
assessment of the support a person needs to exercise legal capacity, or agency. The
second paragraph of the Support Guidelines reflects this approach.
3.38 The starting point in any assessment of support needs is a presumption of
ability.30 Paragraph  (2)(a)  reflects  the  object  of  CRPD  art  12(2)  ‘that  persons  with
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of their
lives’. It also reflects the ALRC’s framing principles, particularly of equality and
autonomy. A presumption of capacity is also the starting point of the common law, as
discussed in Chapter 2. It places the onus on those who want to contest that a person
has decision-making ability with respect to a particular transaction, or generally.
3.39 Legislative statements of this presumption often use the word ‘capacity’ and
include the qualification ‘unless it is established that he or she lacks capacity’. The
ALRC’s formulation keeps the qualification out of the Guidelines, reflecting the rights
emphasis of the CRPD. The focus needs to be on assessment of the support necessary
to exercise legal agency. The VLRC similarly recommended that a person ‘should not
be considered to lack the capacity to make a decision if it is possible for them to make
that decision with appropriate support’.31 An assessment of ability in terms of support
acts to encourage support, enhancing a person’s ability. Similarly, the Mental Capacity
Act 2005 (UK)  provides  that  ‘[a]  person  is  not  to  be  treated  as  unable  to  make  a
decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without
success’.32
3.40 The formulation in paragraph (2)(b) departs from status-based assessments. It
reflects comments by the UNCRPD in its General Comment on art 12, and its criticism
of conflating legal and mental capacity:
Legal capacity and mental capacity are distinct concepts. Legal capacity is the ability
to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and to exercise these rights and duties (legal
agency). It is the key to accessing meaningful participation in society. Mental capacity
29 Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 92. In recommending such an approach that was
subsequently incorporated in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), the Law Commission of England and
Wales deliberately rejected status-based assessments: Law Commission, Mental Incapacity,  Report  No
231 (1995) [3.5]–[3.6]. In that inquiry, the Law Commission received a ‘ringing endorsement’ of the
functional approach: [3.6].
30 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 26. Examples:
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(2); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta) s 2(a);
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) ss 5–7, sch 1; National Disability Insurance Scheme
Act 2013 (Cth) s 17A. See also: NCOSS, Submission 26; Mental Health Coordinating Council,
Submission 07; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
31 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 27(e).
32 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(3).
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refers to the decision-making skills of a person, which naturally vary from one person
to another and may be different for a given person depending on many factors,
including environmental and social factors. ... Under article 12 of the Convention,
perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity must not be used as justification for
denying legal capacity.33
3.41 Bruce Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython submitted that stereotyping detracts
from equality, and prevents the ‘flourishing’ of people with disability:
Ultimately equality is a pernicious abstraction unless it fosters flourishing. Equality is
significant because inequality is associated with discrimination, in particular the non-
recognition of capabilities on the basis of stereotypes and the retention of barriers to
the fulfilment of both people with disabilities and people around them.34
3.42 Paragraphs (2)(d)–(e) reflect a functional assessment of ability. These
Guidelines may apply to a decision, or types of decision, depending on the
circumstances. As the Council of Social Service of NSW (NCOSS) submitted:
Determinations about capacity must be made not only on a person-by-person basis,
but also about every separate decision for each person, because people may have
different capacity to make different decisions at different times.35
3.43 As  the  Law  Commission  of  England  and  Wales  concluded  in  a  review  of
‘mental incapacity’ in 1995, status-based assessments should be rejected as being
‘quite out of tune with the policy aim of enabling and encouraging people to take for
themselves any decision which they have capacity to take’.36
3.44 In the context of the Support Guidelines, the functional approach is directed
towards an assessment of the support needs of the person who requires decision-
making support. In other specific contexts, this approach may also inform decisions
about the need to appoint another to assist or represent the person.
3.45 There are concerns that functional tests of ability may present inappropriate
barriers to the exercise of legal agency. However, it is not practicable to completely do
away with some functional tests of ability that have consequences for participation in
legal processes. For example, the integrity of a criminal trial (and, arguably, the
criminal law itself) would be prejudiced if the defendant does not have the ability to
understand and participate in a meaningful way. It may also breach the person’s human
rights by denying them a fair trial, implicating arts 12 and 13 of the CRPD.
33 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [13].
34 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38. The submission of NCOSS to the NDIS Rules also strongly
rejected decisions based on stereotyping, referred to in its submission to this Inquiry: NCOSS, Submission
26.
35 NCOSS, Submission 26.
36 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.3].
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3.46 Other law reform bodies have endorsed the functional approach.37 In  its
extensive inquiry on Queensland’s guardianship laws, the QLRC commented that the
functional approach is a ‘widely accepted modern capacity model’,38 and observed that
It has been suggested that one of the advantages of the functional approach is that it
‘best accommodates the reality that decision-making capacity is a continuum rather
than an endpoint which can be neatly characterised as present or absent’. In contrast to
the status model, there is no requirement for the presence of a particular type of
disability or condition. The relevant question is whether the adult lacks capacity for
making a decision about a given matter, for whatever cause and for whatever reason.39
3.47 The  ALRC  notes  some  criticism  by  the  UNCRPD  of  what  it  described  as  a
functional approach in its General Comment on art 12:
The functional approach attempts to assess mental capacity and deny legal capacity
accordingly. ... This approach is flawed for two key reasons: (a) it is discriminatorily
applied to people with disabilities; and (b) it presumes to be able to accurately assess
the inner-workings of the human mind and, when the person does not pass the
assessment, it then denies him or her a core human right—the right to equal
recognition before the law. In all of those approaches, a person’s disability and/or
decision-making skills are taken as legitimate grounds for denying his or her legal
capacity and lowering his or her status as a person before the law. Article 12 does not
permit such discriminatory denial of legal capacity, but rather requires that support be
provided in the exercise of legal capacity.40
3.48 When the General Comment was in draft form, the emphasis in this paragraph
was softened by a later comment that ‘functional tests of mental capacity, or outcome-
based approaches that lead to denials of legal capacity violate Article 12 if they are
either discriminatory or disproportionately affect the right of persons with disabilities
to equality before the law’.41 However, the final form of the General Comment dropped
these words. The ALRC considers that, with appropriate safeguards, and a rights
emphasis, there is no ‘discriminatory denial of legal capacity’ necessarily inherent in a
functional test—provided the emphasis is placed principally on the support necessary
for decision-making and that any appointment is for the purpose of protecting the
person’s human rights.
37 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 27(a);
Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Substitute Decision-Making for People
Lacking Capacity, NSW Parliament (Report 43, 2010) [4.56]. With respect to para (f), compare, eg,
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 27(b); Queensland
Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Final Report R67 (2010) rec
7–14(d). See also Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Substitute Decision-Making
for People Lacking Capacity, NSW Parliament (Report 43, 2010) rec 1.
38 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Final Report R67
(2010) [7.105].
39 Ibid [7.103]. Citing Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Vulnerable Adults and the Law,  Report No 83
(2006) [2.28].
40 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [15].
41 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2013 [21] (emphasis added).
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3.49 Paragraph (2)(d) rejects an outcomes-based approach and captures what is
described as ‘the dignity of risk’, which is underpinned by the framing principle of
autonomy. As Dr Mary Donnelly explains,
Respect for the liberal principle of autonomy requires that external factors, including
the outcome of the decision reached and the degree of risk assumed, are irrelevant to
the determination of capacity. ... [R]espect for autonomy is premised on allowing each
individual to determine for herself what is good. Therefore, whether or not a person’s
decision complies with other people’s perception of ‘the good’ is irrelevant to whether
the person has capacity. In the words of the Law Commission [of England and
Wales], according a role to the nature of the decision reached is inappropriate because
it ‘penalises individuality and demands conformity at the expense of personal
autonomy’.42
Will, preferences and rights
Principle 3: Will, preferences and rights
The will, preferences and rights of persons who may require decision-making
support must direct decisions that affect their lives.
3.50 The Terms of Reference direct the ALRC to consider ‘how maximising
individual autonomy and independence’ can be modelled in Commonwealth laws and
legal frameworks. The emphasis on the will and preferences of a person who may
require support in making decisions is at the heart of the paradigm shift away from
‘best interests’ standards, as discussed in Chapter 2. Given that the focus on will and
preferences is such a key idea in all the discussions, the ALRC considers that it needs
to be identified as a general principle. It reflects the framing principles of dignity,
equality, autonomy, and inclusion and participation.
3.51 There are a range of formulations of this concept, including those of the VLRC
and the QLRC in their reports on guardianship. In its list of ‘new general principles’,
the VLRC included the principle that ‘people with impaired decision-making ability ...
have wishes and preferences that should inform decisions made in their lives’.43 The
QLRC recommended that emphasis should be placed on promoting and safeguarding
‘the adult’s rights, interests and opportunities’ and ‘the importance of preserving, to the
greatest extent practicable, the adult’s right to make his or her decisions’.44
3.52 The ALRC has chosen ‘must’ in the formulation of National Decision-Making
Principle 3, to signal that this general principle has an important role in modelling
Commonwealth laws. The word ‘direct’ should also be used, rather than a word like
‘inform’, as ‘direct’ attaches more weight to their will and preferences than does
‘inform’. The ALRC also considers that the principle should not be qualified by words
42 Donnelly, above n 29, 101. Quoting Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.4].
43 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 21(d).
44 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Final Report R67
(2010) recs 7–14 (b), (c).
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such as ‘to the greatest extent practicable’, which is contained, for example, in the
QLRC formulations.45 What happens when a person’s will and preferences cannot be
determined is considered as a separate issue in the Guidelines.
3.53 Article 12(4) of the CRPD uses the formulation ‘rights, will and preferences’.
The ALRC formulation follows the spectrum of decision-making based on the will and
preferences of a person, through to a human rights focus in circumstances where the
will and preferences of a person cannot be determined. The inclusion of ‘rights’ is the
crucial safeguard. In cases where it is not possible to determine the will and
preferences of the person, the default position must be to consider the human rights
relevant to the situation as the guide for the decision to be made.
3.54 The emphasis should be shifted from ‘best interests’ to ‘will and preferences’
approaches. Even in those examples of approaches where ‘best interests’ are defined by
giving priority to ‘will and preferences’,46 the standard of ‘best interests’ is still
anchored conceptually in regimes from which the ALRC is seeking to depart.
3.55 Stakeholders strongly supported this approach.47 For  example,  QDN  said  that
‘[t]his is an important development in acknowledging the rights of an individual who is
unable to make a decision independently’.48 The Australian Research Network on Law
and Ageing welcomed
the emphasis of the Principles on the human rights of the person to whom the decision
relates. In particular we note the importance of looking beyond the concept of
promoting the personal autonomy of persons, to include the wider right of respect for
the person’s dignity. It has been recognized that dignity is a wider concept than
autonomy, and a universal value to which all persons are entitled. It therefore has
special relevance for those whose capacity is compromised, either because of
conditions producing fluctuating capacity, or for more chronic situations.49
3.56 Principle 3 applies to both supporters and representatives. In the ALRC’s model,
where a person appoints a supporter, as set out in the Commonwealth decision-making
model,50 decisions remain those of the person, not of the supporter. The concern is to
describe the relationship between the person being supported and the supporter, 51 and
establish the expectations of a formal supporter role. Chapter 4 discusses the duties of
supporters and representatives.
3.57 To provide greater clarity about the distinction between a supporter and a
representative and full emphasis to will and preferences in decision-making, the Will,
Preferences and Rights Guidelines (below) refer to both roles.52 The Principle has a
45 See Ibid ch 4 (The General Principles).
46 For example, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK). See discussion in Ch 2.
47 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120; Queenslanders with Disability Network,
Submission 119; ADACAS, Submission 108; Australian Research Network on Law and Ageing,
Submission 102; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
48 Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
49 Australian Research Network on Law and Ageing, Submission 102.
50 See Ch 4.
51 See, eg, Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
52 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposal 3–6.
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role in embodying the move away from objective ‘best interests’ approaches, which is
most necessary when a person is appointed to make decisions on behalf of another. In
the ALRC’s model, this occurs when another person is appointed as a ‘representative’.
The significant shift is in the decision-making standard by which that person must act,
and the constraints on the appointment of a representative in the first place. Given that
such appointments are made under state and territory law, the full implementation of
the ALRC’s recommendations will be dependent on reform of state and territory
legislation.
Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines
Recommendation 3–3 Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines
(1) Supported decision-making
(a) In assisting a person who requires decision-making support to make
decisions, a person chosen by them as supporter must:
(i) support the person to express their will and preferences; and
(ii)  assist the person to develop their own decision-making ability.
(b)  In communicating will and preferences, a person is entitled to:
(i)  communicate by any means that enable them to be understood; and
(ii)  have their cultural and linguistic circumstances recognised and
respected.
(2) Representative decision-making
Where a representative is appointed to make decisions for a person who requires
decision-making support:
(a)  The person’s will and preferences must be given effect.
(b)  Where the person’s current will and preferences cannot be determined,
the representative must give effect to what the person would likely want,
based on all the information available, including by consulting with
family members, carers and other significant people in their life.
(c)  If it is not possible to determine what the person would likely want, the
representative must act to promote and uphold the person’s human rights
and act in the way least restrictive of those rights.
(d) A representative may override the person’s will and preferences only
where necessary to prevent harm.
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3.58 The Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines begin by clearly differentiating
between supported and representative decision-making.53 The starting point, in both
cases, is that decisions must be directed by the will and preferences of the person
needing decision-making support.
3.59 Paragraph (1) defines the meaning of supported decision-making, in terms of the
role of the supporter and the right of the person being supported to express their will
and preferences.
3.60 Paragraph (2) sets the standard for representative decision-making. Importantly,
the Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines address what should happen when the
current will and preferences of a person cannot be determined. The focus should be on
what the person’s will and preferences would likely be. In the absence of a means to
determine this, a new default standard is advocated—expressed not in terms of ‘best
interests’, but in terms of human rights.
3.61 Paragraph (2)(a) provides that a person’s will and preferences must be given
effect, which is central to the paradigm shift signalled in the CRPD and involves an
emphasis on participation and communication.
3.62 Paragraph (2)(b) provides the standard for how a representative should act, in
circumstances where the supported person’s will and preferences cannot currently be
determined. The representative must seek to ascertain what the person would likely
have wanted in the particular circumstances. This is essentially a past preferences
approach.54 It requires a consideration of past information about decision-making
choices. A key source of such information is likely to be the person’s family members,
carers and other significant people in their life.
3.63 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) includes a list of those who could provide
such information.55 Similar lists have been included in, for example, the Mental Health
Act 2014 (Vic);56 and the Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA).57 Consulting family members
and others provides a further avenue for recognising the role of family members and
carers.
3.64 Stakeholders endorsed the recognition of family as supporters who can provide
relevant information regarding will and preferences. For example, the Mental Health
Coordinating Council submitted:
The role of family members and carers should be recognised in Commonwealth laws.
The supporting policy frameworks must reflect that those assessing capacity and
supporting decision-making must listen to, learn from and act upon communications
from the individual and their carers about what is important to each individual. This
53 This was also suggested by Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
54 See Ch 2.
55 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK)  s  4(6),  (7).  See  also: Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA)
s 5; Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT)  ss  4,  5A; Adult Guardianship and
Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta) cA4.2, s 2(d).
56 For example, s 71(4).
57 For example, pt 2 div 4, ‘Wishes of a person’.
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involves acknowledging each individual is an expert on their own life and that their
‘recovery’ and care involves working in partnership with individuals and their carers
to provide support in a way that makes sense to them and that assists them realise
their own hopes, goals and aspirations.58
3.65 Paragraph  (2)(c)  embodies  a  human  rights  approach,  where  the  will  and
preferences cannot be determined by any means. The underlying idea in this guideline
is that the default position should not be expressed in terms of a ‘best interests’
standard.
The ‘best interests’ principle is not a safeguard which complies with article 12 in
relation to adults. The ‘will and preference’ paradigm must replace the ‘best interests’
paradigm to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the right to legal capacity on
an equal basis with others.59
3.66 The move away from a best interests standard was also strongly supported by
stakeholders.60 There  are  different  ways  that  this  shift  can  be  expressed.  The  VLRC,
for example, recommended that the ‘promotion of the personal and social wellbeing of
the person’ replace ‘best interests’.61 The QLRC recommended that powers should be
used in a way that ‘promotes and safeguards’ and is ‘least restrictive’ of an adult’s
‘rights, interests and opportunities’.62
3.67 The kinds of human rights encompassed by the Guideline include the various
matters set out in the CRPD, including:
· respect for inherent dignity—preamble and art 3;
· non-discrimination—art 5;
· liberty and security—art 14;
· freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—
art 15;
· physical and mental integrity—art 17;
· liberty of movement—art 18;
· independent living—art 19;
· respect for privacy—art 22;
· respect for home and family—art 23; and
· participation in political and public life—art 29.
58 Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
59 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014.
60 Eg, Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130; Justice Connect and Seniors
Rights Victoria, Submission 120; Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119; Australian
Research Network on Law and Ageing, Submission 102; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic),
Submission 95; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 94.
61 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) 536 n 83.
62 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Final Report R67
(2010) [5].
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3.68 While the ALRC has sought distance from the ‘best interests’ standard of
previous eras, the Law Council of Australia submitted that
the ‘best interests’ of an individual should be consistent with their will and
preferences in the majority of circumstances. If these are inconsistent, or if one is
unable to be ascertained, the objective and subjective elements of each approach can
be balanced by reference to appropriate international human rights standards.
The Law Society of New South Wales advises that ‘best interests’ standards should be
retained as a last resort for people with disabilities whose will and preferences cannot
be determined, for example, to prevent elder abuse.63
3.69 Some have suggested the retention of the ‘best interests’ approach as a
fallback.64 Part of the issue with the ‘best interests’ standard was said to be that it was
poorly understood. The Office of the Public Advocate (Qld) observed that
what is in a person’s best interests has often been conflated with ‘medical judgement’
or another professional’s judgement. Such determinations do not take into account the
particular views, wishes and needs of the person.
‘Best interests’ is often applied in an unsystematic way without any unpacking of
relevant considerations, including the values and principles applied in the decision-
making process.65
3.70 The OPA (Qld) also argued that, without ‘careful guidance, education, training
and advice’, a rights-based approach could be similarly fraught and that the ‘kind of
cultural change that needs to be achieved will be difficult to effect without a holistic
strategy’.66
[S]upporters and other decision-makers must be provided with guidance about how to
apply a rights-based approach, including how to evaluate and weigh different
considerations. Formal guidelines or codes of practice under the relevant legislation
should also be provided to guide decision-makers in implementing a rights-based
approach.67
3.71 The importance of developing codes of practice was also emphasised by the
Mental Health Coordinating Council:
Whilst we agree that there needs to be a consistent approach to the assessment of
capacity in the context of representative decision making, promoting individual
autonomy as circumstances require, it is important that the process does not become
too proscriptive and therefore run the risk of leading to, for example, harm or neglect.
At the end of the day the legislation must have an underpinning code of practice that
provides the key framework and principles of best practice.68
63 Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
64 Eg, the NSWCID submitted that ‘[t]here should also be caution about completely dispensing with the best
interests approach—it has weaknesses but it also has the strength of being able to flexibly accommodate
the unique and fluctuating circumstances of an individual’: NSW Council for Intellectual Disability,
Submission 33.
65 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 94.
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3.72 In its General Comment on art 12, the UNCRPD suggested that, if the will and
preferences of a person could not be determined, the new standard to replace ‘best
interests’ should be the ‘best interpretation of will and preferences’.69
3.73 CDLP Galway referred to this ‘best interpretation’ approach in submitting that,
Whereas good efforts should be made to determine the will and preference of the
relevant person, where the ‘best interpretation’ arrived at leads to a conflict of human
rights (eg right to health in conflict with right to self-determination), it may be better
for outside decision-makers to adhere to subjective guidance and follow the principle
of ‘best interpretation’ rather than setting forth ‘objective’ rules which would allow
the representative to decide which balance of human rights to achieve.70
3.74 CDLP Galway also referred to amendments to Irish legislation,  which inserted
the following definition of ‘best interpretation’:
the interpretation of the relevant person’s past and present communication (using all
forms of communication, including, where relevant, total communication, augmented
or alternative communication, and non-verbal communication, such as gestures and
actions) that seems most reasonably justified in the circumstances.71
3.75 It was suggested that ‘this language could be used to guide the ALRC in its
development of final recommendations on how will and preferences may be
determined in situations of last resort’.72 Such an approach may sometimes be
instructive in terms of how current and past will and preferences are determined under
paragraphs (2)(a) and (b) of the Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines.
3.76 Consistently with the CRPD, it is important to leave the ‘best interests’ language
behind in advancing supported decision-making in Australian laws and legal
frameworks. However, it is not clear that the ‘best interpretation’ approach should
necessarily be the default standard when a person’s will and preferences are not
known, nor are capable of being made known. Judges have developed other approaches
in such contexts, for example:
· what a reasonable and ordinary man might do in the position of a ‘lunatic’ with
respect to the disposition of his surplus income—the standard developed by
Lord Eldon LC in the leading case concerning the ‘substituted judgment’
approach;73 and
69 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [21]. This paragraph was added between
the draft and the final form of the General Comment on art 12, with respect to art 12(4).
70 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130.
71 Ibid. Quoting the From Mental Capacity to Legal Capacity (Amendment) (No 2) Assisted Decision-
Making (Capacity) Bill (2013) [2.1.5].
72 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130.
73 Ex Parte Whitbread, in the Matter of Hinde, a Lunatic (1816) 2 Mer 99, 35 ER 878. See William
Thompson and Richard Hale, ‘Surplus Income of a Lunatic’ (1894) 8 Harvard Law Review 472, 474–
475. The authors then trace the application of Lord Eldon’s principle in later cases. See also R Croucher,
‘“An Interventionist, Paternalistic Jurisdiction”? The Place of Statutory Wills in Australian Succession
Law’ (2009) 32 University of New South Wales Law Journal 674.
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· the ‘wise and just husband and father’ approach in relation to family provision
litigation.74
3.77 The danger in such approaches is that they reveal a certain blurring of the
subjective and objective in the creation of a ‘legal fiction’.75 They also run the risk of
contradicting other principles advocated by the UNCRPD in its General Comment, in
particular that
All forms of support in the exercise of legal capacity (including more intensive forms
of support) must be based on the will and preference of the person, not on what is
perceived as being in his or her objective best interests.76
3.78 The  ALRC  considers  that  it  is  better  to  use  human  rights  standards  as  the
benchmark, accompanied by appropriate guidelines, codes of practice and other
explanatory material, developed over time. Such material should be accompanied by
appropriate training and guidance.
3.79 Where a representative is appointed, the decision-making standard to be applied
is, therefore, to give priority to the will and preferences of the person but, if these
cannot be determined, decision-making must emphasise the human rights of the
person, particularly as articulated in the CRPD. Decisions must also be made on the
basis of the least restrictive option—a point included specifically in the Safeguards
Guidelines.77 This approach uses objective standards—because the subjective cannot
be determined.
3.80 The NSW Council for Intellectual Disability (NSWCID) questioned whether
human rights provide an adequate basis for decisions where a person’s will and
preferences cannot be ascertained. The NSWCID noted that there is limited
understanding of human rights and there are many international instruments. Different
rights may point to different outcomes ‘so that quite complex balancing exercises are
required to make a decision’.
The result of all this might be that only highly educated people were qualified to make
representative decisions. We are concerned about the prospect of removing from
eligibility as representatives down to earth practical family members who have a
lifetime’s knowledge of a person with disability.78
3.81 The NSWCID preferred the standard recommended by the VLRC—that
representatives be required to exercise their powers ‘in a manner that promotes the
personal and social wellbeing of the person’, with guidance from a list of relevant
factors.
74 See, eg, Rosalind Croucher, ‘The Concept of Moral Duty in the Law of Family Provision—A Gloss or
Critical Understanding?’ (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Legal History 5.
75 See Louise Harmon, ‘Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment’
[1990] Yale Law Journal 1, 22.
76 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [29](b).
77 See, eg, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(6); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta)
cA4.2, s 2(c); NSW Trustee and Guardian Act s 39(b). See also: Mental Health Coordinating Council,
Submission 07; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
78 NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 131.
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3.82 Autonomy is a key principle of the CRPD, but a human rights approach places
autonomy in a much wider context. As Donnelly suggests, a human rights framework
‘provides a mechanism within which to deal with questions of limitations on the right
of autonomy’:
The contribution of the CRPD is likely to be most significant in providing human
rights support for the development of legal obligations to empower patients, in the
context of capacity assessment, decision-making on behalf of people lacking capacity
and treatment for a mental disorder.79
3.83 The human rights approach is also reflected in the paragraph 2(d) of the Will,
Preferences and Rights Guidelines, which provides that a representative may override
the will and preferences of a person only where necessary to prevent harm. This is
consistent with the CRPD in that, for example, art 17 of the CRPD may require the
representative to make a decision that protects the person’s ‘physical and mental
integrity’, notwithstanding the decision conflicts with the person’s expressed will and
preferences. A qualification of this kind tests the limits of autonomy, particularly
where the limitation concerns harm to oneself. Examples are seen usually in the
context of mental health legislation: to save a patient’s life, or to prevent a patient from
seriously injuring themselves or others. Safeguards may be included in terms of
ensuring that the course of action proposed is the ‘least restrictive’ option.80 The latter
approach is captured in the Safeguards Principles, considered below.
3.84 Whenever a limit is included, considerable care is needed in translating it into
practice. A provision that a person’s will and preferences may be overridden based on
the outcome of a decision—in this case, harm—runs contrary to a focus on ability that
is not outcomes-based.81 However, it is not necessarily inconsistent with a principle of
autonomy, as autonomy is not an absolute concept. The classical conceptualisation of
autonomy, by John Stuart Mill, recognised some limit—that it may be limited in order
‘to prevent harm to others’.82 He  gave  the  example  of  a  wayfarer,  summarised  by
Donnelly as follows:
Mill describes a wayfarer approaching a dangerous bridge in circumstances in which
it  is  uncertain whether she is  aware of the danger.  He states that  it  is  permissible to
stop the wayfarer and warn her of the dangers ahead but if, following the warning, the
wayfarer still wishes to proceed, she should be permitted to do so. Mill also
recognised that interference with individual freedom could be justified in order ‘to
prevent harm to others’. However, this justification does not allow a wholesale
overriding of individual freedom. While acknowledging that ‘no person is an entirely
isolated being’, Mill argued that a person can be stopped from doing something only
if, in doing that thing, she would ‘violate a distinct and assignable obligation’ to
others.83
79 Donnelly, above n 29, 277.
80 See, eg, Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 71(3) concerning treatment decisions for patients who either do
not have capacity to give informed consent, or who do not give informed consent.
81 See above.
82 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859) in John Gray (ed) On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford
University Press, 1991) 14.
83 Donnelly, above n 29, 21. Citing John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859) in John Gray (ed) On
Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, 1991) 107, 14, 88 respectively.
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3.85 Overriding will and preferences on the basis of preventing harm to others is one
aspect of a harm principle; another concerns the issue of preventing harm to oneself.
Arnold and Bonython defended the need to make decisions on behalf of people in some
contexts and suggested that this is consistent with human rights law and with ‘accepted
bioethical standards and with the practicalities of both health care and social activity’:
It is axiomatic that all Australians, with or without disabilities, may experience life-
threatening circumstances in which a decision should be made by a medical
practitioner or other recognised decision-maker within a coherent and transparent
legal framework to preserve the life of the individual. From a human rights
perspective it is also axiomatic that interventions that are contrary to the will of some
individuals will be necessary in order to both preserve the life of those individuals and
the lives of the intimates or other associates of those individuals.84
3.86 Intervening to preserve the life of a person against their will and preferences is
what CDLP Galway described as one of the ‘hard cases’. They give the example of a
person with anorexia:
Many people with anorexia express a will to live, but a preference to not eat. In these
cases, an outside decision-maker may be involved, but would still be restricted from
making a decision that was contrary to the individual’s expressed will and preference.
PEG feeding, for example, would only be allowed if the individual agreed to it. These
situations will always be difficult—they are difficult under ‘best interests’
determinations and they will continue to be difficult under an approach that prioritises
will and preference.85
3.87 While emphasising the support paradigm and the paramountcy of will and
preferences, CDLP Galway said that this ‘does not mean that vulnerable individuals
who are having difficulty expressing their will and preference are going to be left by
the wayside in emergency situations’:
For example, in a situation in which an individual is displaying behaviours of serious
self-harm, the support paradigm does not leave the individual to perish. Instead, it
asks support people around the person to closely examine what is happening and to
support the individual by taking actions that will facilitate her or his decision-making
ability to a point at which she or he can clearly express her or his will and preferences.
This could mean a variety of things, including but not limited to assisting the
individual in stopping the self-harming behaviour and interacting with the individual
in a caring and understanding manner and/or attempting to create an environment that
the individual feels safe and comfortable in to allow her or him to be in an optimal
decision-making scenario. Throughout any interaction, the goal remains of arriving at
the will and preference of the individual. Further, according to the terms of the CRPD,
any emergency interventions must adhere to the principle of non-discrimination by
ensuring that criteria for crisis interventions do not discriminate on the basis of
disability (for example, by using mental health diagnosis or mental capacity
assessments).86
3.88 How does one achieve an intervention which is both respectful of will and
preferences, but is also least restrictive of the person’s human rights? CDLP Galway
84 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
85 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130 (citations omitted).
86 Ibid.
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argued that permitting intervention in the way they described is not the same, nor
should it be, ‘equated to substitute decision-making systems that currently exist’:
There are clear distinctions, which are 1) using ‘will and preference’ as the guiding
paradigm as opposed to ‘best interest,’ 2) not denying legal capacity to individuals
with disabilities on a different basis, and 3) not imposing outside decision-makers
against the will of the individual.
However, there are times in which a decision needs to be made and the relevant
individual is not able to make a decision or needs assistance in making the decision.
The foregoing explanation is meant to show that Article 12 can and does address these
situations without the need for substituted decision-making. However, it is also
important to stress that these solutions are ONLY intended to apply to the ‘hard
cases’, and should not encroach into cases where an individual is expressing a will
and preference—even where the will and preference of the individual is contrary to
medical advice or to advice of mental health professionals. It should also not be used
to impose an outside decision-maker on a person who is expressing an unpopular or
unorthodox decision. The solutions proposed for these ‘hard cases’ only apply at the
end of a process where there is a genuine inability to understand a person’s will and
preference or where it is impossible to realise the person’s will and preferences
without breaching some other aspect of the law.87
3.89 The Australian Guardianship and Administration Council (AGAC) submitted
similarly that,
in  certain  circumstances,  the  views  of  the  person  might  lead  to  outcomes  that  are
significantly detrimental to the person’s health and welfare. In these circumstances,
recognition of the representative’s authority to make decisions contrary to the wishes
of the person is essential.88
3.90 CDLP Galway said that, while intervention ‘in some exceptional cases which
conflicts with the individual’s will and preferences should be permissible’, they need to
be ‘disability-neutral and not justified on the basis of an individual’s decision-making
ability’.89
3.91 The development of codes of practice, guidance and accountability measures
will, over time, lead to a shift in ‘culture’ and practice. An important aspect of this
cultural shift arises in decisions where the person involved has expressed will and
preferences that are likely to be financially detrimental. The issue is captured in the
phrase ‘dignity of risk’. While the UNCRPD has referred to the need to protect people
from ‘undue influence’, it has also said that protection must ‘respect the rights, will and
preferences of the person, including the right to take risks and make mistakes’.90
87 Ibid.
88 AGAC, Submission 91.
89 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130.
90 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [22].
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Safeguards
Principle 4: Safeguards
Laws and legal frameworks must contain appropriate and effective safeguards in
relation to interventions for persons who may require decision-making support,
including to prevent abuse and undue influence.
3.92 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider whether ‘the powers and
duties of decision-making supporters and substituted decision-makers’ are ‘effective,
appropriate and consistent with Australia’s international obligations’. The Terms of
Reference also ask the ALRC to consider mechanisms to review decisions about the
assessment of a person’s ability ‘to independently make decisions’.
3.93 Article 12(4) of the CRPD sets out safeguards obligations. The article requires
that all measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and
effective safeguards. In particular, it requires that such safeguards:
· prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights law;
· respect the rights, will and preferences of the person;
· are free of conflict of interest and undue influence;
· are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances;
· apply for the shortest time possible;
· are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial
authority or judicial body; and
· are proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights
and interests.91
3.94 The Safeguards Principle and Guidelines reflect these requirements.
Safeguards Guidelines
Recommendation 3–4 Safeguards Guidelines
(1) General
Safeguards should ensure that interventions for persons who require decision-
making support are:
(a) the least restrictive of the person’s human rights;
91 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 12(4).
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(b) subject to appeal; and
(c) subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring and review.
(2)  Support in decision-making
(a) Support in decision-making must be free of conflict of interest and undue
influence.
(b) Any appointment of a representative decision-maker should be:
(i)  a last resort and not an alternative to appropriate support;
(ii)  limited in scope, proportionate, and apply for the shortest time
possible; and
(iii) subject to review.
3.95 These Guidelines capture the essential elements of safeguards that should be
incorporated in laws and legal frameworks that deal with decision-making by people
who need support to make decisions.
3.96 Stakeholders generally supported the ‘least restrictive’ intervention and ‘last
resort’ appointment approaches. These are consistent with the position of the
Australian Government as set out in the Interpretative Declaration on art 12 of the
CRPD, discussed in Chapter 2.
3.97 The Law Council referred to some current good practice examples of
requirements on guardians ‘to restrict as little as possible the freedom of decision
making and action of a person in need of, or under, guardianship’92 and of reluctance to
make guardianship orders in the first place. The QDN, for example, emphasised that it
is ‘critical that appointments of representatives and supporters be time and task
specific’.93
3.98 Paragraph (2)(a) reflects the need for safeguards to be directed to the potential
problem of conflict between a supporter or representative and the person being
supported. Stakeholders identified this as an issue. For example, CDLP Galway
submitted:
It is vital to recognize the role of the family as a natural support system, and the
crucial role of carers and others in supporting persons who may require decision-
making support. However, this principle must always be accompanied by safeguards
in order to minimize conflicts of interest which inevitably arise. While the family
should be recognized as a natural support system, they should only be assigned the
92 Law Council of Australia, Submission 142. Referring to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal
website and restrictions in the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW).
93 Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
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role of the support in cases where the person gives consent to family members
assuming such a role.94
3.99 Similarly, Justice Connect said that:
One concern with appointing a supported or substitute decision maker is the level to
which that person is able to divorce themselves from their own bias and concerns, and
act in accordance with the will and preferences of the supported person.95
3.100 The circumstances in which representative decision-makers are appointed need
to be reviewed, and should be central to review of state and territory legislation in the
light of the National Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-
making model. Implementing paragraph (2)(b) of the Safeguards Guidelines should
result in more constraint in the appointment of representative decision-makers.
3.101 The ALRC recognises that this is an iterative process that will take some time.
The goal is for supported decision-making to become the dominant model—not only in
aspiration, but also in practice. The OPA (Qld) submitted:
Regardless of views about the compatibility of guardianship laws with the
Convention, there is general recognition that the focus must now move from the
challenges facing a person with disability to the supports that should be provided to
enable them to make decisions and exercise their legal capacity. This means that the
appointment of a substitute decision-maker should not preclude efforts to support a
person to make their own decisions.96
3.102 CDLP Galway acknowledged that paragraph (2)(b) sets out an ‘important
safeguard’, but said that ‘there should be something to distinguish it from the already
existing safeguards in the antiquated substituted decision-making regimes’. As
observed by the UNCRPD in its General Comment, the ‘most important safeguard for
a decision-making regime is respect for the rights, will, and preferences of the relevant
person’.97
3.103 In the National Decision-Making Principles, respect for the will and preferences
of the person is embodied in the standard by which a representative is to act, as set out
in Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines. To distinguish the old approach from the
new, it is also necessary to move away from status-based assessments of legal capacity
and to emphasise the role of support, as reflected by the Support Guidelines.
3.104 Stakeholders acknowledged that access to appeal and review mechanisms is an
important safeguard.
Safeguards should not just respect due process or judicial review of the interventions
that restrict legal capacity. There is a need for checks and balances in order to respect
the process as well as the autonomy of the relevant person. For example, monitors
could be appointed in certain support agreements to ensure that significant decisions
are made on the basis of the relevant person’s will and preference. Also, the
infrastructure at Commonwealth and State or Territory levels established to oversee
94 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130.
95 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
96 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
97 Centre for Disability Law and Policy NUI Galway, Submission 130.
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and implement new legislation in this arena will be crucial, and accessible complaints
mechanisms must be established within the implementing bodies to ensure ease of
access for those using support to exercise legal capacity, as well as the usual recourse
to the courts ... Additionally, there should be training and support for the supporters to
ensure that they fully understand their role and the scope of their powers. Lastly, there
should be an appeal process to an independent and impartial tribunal or court for
instances when the relevant person is unable to choose his or her own representative
and where an outside decision-maker is appointed to make particular decisions.98
3.105 This statement illustrates how safeguards need to considered at all relevant
points along the spectrum of decision-making support, and in relation to all persons
and organisations involved in the particular category of decision.
98 Ibid.
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Summary
4.1 To encourage the adoption of supported decision-making at a Commonwealth
level, the ALRC recommends a new model for decision-making (the Commonwealth
decision-making model). This chapter outlines the model, based on the positions of
‘supporter’ and ‘representative’. The role of both supporters and representatives is to
support people who may require decision-making support to make decisions in the
relevant area of Commonwealth law.
4.2 This chapter describes the Commonwealth decision-making model and discusses
the potential application of the model in areas of Commonwealth law, and the chosen
terminology.
4.3 The chapter then addresses the key elements of the model. It makes
recommendations about amending the objects or principles provisions in relevant
Commonwealth legislation; the appointment, recognition, functions and duties of
supporters and representatives; and appropriate and effective safeguards. The chapter
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also discusses the interaction of supporters and representatives with state and territory
appointed decision-makers, such as guardians and administrators.
4.4 The ALRC recommends that mechanisms should be developed for sharing
information about appointments of supporters and representatives, including to avoid
duplication of appointments and to facilitate review and monitoring; and that the
Australian Government provide guidance and training in relation to supported
decision-making.
Supported decision-making at a Commonwealth level
Recommendation 4–1 A Commonwealth decision-making model that
encourages supported decision-making should be introduced into relevant
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks in a form consistent with the
National Decision-Making Principles and Recommendations 4–2 to 4–9.
4.5 In the ALRC’s view, it is desirable to introduce statutory mechanisms for formal
supported decision-making at a Commonwealth level.
4.6 The ALRC recommends introducing mechanisms for the appointment of
‘supporters’ for adults who may require decision-making support, in some areas of
Commonwealth law. The introduction of provisions relating to ‘representatives’ to
address circumstances in which a person may desire, or require, someone else to make
decisions for them, is also recommended.
4.7 A range of stakeholders expressed support for the legislative recognition of
supported decision-making or gave ‘in principle’ support for the model proposed in the
Discussion Paper.1
4.8 The National Association of Community Legal Centres (NACLC), for example,
submitted that the introduction of statutory mechanisms for formal supported decision-
making at a Commonwealth level is an ‘important first step in the reform of laws and
legal frameworks to ensure people with disability in Australia enjoy equal recognition
before the law and recognition of their right to legal capacity on an equal basis with
others’.2
4.9 Pave the Way suggested that the decision-making model should be implemented
through a single Commonwealth Act, so that ‘all relevant Commonwealth agencies
1 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 142; National Association of Community Legal Centres,
Submission 127; Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126; Illawarra Forum, Submission 124; Office of
the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95;
AGAC, Submission 91; MHCA, Submission 77; Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17;
Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06. See also Victorian Law Reform Commission,
Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [7.73]–[7.82], which adopted the view that formalisation of
supported decision-making arrangements would be desirable.
2 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
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recognise decisions that are made with support as well as recognising the role of
supporters and representatives’.3
4.10 The Commonwealth decision-making model represents a significant shift in
approaches to decision-making. The question of how the ALRC’s model would interact
with decision-making regimes under state and territory law also requires further
consideration.
4.11 The ALRC considers that the model should be applied first to decision-making
under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and in some other areas of
Commonwealth responsibility—social security, aged care and eHealth records. It is
intended that the Commonwealth decision-making model will also influence reform of
state and territory laws.4
Levels of support
4.12 Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD)5 and the Support Principle6 contain the central concept of decision-making
support. The Commonwealth decision-making model is based on the idea that all
adults, except in very limited circumstances, have some level of decision-making
ability and should be entitled to make decisions expressing their will and preferences,
but may require varying levels of support to do so. Supported decision-making
reflects efforts to provide better ways of recognising and meeting the needs of adults
who have difficulty with certain areas of decision-making but who could make their
own decisions ‘with a little friendly help’.7
4.13 Rather than starting by questioning whether a person has the capacity to make
decisions—reflecting a binary view of capacity and decision-making8—the preferable
approach is to ask what level of support, or what mechanisms are necessary, to support
people to express their will and preferences. This recognises that the ability of a person
who needs decision-making support ‘to exercise legal agency is dependent on the
integrity, quality and appropriateness of support available’.9
4.14 A person may require varying levels of support to make a decision:
· Minimal support—for example, a person may require no support, or require
some assistance obtaining information, but when provided with the information
is then able to make the necessary decision. Similarly, the person may only
require support to communicate to a third party a decision they have made.
3 Pave the Way, Submission 90.
4 See Ch 10.
5 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
6 National Decision-Making Principle 2.
7 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. See Robert M Gordon, ‘The Emergence of Assisted
(Supported) Decision-Making in the Canadian Law of Adult Guardianship and Substitute Decision-
Making’ (2000) 23 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 61, 71.
8 See Ch 2.
9 PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66.
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· Low to medium support—for example, a person may require support to obtain
information, have the information explained to them in an appropriate way, and
receive advice about the possible decisions they might make.
· High support—for example, a person may require support to obtain information,
have the information explained to them in an appropriate way, receive advice
about the possible decisions they might make, communicate their decision, and
follow through to ensure their decision is given effect.
4.15 At each of these levels of support, under the Commonwealth decision-making
model, a person could appoint a supporter or supporters to assist them to make a
decision in the particular area of Commonwealth law.
4.16 There is one other category of support—full support.10 In such circumstances a
person may choose someone else to make decisions for them, or it may be necessary to
appoint someone to do so. Under the Commonwealth decision-making model, a
representative would first attempt to support the person to express their will and
preferences in order to make a decision. Where it is not possible to determine the
person’s will and preferences, the representative would make a decision based on what
the person would likely want, or on the basis of the person’s human rights relevant to
the situation. This is discussed further in Chapter 3 under the Will, Preferences and
Rights Guidelines and is consistent with National Decision-Making Principle 3.
4.17 Representative decision-making is ‘based on facilitating access to the enjoyment
of existing rights, rather than on making decisions on behalf of a person based on a
subjective assessment of their best interest’.11 Importantly, the functions and duties of
representatives differ from, and build on, those of nominees under existing
Commonwealth laws, such as plan nominees appointed under the National Disability
Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act).12
4.18 Stakeholders expressed concerns about the potential risks arising from a
combination of supported decision-making and decision-making by a substitute. In
particular, there was concern that substitute decision-making could become
predominant—what Professor Terry Carney and Dr Fleur Beaupert refer to as ‘net
widening’.13
4.19 The Australian Guardianship and Administration Council (AGAC) stated that,
while they agreed in principle with the application of the model to Commonwealth
laws,
we are concerned about the details of implementing this in a practical sense and the
very real risk of fragmentation, confusion and a potential for a lesser level of support
being the functional outcome. In short it runs the risk of making everyday decision
10 The concept of fully supported decision-making and its development is discussed in more detail in Ch 2.
11 PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66.
12 See Ch 5.
13 Terry Carney and Fleur Beaupert, ‘Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges Balancing Law, Services
and Civil Society in Advancing CRPD Supported Decision-Making’ (2013) 36 University of New South
Wales Law Journal 175.
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making more, not less complex, by adding an additional layer of formal decision
making appointment.14
4.20 The Offices of the Public Advocate (South Australia and Victoria) (OPA (SA
and Vic)) stated that providing a legislative framework for supported decision-making
is desirable for a number of important reasons, including
to respect the rights of people with cognitive impairment to participate in the
decisions that affect their lives; to reflect the sometimes evolving or fluctuating nature
of capacity noting that capacity is decision-specific; to ensure guardianship laws are
compliant with the CRPD; and to reinforce the supremacy of the rights paradigm in
laws that impact on people who require decision-making support.15
4.21 However, they acknowledged that, in practice, ‘relationships of support
currently operate informally, and often very effectively’ and there are risks in
‘formalising otherwise successful decision-making arrangements’.16 Advocacy for
Inclusion also cautioned against ‘over-formalising’ supported decision-making. This
risks ‘hindering the autonomy and decision-making rights of people with disabilities’
and takes away their control ‘by potentially setting out how decision-making
arrangements should operate, who they could appoint as a supporter, and what the
supporter might be obliged to do’. However,
there will be cases where a person with disability does not have access to respectful,
trusting, natural relationships. In these cases, if the person with disability chooses they
should be supported to establish relationships with formal supporters who have
undergone the appropriate checks, and who have undertaken training in supported
decision-making. Supported decision-making should be considered a mostly informal
arrangement, while facilitated decision-making should be considered a formal
arrangement.17
4.22 Circumstances that can lead to the appointment of formal decision-makers
include that supporters have difficulty dealing with third parties, such as
telecommunications companies, hospitals and health services on behalf of persons with
disability; and the need to fulfil administrative requirements demanded by government
agencies.18 The Office of the Public Advocate (Qld) observed that
The legal recognition of ‘supporters’ potentially addresses many of these problems. It
may mean that a person with disability can continue to receive informal support to
make decisions and communicate with third parties, without the need for their legal
decision-making capacity to be revoked.19
4.23 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria (Justice Connect) submitted that a
‘mechanism for the appointment of support decision-makers may act as a valuable (and
less restrictive) alternative to … guardianship and administration orders’ for older
14 AGAC, Submission 91.
15 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
16 Ibid.
17 Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126.
18 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110.
19 Ibid.
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people.20 Encouraging alternatives to guardianship and administration was considered
desirable by many stakeholders.
Operation and effect of the model
Operation
4.24 The Commonwealth decision-making model provides for formal supported
decision-making along a spectrum. At one end is a supporter appointed by a person
who requires decision-making support to assist them to make a decision or a category
of decisions. At the other is representative decision-making, which involves the
appointment of a representative, either by the person who requires decision-making
support or a court, tribunal or other body.
4.25 The development of the Commonwealth decision-making model was influenced
by the examination and articulation of approaches to supported decision-making by
bodies  such  as  the  Victorian  Law  Reform  Commission  (VLRC),  the  Office  of  the
Public Advocate (SA), as well as a number of international models.21
4.26 The ALRC intends that a supporter and representative scheme would be
provided for in particular areas of Commonwealth law, tailored to suit the legislative
context. However, it should incorporate a number of key elements based on the model
outlined below.
4.27 This approach was supported in submissions which suggested, for example, that
the ALRC ‘explore the idea of consolidating Commonwealth ... decision systems or at
least having one consistent structure that each system hangs off’.22
4.28 The ALRC focuses on a number of key elements of the model, rather than being
prescriptive about the mechanics of its application. For example, the ALRC does not
intend to outline the formal requirements that may be necessary to facilitate the
appointment of a supporter, or the way in which a particular Commonwealth
department or agency might record the appointment, other than to highlight the need
for information sharing between Commonwealth departments and agencies.
Effect
4.29 The implementation of the Commonwealth decision-making model is likely to
have  a  number  of  important  outcomes.  First,  it  would  ensure  that  persons  with
disability retain decision-making power in areas of Commonwealth law. It allows them
to express their will and preferences and exercise their legal capacity on an equal basis
with others.
20 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
21 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship,  Final  Report  No  24  (2012);  Office  of  the
Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17, attachment 1, ‘Stepped Model of Supported and Substitute
Decision-Making’. See also Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK); Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, ‘A New
Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity’ (Law Commission of Ontario,
October 2010); Amnesty International and the Centre for Disability Law and Policy, National University
of Ireland, Galway, Essential Principles: Irish Legal Capacity Law, 2001.
22 NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.
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4.30 Secondly, formalisation of support relationships would, as emphasised by the
VLRC in its guardianship report, ‘provide important legal acknowledgment of the fact
that mechanisms other than substitute decision making can be used to help people
engage in activities requiring legal capacity’.23
4.31 Thirdly, formalisation of support arrangements in the way envisaged by the
model is likely to create greater certainty for third parties about the role of supporters
and facilitate the provision of decision-making support to persons who may require it. 24
It would allow third parties to interact with supporters about decision-making with
greater confidence.
4.32 By formalising support relationships, the model also provides a mechanism for
acknowledging and respecting the role of family, carers and other supporters in the
lives of people with disability, which is one of the key elements of the Support
Guidelines.25 This may help address some of the difficulties and frustrations expressed
by stakeholders in the course of this Inquiry about insufficient recognition of ‘natural’
supporters.26 Recognition of supporters may also have the added effect of decreasing
applications for state and territory guardianship and administration orders initiated
primarily for the purposes of engaging with Australian Government systems. 27
4.33 To guide the adoption of supported decision-making at a Commonwealth level,
the ALRC makes a range of recommendations that form a Commonwealth decision-
making model.
Terminology
4.34 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked whether the terms ‘supporter’ and
‘representative’ were the most appropriate to use in the Commonwealth decision-
making model.28
4.35 As discussed in Chapter 2, the terminology relating to capacity and decision-
making is often a contested area, but the development of a new lexicon of terms may
23 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012), [8.62]. See also UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3
(entered into force 3 May 2008).
24 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012); Disability
Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission No 61 to the Victorian Law Reform Commission,
Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011; Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s
Guardianship Laws, Report No 67, 2010.
25 See Ch 3.
26 See, eg, Carers Alliance, Submission 84;  Carers  NSW, Submission 23; Centre for Rural Regional Law
and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20;  Office  of  the  Public
Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Carers Queensland Inc, Submission 14. See also more generally in
relation to family and carers: G Llewellyn, Submission 82; NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81;
Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68; B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38; Office of
the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
27 See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110; AGAC, Submission 51. Pave the Way
observed that ‘families are less likely to seek a guardianship or administration order in relation to their
loved one when government agencies and other organisations recognise their role in their family
member’s lives’: Pave the Way, Submission 09.
28 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 4–2.
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help to signal the ‘paradigm shift’ in attitudes to decision-making reflected in the
CRPD. The ALRC concludes that retaining the terminology proposed in the Discussion
Paper is the best option to effect this.
4.36 The term ‘supporter’ is used in the ALRC’s model to reflect the role played by
an individual or organisation that provides a person with the necessary support to make
a decision or decisions. The term reflects the nature of the role, and indicates that
ultimate decision-making power and responsibility remains with the person, with
support being provided to assist them in making the decision themselves.
4.37 The term supporter is used by the VLRC in its guardianship report.29 The VLRC
described a supporter as a ‘new legal mechanism’. A supporter
could assist some people with impaired decision-making ability to continue to
exercise legal capacity. Unlike substitute decision makers, supporters would not have
the power to make decisions on behalf of a person, but they would be authorised to do
certain things to assist the person to make their own decision.30
4.38 The term ‘representative’ is used in the Commonwealth decision-making model
to signal that the role of a representative is to support and represent the will,
preferences and rights of the person who requires decision-making support. 31
‘Representative’  was  preferred  over  ‘nominee’  to  signal  the  shift  from  existing
decision-making arrangements in areas of Commonwealth law, including the NDIS and
social security, both of which use the term nominee. Further, in circumstances where a
person who may require decision-making support has not chosen or ‘nominated’ the
person, the term nominee does not appropriately reflect the nature of the appointment.
4.39 In general, stakeholders agreed with the chosen terminology,32 although there
were some divergent views. The Office of the Public Advocate (Vic) observed that
‘representative’ connotes an appointment that is ‘less permanent’ in nature than a
substitute decision-maker, and that the representative is there ‘with the will of the
person’, even though sometimes a representative may be appointed by a court or
tribunal.33
4.40 However, AGAC pointed to a difference of opinion among its members about
the potential for confusion concerning the use of the term ‘representative’:
Some members have raised concerns that the use of the term is potentially too broad
and may lead to duplication of appointments under state legislation, and also possible
conflict between multiple decision makers appointed under different regimes. Other
members argued that ‘representative’ is closely aligned with concepts of agency,
29 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 30.
30 Ibid 126. The Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (Vic), enacted in August 2014, implements some of the
VLRC’s recommendations in creating the role of a ‘supportive attorney’: see Powers of Attorney Act
2014 (Vic) pt 7.
31 This formulation is currently used under the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012
(Cth). The term representative is also used in other jurisdictions, eg, Representation Agreement Act 1996
(British Columbia).
32 See, eg, Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119;  Offices  of  the  Public  Advocate  (SA
and Vic), Submission 95; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 94.
33 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
4. Supported Decision-Making in Commonwealth Laws 99
where principals have the capacity to instruct. Conversely, other members felt that it
is appropriate.34
4.41 KinCare Services objected to the use of the term ‘supporter’ to identify
individuals or organisations with formal support relationships because ‘exclusively
informal networks have long been identified as “support” groups, and to attach this
term to formal partnerships may bring about confusion’.35
Objects and principles of Commonwealth legislation
Recommendation 4–2 The objects and principles provisions in
Commonwealth legislation concerning decision-making by persons who require
decision-making support should reflect the National Decision-Making
Principles.
4.42 The first key component of the ALRC’s recommended approach to reform of
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks is the inclusion of supported decision-
making principles under relevant legislation.
4.43 The ALRC recommends amendment of existing objects or principles provisions
contained in relevant legislation, or where there are no such provisions, their inclusion,
to reflect the National Decision-Making Principles.
4.44 This would ensure the National Decision-Making Principles guide the
application and interpretation of the legislation as a whole, or the particular division or
part that deals with supporters and representatives.
4.45 This approach was supported by a number of stakeholders.36 For example, the
Disability Advocacy Network Australia (DANA) submitted that
it should be an explicit object of legislation in the disability area ... to promote the
decision making capacity of people with disability, to build the capacity of people
with disability to make decisions and participate in decision making, and to enable
access to decision making support for all people with disability whose decision
making capacity is impaired.37
Supporters
4.46 The Commonwealth decision-making model recommended by the ALRC
promotes formal supported decision-making. At the core of supported decision-making
is the idea that all persons, except in very limited circumstances, have some level of
decision-making ability and that, with appropriate support, they can be supported to
34 AGAC, Submission 91. AGAC stated that members agreed, however, that there is a need to move from
old language to remove the ‘stigmatising effect’ of terms such as ‘financial manager’ and ‘guardian’.
35 KinCare Services, Submission 112.
36 See, eg, Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; Mental Health Coordinating
Council, Submission 94.
37 Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36.
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make a decision. The nature and level of the support may vary but the decision remains
that of the person who requires the decision-making support.
4.47 A supporter under the model is an individual or organisation appointed by a
person to enable them to make a decision. Ultimate decision-making power and
responsibility remains with the person who requires decision-making support.
Supporters should be entitled to support people to make any decision relevant to the
area of Commonwealth responsibility in relation to which they have been appointed,
including financial decisions.
4.48 A person may appoint whomever they want as their supporter and may appoint
more than one. For example, a person may appoint a family member, friend or carer. A
supporter may perform a range of functions, including in relation to information,
advice or communication. The ALRC does not consider that there should be a
requirement that a supporter be unpaid.38 For example, there may be circumstances in
which a paid carer may be appointed as a supporter, particularly where the person does
not have family support or is socially isolated.39 Advocacy organisations, which may
not be directly paid by the person, but receive funding from government or other
sources, may in certain instances be appropriately appointed as a supporter.40 A person
may also appoint, or revoke their appointment of, a supporter at any time.
4.49 There is currently no provision in Commonwealth legislation for a supporter or
supporter-type role, which reflects the ideals of supported decision-making. The
mechanisms closest to the role of a supporter are Centrelink correspondence
nominees41 and nominated representatives in relation to eHealth.42 However,  as
outlined below, these roles differ significantly from that of a supporter, particularly
with respect to the duties owed to the person who needs decision-making support.43
What about informal supporters?
4.50 Informal supporters and support networks play a vital role in decision-making of
persons with disability. Support under art 12 of the CRPD ‘encompasses both informal
and formal support arrangements, of varying types and intensity’.44 As the VLRC
stated:
supported decision making recognises the interdependent nature of most people’s
lives. Most people make important decisions with personal support (such as advice
38 Compare; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship,  Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 38; Office
of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
39 See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67; ADACAS, Submission 29. See
also Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) recs 62, 63.
40 See, eg, discussion of the importance of advocates in decision-making regimes: Disability Advocacy
Network Australia, Submission 36. See also MDAA, Submission 43 in relation to advocates’ authority to
engage with Centrelink.
41 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123C, 123H. See also Department of Social Services,
Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1], [8.5.2].
42 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 7.
43 See the discussion of social security and eHealth in Ch 6.
44 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [15].
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from family, friends or mentors), or sometimes with professional support (for
example, doctors or accountants).45
4.51 A number of stakeholders emphasised the important role informal supporters
play in decision-making and that entitlement to support should include informal
support.46 The Multicultural Disability Advocacy Association of NSW highlighted the
effect of culture on decision-making and noted ‘the differences in ways decisions are
made in various cultures’:
in some cultures decisions are made by individuals, whereas in others, all important
decisions may be made by the head of the family, or collectively by the local elders,
or in consultation with other significant members of the family or community
concerned.47
4.52 Consistent with these observations, some stakeholders have expressed concerns
about the potential for over-formalising existing support mechanisms and support
networks that assist people with disability to make decisions.48 In  the  ALRC’s  view,
the recognition of supporters should not diminish the involvement of, or respect for,
informal support, including in relation to decision-making.
4.53 A number of the elements of the Commonwealth decision-making model
recognise the valuable role played by informal supporters. For example, the ALRC
recommends that formal supporters have an obligation to support a person to consult
family members, carers and other significant people in their life in the process of
making decisions. A similar duty applies to representatives. There are also specific
mechanisms in some areas of Commonwealth law considered in following chapters.
4.54 Importantly, however, some informal arrangements are ‘in fact more restrictive
... because decisions [are] made informally on a substitute basis by others’.49 The
formalisation of such arrangements and associated safeguards may ensure people are
able to exercise choice and control over decision-making in their lives.
Recognition of supporters
Recommendation 4–3 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal
frameworks should include the concept of a supporter and reflect the National
Decision-Making Principles in providing that:
(a) a person who requires decision-making support should be able to choose
to be assisted by a supporter, and to cease being supported at any time;
(b) where a supporter is chosen, ultimate decision-making authority remains
with the person who requires decision-making support; and
45 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [8.5].
46 See, eg, Carers NSW, Submission 23; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
47 MDAA, Submission 43.
48 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Submission 45.
See also in relation to ‘net widening’: Carney and Beaupert, above n 13.
49 Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. See also AGAC, Submission 51.
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(c) supported decisions should be recognised as the decisions of the person
who required decision-making support.
4.55 To introduce the concept of formal supported decision-making at a
Commonwealth level, the ALRC recommends that relevant laws and legal frameworks
should include the concept of a supporter and establish supporter arrangements. These
laws and legal frameworks should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles and
include a number of key elements relating to the recognition of supporters.
4.56 The most important element is recognition that, where a supporter is chosen,
ultimate decision-making authority remains with the person who requires decision-
making support, and that supported decisions must be recognised as the decision of the
person who required that support.50 These elements are intended to encourage support
to be provided where this is needed to enable a person to make or convey a decision.
This in turn maximises the autonomy of the person, and allows for dignity of risk.
4.57 The other element of the recommendation relates to ensuring that a person is
able to exercise choice and control over their supporter or supporters. This is not
provided for under any existing Commonwealth decision-making regimes.51
4.58 The ACT Disability, Aged and Carer Advocacy Service (ADACAS) submitted
that the provision of a signed document should be a sufficient basis for a
Commonwealth agency to recognise a supporter. Any other approach, it said,
‘reinforces the old fashioned view that people with disabilities lack capacity’. Further,
‘specific recognition of supporters should only be required by the Commonwealth
where they need a level of access that would otherwise be prevented by law’—
including for privacy reasons, receipt of monies or ‘where the supporter conveys …
decisions purportedly made by the person being supported’.52
4.59 The OPA (SA and Vic) observed that further consideration will be required as to
the status of supporter arrangements, and information about where any ‘appointment
instruments’ are to be lodged.53
4.60 Any new legislative scheme for recognising supporters is likely to have limited
practical impact if people do not have access to an appropriate supporter. Under the
CRPD, Commonwealth, state and territory governments have an obligation to provide
50 The VLRC made a similar recommendation: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final
Report No 24 (2012) rec 46.
51 For example, social security legislation does not make provision for the person with a nominee
arrangement to request suspension or revocation: Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123E.
Stakeholders emphasised the importance of this power: see, eg, Physical Disability Council of NSW,
Submission 32. See also Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012)
rec 54.
52 ADACAS, Submission 108.
53 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
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support to persons with disability to assist them in decision-making.54 There seems no
reason why individual advocates or advocate organisations should not be recognised as
supporters. Only the person supported would have the authority to choose a supporter,
and would also have the power to suspend or revoke the arrangement at any time.
4.61 The OPA (SA and Vic) suggested that further consideration be given to the
possible role of government, including Australian Government departments and state
and territory offices of the public advocate and public guardians, in providing
supporters. Another possibility is the development of organisations specialised in
providing advice and support, such as the Nidus Personal Planning Resource Centre in
British Columbia, Canada.55
Functions and duties
Functions of a supporter
Recommendation 4–4 A supporter assists a person who requires support
to make decisions and may:
(a)  obtain and disclose personal and other information on behalf of the
person, and assist the person to understand information;
(b)  provide advice to the person about the decisions they might make;
(c)  assist the person to communicate the decisions; and
(d)  endeavour to ensure the decisions of the person are given effect.
4.62 A supporter may perform a number of functions for a person who requires
decision-making support. The ALRC recommends that relevant Commonwealth laws
and legal frameworks should provide that supporters may exercise some or all of the
functions outlined in Recommendation 4–4.
4.63 For example, a supporter may need to obtain relevant information and explain it
to the person they are supporting in a way that is easily understood, or provide advice
to the person about the decisions the person might make. This role in the collection and
explanation of information is provided for under a number of existing and proposed
models of supported decision-making.56
54 ‘States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity’: UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 12(3).
55 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95. Nidus is a non-profit, charitable
organisation established by citizens and community groups involved in the development of the British
Columbia Representation Agreement Act,  to  ensure  the  public  had  access  to  information  and  assistance
with Representation Agreements: see Nidus, History <www.nidus.ca>.
56 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 43; Adult
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta) div 1, s 4(2); Decision Making, Support and Protection
to Adults Act 2003 (Yukon) sch A, pt 1, s 5(1).
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4.64 It is important that supporters are able to handle relevant personal information of
the person they are supporting. Stakeholders highlighted the difficulties that family
members and carers often face in attempting to obtain access to information. The
operation of the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) and the recognition of supporters under that
Act is discussed in Chapter 6.
4.65 In circumstances where a person who may require decision-making support
experiences difficulty communicating, the supporter may either assist them to
communicate a decision, or in some circumstances may communicate the person’s
decision to third parties. Where a supporter is purportedly communicating a person’s
decision, it may be necessary for the relevant Commonwealth department or agency to
include additional safeguards to ensure that there is no abuse of the supporter’s
function or duties. This communication-related role is currently provided for under a
number of decision-making models.57
4.66 A supporter may also play a role in endeavouring to ensure that the decision of
the person is given effect. They may, for example, contact the relevant Commonwealth
department or agency to follow up on the information provided, or the decision, or
provide assistance for the person to seek review of a decision. However, it would be a
matter for individual supporters to determine the extent to which they are able to play
this role, depending on the circumstances of the person who requires decision-making
support and the particular decision. This role is also provided under some current
decision-making regimes overseas, including in the United Kingdom and Yukon,
Canada.58
Supporter duties
Recommendation 4–5 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal
frameworks should provide that supporters of persons who require decision-
making support must:
(a)  support the person to make decisions;
(b)  support the person to express their will and preferences in making
decisions;
(c)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial, and cultural
wellbeing of the person;
(d)  act honestly, diligently and in good faith;
(e)  support the person to consult, as they wish, with existing appointees,
family  members,  carers  and  other  significant  people  in  their  life  in
making decisions; and
57 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 43; Adult
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta) div 1, s 4(2); Decision Making, Support and Protection
to Adults Act 2003 (Yukon) sch A, pt 1, s 5(1).
58 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 36(3); Decision Making, Support and Protection to Adults Act 2003
(Yukon) sch A, pt 1, s 5(1).
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(f)  assist the person to develop their own decision-making ability.
For the purposes of paragraph (e), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to
include existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or
organisation who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship
of the person, or is a person formally appointed to make decisions for the
person.
4.67 The duties of supporters should be set out in the legislation relevant to the area
of Commonwealth law. In response to the Discussion Paper, stakeholders broadly
supported this statement of duties.59
4.68 The first duty should be to act only within the scope of their appointment. This
does not preclude supporters acting informally, or a person appointing a supporter in
relation to a wider range of decisions than initially envisaged.
4.69 Supporters should be required to act in a manner that promotes the personal,
social, financial, and cultural wellbeing of the person who requires decision-making
support. This duty is similar to the duty imposed on nominees under the NDIS Act to
act in a manner that promotes personal and social wellbeing,60 but adds elements
relating to financial and cultural wellbeing.
4.70 Given the potential role of supporters in supporting people to make decisions
which relate to finances, reference to financial wellbeing seems important. In addition,
the importance of cultural wellbeing and sensitivity was highlighted by a number of
stakeholders.61 However, National Disability Services (NDS) noted that it is ‘unclear
exactly how cultural wellbeing will be promoted in relation to decision-making; this
will require thoughtful evaluation as there are some risks of conflict between cultural
considerations and individual rights’.62 The OPA (SA and Vic) submitted that
‘financial’ and ‘cultural’ wellbeing need not be listed separately, as these aspects of
wellbeing can be considered encompassed by the term ‘personal and social
wellbeing’.63
4.71 In addition, there should be a duty to facilitate consultation. A number of
stakeholders highlighted the importance of ensuring supporters (and representatives)
consult family members, carers and other significant people in the life of the person
59 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; ADACAS, Submission 108; Offices
of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; National Disability Services, Submission 92.
60 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 80(1).
61 See, eg, MDAA, Submission 43.
62 National Disability Services, Submission 92.
63 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
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who may require decision-making support.64 However, the duty should be to facilitate
consultation only as desired by the person requiring decision-making support.65
4.72 In order to facilitate the appropriate interaction of supporters with existing state
and territory appointed decision-makers, a supporter should also have a duty to
facilitate consultation with existing appointees. The recommended definition of
‘existing appointee’ is similar to the one in the NDIS Act.66 A duty to facilitate
consultation with existing appointees may help address concerns about ‘access to
critical and relevant information’ by state or territory appointed decision-makers.67
4.73 Finally, supporters should also have an obligation to develop the capacity of the
person being supported to make their own decisions. This would mirror an obligation
imposed on nominees under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee)
Rules 2013 (Cth) (the Nominee Rules).68 The nature and content of the obligation will
vary according to the circumstances of the appointment. For example, the identity of
the supporter will affect their ability to develop the person’s capacity, as will resource
constraints.
4.74 NDS observed that assisting the person to develop their own decision-making
ability, while important, is potentially a complex task. This complexity, and the skills
required to discharge this duty, must be considered ‘when applying the model to
different areas of law’. Moreover, it is also likely to have training and funding
implications.69 Dr Fleur Beaupert, Dr Piers Gooding and Linda Steele submitted that
this duty should be expressed as being ‘to assist the person requiring support to
exercise his or her legal capacity with less support in the future if he or she so
wishes’.70
4.75 Pave the Way considered the duty to be ‘too onerous’ and expressed the view
that, according to the CRPD, the state (rather than the supporter or representative) is
obliged to provide resources that aim to develop people’s decision-making ability. 71
4.76 ADACAS suggested that, for the purpose of examining supporters’ duties and
safeguards, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the different categories of
supporters—for example, support by family and friends, introduced volunteers, paid
care workers, independent advocates and professional decision supporters.72
4.77 In a similar vein, NACLC stated that the ALRC should give further thought as
to how ‘professional supporters’ (such as social workers or lawyers) might operate in
64 See, eg, Carers Queensland Inc, Submission 14.
65 ‘If the person making decisions is unable to consult themselves even with support, and this is undertaken
by the supporter, then the person should either be present or aware of the consultations’: Offices of the
Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
66 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(4).
67 Financial Services Council, Submission 35.
68 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.10. See also Mental Capacity Act
2005 (UK) s 4(4).
69 National Disability Services, Submission 92.
70 F Beaupert, P Gooding and L Steele, Submission 123.
71 Pave the Way, Submission 90.
72 ADACAS, Submission 108.
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practice, and in relation to the ‘interaction of any duties owed by a supporter under the
relevant piece of Commonwealth legislation and any other duties or obligations they
owe (such as under professional conduct rules and regulations, or other relevant
legislation) and the potential for conflict of interest’.73 It also observed that some
duties, such as the duty to develop the capacity of the person with disability, extend
beyond the role played by a community legal centre lawyer.74
4.78 The ALRC considers that basic duties of the type recommended should be
applicable to supporters of any kind. The exact nature and content of these duties is
likely to require further articulation in specific areas of Commonwealth law, dependent
on the context. It is implicit that supporters should only have to perform these duties to
the extent reasonable in the circumstances and as desired by the person being
supported.
4.79 While supporters should have a high level of responsibility, there may be
concerns about the unintended consequences of statutory duties—and, in particular,
people being deterred from acting as supporters.75
4.80 A notable issue is whether supporters should have any personal liability for
decisions made by the person being supported. The VLRC commented that
determining the extent to which supporters should be liable in such circumstances is
‘challenging’.76 It can be argued ‘that the supported person should be responsible for
the consequences of any decisions made within a supported arrangement because they
retain decision-making authority’.77 However, the VLRC concluded that the law should
‘recognise that the support relationship is one of special trust and confidence, and the
supported person is likely to be in a position of vulnerability relative to their
supporter’:
Therefore, to avoid doubt, the law should designate the relationship between a
supporter and the supported person as fiduciary. Supporters who fail to comply with
their fiduciary obligations will leave themselves open to the full range of equitable
remedies that are available in these circumstances.78
4.81 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked whether the relationship of supporter
to the person who requires support should be regarded as a fiduciary one. 79
Stakeholders had mixed views on this issue.
73 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
74 Ibid.
75 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) [4.53]–[4.58].
76 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [8.128].
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid [8.128]–[8.130]. See Ibid recs 59–61.
79 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 4–3. Fiduciary obligations are a creation of the Chancery courts
so that, within certain relationships, and in certain situations, ‘equity enforces stringent duties of loyalty
and propriety which go far beyond the obligations which people owe to each other at common law’:
Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [15.2.10].
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4.82 The Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) expressed concern that the ‘imposition of
fiduciary duties might discourage people from accepting the role of supporter,
especially if the duty results in supporters needing to take out insurance’.80 As this
might frustrate the objective of encouraging recognition of supported decision-making,
the LIV argued that a lesser duty should be imposed on supporters than applies to
substitute decision-makers.81
4.83 Other stakeholders agreed that supporters should not be subject to fiduciary
duties.82 NDS, for example, argued that such duties are unnecessary—first, because the
role of a supporter can be revoked by the person being supported; and secondly,
because, where supporters are in paid positions, this provides scope to hold them to
account through a contractual relationship (for example, a supporter could be held
liable if they are paid to manage correspondence, and negligence in this task results in
financial disadvantage for the client).83
4.84 In contrast,  the OPA (SA and Vic) submitted that  it  was appropriate to impose
fiduciary duties on supporters, and this would be ‘unlikely to deter a well-intentioned,
honest supporter’:
In considering this issue, there is a need to distinguish between lack of skill or
diligence (negligence) and lack of honesty (breach of fiduciary duty). We suspect that
supporters are more likely to be deterred by concerns about whether they are skilled
enough or have enough time to perform the role, rather than concerns about such
things as whether they might inadvertently benefit themselves or a related party.84
4.85 More generally, the ALRC acknowledges that the issue of the potential liability
of supporters (and representatives) is a difficult one. There has been insufficient
opportunity to fully canvass the issues involved and, therefore, it would be
inappropriate to make any recommendation in this regard. It is also possible to argue
that, given the many categories of supporters and representatives, and the widely
varying contexts in which decision-making takes place, it may be best to leave
80 Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129.
81 Ibid.
82 ADACAS, Submission 108; National Disability Services, Submission 92;  Pave the Way, Submission 90.
Some stakeholders submitted that, in contrast, representatives should be subject to fiduciary duties, given
their different role: ADACAS, Submission 108; Springvale Monash Legal Service, Submission 104.
83 National Disability Services, Submission 92.
84 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95. The OPA (SA and Vic) also noted that
supporters may be voluntary or paid employees of an agency and subject to additional safeguards—for
example, if engaged by an advocacy organisation they would be required to abide by the code of conduct
or guidelines of that organisation and also be covered by its liability insurance. See also Justice Connect
and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120; I Watts, Submission 114.
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consideration of this issue to those drafting Commonwealth laws in specific areas,85 or
to resolution by the courts.86
Safeguards
4.86 Article 12(4) of the CRPD requires that all measures relating to the exercise of
legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards. The balance between
ensuring supporters and decisions made under support arrangements are subject to
appropriate safeguards, and avoiding over-regulation of supporters is a delicate one.
Excessive regulation may
discourage honest people from accepting an appointment as a supporter. Too much
regulation would also have a tendency to undermine the important relationship of trust
between a supporter and a supported person.87
4.87 There needs to be a number of safeguards and recognition of the purpose of each
safeguard. For example, some are designed to protect the person who may require
decision-making support from abuse, neglect or exploitation; others may be required to
‘ensure that a decision made under a supported decision making arrangement truly
expresses and effects the wishes of the person with disability’.88
4.88 The OPA (Vic) highlighted that supported decision-making opens up ‘the
possibility of conflict, undue influence, abuse and exploitation’.89 Similarly, Bruce
Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython submitted that
factors such as undue, or inappropriate, influence are not specific to decision-making
by disabled people; nonetheless steps should be taken to ensure that their decision-
making—particularly decision-making with serious consequences, such as extensive
or potentially high risk medical treatment, or decisions about care—are not a
consequence of inappropriate consideration of factors of this type.90
4.89 AGAC observed that supported decision-making schemes must ‘value-add’ to
informal decision-making schemes by providing accountability structures and
transparency. It stated that, like guardianship systems, supported decision-making
systems must also have ‘clear systems for avoiding, so far as possible, the inclusion of
supported decision makers who may use that position to abuse a person with a
disability’.91 In this context, AGAC stated that, sometimes, a ‘guardianship or
85 For example, the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) provides nominees with statutory
protection against criminal liability for things done in good faith, and by the nominee in his or her
capacity as nominee; and that a nominee does not commit a breach of statutory duty in doing any act
where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the best interests of the person being
represented: Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123N, 123O.
86 The fiduciary concept is said to be a ‘fluid one, taking a wide variety of relationship forms and giving rise
to a wide variety of obligations’. Courts may be required to ascertain whether a particular relationship is
fiduciary, identify the nature of the particular fiduciary relation, and define the precise obligations
flowing from it: Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [15.2.10].
87 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [8.120].
88 Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
89 Office of the Public Advocate (Victoria), Supported Decision-Making: Background and Discussion
Paper (2009) 25.
90 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
91 AGAC, Submission 51.
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administration order can be a tool to empower the person with the disability to exercise
his or her own choice of support’ where supporters have not been acting in their
interest.92
4.90 While it is difficult to protect people who may require decision-making support
from abuse and neglect in all instances, there are potential safeguards against
exploitation by supporters under the Commonwealth decision-making model. The key
safeguards include:
· the recommended duties of supporters;
· the ability of the person who requires decision-making support to revoke the
appointment at any time;
· provision for the appointment of more than one supporter; and
· guidance and training for people who require decision-making support, their
supporters and Commonwealth departments and agencies interacting with them.
4.91 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked what safeguards in relation to
supporters should be incorporated into the Commonwealth decision-making model. 93
For example, in British Columbia, Canada, a monitor must be appointed to oversee the
person providing support to safeguard against financial abuse, except in certain
circumstances.94 Suggestions made to the VLRC in its guardianship inquiry included:
the registration of arrangements; police checks on appointments; and appointment of
monitors.95
4.92 Stakeholders generally agreed with the importance of the key safeguards listed
above, while noting the complexity of issues involved.96 The  OPA  (SA  and  Vic)
suggested that additional safeguards might involve a register of appointments and
police checks being conducted in relation to appointments.
4.93 In view of the possibilities of undue influence, abuse and exploitation,
safeguards appropriate to the scope of the appointment are essential.97 The possible
conflicts of interest in relation to paid supporters were identified as a particular
concern:
Some of the current projects in the area of supported decision making are using
disability workers in the support role and this needs to be evaluated. It is conceivable
that the role could expand to this wider group if conflict of interest considerations
were managed as part of supporter selection and training.98
92 AGAC, Submission 91.
93 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 4–4.
94 Representation Agreement Act 1996 (British Columbia) ss 12(1), (2).
95 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012), [8.57].
96 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; Mental Health Coordinating Council,
Submission 94.
97 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
98 Ibid.
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4.94 The NSW Council for Intellectual Disability (NSWCID) agreed that excessive
regulation may ‘unduly interfere with the relationship between the person and
supporter’. However it stated that
there needs to be some process for informing supporters of their responsibilities and to
seek intervention by a tribunal if a supporter is not fulfilling their responsibilities to a
person who lacks decision making capacity—this may entail an application to have a
representative appointed as occurs now with applications for guardianship.99
4.95 The Victorian Deaf Society highlighted the importance of ‘a paper trail that
formalises and legalises the relationship’ and proper oversight, for example, by a case
manager.100 Advocacy for Inclusion suggested that an ‘independent body should be
established to provide formal monitoring and safeguards for people with disabilities in
supported and facilitated decision-making arrangements’.101
4.96 In relation to safeguards, it may be necessary to distinguish between support
provided by family and friends and support provided by paid professionals. For
example,  as  discussed  in  relation  to  the  NDIS,102 advocacy or other organisations
providing professional support services may be subject to quality assurance and other
accreditation standards that should not apply to ‘natural’ supporters, such as family or
friends.
Representatives
Recommendation 4–6 Relevant Commonwealth legislation should
include the concept of a representative and provide for representative
arrangements to be established that reflect the National Decision-Making
Principles.
4.97 In certain circumstances, a person may require someone else to make decisions
for them. The ALRC recommends the introduction of representatives as a mechanism
for this in areas of Commonwealth law.
4.98 A representative should only be appointed as a last resort and in limited
circumstances. A representative under the model is an individual or organisation
appointed by a person who requires decision-making support, or through some other
appointment mechanism as discussed below. A representative would support a person
to make decisions and express their will and preferences in making decisions;
determine the person’s will and preferences and give effect to them; or consider the
person’s human rights relevant to the situation in making a decision where their will
and preferences cannot be determined at all.
99 NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 131.
100  Vicdeaf, Submission 125.
101  Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126.
102  See Ch 5.
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4.99 As with supporters, the introduction of representatives would occur under
specific Commonwealth legislation and needs to be tailored to suit the particular
legislative context. As discussed below, a number of core elements should be included
in any Commonwealth scheme for representatives.
Appointment
4.100 Representatives might be appointed under the Commonwealth decision-making
model in a number of ways. The preferable form of appointment involves a person
appointing their own representative.103 A person may choose to appoint a
representative—including in circumstances where they have decision-making ability
but would prefer to appoint a representative, or in anticipation of losing decision-
making ability.104
4.101 A representative should not generally be appointed without a request from the
person, except where the person needs a representative but is unable to request
appointment themselves, even with support. However, other appointment mechanisms
need to be considered to account for circumstances where a person may not be in a
position to appoint their own representative, but requires a decision-maker in an area of
Commonwealth law and may or may not have a decision-maker appointed for them
under state or territory legislation with relevant duties or powers. In such
circumstances, the initiative might come from a carer or other person who offers to be
the representative.105
4.102 The  ALRC  considered  what  mechanisms  there  should  be  at  a  Commonwealth
level to appoint a representative for a person who requires decision-making support. 106
There are different options for appointment through a Commonwealth mechanism, or
in a specific area of Commonwealth law.
4.103 First, jurisdiction might be conferred on a Commonwealth court or tribunal (or
other body) to appoint representatives. Appointment might operate in a similar way to
the appointment of state and territory guardians and administrators. That is, the
Australian Government could develop ‘a single scheme for assessment of the need for
a representative in these [Commonwealth] decision making areas, with a system for
impartial appointment and review’.107 ADACAS suggested that ‘the appointment of
representatives should be made by an independent body’ at a Commonwealth level,
mirroring the functions of state and territory tribunals.108
4.104 The ALRC has not pursued the idea of a new court or tribunal jurisdiction or
Commonwealth body with responsibility for appointing representatives across different
areas of Commonwealth law. The areas in which Commonwealth legislation needs to
103  See, eg, ADACAS, Submission 108; Springvale Monash Legal Service, Submission 104.
104  Eg, in the appointment of enduring powers of attorney.
105  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.15.
106  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 4–5.
107  AGAC, Submission 51.
108  ADACAS, Submission 108. See also NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 131.
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provide separately for the appointment of representatives are few, and there is no need
to create what might be seen as a parallel or duplicate guardianship system.109
4.105 Another option is to provide for the appointment of a representative by the
relevant Commonwealth department or agency, as is currently permitted in the context
of the NDIS and social security.110
4.106 Many stakeholders expressed concerns about the appointment of representatives
by the heads of Commonwealth agencies, such as NDIA and Centrelink.111 The
Springvale Monash Legal Service, for example, stated that, given ‘the imposition on
the individual liberty of the represented person, the appointment of a substituted-
decision maker should ideally be made by a tribunal or a court’.112 ADACAS
submitted that agencies should not have power to appoint representatives because
‘there is a clear conflict of interest’ as ‘it can be expected that diligent representatives
will find themselves in conflict with Commonwealth agencies at some point’.113
4.107 Others were prepared to countenance the possibility, provided it was
appropriately framed. The OPA (SA and Vic) stated that, in limited circumstances and
subject to qualifications,114 representatives ‘appointed by CEOs/Departmental
Secretaries under Commonwealth laws could play decision-making roles on behalf of
individuals who do not have the capacity to make particular decisions’.115
4.108 Finally, Commonwealth laws could provide mechanisms under which state and
territory appointees would be recognised as representatives for the purposes of
Commonwealth legislative schemes. That is, there would be a ‘more fully developed
symbiosis with State and Territory substitute decision making schemes’.116 NDS
considered that the ‘least bureaucratic mechanism’ for appointing representatives
would be through these existing courts or tribunals, rather than the ‘specific
Commonwealth agency responsible for each affected area of law’:
This allows a common approach, and indeed a common representative across different
areas  of  life  and  perhaps  across  jurisdictions.  This  approach  also  allows  the  chosen
mechanism to build expertise and infrastructure for making good determinations,
instead of spreading across several small subunits within larger agencies. This
external mechanism could potentially monitor both representative and supporter
arrangements.117
109  Unless perhaps there were to be a national law dealing with supported decision-making, replacing
existing state and territory guardianship and administration law.
110 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth); Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth).
See Chs 5–6.
111  See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; ADACAS, Submission 108;
Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 94; Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68;
Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission
32.
112  Springvale Monash Legal Service, Submission 104.
113  ADACAS, Submission 108.
114  In relation to decision-making under the NDIS: see Ch 5.
115  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
116  AGAC, Submission 51.
117  National Disability Services, Submission 92.
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4.109 NDS strongly supported encouraging the appointment of existing
representatives, such as state-appointed guardians for Commonwealth duties, where
appropriate, although this should not be automatic.118 ADACAS also accepted that
there may be a case for the Commonwealth recognising state and territory
appointments.119 The OPA (SA and Vic) stated, if representatives were to be appointed
under Commonwealth laws (as proposed by the ALRC), existing state and territory
tribunal appointments should be recognised ‘where certain thresholds are met’. In
addition,
There needs to be clarity around who can appoint, and who can be appointed as,
representatives (taking note, for example, of earlier personal and tribunal
appointments at state and territory level), and there would be a place for the
articulation in federal legislation of general principles governing when tribunal
appointments would be required.120
4.110 The Safeguards Guidelines provide that the appointment of a representative
decision-maker should be a last resort and not a substitute for appropriate support and
that any appointment should be limited in scope, be proportionate, and apply for the
minimum time. Further, decisions and interventions (which would include any
appointment of a representative) must be the least restrictive of the person’s human
rights; subject to appeal; and subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring
and review.121
4.111 Under the Commonwealth decision-making model, any appointment mechanism
for representatives should comply with these requirements. For the purposes of
describing the model, the ALRC does not intend to be any more prescriptive than this,
because the best appointment mechanism will depend on the exact role of the
representative within the particular area of Commonwealth legislative responsibility.
4.112 Appointment mechanisms need to be ‘proportionate’. For example, the
NSWCID has suggested that there should be
a straightforward process for a close family member to become representative of a
person for processes like Centrelink and eHeath records … On the other hand, there
will be situations where the enormity or contentiousness of the situation or the alleged
inappropriateness of a proposed representative means that the issue of whether there
should be a representative and who that should be needs to be determined by a
tribunal analogously to guardianship proceedings in the current state and territory
tribunals.122
4.113 In  some  cases,  including  in  relation  to  the  NDIS,  there  should  be  a  confined
power for the agency head to appoint a representative. In doing so, the agency head
should consider whether an existing state or territory appointed decision-maker (or
118  Ibid.
119  ADACAS, Submission 108.
120  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
121  See Ch 3.
122  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 131.
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existing Commonwealth supporter or representative) should be appointed.123 The
appointment mechanism for representatives under the NDIS is discussed in more detail
in Chapter 5.
Functions and duties
Functions of a representative
Recommendation 4–7 A representative assists a person who requires
support to make decisions or, where necessary, makes decisions on their behalf
and may:
(a) obtain and disclose personal and other information on behalf of the
person, and assist the person to understand information;
(b) provide advice to the person about the decisions that might be made;
(c) communicate the decisions; and
(d) endeavour to ensure the decisions made are given effect.
4.114 The ALRC recommends that a representative perform the same basic functions
as a supporter, with minor changes to reflect the fact that—while having a duty to
support the person to make their own decisions where possible—the representative
may make decisions on the person’s behalf, reflecting the person’s will and
preferences.
Representative duties
Recommendation 4–8 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal
frameworks should provide that representatives of persons who require decision-
making support must:
(a)  support the person to make decisions or make decisions on their behalf
reflecting their will and preferences;
(b)  where it is not possible to determine the will and preferences of the
person, determine what the person would likely want based on all the
information available;
(c)  where (a) and (b) are not possible, consider the person’s human rights
relevant to the situation;
(d)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural
wellbeing of the person;
123  For example, an amended form of the considerations under r 3.14 of the National Disability Insurance
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth). See also considerations as recommended in the Victorian Law
Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012).
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(e)  act honestly, diligently and in good faith;
(f)  consult with existing appointees, family members, carers and other
significant people in their life in making decisions; and
(g) assist the person to develop their own decision-making ability.
For the purposes of paragraph (f), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to
include existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or
organisation who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship
of the person, or is a person formally appointed to make decisions for the
person.
4.115 A representative should have the same basic duties as a supporter, and additional
duties reflecting the fact that a representative may make decisions on the person’s
behalf, reflecting the person’s will, preferences and rights.
4.116 The core duties the ALRC considers are appropriate for representatives include
the duty to support the person who requires decision-making support to express their
will and preferences. As discussed in Chapter 3, this standard is preferred to an
objective ‘best interests’ test, which currently applies to nominees under existing
Commonwealth legislation and to state and territory appointed decision-makers.124
4.117 This shift away from the best interests test received significant support from a
wide range of stakeholders.125 In circumstances where a representative needs to
determine the will and preferences of the person, because the person is unable to
communicate them, the representative must determine what the person would likely
want based on all the information available. This may, for example, involve
consideration of decisions the person has made in the past. If that is not possible,
consideration should turn to the person’s human rights relevant to the situation.
Ultimately, however, this approach requires decision-making ‘based on facilitating
access to the enjoyment of existing rights, rather than on making decisions on behalf of
a person based on a subjective assessment of their best interest’.126
4.118 What steps are reasonable to discharge the duties of a representative? It would
have to be considered in the particular decision-making context. For example, it would
be unreasonable to expect a representative to fulfil the duty to assist the person to
develop their own decision-making ability in circumstances where a person does not
have, and is unlikely ever to develop, the ability to make decisions.
124  See, eg, Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123O.
125  See, eg, PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66; Qld Law Society, Submission 53.
126  PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66.
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4.119 The statement of representatives’ roles and duties set out in the Discussion
Paper127 and, in particular, the focus on assisting people to express their will and
preferences was broadly supported by stakeholders.128
4.120 Beaupert, Gooding and Steele submitted that the functions of a representative
should refer to ‘making representative decisions on a person’s behalf, only in situations
where the person’s will and preferences and what they would likely want cannot be
determined’.129
Safeguards
Recommendation 4–9 The appointment and conduct of representatives
should be subject to appropriate and effective safeguards.
4.121 Consistent with National Decision-Making Principle 4 and art 12(4) of the
CRPD, the ALRC recommends that the appointment and conduct of representatives be
subject to appropriate and effective safeguards.
4.122 Article 12(4) of the CRPD requires that all measures relating to the exercise of
legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards. In particular, it requires
that such safeguards:
· respect the rights, will and preferences of the person;
· are free of conflict of interest and undue influence;
· are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances;
· apply for the shortest time possible;
· are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial
authority or judicial body; and
· are proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights
and interests.130
4.123 Stakeholders emphasised the importance of safeguards and made a range of
suggestions in this regard.131 Justice Connect suggested a range of recordkeeping and
audit requirements that should be imposed on representatives. In addition:
127  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposals 4–7, 4–8.
128  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; Mental Health Coordinating Council,
Submission 94; National Disability Services, Submission 92.
129  F Beaupert, P Gooding and L Steele, Submission 123.
130 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Opened for Signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into Force 3 May 2008) art 12(4).
131  See, eg, Vicdeaf, Submission 125; Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120; Offices
of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
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It may be appropriate to establish an independent regulatory body or Commonwealth
agency (or confer state based tribunals with the power) to monitor and undertake
investigations. It may also be appropriate for that body to receive declarations and
carry out random audits.132
4.124 Other stakeholders also referred to the desirability of an independent body to
provide formal monitoring and safeguards for representative decision-making.133
4.125 Review and appeal mechanisms were another area of concern. NACLC
observed that the complexity of existing mechanisms ‘significantly affects the ability
of some people with disability to seek review of government and substitute decision-
maker decisions’.134 More generally, some concern was expressed about the absence of
a ‘definite proposal for appointment, reviews, monitoring and safeguards’ under the
Commonwealth decision-making model.135
4.126 Clearly, there need to be safeguards with respect to representatives—both to
protect people who require decision-making support from abuse, neglect or
exploitation and to protect the appointed representative. However, the ALRC does not
intend to be prescriptive about the nature or operation of the safeguards which should
apply. As with appointment mechanisms, the appropriate safeguards are dependent on
the decision-making context.
4.127 Article 12(4) of the CRPD represents the key safeguard elements of any
Commonwealth representative scheme. In the light of art 12(4), it may be necessary for
the Australian Government to consider the following elements in implementing the
decision-making model in areas of Commonwealth law:
· mechanisms for review and appeal of the appointment of representatives,
including on the application of any interested party;
· the potential for representatives to be periodically required to make declarations
regarding compliance with their duties;136
· reporting obligations on representatives with respect to decisions, for example
by provision of a report, inventory or accounts;137
· the powers of any Commonwealth body conferred with jurisdiction to appoint a
representative should include the power to respond to instances of abuse, neglect
or exploitation;
132  Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
133  Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126; Vicdeaf, Submission 125.
134  National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
135  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110.
136  Note, however the VLRC did not favour this form of compliance requirement: Victorian Law Reform
Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [18.105].
137  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 84; Social Security (Administration) Act
1999 (Cth) s 123L; Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.3]; Victorian
Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) recs 297–302.
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· the role of Commonwealth departments and agencies in monitoring, auditing
and investigating the conduct of representatives;138 and
· the broader applicability of safeguards envisaged under a NDIS quality
assurance and safeguards framework.
Interaction with other appointed decision-makers
4.128 One of the major difficulties in applying the Commonwealth decision-making
model is determining the appropriate interaction of supporters and representatives with
other supporters and representatives, as well as state and territory appointed decision-
makers, such as guardians and administrators. The NSW Government observed that
important issues in relation to this interaction include:
Whether state-based appointees should automatically be appointed under the
Commonwealth scheme.
If different persons are appointed, whether a Commonwealth appointee’s authority
would override the authority of a state-based appointee where the scope of their
appointments may intersect (for example, would a decision by a representative under
the NDIS affecting a person’s accommodation override a decision by a state-based
guardian in relation to accommodation?).
The mechanism for resolution of disputes between Commonwealth appointees and
state-based appointees. It is important to recognise that state-based appointments
include both Tribunal/Court appointed and principal-appointed arrangements, such as
enduring guardianship.
The institution of double-duties upon appointees under both Schemes and whether this
might make people reluctant to be appointed.
The recognition of Commonwealth appointees in State-based legislation and vice
versa.139
4.129 Stakeholders raised a wide range of interaction issues and possible scenarios. 140
In some cases, support for the Commonwealth decision-making model was qualified
by concerns about whether it would be able to interact successfully with state and
territory appointments of substitute decision-makers, such as guardians and
administrators.141
4.130 One starting point was that, ideally, where appointments are made under both
Commonwealth and state or territory legislation, the same person should be
appointed—to avoid multiple representatives, duplication of roles and duties, and
138  See, however, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [18.106]–
[18.107].
139  NSW Government, Submission 135.
140  See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; Vicdeaf, Submission 125;
Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld),
Submission 110; ADACAS, Submission 108; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission
95; AGAC, Submission 91.
141  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
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problems where different representatives for the same person disagree about how to
support decision-making. That is,
where there are several systems in which a person may have an appointed
decision-maker, those systems must integrate and, where appropriate, allow the same
decision-maker to act in all systems.142
4.131 Where different Commonwealth and state and territory representatives are
appointed, this may ‘create conflict and ambiguity for the person and the support
agency about who should provide support, obtain personal information and make
decisions in a given situation’.143 Justice Connect stated that this situation
has the potential to create inconsistency between roles and responsibilities of
supporters or representatives appointed under Commonwealth laws, and those
appointed under existing state and territory legislation. In turn, this may further
confuse the vulnerable or cognitively impaired people who require assistance making
decisions and their supporters and representatives who already deal with complicated
State and Territory laws.144
4.132 It  was  said  to  be  ‘highly  desirable’  that  the  same  person  be  appointed.145 The
appointment of an existing state or territory appointed decision-maker should be
‘permitted and encouraged’.146
4.133 To some extent, this is already the case under some existing Commonwealth
schemes. For example, the Nominee Rules provide that the CEO is to have regard to a
‘presumption’ that a court-appointed decision maker or a participant-appointed
decision-maker should be appointed as an NDIS nominee.147 However, there may be
circumstances where it is not appropriate for a state or territory appointed decision-
maker to be a representative for Commonwealth purposes.
Existing state or territory appointment
4.134 The following section explains how the ALRC envisages Commonwealth
decision-making schemes would interact with those at the state and territory level. This
issue is closely related to the chosen mechanism for appointing representatives; and
highlights the need for parallel reform of state and territory guardianship and
administration laws to integrate with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
Chapter 5 examines in more detail how the model might interact with state and
territory systems, in the particular context of the NDIS.
4.135 Under supporter and representative schemes, a Commonwealth agency would be
responsible for recognising that a person is a representative for the purposes of the
particular scheme being administered, whether or not the agency actually appoints the
person. The agency would have to be satisfied that the person actually needs a
142  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
143  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110.
144  Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
145  ADACAS, Submission 108.
146  Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
147 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 4.8(a). See Ch 5.
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representative—that is, a representative decision-maker is being appointed, or
recognised as a last resort and not as a substitute for appropriate support.148
4.136 Some assessment of the person’s support needs must take place before a
representative is appointed for them. If there is an existing state or territory appointed
guardian or administrator, there would be more reason to suggest the person also needs
a representative for the purposes of the Commonwealth scheme, particularly where the
appointment has been made in accordance with criteria consistent with the National
Decision-Making Principles.
4.137 Even so, the appointment of that person as a representative should not be
automatic. While there may be a presumption of appointment or recognition, the
agency’s decision may depend on the nature and scope of the state or territory
appointment. Where the existing appointee has been appointed by the person
themselves, for example under a power of attorney, the presumption may be seen as
stronger—because it reflects the person’s will and preferences. Against that, however,
a tribunal appointment provides procedural standards and safeguards.
4.138 In some contexts, the agency may still decide that the appointee under state or
territory law is not suitable for appointment, and appoint another person as the
representative.
4.139 In the ALRC’s view, the Commonwealth representative’s authority would
override the authority of a state or territory appointee where the scope of their
appointments overlap. That is, where a matter concerns a decision being made for the
purposes of the Commonwealth legislation, the Commonwealth representative is
responsible.149
4.140 AGAC raised an example of possible interaction issues. It expressed concern
about the possibility of Centrelink appointing a representative who is different from an
existing state-appointed administrator or financial manager with responsibility for
managing all other aspects of a person’s financial affairs for a person whose primary
income is a Centrelink benefit.150 In the ALRC’s view, this situation can be expected to
arise only rarely because the administrator or financial manager would generally be
appointed as the Centrelink representative, if one is needed.151 Even where this does
not occur, the problems caused may not be insuperable, given consultation and
cooperation. In any case, if the administrator is effectively unable to perform any
residual role, there may be no continuing need for the state or territory appointment.
148  Consistently with the Safeguards Guidelines. While attention is being given here to the interaction of
representatives, the whole thrust of the Commonwealth decision-making model is to encourage supported
decision-making and to minimise the need to appoint representatives in the first place.
149  In some circumstances, s 109 of the Australian Constitution may operate to ensure that the responsibility
of a state or territory appointed decision-maker extends only to those areas not covered by the decision-
making powers of the Commonwealth representative.
150  AGAC, Submission 91.
151  Except perhaps where Centrelink is not aware of the existing appointment. See ‘Information sharing’
below.
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No existing appointment
4.141 Where there is no existing appointment, and no other potential representative
exists, such as a family member or other supporter, agencies may need to explore other
options.
4.142 In some circumstances, these options may include applying to a state or territory
guardianship board or tribunal for the appointment of a person with powers and
responsibilities comparable to those of a representative under the relevant
Commonwealth scheme. This possibility, which raises a range of interaction and other
issues, is discussed in more detail in the context of the NDIS in Chapter 5.
4.143 Under  some  state  or  territory  regimes,  it  may  already  be  possible  for  a
Commonwealth agency, or some other person, to apply for the appointment of a state
or territory guardian or administrator to ensure that a person is available to make
decisions.
4.144 This has already occurred in NSW, for example, where the Guardianship
Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) has appointed the
Public Guardian, in part, to ensure that there is someone to perform the duties of a
nominee for a participant in the NDIS.152 The NCAT stated that the appointment of a
guardian ‘solely for this purpose’, where there is a friend or relative who could be
considered as a nominee by the National Disability Insurance Agency, would not be
consistent with the principles of the NSW legislation.153
4.145 If Commonwealth agencies were to have regular recourse to state and territory
guardianship and administration systems to find people suitable for appointment as
representatives, this would have resource and funding implications for state and
territory governments.
Implications for state and territory laws
4.146 The interaction between Commonwealth and state and territory systems may be
difficult in practice if states and territories retain ‘existing decision-making systems,
particularly given the substitute decision-making nature of many such systems’.154 The
OPA (Qld) observed that proposals to address possible conflict between systems would
require ‘extensive cooperation and communication between state-based guardianship
tribunals and public guardians, and individual Commonwealth agencies who may have
appointed representative decision makers’.155
152  See KCG [2014] NSWCATGD 7.
153  See Ibid [70]. Referring to Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) ss 4, 14(2). Most importantly, s 14(2) requires
NCAT, in considering whether to make a guardianship order to have regard, among other things, to the
importance of preserving the person’s existing family relationships and the practicability of services being
provided to the person without the need for the making of such an order.
154  National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127. The NSWCID stated that a ‘national
approach is highly desirable that involves a high degree of consistency and symbiosis between
State/Territory and Commonwealth approaches’: NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission
131.
155  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110.
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4.147 In fact, a number of issues arise that may require legislative change to resolve, if
state or territory guardians and administrators are to perform roles under
Commonwealth schemes.
4.148 The first concerns duties and obligations. A person appointed by a state or
territory body, such as NCAT, would have duties under state or territory legislation, 156
as well as under the Commonwealth law. While these duties may sometimes be
interpreted as consistent, there may be times when they conflict.
4.149 Most obviously, under state legislation, a guardian may have a duty to make
decisions in the best interests of the person represented, while having a duty under
Commonwealth legislation to ensure that the person’s own will and preferences direct
the decision. While it seems clear that, when making decisions for the purposes of
Commonwealth legislation, Commonwealth legislative duties would apply, the person
may then be in breach of duties owed as a guardian under state or territory legislation
making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to continue to act in the latter role.157
4.150 Legislative change may also be required to allow state or territory appointees to
be appointed under orders that better align with duties and responsibilities under
Commonwealth legislation—for example, so that they can make both lifestyle and
financial decisions under the NDIS.
Information sharing
Recommendation 4–10 The Australian and state and territory
governments should develop mechanisms for sharing information about
appointments of supporters and representatives, including to avoid duplication
of appointments and to facilitate review and monitoring.
4.151 Information sharing will be important in ensuring the effective operation of the
Commonwealth decision-making model and its interaction with state and territory
systems. Information about appointments needs to be shared between Commonwealth
departments and agencies, and between the Commonwealth and state or territory
bodies.
4.152 The ALRC recommends that the Australian and state and territory governments
develop methods of information sharing. Information sharing could take a number of
forms and serve different functions, including avoiding unnecessary duplication of
appointments and facilitating review and monitoring of existing appointments.
156  For example, under the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) a guardian has a duty to ensure that the ‘freedom
of decision and freedom of action’ of the person represented is ‘restricted as little as possible’; and that
the person is ‘encouraged, as far as possible, to be self-reliant in matters relating to their personal,
domestic and financial affairs’: Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4.
157  See, however, National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.7. This is discussed
in Ch 5.
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4.153 At the more formal end of the spectrum, information sharing could take the form
envisaged by VLRC, which recommended that supported decision-making
arrangements and orders be registered online and not come into force until
registration.158 This type of register could act as a centralised source of information
about the appointment of supporters and representatives in particular areas of
Commonwealth law, and facilitate the appointment of existing appointees or
representatives as a supporter or representative.
4.154 Less formally, Commonwealth departments and agencies could develop or
revise existing memoranda of understanding with state and territory bodies with respect
to information sharing. Informal information sharing arrangements are already in place
between some Commonwealth agencies and public trustees and guardians in some
jurisdictions. For example, the NSW Trustee and Guardian has entered a number of
arrangements under memoranda of understanding with Commonwealth agencies to
‘share data in order to ensure that the needs of persons are protected and to minimise
the duplication of effect’.159
4.155 AGAC highlighted that Commonwealth appointments may sometimes need to
be reviewed because a representative’s appointment at state or territory level has been
varied or revoked.160 This may be another reason to develop information sharing about
appointments.
4.156 Stakeholders were positive about the idea of new registers of decision-makers
and other information sharing mechanisms.161 The  Queensland  Law  Society,  for
example, submitted that strategies should include a register of decision-makers under
state laws, including enduring powers of attorney and advance healthcare directives.162
4.157 The LIV has previously supported information sharing through a national
register for powers of attorney, with the aim of reducing the extent of abuse of these
instruments and increasing certainty for third parties about whether an enduring power
is current and valid. Consistently, the LIV supported the development of mechanisms
for sharing information about supporter and representative appointments and suggested
that the Australian Government consider ‘which agency would be responsible for
administering and maintaining the register, funding arrangements, the use and
accessibility of the register, and privacy issues of such a register’.163
158  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [8.123], [8.124].
159  AGAC, Submission 91.
160  Ibid.
161  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129; Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120;
Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110; Qld Law Society, Submission 103; Offices of the
Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
162  Qld Law Society, Submission 103.
163  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129.
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Guidance and training
Recommendation 4–11 The Australian Government should ensure that
persons who require decision-making support, and their supporters and
representatives, are provided with information and guidance to enable them to
understand their functions and duties.
Recommendation 4–12 The Australian Government should ensure that
employees and contractors of Commonwealth agencies who engage with
supporters and representatives are provided with information, guidance and
training in relation to the roles of supporters and representatives.
4.158 Consistent information and advice, and targeted guidance and training for all
parties involved in the Commonwealth decision-making model is of vital importance in
ensuring its effective operation.
4.159 Guidance and training also contributes to the fulfilment of Australia’s
obligations under art 4 of the CRPD to promote training in the rights recognised in the
CRPD so as to better provide the assistance and services guaranteed by those rights.164
It may also respond to recommendations made by the UNCRPD that Australia
provide training, in consultation and cooperation with persons with disabilities and
their representative organizations, at the national, regional and local levels for all
actors, including civil servants, judges and social workers, on recognition of the legal
capacity of persons with disabilities and on the primacy of supported decision-making
mechanisms in the exercise of legal capacity.165
4.160 It will be important to develop and deliver accessible and culturally appropriate
information, guidance and training for:
· people who require decision-making support;166
· supporters and representatives;167 and
· the employees and contractors of Commonwealth agencies which operate under
the recommended model.
164 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 4(1)(i). See also art 8.
165  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of
Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its 10th Session (2–13 September 2013)’ (United Nations,
4 October 2013) 26.
166  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Disability Services Commissioner Victoria,
Submission No 61 to the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011.
167  Carers NSW, Submission 23; Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission No 61 to the
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011.
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4.161 This approach was strongly encouraged by stakeholders.168 For  example,  NDS
observed that
To effectively implement both the supporter and representative role and more broadly
the national decision-making principles, there is a need for an awareness-raising and
learning and development strategy. Specific guidance and training needs to be
available for the decision-maker, supporters, representatives and Commonwealth
agencies interacting with the decision-maker.169
4.162 One obvious concern was for guidance and training that focuses on the concept
of supported decision-making itself.170 The point at which supported decision-making
moves to representative decision-making needs to be closely monitored by supporters,
and by the Commonwealth agencies responsible for implementing the scheme.171
[A] key element in educating supporters is that they have a support role only: the
supporter is not the decision maker, and is educated as such on support strategies, and
how not to inadvertently become a substitute decision maker in this role.172
4.163 Another concern was training in developing people’s decision-making ability.
Stakeholders emphasised the need for ‘training and support being provided for people
with disabilities to enhance their own decision making skills and their understanding of
the various options for assistance’.173 NSWCID submitted that for some people with
intellectual disability,
in ideal circumstances they may be able to make their own decisions. However, they
may not be in those circumstances in that they have had very limited exposure to
alternatives to current deprived lifestyles and/or are in entrenched relationships of
control (benevolent or malevolent) by family members or other long-standing people
in their lives.174
4.164 Scope submitted that resources and supports are required to build decision-
making ability and that
An evidence base is growing that supports the notion that all people, regardless of
their level of cognitive impairment, can have their preferences heard through highly
collaborative, detailed and lengthy supported decision making processes. These
processes are reliant on strong circles of support that work collaboratively to support
people to participate in decisions that reflect their preferences.175
168  National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; Qld Law Society, Submission 103;
Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 94; National Disability Services, Submission 92;
AGAC, Submission 91; Scope, Submission 88.
169  National Disability Services, Submission 92.
170  See, eg, Carers NSW, Submission 23; Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
171  AGAC, Submission 91.
172  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
173  Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission No 61 to the Victorian Law Reform Commission,
Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011, 6.
174  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.
175  Scope, Submission 88. References omitted.
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4.165 More broadly, stakeholders highlighted that the development and integration of
supported decision-making will require significant cultural and attitudinal change
within the community.176 NACLC, for example, suggested that, in addition to
education and training for those engaged directly in the decision-making, a national
community awareness and education campaign should be recommended.177
176  See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; Scope, Submission 88.
177  National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
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Summary
5.1 The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) represents a significant new
area of Commonwealth responsibility and expenditure with respect to people with
disability in Australia.
5.2 The ALRC recommends that the Commonwealth decision-making model be
applied to the NDIS, which already incorporates elements of supported decision-
making. This will require some amendment of the National Disability Insurance
Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act) and Rules to provide for legal recognition of
‘supporters’ and ‘representatives’, including provisions for their appointment, removal
and associated safeguards.
5.3 The  ALRC  also  recommends  that  the  Chief  Executive  Officer  (CEO)  of  the
National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) should retain the power to appoint a
‘representative’ for a participant as a measure of last resort. There are circumstances
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where the exercise of this power is necessary—in the absence of a Commonwealth
guardianship tribunal or equivalent body—to ensure that people with a disability are
properly supported in relation to the NDIS.
5.4 There should be a presumption that an existing state or territory appointed
decision-maker with comparable powers and responsibilities should be appointed as an
NDIS representative. Amendments to the legislation governing state and territory
decision-makers may be necessary to facilitate this.
5.5 In the light of the shift towards a supported decision-making model, the ALRC
also recommends that the Australian Government provide guidance and training in
relation to decision-making and the NDIS.
The NDIS
5.6 The introduction of the NDIS followed a long-standing concern about the
inefficiency and inequitable nature of disability support arrangements in Australia and
calls for the introduction of a new mechanism for funding support for persons with
disability. The establishment of the NDIS represents a new area of Commonwealth
responsibility and ‘a significant step toward addressing the deficiencies of the current
disability service systems that exist across Australia, and to advancing cultural change
and genuine social inclusion’.1
5.7 The NDIS was designed to empower people with disability and facilitate their
choice and control.2 With respect to decision-making, while the NDIS Act contains
some provisions which facilitate supported decision-making, it ultimately retains a
mechanism for substitute decision-making through the use of ‘nominees’.3
5.8 While not all persons with disability are eligible for the NDIS, it represents the
primary area of Commonwealth law in which the Commonwealth decision-making
model should apply.
5.9 The NDIS is still in its early stages with roll-out at several trial sites. The
ongoing roll-out of the NDIS and the scheduled reviews, outlined below, provide
timely opportunities for implementing and evaluating a supported decision-making
model.
Background
5.10 In August 2011, the Productivity Commission released its report, Disability
Care and Support.4 The report found that ‘current disability support arrangements are
inequitable, underfunded, fragmented and inefficient, and give people with a disability
little choice’.5 The Productivity Commission recommended the establishment of a new
1 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
2 See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 3(1).
3 Ibid pt X.
4 Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’ (July 2011) 54 Vol 1; Productivity Commission,
‘Disability Care and Support’ (July 2011) 54 Vol 2.
5 Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’, above n 4, Vol 1, 5.
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National Disability Insurance Scheme to provide insurance cover for all Australians in
the event of significant disability. It suggested that the main function of the NDIS
would be to fund long-term high quality care and support for people with significant
disabilities.
5.11 In response, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) recognised the
need for major reform of disability services through an NDIS. At a meeting of the
Select Council on Disability Reform in October 2011, all Select Council Ministers
agreed to lay the foundations for the NDIS by mid-2013.6 In December 2012, COAG
signed an Intergovernmental Agreement for the NDIS launch.7 The Commonwealth
and several states and territories also signed bilateral agreements confirming the
operational and funding details for the roll-out of the NDIS.8
5.12 In  March  2013,  the  NDIS  Act  was  enacted.9 The  Act  is  supplemented  by  a
number of NDIS Rules, which address the more detailed operational aspects of the
scheme.10 There are also a number of Operational Guidelines, including about
nominees and supporting participants’ decision-making.11 The scheme is administered
by the NDIA.
5.13 Implementation of the NDIS began in July 2013 with roll-out in four trial
sites—South  Australia,  Tasmania,  the  Hunter  Area  in  New  South  Wales,  and  the
Barwon area of Victoria.  In July 2014, the NDIS commenced further trial  sites in the
Australian Capital Territory, the Barkly region of the Northern Territory, and in the
Perth Hills area of Western Australia.12 Roll-out of the full scheme in all states and
territories except Western Australia is scheduled to commence progressively from July
2016.13
Reviews and evaluations
5.14 There are a number of completed, current and planned reviews of the NDIS and
NDIA of potential relevance to this Inquiry, including:
· a review of the capabilities of the NDIA;14
6 Select Council on Disability Reform, Meeting Communiqué (October 2011).
7 Intergovernmental Agreement on the NDIS Launch, 7 December 2012.
8 Ibid schs A–E.
9 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth).
10 See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme (Children) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability
Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Plan
Management) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Protection and Disclosure of
Information) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Registered Providers of Supports)
Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Becoming a Participant) Rules 2013 (Cth).
11 National Disability Insurance Agency, Nominees–Overview, Operational Guideline (2013); National
Disability Insurance Agency, Nominees–Whether a Nominee Is Necessary, Operational Guideline (2013);
National Disability Insurance Agency, General Conduct–Supporting Participant’s Decision-Making,
Operational Guideline (2013).
12 See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme, NDIS Opens for Business in the ACT <www.ndis.gov.au>.
13 See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme, Roll out of the NDIS <www.ndis.gov.au>.
14 J Whalan AO, P Acton and J Harmer AO, ‘A Review of the Capabilities of the National Disability
Insurance Agency’ (January 2014).
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· a COAG report on cost drivers of the NDIS;15
· consideration of the NDIS in the course of the National Commission of Audit;16
· an evaluation of the trial of the NDIS being led by the National Institute of
Labour Studies;17
· an independent review of the operation of the NDIS Act;18
· a review of the Intergovernmental Agreement by the Ministerial Council;19 and
· a KPMG interim report  for the Board of the NDIA on the optimal approach to
transition to the full NDIS.20
5.15 A Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on the NDIS was also established in
December 2013, tasked with reviewing the implementation, administration and
expenditure of the NDIS.21
5.16 As many of these reviews and evaluations will be conducted following the
conclusion of the ALRC’s Inquiry, the recommendations in this Report may inform
their work.
Decision-making under the NDIS
5.17 Current decision-making arrangements under the NDIS Act incorporate
elements of both supported and substitute decision-making, as well as informal and
formal decision-making. The three key decision-making mechanisms include:
autonomous decision-making by participants; informal supported decision-making; and
substitute decision-making by nominees.
5.18 A person can make an access request to be a participant under the NDIS.22 If the
person meets the access criteria, the person becomes a participant on the day the CEO
of the NDIA decides that they meet the access criteria.23
5.19 The main object of the NDIS Act is to ‘enable people with disability to exercise
choice and control in the pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery of their
supports’.24 The Act provides that ‘the supportive relationships, friendships and
connections with others of people with disability should be recognised’.25
15 Requested by COAG Disability Reform Council: COAG Disability Reform Council, Meeting
Communiqué, 18 December 2013.
16 See, ‘Towards Responsible Government, Phase One’ (National Commission of Audit, February 2014);
‘Towards Responsible Government, Phase Two’ (National Commission of Audit, March 2014).
17 NDIS Evaluation, Evaluation of the Trial of NDIS <www.ndisevaluation.net.au>.
18 Due to commence in 2015: National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 208(1).
19 Due to commence in 2015: Intergovernmental Agreement on the NDIS Launch, 7 December 2012 [121].
See J Whalan AO, P Acton and J Harmer AO, above n 14, attachment C.
20 ‘Review of the Optimal Approach to Transition to the Full NDIS’ (Interim Report, KPMG).
21 Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on the National Disability Insurance Scheme, Homepage
<www.aph.gov.au>.
22 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 18.
23 Ibid ss 28, 22–27 (access criteria).
24 Ibid s 3(1)(e).
25 Ibid s 5(e).
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5.20 If a person is a participant, the CEO must facilitate the preparation of a plan with
them. A plan will cover, among others matters, general support to be provided to the
participant, as well as any ‘reasonable and necessary’ supports that will be funded
under the NDIS.26
Nominees
5.21 The NDIS Act provides for a nominee scheme which is modelled largely on the
existing substitute decision-making scheme under social security law. These provisions
may limit the scope for autonomous decision-making by participants.
5.22 There are two types of nominees under the NDIS—‘plan nominees’ and
‘correspondence nominees’. A plan nominee may be appointed to prepare, review or
replace a participant’s plan, or manage the funding for supports under the plan.27 The
role of a correspondence nominee is narrower. A correspondence nominee may be
appointed to do any other act that may be done by a participant under, or for the
purposes  of,  the  NDIS  Act,28 but in practice is confined to making requests to the
NDIA or receiving notices from the NDIA on behalf of the participant.
Appointment
5.23 The NDIS Act provides that the CEO of the NDIA may appoint a plan nominee
or  a  correspondence  nominee  either  at  the  request  of  the  participant,  or  on  their  own
initiative.29 The same person can be appointed as both a plan and correspondence
nominee.30
5.24 The National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth)
(Nominee Rules) provide further detail about whether a nominee should be appointed,
who should be appointed as a nominee, duties of nominees, and cancellation and
suspension of nominees.31 For example, r 3.1 provides:
people with disability are presumed to have capacity to make decisions that affect
their  own  lives.  This  is  usually  the  case,  and  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  appoint  a
nominee where it is possible to support, and build the capacity of, participants to
make their own decisions for the purposes of the NDIS.32
5.25 The Nominee Rules also acknowledge that appointment of a nominee on the
initiative of the CEO of the NDIA is to be a measure of last resort:
appointments of nominees will be justified only when it is not possible for participants
to be assisted to make decisions for themselves. Appointments of nominees usually
come about as a result of a participant requesting that a nominee be appointed.
26 Ibid ss 32 (CEO must facilitate a plan), 33 (matters that must be included in a plan).
27 Ibid s 78.
28 Ibid s 79. See also National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.9, 3.10.
29 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 86, 87. See also National Disability Insurance
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.11—3.15.
30 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(1).
31 A number of other rules are also relevant, including for example, National Disability Insurance Scheme
(Children) Rules 2013 (Cth).
32 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.1.
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It is only in rare and exceptional cases that the CEO will find it necessary to appoint a
nominee for a participant who has not requested that an appointment be made.33
5.26 In appointing a nominee, the CEO must take into consideration ‘the wishes (if
any) of the participant regarding the making of the appointment’34 and have regard to a
number of other matters.35 In determining whether to appoint a particular nominee,
there are also a range of matters the CEO must take into account.36 Appointment of a
nominee may be indefinite or for a particular period of time.37
5.27 Where requested by the participant, the CEO must cancel the appointment of a
nominee who was appointed at a participant’s request.38 However, where a nominee
was appointed on the initiative of the CEO, the CEO may cancel the appointment, but
is not obliged to do so.39
Duties
5.28 Nominees owe a duty to a participant ‘to ascertain the wishes of the participant
and act in a manner that promotes the personal and social wellbeing of the
participant’.40 Nominees also have a number of other duties, including a duty to:
· consult;
· develop the capacity of the participant; and
· avoid or manage conflicts of interest.41
5.29 Importantly, a plan nominee appointed on the initiative of the CEO is ‘able to do
an act on behalf of the participant only if the nominee considers that the participant is
not capable of doing the act’.42 A plan nominee appointed at the request of the
participant has a duty to refrain from doing an act unless satisfied that: ‘it is not
possible for the participant to do, or to be supported to do, the act himself or herself’;
or it is possible, but the participant does not want to do the act himself or herself. 43
5.30 The ALRC understands that, in some trial sites, there have been very few
appointments of plan nominees.44 For example, to date, no nominee appointments have
been made in the NDIS trial site in NSW. As discussed below, use of the CEO’s power
33 Ibid rr 3.1, 3.4.
34 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(2)(b).
35 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth)  r  3.14.  See  also National Disability
Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(4).
36 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 4.5–4.8.
37 Ibid rr 4.9–4.11.
38 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)  s  89.  See  also National Disability Insurance
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) pt 6.
39 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)  s  90.  See  also National Disability Insurance
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) pt 6.
40 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)  s  80.  See  also National Disability Insurance
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 5.3, 5.4.
41 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 5.8–5.14.
42 Ibid r 5.5.
43 Ibid r 5.6.
44 See discussion of informal supporters in Ch 4.
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to appoint a nominee may manage situations where persons with disability have no
natural support networks or no-one they know who can be appointed.
Reform of decision-making under the NDIS
5.31 The NDIS Act provides for supported decision-making in a manner largely
consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) and the National Decision-Making Principles. However, some
amendments  will  be  necessary  to  bring  the  NDIS  in  line  with  the  ALRC’s
Commonwealth decision-making model.
5.32 First, the ALRC recommends amendment of the objects and principles
provisions of the NDIS Act.
5.33 Secondly, the existing NDIS nominee scheme should be replaced with a scheme
for ‘supporters’ and ‘representatives’, as described in Chapter 4. In particular, the
NDIS Act, Rules and Operational Guidelines should be amended to provide a
mechanism for the recognition of supporters appointed by participants and
representatives. In effect, the reforms would result in the current ‘correspondence
nominee’ role being subsumed by the supporter role and plan nominees being replaced
by representatives.
5.34 Stakeholders highlighted the importance of ensuring that the NDIS should
continue as a benchmark model for supported decision-making. For example, the
Queenslanders with Disability Network (QDN) noted that
The NDIS can play a leading role in demonstrating to people with disability and their
families, how supported decision-making can lead to better outcomes. This will create
an expectation that will drive demand for reform in other jurisdictions to adopt a
uniform supported decision-making framework.45
5.35 The  NDIA expressed  support  for  the  objectives  of  the  ALRC’s  proposals  with
regard to applying the National Decision-Making Principles and Commonwealth
decision-making model, which it considered are consistent with both the objectives of
the NDIS Act and the NDIA’s strategic plan.46
5.36 More generally, stakeholders strongly endorsed the need for supported decision-
making in the NDIS to enable participants ‘to obtain support to make and implement
their own decisions’.47 This is likely to be of particular significance for many groups of
people with disability. The Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National
Rural Law and Justice Alliance emphasised, for example, the importance of supported
decision-making arrangements ‘for people living in regional and rural communities,
45 Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
46 National Disability Insurance Agency, Submission 118.
47 Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.  See  also:  MHCA, Submission 77; NSW Public
Guardian, Submission 50; NCOSS, Submission 26; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the
National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20.
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where local family and neighbourhood networks can be particularly strong and
supportive’.48
5.37 The application of the Commonwealth decision-making model may go some
way to helping avoid the appointment of guardians and other substitute decision-
makers ‘in lieu of appropriate support, assistance, information or case management’ 49
in  most  cases.  However,  as  discussed  below,  there  may  still  be  a  role  for  state-
appointed decision-makers in instances where a person requires an NDIS
representative.
5.38 The ALRC does not intend to be overly prescriptive about the mechanism for
recognising supporters in the context of the NDIS. Nor has the ALRC examined
funding mechanisms or practical matters involving resources and responsibilities.
Whether there is a general duty to provide support and who should bear the cost of
support are consequential issues.
Objects and principles
Recommendation 5–1 The objects and principles in the National
Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) should be amended to ensure
consistency with the National Decision-Making Principles.
5.39 The ALRC recommends amendment of the existing objects and principles
clauses contained in ss 3–5 of the NDIS Act to reflect the National Decision-Making
Principles. This would ensure the National Decision-Making Principles guide the
application and interpretation of the legislation as a whole, and the particular division
of the Act dealing with supporters and representatives.
5.40 Stakeholders such as the Disability Advocacy Network Australia (DANA)
expressed the view that
it should be an explicit object of legislation in the disability area, such as the NDIS
Act, to promote the decision making capacity of people with disability, to build the
capacity of people with disability to make decisions and participate in decision
making, and to enable access to decision making support for all people with disability
whose decision making capacity is impaired.50
5.41 Section  3  of  the  NDIS  Act  contains  general  objects  of  the  Act.  Section  4
contains general principles guiding actions under the Act, including that:
· people with disability should be supported to participate in and contribute to
social and economic life to the extent of their ability;
48 Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission
20.
49 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
50 Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36.
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· people with disability should be supported to exercise choice, including in
relation to taking reasonable risks, in the pursuit of their goals and the planning
and delivery of their support;
· people with disability have the same right as other members of Australian
society to be able to determine their own best interests, including the right to
exercise choice and control, and to engage as equal partners in decisions that
will affect their lives, to the full extent of their capacity;
· people with disability should be supported in all their dealings and
communications with the Agency so that their capacity to exercise choice and
control  is  maximised  in  a  way  that  is  appropriate  to  their  circumstances  and
cultural needs; and
· the role of families, carers and other significant persons in the lives of people
with disability is to be acknowledged and respected.51
5.42 Section 5 of the NDIS Act contains general principles guiding action of people
who may do acts or things on behalf of others, including:
· people with disability should be involved in decision making processes that
affect them, and where possible make decisions for themselves; and
· the judgments and decisions that people with disability would have made for
themselves should be taken into account.52
5.43 While the intent of the objects and principles provisions in many ways reflects
the CRPD and National Decision-Making Principles, some amendment is required, not
least to recognise will and preferences decision-making.
5.44 For example, the focus under the general principle in s 4(8) of the NDIS Act
should be on the right of participants to express their will and preferences and to
exercise choice and control with respect to decision-making. This would require
removal of references to people with disability being ‘able to determine their own best
interests’, and being ‘equal partners in decisions’.53 Such amendments would reflect
the recommended shift from substitute decision-making to supported decision-making;
the shift away from ‘best interests’ towards ‘will, preferences and rights’; and the idea
that decision-making authority should remain with the participant.
Supporters
Recommendation 5–2 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act
2013 (Cth) and NDIS Rules should be amended to include provisions dealing
with supporters consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
51 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 4.
52 Ibid s 5.
53 Ibid s 4(8).
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5.45 The Commonwealth decision-making model recommended by the ALRC would
introduce the concept of formal supported decision-making in the NDIS. While there is
currently no provision for the nomination of formal supporters under the NDIS Act, the
model would formalise the role played by nominees as supporters, such as family
members.
5.46 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the central idea, already recognised by the
NDIS Act, is that participants should be supported to make their own decisions. A
participant would be entitled to appoint a supporter to support them to make NDIS-
related decisions. Importantly, even where a participant appoints a supporter, ultimate
decision-making authority remains with the participant. Where a participant chooses to
appoint more than one supporter, it would be a matter for the participant to determine
what specific functions each supporter might play.
5.47 Importantly, providing mechanisms for the appointment of formal supporters
and representatives under the NDIS Act should not diminish the involvement of and
respect for informal support in decision-making. Provisions which recognise and
facilitate the involvement of informal supporters in the NDIS are consistent with the
National Decision-Making Principles.54
5.48 The ALRC recognises the danger of over-formalising the role of informal
supporters, but argues that it is necessary to provide some mechanism for legislative
recognition, especially when dealing with third parties. Even where people have
‘natural’ or informal support from families, they may want to appoint a particular
person to help them deal with the NDIS. Providing some legal recognition of such a
role may help prevent situations where the NDIA is not sure whom to deal with, for
example, where there is conflicting communication or advice from family members.
Appointment
5.49 The NDIS represents a fundamental shift in funding for, and provision of,
disability services in Australia. In addition to existing mechanisms, such as the Sector
Development Fund,55 supporters would play a key role in ensuring prospective
participants and participants receive appropriate support to engage with the NDIS.
5.50 A participant or prospective participant should be able to appoint a supporter or
supporters at any time during their engagement with the NDIS. Appointment by a
participant would be the only mechanism by which a supporter may be appointed. 56
Making provision for the appointment of supporters may also limit instances of carers,
family members, service providers or others seeking appointment of a nominee or
54 See, eg, Ibid principles (e), (f). National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth)
rr 3.14(b)(iv), 3.14(b)(v), 4.8(b)(ii)(A), 4.8(c), 5.8(b).
55 ‘The Sector Development Fund helps people with disability, families and carers, service providers, and
the disability workforce to transition to the NDIS. A wide range of activities will be funded during the
launch period and in the lead up to national roll out of the Scheme’: National Disability Insurance
Scheme, Sector Development Fund <www.ndis.gov.au>.
56 See discussion in Ch 4 in relation to potential alternative mechanisms for appointment of a representative.
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guardian under state or territory law because they incorrectly assume it is necessary, or
simply to facilitate registration as a participant with the NDIS.57
5.51 Most importantly, applying the Commonwealth decision-making model to the
NDIS should ensure that, where a supporter is appointed, ultimate decision-making
authority remains with the participant. Any decision made by a participant with the
support of a supporter should be recognised by the NDIA, service providers and others
as the decision of the participant.
5.52 A participant should be entitled to appoint whomever they want as their
supporter, if they want one. Stakeholders have highlighted, however, that there are
many instances where a person will not have any available support, and an independent
body may be required to provide support. Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria
suggested that,
ideally, an independent body would be provided with sufficient resources and funding
to ‘employ suitably qualified people to take on the role’ equivalent to the OPA/State
Trustees in the Victorian jurisdiction.58
5.53 Advocacy for Inclusion also submitted that, where a person has no existing
natural support, ‘they should have access to formal supporters who have undergone
appropriate checks and training so that they can select a person they are comfortable
with’.59
5.54 Other stakeholders emphasised the importance of independent advocacy in
supporting NDIS participants.60 There seems no reason why individual advocates or
advocate organisations should not be appointed as a participant’s supporter. Only a
participant would have the authority to appoint a supporter and would also have the
power to suspend or revoke the appointment at any time.
5.55 The National Disability Advocacy Program (NDAP), managed by the
Department of Social Services, funds advocates at NDIS trial sites. These advocates
can ‘assist people to participate in decision making and increase their capacity to
understand the service delivery options available to enable them to meet their goals’. 61
Funding also allows advocates to provide assistance to people seeking merits review of
NDIA decisions before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), by providing a
support person.
57 See, eg, AGAC, Submission 51.
58 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
59 Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126.
60 See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36.
61 Department of Social Services, National Disability Advocacy Program <www.dss.gov.au>.
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5.56 One option, which might help address the issue of funding for supporters and
representatives, may be to include funding for these decision-making arrangements as
part of participant packages of support.62 This  might  include  support  to  allow  a
participant to make supported decisions in the management of their own funds.63
5.57 It may be inappropriate, however, to use individual participant funding for
decision-making support. Arguably this should be provided separately by the NDIA or
other government agency—through programs such as the NDAP—in order to ensure
compliance with international obligations of State Parties under the CRPD with respect
to the provision of support. The Nominee Rules provide that it is ‘expected that the
Agency will assist nominees in fulfilling’ a duty to develop the capacity of
participants.64 This may be a basis for arguing that NDIA responsibility for support
was envisaged, to at  least  a certain extent,  in the drafting of the NDIS Rules.  On the
other hand, provision of support to make decisions with respect to the NDIS might be
exactly the type of reasonable and necessary support that should be funded under the
NDIS.
Functions and duties
Functions of a supporter
5.58 Under existing arrangements, a plan nominee’s role may encompass decisions
relating to the preparation, review or replacement of the participant’s plan; or
management of funding for supports under the plan.65 The  scope  of  the  role  of  a
correspondence nominee is narrower, and more closely reflects the functions of a
supporter, who is able to make requests to or receives notices from the NDIA on behalf
of the participant.66
5.59 The functions of a supporter under the NDIS should include those set out in
Recommendation 4–4. For example, a supporter should be able to liaise with the NDIA
on behalf of the participant or prospective participant to obtain information relevant to
assessment, planning, or the management of NDIS funds. A supporter may attend
planning meetings and support the participant to make decisions about what their goals
and aspirations are, and what supports are required. A supporter should also endeavour
to ensure the participant’s decisions are given effect.
62 Participants develop a plan with the NDIA which must include a participant’s statement of goals and
aspirations and a statement of participant supports. The statement of participant supports sets out the
supports that will be provided or funded by the NDIS. There are two types of supports—general supports
that will be provided to, or in relation to, the participant, and reasonable and necessary supports. There are
a range of criteria and tests for determining whether something is a reasonable and necessary support and
should be funded by the NDIS: National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.11.
See also National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013 (Cth) and various
Operational Guidelines, such as the Operational Guidelines on Planning and Assessment—Supports in
the Plan.
63 Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
64 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.11.
65 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)  s  78; National Disability Insurance Scheme
(Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.7.
66 The matters the correspondence nominee is able to deal with cannot be limited further by the instrument
of appointment: National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.8.
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Supporter duties
5.60 The recommended duties of a supporter amend and expand upon the duties of
nominees under the existing system. The ALRC recommends that a supporter’s duties
should include:
· supporting the NDIS participant to make the decision or decisions for which
they are appointed;
· supporting the NDIS participant to express their will and preferences in making
a decision;
· acting in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural
wellbeing of the NDIS participant;
· acting honestly, diligently and in good faith;
· supporting the NDIS participant to consult with ‘existing appointees’, family
members, carers and other significant people in their life in making a decision;
and
· assisting the NDIS participant to develop their own decision-making ability.
5.61 A key duty owed by supporters is the duty to develop the decision-making
ability of the participant. A similar duty is already owed by nominees under the NDIS
Rules, which provide that a nominee has a duty to ‘apply their best endeavours to
developing the capacity of the participant to make their own decisions, where possible
to a point where a nominee is no longer necessary’.67 The importance of the duty to
assist a person to develop their own decision-making capacity is discussed in
Chapter 4.
5.62 While there is currently no duty of nominees to support the participant to make
decisions, this type of duty may have been intended under the NDIS Rules. That is, in
deciding who to appoint as a nominee, the CEO is to have regard to the degree to
which the proposed nominee is willing and able to ‘involve the participant in decision-
making processes’, and ‘assist the participant to make decisions for himself or
herself’.68 It  is  important  that  there  be  a  similar  duty  on  supporters  to  support  a
participant to make decisions and to express their will and preferences.
5.63 It is appropriate to add financial and cultural wellbeing to this list, reflecting the
role supporters may play in supporting participants to make decisions relating to NDIS
funds, and the importance of culturally sensitive and appropriate support.69 This idea of
sensitivity to cultural and linguistic circumstances is not an existing duty owed by
nominees. However, in deciding whom to appoint as a nominee, the CEO is to have
67 Ibid r 5.10.
68 Ibid rr 4.8(b)(C), 4.8(b)(D).
69 See, eg, MDAA, Submission 43.
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regard to the degree to which the proposed nominee is ‘sensitive to the cultural and
linguistic circumstances of the participant’.70
5.64 A nominee currently has a duty to consult ‘any court-appointed decision-maker
or any participant-appointed decision-maker’ and ‘any other person who assists the
participant to manage their day-to-day activities and make decisions (for example, a
person who cares for the participant)’ in relation to doing acts under, or for the
purposes  of,  the  NDIS Act.71 If more than one person is appointed as plan nominee,
each of them also owes a duty to consult with the others.72 In order to reflect the
supported rather than substitute decision-making role played by supporters, the ALRC
considers that the supporter duty be modified to be a duty to facilitate consultation with
the same categories of people.
5.65 The duties supporters should owe include the duty to support the participant to
make the decision or decisions in relation to which they were appointed and to express
their will and preferences, and to act honestly, diligently and in good faith. As
discussed below, safeguards should be in place to ensure, for example, that supporters
do not abuse their position for their own self-interest.
Representatives
Recommendation 5–3 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act
2013 (Cth) and NDIS Rules should be amended to include provisions dealing
with representatives consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
5.66 In certain circumstances, a participant may not be able to make decisions
themselves or with support, and may need a representative to be appointed for them.
This should only occur in line with the National Decision-Making Principles and as a
last resort.
5.67 The ALRC recommends that the current ‘nominee’ provisions be amended to
allow the appointment of a representative. The change in terminology from ‘nominee’
to ‘representative’ is consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles.
However, the provisions dealing with representatives will operate much the same as the
nominee provisions, with some exceptions as discussed below.
5.68 Many of the elements contained in the ALRC’s model for ‘representatives’ are
already incorporated into the NDIS Act, Rules or Operational Guidelines. For instance,
consistent with the ALRC’s approach, nominees are appointed as a last resort, and
there are duties on nominees to ascertain the will and preferences of the participant and
to act in a manner that promotes the personal and social wellbeing of the participant.
70 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 4.8(b)(iv).
71 Ibid r 5.8.
72 Ibid r 5.9.
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5.69 The role of a representative is to support a participant to express their will and
preferences in making decisions and, where necessary, to determine the will and
preferences of a participant and give effect to them. If the will and preferences of the
participant cannot be ascertained, the representative should consider the human rights
relevant to the situation in making a decision. Such decisions may relate to the
planning process, the participant’s plan, supports funded by the NDIS, interaction with
service providers, or similar matters.
Functions and duties
Functions of a representative
5.70 Under the current nominee provisions, the role of a plan nominee may
encompass decisions relating to the preparation, review or replacement of the
participant’s plan; or management of funding for supports under the plan. However, the
Nominee Rules provide for limitations on the matters that a plan nominee is appointed
to deal with:
For example, the appointment might be restricted so as to prevent the nominee from
specifying the goals, objectives and aspirations of the participant. In such a case, the
nominee might still have authority with respect to the management of funding under a
plan. Alternatively, the CEO might appoint 2 or more plan nominees, and, in each
instrument of appointment, limit the matters in relation to which each person is the
plan nominee.73
5.71 Despite this provision, some stakeholders expressed concern that the role played
by plan nominees is ‘a global appointment’, and it relies ‘on the discretion of the
nominee to limit the use of their power; in particular the power to make substitute
decisions when a person cannot be supported to make their own decisions’.74
5.72 The scope of the role of a correspondence nominee is narrower and more closely
reflects the functions performed by a supporter. For example, a correspondence
nominee may make requests to the NDIA or receive notices from the NDIA, on behalf
of the participant.75
5.73 The ALRC considers that a representative should perform some or all of the
functions articulated in Recommendation 4–7. These parallel the functions of
supporters and are discussed in more detail below.
5.74 In line with the National Decision-Making Principles, the ALRC suggests that,
in introducing the concept of representative under the NDIS, consideration be given to
potential categories of representatives and ensuring that any appointment is decision-
specific and limited in scope and time. For example, it may be appropriate to separate
representative roles between those who provide general support in relation to
73 Ibid r 3.8.
74 Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
75 The matters the correspondence nominee is able to deal with cannot be limited further by the instrument
of appointment: National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.8.
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interaction with the NDIA and planning, and those who are involved in financial
decisions.76
Representative duties
5.75 Representatives under the NDIS will play a key role in providing support to
participants requiring full decision-making support. As a result, representatives should
be subject to the duties and responsibilities articulated in Recommendation 4–8. A
representative should have the same duties as a supporter, and a number of additional
duties. It is important that representatives owe specific duties under the NDIS Act and
Rules, even where they are an existing state or territory appointed decision-maker and
are subject to duties under state and territory legislation.
5.76 The key duties the ALRC recommends that a representative should owe under
the NDIS Act and Rules are:
· providing support to a participant to express their will and preferences in making
decisions;
· where it is not possible to determine the current will and preferences of the
participant, determining what the person would likely want based on all the
information available;
· where the first two avenues are not possible, considering the human rights
relevant to the situation;
· acting in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural
wellbeing of the participant;
· providing support to the participant to consult with ‘existing appointees’, family
members, carers and other significant people in their life when making a
decision; and
· developing the capacity of the participant to make their own decisions.
5.77 There are a number of additional duties appropriate for NDIS representatives
who provide fully supported decision-making support. One such duty is to support the
participant to express their will and preferences. This is not currently reflected in the
duties of nominees to ‘ascertain the wishes of the participant’, which is similar to but
does not require provision of support to express will and preferences. However, there is
some suggestion that this type of duty was intended under the NDIS Rules because, in
deciding who to appoint as a nominee, the CEO is to have regard to the degree to
which the proposed nominee is willing and able to ‘involve the participant in decision-
making processes’, ‘assist the participant to make decisions for himself or herself’ and
‘ascertain what judgements and decisions the participant would have made for him or
herself’.77 Nonetheless, it is necessary for a representative to have an explicit duty to
support a participant to express their will and preferences.
76 As suggested by Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
77 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 4.8(b)(C), 4.8(b)(D), 4.8(b)(E).
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5.78 While the focus of decision-making under the NDIS should be on supporting a
participant to express their will and preferences, there is a need to make provision for
circumstances in which a representative is providing full support in decision-making.
In such circumstances, the representative must determine what the person would likely
want based on all the information available. This may require engagement with the
NDIA, service providers, family members and others to establish an understanding of
factors such as the nature of decisions the participant has made in the past, and their
values and beliefs. Where this is not possible, the representative must consider the
human rights relevant to the situation, and make the decision that is least restrictive of
these rights.
Appointment by the CEO
Recommendation 5–4 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act
2013 (Cth) should be amended to incorporate provisions dealing with the
process and factors to be taken into account by the CEO of the National
Disability Insurance Agency in appointing representatives. These provisions
should make it clear that the CEO’s powers are to be exercised as a measure of
last resort, with the presumption that an existing state or territory appointee will
be appointed, and with particular regard to the participant’s will, preferences and
support networks.
5.79 In the ALRC’s view, the power of the CEO to appoint a representative needs to
be retained. Problems may arise where an NDIS participant has no informal networks
to support them, and no state-based appointed decision maker is available to be
appointed as a representative. In the absence of the creation of some new
Commonwealth body, similar to a guardianship tribunal, the exercise of the power to
appoint a representative by the CEO may be necessary and desirable, provided that the
power is subject to appropriate safeguards.
5.80 Despite the concerns of some stakeholders, the NDIS Act and Rules make it
clear  that  the  CEO’s  powers  are  to  be  exercised  as  a  measure  of  last  resort,  with
particular regard to the participant’s wishes and support networks and the existence of
state or territory appointees. However, given the importance of this issue, some of
these provisions should be elevated into the primary legislation.
5.81 The NDIS Act currently provides that the CEO of the NDIA may appoint a plan
nominee or a correspondence nominee at the request of the participant, or on the
initiative of the CEO.78 The CEO of the NDIA must take into account several factors in
determining whether to appoint a particular nominee.79 In  addition,  the  CEO has  the
78 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 86, 87. See also National Disability Insurance
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.11–3.15.
79 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 4.5–4.8.
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power to make an appointment for a particular period80 and power to limit the scope of
the appointment.81 The Rules provide that:
It is only in rare and exceptional cases that the CEO will find it necessary to appoint a
nominee for a participant who has not requested that an appointment be made. In
appointing a nominee in such circumstances, the CEO will have regard to the
participant’s wishes and the participant’s circumstances (including their formal and
informal support networks).82
5.82 This general principle is expanded upon in r 3.14, which provides that the CEO,
when deciding to appoint a nominee must:
(a)   consult with the participant; and
(b)   have regard to the following:
 (i)   whether the participant would be able to participate effectively in the
NDIS without having a nominee appointed;
 (ii)  the principle that a nominee should be appointed only when necessary,
as a last resort, and subject to appropriate safeguards;
 (iii)  whether the participant has a court-appointed decision-maker or a
participant-appointed decision-maker;
 (iv)  whether the participant has supportive relationships, friendships or
connections with others that could be:
(A)   relied on or strengthened to assist the participant to make their
own decisions; or
(B)   improved by appointment of an appropriate person as a
nominee;
(v)   any relevant views of:
(A)   the participant; and
(B)    any  person  (including  a  carer)  who  assists  the  participant  to
manage their day-to-day activities and make decisions; and
(C)   any court-appointed decision-maker or participant-appointed
decision-maker.
5.83 Rule 3.14 requires that the decision is taken with regard to the wishes of the
applicant and in the context of available supports. The Rules also provide that
An example of a circumstance in which a nominee might be appointed without a
request from the participant is where the CEO considers that the participant needs a
nominee, but is unable to request appointment himself or herself, even with support.
In such circumstances, the initiative might come from a carer or other person who
offers to be the nominee.83
80 Ibid rr 4.9–4.11.
81 Ibid r 3.8.
82 Ibid r 3.4.
83 Ibid r 3.15.
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5.84 Stakeholders expressed concern about provisions that enable the CEO or
delegate to appoint a nominee on the initiative of the agency, rather than at the request
of the participant.84 DANA, for example, submitted that the power is ‘largely
unfettered’ and gives the CEO or delegate
considerable freedom to appoint or cancel appointment of a nominee with or without
the agreement of the participant or respect for the participant’s wishes, with or
without regard for any existing guardianship, power of attorney or other substitute
decision-making arrangement for the participant, and most importantly with or
without first seeking to support and enable the participant to make the required
decisions for him/her-self. This appointment power appears to give little regard to
enabling the decision-making capacity of participants.85
5.85 Similarly, the National Association of Community Legal Centres submitted the
current provisions give the agency ‘considerable power’ to appoint a nominee and do
not require ‘consideration or facilitation of the decision-making capability of the
person with disability’—and that such provisions should not be replicated under the
Commonwealth decision-making model.86
Interaction with state and territory systems
Recommendation 5–5 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act
2013 (Cth) should be amended to provide that, before exercising the power to
appoint a representative, the CEO of the National Disability Insurance Agency
may make an application to a state or territory guardianship or administration
body for the appointment of a person with comparable powers and
responsibilities. The CEO may then exercise the power to appoint that person as
a representative under the NDIS Act.
5.86 Under  the  NDIS  Act,  the  CEO  of  the  NDIA  must,  in  considering  whether  to
appoint a nominee, have regard to whether there is a person under Commonwealth,
state or territory law who ‘has guardianship of the participant’, or ‘is a person
appointed by a court, tribunal, board or panel (however described) who has power to
make decisions for the participant and whose responsibilities in relation to the
participant are relevant to the duties of a nominee’.87 The Rules provide that the CEO
must also have regard to
the presumption that, if the participant has a court-appointed decision-maker or a
participant-appointed decision-maker, and the powers and responsibilities of that
84 See, eg, Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36; Physical Disability Council of NSW,
Submission 32. A similar concern was expressed in relation to children’s representatives: Children with
Disability Australia, Submission 68.
85 Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36. See also National Association of Community
Legal Centres, Submission 127.  See  also  Physical  Disability  Council  of  NSW, Submission 32. The
Physical Disability Council of NSW submitted that the provision ‘is not consistent with person centred
practice’.
86 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
87 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(4).
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person are comparable with those of a nominee, that person should be appointed as
nominee.88
5.87 Further, the CEO is to ‘consult, in writing, with any court appointed decision-
maker or participant-appointed decision maker in relation to any appointment’. 89
Nominees themselves also have a duty to consult with ‘any court-appointed decision-
maker or any participant-appointed decision-maker’.90
5.88 As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the key difficulties in applying the
Commonwealth decision-making model to the NDIS is determining how NDIS
supporters and representatives interact with state and territory appointed decision-
makers.
5.89 The NDIA stated that, in relation to interaction issues generally, it ‘recognises
the importance of ensuring that  to the greatest  extent possible the NDIS operates in a
way that complements other arrangements for supporting people with disability
including in relation to the management of NDIS funds’.
The Agency is working collaboratively with others including state and territory
guardianship and administration tribunals to address the issues raised by these and
other questions. For example, the Agency has been entering into arrangements for the
exchange of information, consistent with the privacy provisions of the NDIS Act, with
state and territory guardianship and administration tribunals.91
5.90 The interaction issues are of particular relevance given the ongoing roll-out of
the NDIS. Stakeholders expressed concerns about an increase in applications for the
appointment of state or territory decision-makers since the introduction of the NDIS.
For example, the Australian Guardianship and Administration Council (AGAC)
submitted that
the introduction of the NDIS creates a number of decision making ‘events’ and a
greater degree of scrutiny of informal substitute decision-makers or supporters and
leads to an increase in the number of applications under guardianship legislation. In
these and other hearings there have been discussions about the increased number and
complexity of decisions that will need to be made as a result of the introduction of the
NDIS. AGAC anticipates a commensurate increased call on the advocacy functions of
the Public Advocates and Public Guardians and on the financial management role of
the Public Trustees as well as on the Tribunals.92
5.91 To address concerns about the duplication of representatives, and the
development of a parallel Commonwealth system of appointments, the NDIS Act
should be amended to provide that, before exercising the power to appoint a
representative, the CEO of the NDIA may make an application to a state or territory
guardianship or administration body for the appointment of a person with comparable
powers and responsibilities.
88 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 4.8(a).
89 Ibid r 4.12.
90 Ibid r 5.8(a).
91 National Disability Insurance Agency, Submission 118.
92 AGAC, Submission 51.
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5.92 If the NDIA is to have regular recourse to state and territory guardianship and
administration systems to find people suitable for appointment as representatives, this
will have resource and funding implications for state and territory governments.
State and territory appointments
5.93 The NSW Government expressed concern about the ‘practical reality’ that,
where a participant has no informal support network, the NDIA is managing the plan
on the participant’s behalf and that ‘the decisions being made by the NDIA are in the
nature of substitute decisions with no independent monitoring or scrutiny’.93
5.94 The Guardianship Division of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of NSW
(NCAT) has received ‘over 85 applications for the appointment of a guardian for a
person who is, or will become a participant in the NDIS’ in the Hunter Region launch
site.94 NCAT noted that applications were made by family members or care providers
who were concerned about the operation of the NDIS.
5.95 In some cases, where a participant is seen to have adequate support from
informal support networks, or strong advocates, NCAT has rejected the application for
guardianship. For example, in KTT, NCAT commented
The Tribunal was cautious about pre-empting the NDIA processes by making a
guardianship order so that Mrs LBU was all the more likely to be appointed nominee
by the NDIA.95
5.96 In contrast, NCAT appointed a Public Guardian in the case of KCG, where the
person did not have a friend or family member who could support her. NCAT noted:
The irony in reaching this conclusion is that a state based appointment is required for
a  person  in  Miss  KCG’s  circumstances  to  ensure  that  her  interests  in  relation  to  a
Commonwealth scheme are protected, as it seems there is no Commonwealth
equivalent of a Public Guardian, a Public Advocate or other independent body who
could be appointed as a nominee on her behalf.96
5.97 The Office of the Public Advocate (Qld) submitted that, while there is currently
a ‘presumption’ that an existing guardian would also be appointed as a nominee for a
participant, this is not sufficient.97 Similarly, the Office of the Public Advocate (Vic)
stated that, while it was expected that state and territory-appointed guardians and
administrators would be appointed as nominees under the NDIS, ‘a review is required
to ascertain the extent to which this is happening in practice in the launch sites’.98
5.98 The ALRC understands that very few nominees have been appointed by the
CEO of the NDIA, and that this may have contributed to the number of applications for
guardianship being made to relevant state tribunals.
93 NSW Government, Submission 135.
94 Ibid.
95 KTT [2014] NSWCATGD 6, [29].
96 KCG [2014] NSWCATGD 7, [69].
97 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
98 Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.
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Interaction issues
5.99 Stakeholders provided a range of opinions on how interaction issues might be
dealt with. Many suggested that there should be a centralised process because, in most
cases, ‘it is highly desirable that the same person should fulfil both roles’99—that is,
acting as plan nominee and performing guardianship roles more generally.
5.100 The OPA (Qld) submitted that it is logical to have a system of central
registration and ‘the state based decision-making regimes are an obvious vehicle for
this’. Tapping into the existing state based system would ensure that it ‘also connects
people with an existing system of safeguards in the form of opportunities for tribunal
review and oversight of Public Guardians and Trustees’. While this will ‘not provide
all the safeguards needed, it helps to have people connected with an existing and
substantial system’.100 Children with Disability Australia submitted that if a
representative is to be appointed ‘other than at the participant’s initiative it should be
dealt with by the relevant systems for obtaining administration or guardianship
orders’.101
5.101 While stakeholders agreed that it would be desirable to have one decision-
maker, there were differing views on how this should be achieved. For example, the
OPA (SA and Vic) suggested that one option would be for ‘the Commonwealth to
cross-vest state and territory Tribunals with the power to appoint federal
representatives, but this seems unnecessarily complex’.102
5.102 The ALRC considers that the starting point should be that, where a
representative is required, the NDIS Act should encourage the appointment of existing
state or territory appointees as NDIS representatives.  This may require amendment to
the NDIS Act to make it more explicit that the CEO should appoint existing state
appointees where possible, and the ALRC recommends elevating such provisions from
the Rules and into the Act itself.
5.103 In addition, state and territory guardianship and administration legislation should
be amended, if necessary, to facilitate the appointment of guardians and administrators
as NDIS representatives. The OPA (SA and Vic) argued that NDIS nominee
arrangements should ‘better align with state and territory appointments’:103
OPA Vic,  for  instance,  cannot  at  the  moment  play  the  role  of  NDIS  nominee  (as  a
result of the limitations of our state legislative authority, which requires amendment if
we are to be able to play the role of nominee). And while there is no reason why OPA
as guardian of last resort could not in theory act as a plan nominee and make decisions
about goals, services and supports, clearly OPA should not take on financial
management responsibilities. It appears that the NDIA can particularise the role of
nominee, however we note that an equivalent administrator nominee/representative
99 ADACAS, Submission 108. ADACAS argued that the Commonwealth should recognise state-appointed
representatives unless exceptional circumstances exist, in which case the matter should be referred to an
independent tribunal for resolution.
100  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110.
101  Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68.
102  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
103  Ibid.
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function could be devised for situations where a public trustee would be best placed to
perform this role.104
5.104 These comments highlight that this alignment may require state and territory
legislative change. For example, at present, while a plan nominee may manage the
funding for supports under the NDIS participant’s plan, this is not a role a guardian is
able to undertake under some state and territory legislation, including the Guardianship
and Administration Act 1986 (Vic).105
5.105 In Chapter 10, the ALRC recommends that state and territory governments
review laws that deal with decision-making by persons who need decision-making
support by having regard to interaction with supporter and representative schemes
under Commonwealth legislation.
Conflicts of duties
5.106 Another important issue concerns possible conflicts of duties where a state or
territory appointee is also appointed as a representative under the NDIS Act. A person
appointed by a state or territory body, such as NCAT, would have duties under state or
territory legislation, as well as under the Commonwealth law.
5.107 While these duties may sometimes be interpreted as consistent, there may be
times when they conflict. Most obviously, under state legislation, a guardian may have
a duty to make decisions in the best interests of the person represented, while having a
duty under Commonwealth legislation to ensure that the person’s own will and
preferences direct the decision.
5.108 When making decisions for the purposes of Commonwealth legislation,
Commonwealth legislative duties would apply, but the person may then be in breach of
duties owed as a guardian under state or territory legislation making it impossible for
them to continue to act in the latter role.
5.109 However, the Nominee Rules contain some recognition that state and territory
appointees may have different roles and duties than those provided under the NDIS.
Provisions that require a plan nominee appointed on the initiative of the CEO to act
only if the participant is not capable of acting, are stated as not being intended
to affect any obligations or restrictions that impact on a plan nominee and which
apply under State or Territory law (including obligations or restrictions that impact on
them in their capacity as a court-appointed decision-maker or a participant-appointed
decision-maker).106
5.110 This rule appears to operate so that a nominee who has duties to act under state
or territory legislation can continue to do so in relation to decisions under the NDIS—
including acting when the participant is themselves capable of doing so—although
obligations to consult and develop the capacity of the participant are not affected by the
clause.
104  Ibid.
105  Ibid.
106 National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.7.
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5.111 In addition, the Act itself contains a standard constitutional ‘concurrent
operation’ clause providing that ‘it is the intention of the Parliament that this Act is not
to apply to the exclusion of a law of a State or Territory to the extent that that law is
capable of operating concurrently with this Act’.107 This provision also enables
regulations to prescribe ‘kinds of laws of States and Territories as examples of laws’ to
which concurrent operation applies.108
5.112 It is not clear exactly how concurrent operation of laws might affect conflicts of
duties under the NDIS, and under state and territory legislation. This is an issue that
might need future clarification as the NDIS evolves.
Management of NDIS funds
5.113 Under the NDIS Act,  a participant has a choice between requesting that  NDIS
funds be self-managed by the participant, managed by the participant’s plan nominee, a
plan management provider nominated by the participant, or the NDIA.109 Different
options can be chosen for different supports. If a plan nominee has been appointed,
then funding for supports must be managed in accordance with the terms of the
appointment.110
5.114 There are also a number of circumstances under which a participant must not
manage plan funds, including if the CEO is satisfied that management of the plan
would present an ‘unreasonable risk to the participant’.111
5.115 If a participant does not make a plan management request, outlining how they
would like their NDIS funds managed, the funding for supports under the plan is
managed by either a registered plan management provider specified by the NDIA, or
the NDIA.112 If  this  occurs,  the  CEO  of  the  NDIA  ‘must,  so  far  as  reasonably
practicable, have regard to the wishes of the participant in specifying who is to manage
the funding for supports under the plan’.113
5.116 QDN observed that under the NDIS
the capacity of an individual to manage their own funds is a potentially contentious
issue ... An individual with a disability may wish to manage their own supports, but
the CEO may deem the person incapable of discharging this responsibility. These
decisions may not be consistent with guardianship decisions made at a state level, and
consequently the potential for appeal is high.114
5.117 Where the scope of the appointment of a state or territory appointed decision-
maker does not cover management of NDIS funds, a participant should be able to self-
manage their funds, or to appoint a supporter or representative to support them in
107 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 207(1).
108  Ibid s 207(2).
109  Ibid ss 42(2), 43(1).
110  Ibid s 43(2).
111  Ibid s 44.
112  Ibid s 43(4).
113  Ibid s 43(5).
114  Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59.
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making decisions about fund management. Participants should also be entitled to
nominate a plan management provider, or the NDIA to manage their funds.
5.118 However, where a state or territory order which covers the management of
finances is in place, some stakeholders have submitted that it should not be possible for
participants to self-manage NDIS funds. For example, the Financial Services Council
argued that where a state or territory decision-maker has been appointed, they should
‘automatically be the person or entity responsible for managing the funding for
supports’115 and that ‘the NDIS should pay amounts directly to product/service
providers after due consultation with the relevant appointed decision-maker’.116
5.119 The preferable approach is for participants to self-manage their funding for
supports to the extent they desire. One possible benefit is said to be that
the capacity to manage their own funds, also allows participants to recruit their own
staff. Many people with disability identify this as being one of the most influential
elements in achieving ‘choice and control’ in their lives. By facilitating a participant’s
capacity to manage their own funds through the use of supported decision-making,
people with disability (who in many cases will spend extended periods of time with
paid support workers) will be empowered to recruit the support workers that best suit
their needs. This could be the catalyst for major improvements in many aspects of a
participant’s life.117
5.120 The introduction of supporters and representatives under the NDIS is likely to
reduce the circumstances in which a participant does not make, or is not supported to
make, a plan management request. Where the NDIA does harbour concerns, safeguards
such as trial periods may be used to ensure that any problems that may arise are
addressed. QDN observed that this is ‘an example of how the “dignity of risk” that is
much talked about, can be put into practice’.118
5.121 At the same time, given the amounts of money sometimes involved, there need
to be protective provisions. The ALRC does not recommend any change to the power
of the CEO to refuse to allow self-management where there is an ‘unreasonable risk to
the participant’.119 However, the ALRC suggests that the NDIS Rules, in prescribing
criteria the CEO is to apply in considering whether an unreasonable risk to the
participant would exist,120 include regard to the person’s will and preferences and
decision-making support available to them.
Safeguards
5.122 The appointment and conduct of Commonwealth representatives should be
subject to appropriate and effective safeguards.
115  Financial Services Council, Submission 35.
116  Ibid.
117  Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
118  Ibid.
119 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 44.
120  Under Ibid s 44(3).
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5.123 There are a range of existing complaint, review and appeal mechanisms under
the NDIS. For example, participants may seek internal review of a reviewable
decision,121 make a complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, or seek review of a
reviewable decision by the AAT.122
5.124 In the trial sites, existing state and territory quality assurance frameworks and
safeguards also apply.123 The Department of Social Services is currently developing a
number of options for a national quality assurance and safeguards framework or
approach as part of the NDIS for consideration by COAG. It is anticipated that when
the NDIS is fully rolled out, safeguards will include:
· individualised strategies built into participant plans to help the participant, their
family and support network to reduce the risk of harm, through mechanisms
such as advocates, guardians and nominees;
· arrangements that organisations put in place to protect participants, such as: staff
supervision; internal complaints processes; quality frameworks;
· system level safeguards such as: external review of decisions and actions that
directly impact on a person, such as access to relevant tribunals or commissions;
community visitors schemes; and police checks and working with children
checks; and
· community based safeguards that are available to all members of the
community, such as: practitioner registration requirements; ombudsman offices;
and anti-discrimination, human rights and consumer protection law.124
5.125 Issues concerning safeguards should be considered in the course of developing
the national quality assurance and safeguards framework as part of the NDIS.
5.126 A number of stakeholders, including the Disability Services Commission of
Victoria, advocated for the development of independent oversight of the NDIS,
consisting of a body or bodies with complaint handling and investigative powers;
legislative responsibilities to conduct monitoring, review and inquiry functions; and
responsibility for promoting access to advocacy and supported decision-making.125
5.127 The ALRC does not make recommendations with respect to the specific
safeguards that may be required in the context of the NDIS. Nor does the ALRC
comment  on  systemic  issues  relating  to  safeguards  under  the  NDIS  raised  by
stakeholders, such as the funding of legal support for participants to seek
administrative review of NDIA decisions.126
121  Ibid ss 99, 100.
122  Ibid s 103.
123  ‘Intergovernmental Agreement, Schedule A: Bilateral Agreement for NDIS Launch between the
Commonwealth and New South Wales’ (7 December 2012).
124  National Disability Insurance Scheme, Safeguards <www.ndis.gov.au>.
125  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission 39.
126  See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; NCOSS, Submission 26.
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5.128 However,  there are two matters the ALRC considers might be reviewed in the
context of the NDIS quality assurance and safeguards framework.
5.129 First, the NSW Government observed that there are provisions in the
Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) that prohibit the appointment of paid carers and other
persons with a conflict of interest as substitute decision makers.127 It submitted that if
such appointments were allowed under the Commonwealth model, there would need to
be appropriate supervision and support from an independent body, with powers to seek
the removal of supporters and representatives if required.128 At present, under the
NDIS Act, the CEO has power to cancel or suspend the appointment of a nominee for a
range of reasons,129 including on the request of the participant and where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the person is likely to cause, ‘physical, mental or
financial harm to the participant’.130 This may be sufficient, but might be reviewed.
5.130  Secondly, AGAC raised concerns about the operation of s 65 of the NDIS Act.
This provision is said to prevent a guardianship tribunal from having access to
information held by the NDIA, when this information may be critical to the tribunal’s
consideration of whether a guardianship or administration order is needed.131 This
provision may also require review.
Guidance and training
5.131 Guidance and training for all people involved in decision-making under the
NDIS is vitally important to ensure the effective operation of the supported decision-
making model.
5.132 The NDIA has developed approaches to education, training and community
engagement (including through video, quotes, stories, and webinars) and has produced
a range of guidance material for people with disability, family and carers, service
providers, and participants.132
5.133 The NDIA also offers disability support organisations capacity building strategy
grants to ‘provide and promote local mutual support activities for people with
disability’ with the aim of leading to ‘increased capacity of people with disability and
their families to exercise choice and control, engage with the NDIS and other
community supports as well as actively participate economically and socially’.133
5.134 In terms of decision-making mechanisms, stakeholders such as the Office of the
Public Advocate (SA) have emphasised the need to ensure the NDIS Act and Nominee
Rules are applied appropriately in practice:
127 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) ss 6B(2), 17(1)(b), 25M(1)(a).
128  NSW Government, Submission 135.
129 National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 89–91.
130  Ibid s 91(1).
131  AGAC, Submission 91.
132  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme, Homepage <www.ndis.gov.au>.
133  National Disability Insurance Scheme, Disability Support Organisations—Capacity Building Strategy
Grants <www.ndis.gov.au>.
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Close attention will need to be applied to the implementation of the NDIS Nominees
Rules, and the extent that they encourage support to enable people’s capacity as
opposed to potentially disempowering participants by transferring effective decision
making to plan nominees. NDIS itself can play a role in educating nominees on their
role so that this does not happen, and expecting nominees to attempt to support a
participant make their own decision before taking on a substitute role.134
5.135 National Disability Services suggested that it would also be timely
to develop and provide education material to NDIA staff, families, guardians and
participants about the principles of supported decision-making and the law around
legal capacity.135
5.136 The Mental Health Council of Australia highlighted the need for
capacity building measures, programs or processes at the individual or community
levels to empower consumers and communities to actively participate in supported
decision-making. These could include programs to educate consumers and carers
about the NDIS.136
5.137 Accordingly, participants and supporters and representatives (or potential
supporters and representatives) should be provided with information and advice to
enable them to understand their functions and duties. In addition, the ALRC
recommends that employees and contractors of Commonwealth agencies who engage
with supporters and representatives are provided with information, guidance and
training in relation to the roles of supporters and representatives.137 The ALRC notes
that NDIA employees, service providers, plan management providers, and other
experts and third parties engaged in the NDIS would benefit from such guidance and
training.
5.138 The focus of guidance and training could include topics such as: the introduction
of the supporter and representative model under the NDIS and differences between the
new model and existing nominee provisions; interaction with state and territory
decision-making systems; and supported decision-making in the context of the NDIS.
Other issues
5.139 Stakeholders raised a range of other concerns about the NDIS, some of which
extend beyond the Inquiry’s scope. They involve systemic and practical concerns with
the structure and operation of the NDIS, including those relating to:
· eligibility to become a participant under the NDIS;138
134  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
135  National Disability Services, Submission 49.
136  MHCA, Submission 77.
137  See Recs 4–11, 4–12.
138  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Physical Disability
Council of NSW, Submission 32; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
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· the operation of the NDIS for people with particular types of disability, for
example psychosocial disability;139
· the interaction between the NDIS and other systems, particularly with respect to
funding responsibility;140
· registration and oversight of providers of support;141 and
· decreased funding of state and territory services, and potential gaps where
people with disability are not eligible for the NDIS.142
5.140 While these concerns are important, the issues do not relate directly to the
concepts of legal capacity or decision-making ability.
139  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77. See also Mental Health Council of Australia, Providing Psychological
Support through the NDIS, March 2014.
140  See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
141  See, eg, Ibid.
142  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77.
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Summary
6.1 In Chapter 4, the ALRC recommends a new model for supported and fully
supported decision-making in areas of Commonwealth legislative responsibility (the
Commonwealth decision-making model). Chapter 5 discussed the application of the
model to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).
6.2 This chapter discusses how the Commonwealth decision-making model might
be applied to other existing legislative schemes. These schemes already contain some
decision-making mechanism or make some provision for supporters and
representatives however they are described, and concern individual decision-making in
relation to:
· social security, specifically under the Social Security (Administration) Act
1999 (Cth);
· aged care, under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth); and
· eHealth records, under the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act
2012 (PCEHR Act).
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6.3 The chapter also discusses how the model might be applied to individual
decision-making in relation to personal information under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)
and the provision of banking services.
6.4 In some of these areas, the ALRC considers that legislation should be amended
to include provisions dealing with supporters and representatives consistent with the
Commonwealth decision-making model and suggests how this might be done.
However, any reform needs to be proportionate to the situation, and the role of the
supporter or representative. In relation to privacy and banking, the ALRC recommends
new guidelines to encourage supported decision-making, rather than legislation.
6.5 One overarching issue is the interaction between Commonwealth decision-
making schemes and state and territory appointed decision-makers. In each area, the
interaction of Commonwealth supporters and representatives with state and territory
appointed decision-makers will have to be considered.1
Social security
6.6 The legislative, policy and administrative framework for social security in
Australia is set out in the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), the Social Security
(Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) and the Social Security (International Agreements)
Act 1999 (Cth).2 This section discusses how the Commonwealth decision-making
model may be applied in social security law.
Individual decision-making in social security
6.7 There are three key decision-making mechanisms in the context of social
security law: autonomous decision-making by social security payment recipients;
informal supported decision-making; and substitute decision-making by nominees.
6.8 In many circumstances, family members, friends and others may provide
informal support to persons with disability to make social security-related decisions
without any formal recognition or appointment. The significant role of ‘informal and
supportive decision-making arrangements’ in the context of social security was
emphasised by a number of stakeholders.3
6.9 It is important that providing mechanisms for the appointment of formal
supporters and representatives under the Social Security (Administration) Act should
not diminish the involvement of, or respect for, informal support.
6.10 The Social Security (Administration) Act contains a nominee scheme, and was
the model for the nominee scheme under the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act
1 See also Ch 10.
2 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 3 defines social security law to include these three Acts.
There are equivalent provisions for family assistance (including family tax benefit and child care) in A
New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) pt 8 ss 219TA—219TR.
3 See, eg, Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance,
Submission 20.
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2013 (Cth). Specifically, the Act makes provision for a ‘principal’4 to authorise another
person or organisation to enquire or act on the person’s behalf when dealing with the
Department of Human Services (DHS).5 There are two types of arrangements:
· correspondence nominees—a person or organisation authorised to act and make
changes on the principal’s behalf;6 and
· payment nominees—a person or organisation authorised to receive a principal’s
payment into an account maintained by the nominee.7
6.11 Only one person can be appointed for each arrangement; however the same
person can be appointed as both correspondence and payment nominee.8
6.12 A principal may appoint their own nominee. However, where a question arises
in relation to a principal’s capacity to consent to the appointment of a nominee, or any
concerns arise in relation to an existing arrangement, DHS must ‘investigate the
situation’.9 The Guide to Social Security Law10 provides that, in circumstances where
‘a principal is not capable, for example, due to an intellectual/physical constraint … of
consenting to the appointment of a nominee’, a delegate may appoint one.11 The Guide
also provides that ‘where a principal has a psychiatric disability, a nominee can be
appointed in these instances where there is a court-appointed arrangement such as a
Guardianship Order’.12
6.13 Nominees have a range of functions and responsibilities.13 The primary duty of
nominees is to ‘act at all times in the best interests of the principal’.14
6.14 With respect to issues of liability, a principal is protected against liability for the
actions of their correspondence nominee. Correspondence nominees are not subject to
any criminal liability under the social security law in respect of: any act or omission of
the principal; or anything done, in good faith, by the nominee in his or her capacity as
nominee.15 However, if a correspondence nominee fails to satisfy a particular
4 A ‘principal’ for the purposes of the nominee provisions is a social security payment recipient who has
had a nominee appointed to receive either correspondence and/or payments on their behalf: Social
Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123A.
5 Social security law is administered by the Department of Human Services (DHS) through Centrelink.
6 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123C, 123H; Department of Social Services, Guide to
Social Security Law (2014) [8.52], [8.53].
7 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123B, 123F; Department of Social Services, Guide to
Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1], [8.5.3].
8 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123D(1).
9 Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1], [8.5.2].
10 The Guide to Social Security Law, produced by the Department of Social Services provides guidance to
decision-makers in implementing this legislation: Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security
Law (2014).
11 ‘In these cases, a delegate may appoint a nominee on behalf of the principal, with attention to supporting
evidence, and where the delegate is fully satisfied that the nominee is required and will act in the
principal’s best interests. The decision made by the delegate to appoint a nominee in these circumstances
must be fully documented’: Ibid [8.5.1]–[8.5.2].
12 Ibid.
13 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123H–123L, 123O.
14 Ibid s 123O.
15 Ibid ss 123M, 123N.
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requirement, the principal is taken to have failed to comply with that requirement. This
may then have adverse consequences in terms of compliance and payments.16
The Commonwealth model and social security law
Recommendation 6–1 The Social Security (Administration) Act
1999 (Cth) should be amended to include provisions dealing with supporters and
representatives consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
6.15 To ensure better compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the ALRC recommends that the Social Security
(Administration) Act be amended in the light of the National Decision-Making
Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.
6.16 The application of the Commonwealth decision-making model in social security
law would contribute to the development of consistent decision-making structures
across key Commonwealth areas of law. The desirability of such consistency was noted
by stakeholders, such as the Law Council of Australia.17
6.17 Importantly, providing mechanisms for the appointment of formal supporters
and representatives under the Social Security (Administration) Act should not diminish
the involvement of, or respect for, informal support, including in relation to decision-
making. However, as outlined in Chapter 4, the ALRC considers there are significant
benefits to making provision for formal supported decision-making—a view shared by
a range of stakeholders both generally and in the specific context of social security
law.18
6.18 While the role played by correspondence nominees is broadly analogous to the
role envisaged for supporters under the Commonwealth decision-making model, the
existing nominee system does not make provision for formal supported decision-
making. Accordingly, significant amendments would need to be made to the Social
Security (Administration) Act to incorporate the Commonwealth decision-making
model.
6.19 The ALRC does not prescribe a comprehensive new decision-making scheme
for social security law. However, the ALRC outlines below some key ways in which
the Commonwealth decision-making model might operate in the context of social
security.19
16 See, eg, Ibid s 123J.
17 Law Council of Australia, Submission 83.
18 See, eg, in relation to supported decision-making and social security law: Centre for Rural Regional Law
and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20.
19 Some stakeholders expressed support for the proposals in the Discussion Paper: see, eg, National
Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; National Mental Health Consumer & Carer
Forum, Submission 100.
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6.20 In doing so, the ALRC recognises the importance of informal arrangements in
the context of social security. NACLC observed that, in the experience of community
legal centres, many clients with disability have a preference for informal arrangements:
Often, people are apprehensive about invoking more formal, costly and potentially
disempowering personal decision-making systems that involve state and territory
guardians and administrators.
6.21 While supportive of the Commonwealth decision-making model, NACLC
suggested that the ALRC consider ways in which to ‘ensure that the application of the
Commonwealth decision-making model will not have unintended consequences such
as the over-formalisation of arrangements and could more fully articulate how the
provision of statutory supported decision-making mechanisms can co-exist with
informal support arrangements, including in relation to decision-making’.20
Objects and principles
6.22 Section 8 of the Social Security (Administration) Act contains general principles
of administration. However, there are no principles relating to decision-making. The
ALRC considers that s 8 could be amended to incorporate principles relating to
decision-making and supported decision-making, or that principles could be inserted
into the part of the Act which will contain provisions relating to supporters and
representatives.
Supporters
6.23 Under the Commonwealth decision-making model, a principal would be entitled
to appoint one or more supporters to support them to make decisions related to social
security. Ultimate decision-making power and responsibility would remain with the
principal. Centrelink would need to recognise any decision made by a principal with
the assistance of a supporter as being the decision of the principal.
6.24 A principal may appoint whomever they wish as their supporter including, for
example, a family member, friend or carer. In the context of social security, the ability
to appoint a supporter may also assist advocacy organisations to support persons with
disability. For example, stakeholders such as the Multicultural Disability Advocacy
Association of NSW emphasised the need for an ‘authority form’ to facilitate provision
of support to clients from culturally and linguistically diverse or non-English speaking
backgrounds to engage with Centrelink.21 It may also address some of the privacy-
related difficulties encountered by those who support persons with disability, given one
of the potential roles of a supporter is to handle the relevant personal information of the
principal.
6.25 In many respects, correspondence nominees under the current system reflect the
role potentially played by a supporter, including making enquiries and obtaining
information to assist the principal, completing forms, and receiving mail. The key
difference under the model would be that the principal would formally retain ultimate
20 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
21 MDAA, Submission 43.
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decision-making responsibility. The role of a supporter, under the model, is to support
the principal to make a decision, rather than the supporter themselves making a
decision.
6.26 Rather than having a duty to act in the best interests of the principal, supporters
would have duties to: support the principal to express their will and preferences; act in
a manner promoting the personal, social, financial, and cultural wellbeing of the
principal; act honestly, diligently and in good faith; support the principal to consult
with other relevant people; and develop the capacity of the principal to make their own
decisions. These duties may address concerns expressed by stakeholders that the
current nominee provisions ‘are generally disempowering of the person with the
disability, as they place no obligation on a nominee to act in ways that genuinely
involve the person or that assist them to exercise their legal capacity’.22
6.27 In addition, a principal would be entitled to terminate the appointment of a
supporter at any time. This differs from the current system, under which there does not
appear to be legislative provision for a principal to request cancellation of a nominee
arrangement, an issue raised with concern by a number of stakeholders.23
Representatives
6.28 Consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model, a principal would
also be entitled to appoint a representative to support them to make social security
related decisions.
6.29 There may also be other circumstances in which a representative might be
appointed—for example, where a person may not be in a position to appoint their own
representative, but requires full support in decision-making.
6.30 Chapter 4 discusses possible appointment mechanisms, including appointment
by Commonwealth agency heads or delegates, in confined circumstances. Concerns
expressed in relation to the powers of the Chief Executive Officer of the National
Disability Insurance Agency to appoint a nominee, discussed in Chapter 4, may apply
to the similar powers of Centrelink delegates.24
6.31 The key amendment applying the Commonwealth decision-making model with
respect to representatives, would be to provide that representatives have a duty to
consider the will, preferences and rights of the principal. This would replace the current
duty of nominees to act in the best interests of the principal contained in the Social
Security (Administration) Act.
22 Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission
20.
23 Section 123E of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) outlines the specific power to revoke
a nominee appointment, but does not appear to make provision for a request by a principal. See, eg, Law
Council of Australia, Submission 83.
24 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127. For powers see Department of
Social Services, Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1]–[8.5.2].
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6.32 Finally, this would require that the appointment and conduct of representatives
be subject to appropriate and effective safeguards. In relation to social security law,
these safeguards might include: mechanisms for review and appeal of the appointment
of representatives; potential monitoring or auditing of representatives by Centrelink;
and the retention of existing safeguards. For example, the power of DHS to require the
provision of a statement from a payment nominee outlining expenditure of the
principal’s payments by the nominee, could be applied to representatives.25
Guidance and training
6.33 The ALRC considers guidance and training for all parties involved in decision-
making under social security law is important in ensuring the effective operation of this
model of decision-making. This is particularly so in the light of stakeholder concerns
about existing difficulties in navigating the social security system, interacting with
Centrelink, and obtaining information.
6.34 Accordingly, the ALRC considers it is necessary for Centrelink to develop and
deliver guidance and training for:
· Centrelink payment recipients who require decision-making support;
· supporters and representatives; and
· Centrelink employees and others involved decision-making or engagement with
customers.
6.35 The focus of guidance and training could include topics such as: the introduction
of the supporter and representative model under social security law and differences
between the new model and existing nominee provisions; interaction with state and
territory decision-making systems; and supported decision-making in the context of
social security.
Other issues
6.36 Stakeholders also raised a range of systemic issues concerning social security.
Stakeholders consistently emphasised the complexity of the social security system and
the difficulties persons with disability face in navigating the system; difficulties arising
in relation to eligibility, participation requirements and the consequences of breach of
certain requirements; and appeal and review processes. Stakeholders also highlighted
the particular difficulties for persons with disability who are Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islanders, from a culturally and linguistically diverse community, or who live in a
rural, regional or remote community.26
25 Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123L. It is a strict liability offence not to comply which
attracts a penalty of 60 penalty units. See also Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security
Law (2014) [8.5.3].
26 See, eg, Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64;  Vicdeaf,  Submission 56; Central Australian Legal Aid Service,
Submission 48; MDAA, Submission 43; Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia, Submission
28; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance,
Submission 20. See also National People with Disabilities and Carers Council, Shut Out: The Experience
of People with Disabilities and Their Families in Australia (2009).
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6.37 While these are important issues in the lives of persons with disability, the issues
do not relate directly to individual decision-making, and the ALRC therefore does not
make recommendations in these areas.
Aged care
6.38 This section outlines how the National Decision-Making Principles and the
Commonwealth decision-making model may apply to aged care to ensure equal
recognition before the law and legal capacity for older persons with disability.
6.39 Older people receiving aged care services who have intellectual, cognitive,
physical or mental disabilities may find it difficult, without support, to exercise their
rights to health services and an adequate standard of living and social protection. 27
Caxton Legal Centre referred to ‘Mrs L’, an 83-year old woman who experienced
multiple difficulties in asserting her rights at her nursing home and the Queensland
Civil and Administrative Tribunal:
Mrs L ... was a physically frail woman of European origin, who had a heavy accent.
She  was  in  a  nursing  home,  but  wished  to  be  returned  to  the  care  of  her  husband.
There was  no medical evidence of dementia, but the nursing home had assumed she
had dementia because she was difficult to understand following a surgical
complication that affected her speech. Mrs L was also extremely depressed at the
separation from her husband.
At the guardianship hearing, questions were asked about her ability to cook and care
for herself. Mrs L was a proud woman and acknowledged later that she felt too
embarrassed to admit in front of strangers in an intimidating setting that she was too
frail to cook. However, this was taken by the tribunal to mean she ‘lacked insight’ and
therefore must have impaired capacity. There were also misunderstandings by a
tribunal member about the type of food Mrs L was describing, as a result of her heavy
accent. An interpreter had been requested for Mrs L but was not provided. The Adult
Guardian and Public Trustee were appointed.28
6.40 Aged care is an increasingly important area of federal responsibility in the
context of Australia’s ageing population. The Australian Government regulates
residential aged care and home care, under the Aged Care Act29 and under the Home
and Community Care program.30
27 As required under UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Opened for Signature
30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into Force 3 May 2008) arts 25(b), 28.
28 Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
29 From 1 January 2014, the Australian Aged Care Quality Agency replaced the Aged Care Standards and
Accreditation Agency to take on the accreditation of residential aged care homes. Accreditation is
conducted in accordance with the Quality of Care Principles 2014 (Cth), Quality Agency Reporting
Principles 2013 (Cth) and other legislative instruments issued pursuant to the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth).
30 On 1 July 2012, the Australian Government assumed full funding, policy and operational responsibility
for the Home and Community Care (HACC) services for older people (over the age of 65 or 50 for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people) in all states and territories except Victoria and Western
Australia. Victoria agreed to transition responsibility for HACC for older people to the Commonwealth
from 1 July 2015 and WA agreed to do the same from 2016–17. State and territory governments will
continue to fund and administer HACC services for people under the age of 65 or under 50 for Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people.
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6.41 Under the Australian Aged Care Quality Agency Act 2013 (Cth), the Australian
Aged Care Quality Agency is responsible for the accreditation, monitoring and quality
assurance of Commonwealth subsidised residential aged care providers, and for
monitoring the quality of home and community aged care services.
6.42 The Australian Government responded to the Productivity Commission’s
recommendations in the ‘Caring for Older Australians’ report31 with the ‘Living
Longer Living Better’ reforms to aged care.32
6.43 Both Houses of Parliament have examined issues concerning dementia in recent
years. The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing
recommended uniform definitions, laws and guidelines relating to capacity, in state and
territory legislation.33 The Senate Committee on Community Affairs recommended the
creation of a new Medicare item that encourages health practitioners to undertake
longer consultations with a patient and at least one family member or carer where the
patient has presented with indications of dementia.34 The Committee also
recommended the review of accreditation standards for residential aged care facilities
in relation to managing symptoms of dementia.35
6.44 The Commonwealth decision-making model responds to calls for clear, national
guidance for decision-making in aged care that is compliant with the CRPD.36 The
model would provide for the recognition of supporters who assist aged care consumers
in their decision-making and representatives to make decisions directed by the will,
preferences and rights of aged care consumers.
Individual decision-making in aged care
6.45 At  present,  decisions  in  aged  care  are  made  in  three  ways:  by  the  aged  care
recipients themselves; informally by their families or carers; or by formally appointed
substitute decision-makers such as guardians.
31 ‘Caring for Older Australians’ (Inquiry Report No 53, Productivity Commission, 2011). The Productivity
Commission was requested to develop detailed options for redesigning the aged care system to meet the
challenges facing it in coming decades, including the increasing incidence of dementia, severe arthritis
and serious visual and hearing impairments, and the need for psycho-geriatric care.
32 See Aged Care (Living Longer Living Better) Act 2013 (Cth) and associated legislation. Changes such as
income testing for home care packages, new accommodation payment arrangements for residential aged
care, and the removal of the distinction between high and low levels of care in residential care
commenced on 1 July 2014: Department of Social Services, Reform Overview <www.dss.gov.au>.
33 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Thinking Ahead: Report on the
Inquiry into Dementia-Early Diagnosis and Intervention, 2013 recs 4–5.
34 Senate Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger
and Older Australians Living with Dementia and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia
(2014) rec 1.
35 Ibid recs 8–10, 13–15.
36 John Chesterman, ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian Social
Work 26; ‘Caring for Older Australians’, above n 31, rec 15.10; Law Council of Australia, Submission 83;
Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission
20; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
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6.46 Informal decision-making for an aged care recipient seems routine and
customary in aged care. The Victorian Law Reform Commission report on
guardianship noted that many people with impaired decision-making capacity live in
facilities like nursing homes with only the informal consent of a family member or
carer.37 On the other hand, government agencies and service providers seem to prefer
the formality of legal arrangements for aged care decisions.
6.47 The Australian Guardianship and Administration Council (AGAC) submitted
that ‘informal decision making’ or ‘de facto arrangements’ were initially approved as
‘less restrictive alternatives’ when compared to formal guardianship appointments.
However, AGAC also expressed concern that informal decision-making lacks
safeguards against abuse as required by art 12(4) of the CRPD.38
6.48 AGAC’s experience has been that where Commonwealth agencies have
assumed that most persons with disability have formally appointed guardians and
designed forms on this basis, state and territory tribunals have been periodically
‘inundated by applications for appointment of guardians or administrators’ to give
effect to decisions relating to aged care, for example, for asset assessment required for
application for residential aged care.39
6.49 The current legal framework provides for some elements of supported and
representative decision-making in aged care. Section 96–5 of the Aged Care Act
provides for a person, other than an approved provider, to represent an aged care
recipient who, because of any ‘physical incapacity or mental impairment’ is unable to
enter into agreements relating to residential care, home care, extra services,
accommodation bonds and accommodation charges. Section 96–6 states that in making
an application or giving information under the Act, a ‘person authorised to act on the
care recipient’s behalf’ can do so.
6.50 There is a differentiation between ‘representation’ for binding contracts and
‘authorisation’ for obtaining and receiving information for the aged care recipient.
However, there is inconsistency in the use of the term ‘representative’ throughout the
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks for aged care recipients. This is evident in
the disparate references to a ‘legal representative’ to imply a guardianship
arrangement;40 ‘representative’ to refer to an advocate;41 and an undefined ‘appropriate
person’.42
6.51 The new Quality of Care Principles 2014 (Cth) set out the responsibilities of
approved providers in providing residential and home care services. These principles
also define the ‘representative’ of a care recipient more clearly than in the Act.
37 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) ch 15, 318.
38 AGAC, Submission 51.
39 Ibid.
40 Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) s 52F–2.
41 Ibid s 81.1(1)(c)(ii).
42 Ibid s 44.8A.
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6.52 A representative under the Quality of Care Principles means either: a person
nominated by the care recipient as a person to be told about matters affecting the care
recipient; or a person who nominates themselves and who the relevant approved
provider is satisfied has a connection with the care recipient and is concerned for the
‘safety, health and well-being of the care recipient’.43 Section  5(2)  of  the Quality of
Care Principles states  that  a  person  who  has  a  connection  with  a  care  recipient
includes:
· a partner, close relation or other relative of the care recipient;
· a person who holds an enduring power of attorney given by the care recipient;
· a person who has been appointed by a state or territory guardianship board
(however described) to deal with the care recipient’s affairs; or
· a person who represents the care recipient in dealings with the approved
provider.44
6.53 This definition of representative is similar to both supporters and representatives
in the Commonwealth decision-making model. The intention behind the new definition
in the Quality of Care Principles is to recognise the role of ‘informal substitute
decision-makers’ as representatives of care recipients in their dealings with approved
providers without conferring on them powers of a formal, state or territory appointed
decision-maker such as a guardian or financial manager.45
6.54 This move to acknowledge the role of informal supporters of aged care
consumers is consistent with the ALRC’s overall approach. The requirement for a
representative to have a connection and concern for the safety, health and wellbeing of
an aged care consumer is also broadly consistent with the National Decision-Making
Principles. However, in support of further reform in aged care, stakeholders
emphasised the need to preserve aged care consumers’ right to their autonomy, and the
importance of supporting them in decision-making.
6.55 Caxton Legal Centre noted the ‘omission of the CRPD’ in the Living Longer
Living Better reforms with respect to art 12.46 The Centre for Rural and Regional Law
and Justice, and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance stressed the value of
supported decision-making and co-decision-making arrangements, which are
particularly relevant in the regional and rural context.47
43 Quality of Care Principles 2014 (Cth) s 5(1).
44 Quality of Care Principles 2014 (Cth)  notes  nothing  in  this  section  intends  to  affect  the  powers  of  a
substitute decision-maker appointed for a person under a state or territory law.
45 Explanatory Statement, Quality of Care Principles 2014 (Cth) s 5.
46 Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
47 Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission
20. The Centre also drew attention to the difficulties in accessing in-home support and respite services,
which can greatly exacerbate the ‘disabling effects of ageing’ and, thereby, create greater difficulties for
the person in the exercise of legal capacity.
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6.56 Others reflected on addressing the ‘balance between duty of care and the dignity
of risk’ in aged care decision-making.48 The  OPA  (SA  and  Vic)  submitted  that  the
operation of the Commonwealth model needs to do this ‘while protecting older people
from exposure to abuse’.49 The Illawarra Forum recommended change to the
legislation so that ‘risk management strategies’ do not result in older people with
dementia being ‘locked up’ in aged care.50
6.57 One issue which encapsulates these concerns is the use of restrictive practices on
aged care recipients. The Mental Health Coordinating Council drew attention to the
chemical restraint of some older people and people with mental illness who are deemed
to be ‘challenging’ in care facilities. The Council argued:
Supported decision-making is extremely important for this group of particularly
vulnerable people, who the system characteristically ‘medicates’ and ‘manages’. It is
critical that the mental health and age care services work closely together so that a
vulnerable and isolated person does not fall between service gaps and that older
people are appropriately cared for in mental health and age care facilities using
principles of recovery and enablement.51
6.58 The OPA (SA) suggested amendment of the User Rights Principles52 to
minimise and eliminate the use of restrictive practices in aged care.53 The Office
recommended that there should be a clear definition of each restrictive practice, a
requirement that non-coercive measures be considered and clear authority before any
restrictive practice is used.54
The Commonwealth model and aged care
Recommendation 6–2 The Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) should be
amended to include provisions dealing with supporters and representatives
consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model.
6.59 To ensure better  compliance with art  12 of the CRPD, the ALRC recommends
that the Aged Care Act be amended in the light of the National Decision-Making
Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.
Objects
6.60 Division 2 of the Aged Care Act lists the objects of the legislation in regulating
and funding aged care. They include: encouraging aged care services that ‘facilitate the
48 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
49 Ibid.
50 The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.
51 Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
52 User Rights Principles 2014 (Cth) replaced User Rights Principles 1997 (Cth) on 1 July 2014. User
Rights Principles are among principles made pursuant to Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) s 96–1.
53 Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. See also Office of the Public Advocate (Vic),
Submission 06.
54 Restrictive practices are discussed in Ch 8.
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independence of, and choice available to’ recipients55 and helping recipients ‘to enjoy
the same rights as all other people in Australia’.56 The extensive set of objects does not,
however, directly apply them to decision-making arrangements.
6.61 The ALRC recommends that s 2–1 of the Aged Care Act be  amended  to
incorporate principles relating to supported decision-making. The application of the
Commonwealth decision-making model should help deliver the rights and
responsibilities of aged care recipients contained in the User Rights Principles 2014
(Cth).57
Supporters and representatives
6.62 The User Rights Principles mention representatives in the context of the right of
a home care recipient to participate in their care decisions, if they do not have capacity
to make those decisions themselves.58
6.63 The User Rights Principles also recognise some roles analogous to those of a
supporter under the Commonwealth model. The User Rights Principles provide that a
person whom a care recipient has asked to act for them and ‘advocates and community
visitors’ who are acting for the care recipients, have the right to access aged care
services to check the approved providers have met their responsibilities.59 For example,
approved providers must assist the care recipient to understand information about their
rights and responsibilities.60 Under the existing framework, a person acting for a care
recipient can check whether or not this has occurred. However, the person must either
be a paid advocate or a community visitor.61
6.64 The Commonwealth decision-making model could inform further reform of
aged care legislation towards a rights-based and consumer-focused approach that
acknowledges the role played by family, friends and carers. The model provides a
structured approach for the involvement and regulation of representatives in decisions
by aged care consumers. Supporters and representatives would be guided in their
functions and be certain of their responsibilities.
6.65 Under this Commonwealth model, all aged care consumers have the right to
make their own decisions.62 Supported decision-making in the aged care context means
that people who require decision-making support can make as many of their own
decisions  as  possible,  with  the  assistance  of  a  ‘supporter’,  whether  it  is  about  where
they live or what personal or health care services they receive. For representative
decision-making in aged care, the ‘will, preferences and rights’ standard would replace
the existing ‘best interests’ test.
55 Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) s 2–1(1)(g)(ii).
56 Ibid s 2–1(1)(h).
57 User Rights Principles 2014 (Cth) schs 1–2. These provisions contain the charters of care recipients’
rights and responsibilities for residential care and home care.
58 Ibid sch 2(1)(2)(d).
59 Ibid ss 8, 18.
60 Ibid ss 11(3), 20(3).
61 Ibid ss 8(3), 18.
62 See Ch 3.
172 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
6.66 The Commonwealth decision-making model would apply from the first trigger
for decision-making by an aged care consumer, such as an assessment of care needs by
the Aged Care Assessment Team.63 The decision to undergo assessment of care needs
is often made under pressure when a crisis has arisen for the potential aged care
consumer. This is why there are likely to be benefits in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness for both consumers and approved providers, where an aged care
consumer who needs support has a supporter with them or if they do not have a
supporter available to them, a representative who will make decisions for them
according to their will, preferences and rights.
6.67 The next significant decision for the aged care consumer may be whether to
enter a resident agreement or home care package agreement. These agreements are
legally binding documents that outline the services to be provided, fees charged, and
the rights and responsibilities of both parties. Under the Commonwealth decision-
making model, depending on the aged care consumer’s ability to make decisions and
the availability of support, these decisions may be made by themselves, with the
assistance of a supporter or by their representative.
6.68 There are myriad decisions made in aged care, on a daily, if not an hourly basis,
which cannot practically be governed by a formalised supporter and representative
model. The supporter and representative model might apply only to certain types of
decisions, be trialled by new approved providers of home care services or otherwise
tailored to suit the needs of the aged care consumers and approved providers.
6.69 The accreditation and quality monitoring system is an important safeguard of
rights in the aged care sector. A suite of accreditation standards and guidelines made
under the Aged Care Act regulates service providers.64 There is recognition of
representatives of aged care consumers in the assessor’s guide to accrediting residential
aged care services.65
6.70 If the Commonwealth decision-making model were to be adopted, these
standards and guidelines would need to be revised to recognise the roles of supporters
and representatives. For instance, the Resident Care Manual states that a representative
may be a guardian or a person nominated by the care recipient as his or her
representative.66 The current requirement for a person to act as a representative is that
the approved provider is satisfied that the nominated person has a connection with the
resident, and is concerned for the ‘safety, health and well-being’ of the resident. 67
Under the Commonwealth decision-making model, this would change to the standard
of the ‘will, preferences and rights’ and the representative would have a duty to act in a
way that promotes the ‘personal, social, financial and cultural wellbeing’ of the
person.68
63 The Aged Care Assessment Service in Victoria.
64 The four accreditation standards for residential aged care facilities are set out in the Quality of Care
Principles 2014 (Cth). Approved providers must meet 44 outcomes which relate to these standards.
65 ‘Results and Processes Guide’ (Australian Aged Care Quality Agency, June 2014).
66 Department of Social Services, ‘The Residential Care Manual’ (2014) 6.
67 Ibid.
68 See Chs 3–4.
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6.71 The Home Care Packages Program Guidelines provide that shared decision-
making between the consumer, an appointed representative and the home care provider
should take place where the consumer has ‘cognitive impairment’.69 The
Commonwealth decision-making model would give consistent guidance, so that an
aged care consumer would be presumed to have the ability to make decisions and
entitled to support in making those decisions. If a representative is appointed, the
consumer would be entitled to have the representative make decisions that accord with
the will, preferences and rights of the consumer.
Safeguards against elder abuse
6.72 Stakeholders raised significant concern over elder abuse and the need for
safeguards in protecting the rights of aged care consumers.70 Elder abuse is defined by
the World Health Organization as ‘a single, or repeated act, or lack of appropriate
action, occurring within any relationship where there is an expectation of trust which
causes harm or distress to an older person’.71 It can be physical, psychological,
emotional, sexual or financial abuse. It can also be the result of intentional or
unintentional neglect.72
6.73 Advocacy and safeguarding of rights through having supporter and
representative duties, as well as the guardianship systems around Australia are critical
to preventing elder abuse. Under an effective, nationally coordinated model, the aged
care consumer will receive the kind of assistance they need from supporters whose role
and duties are specified. The aged care consumers will know that they are ultimately
responsible for the decision made with the assistance of a supporter.
6.74 Where a representative makes a decision for the aged care consumer, the
decision will be based on the will and preferences of the person requiring support and
safeguards should apply, consistent with the Safeguards Guidelines. This would ensure
that decisions and interventions are:
· least restrictive of the person’s human rights;
· subject to appeal; and
· subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring and review.73
6.75 The representative will have duties under the model and, when they are also the
aged care consumer’s guardian, they will be bound by duties under state and territory
legislation.
69 Department of Social Services, ‘Home Care Packages Program Guidelines’ (July 2014) [3.1.4].
70 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; AGAC, Submission 91; Caxton Legal
Centre, Submission 67; The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Office of the Public Advocate (SA),
Submission 17; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.
71 World Health Organization, Elder Abuse <www.who.int/ageing/projects/elder_abuse/en/>.
72 Ibid.
73 See Ch 3.
174 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
6.76 It is important for the Commonwealth decision-making model to augment
existing state and territory systems with a clear, structured approach to decision-
making that will mirror the rights and responsibilities of consumers and approved
providers of aged care.74
Guidance and training
6.77 Guidance and training for all parties involved in decision-making under the
Commonwealth legislative framework for aged care is critical to the effective operation
of this model. The OPA (SA and Vic) submitted:
Significant reform and concurrent sector and community education will be required to
ensure that the operation of the Commonwealth decision-making model will balance
duty of care and dignity of risk, while protecting older people from exposure to
abuse.75
6.78 The Department of Social Services (DSS) should develop and deliver targeted
guidance and training for:
· aged care consumers who require decision-making support;
· supporters and representative; and
· DSS and Australian Aged Care Quality Agency employees and others involved
decision-making or engagement with aged care consumers.
6.79 The focus of guidance and training could include topics such as: the introduction
of the supporter and representative model under the law on aged care and differences
between current practice and the new model; interaction with state and territory
decision-making systems; and supported decision-making in the context of aged care.
eHealth records
6.80 The following section discusses the Personally Controlled Electronic Health
Records Act 2012 (PCEHR Act), which contains provisions dealing with decision-
making concerning the collection, use and disclosure of personally controlled
electronic health records—referred to as ‘eHealth records’.
6.81 An eHealth record is an electronic summary of a person’s health records, which
the individual consumer and their healthcare providers can access online when needed.
The eHealth record system was implemented nationally in July 2012, allowing people
seeking healthcare in Australia to register for an eHealth record. Healthcare Provider
Organisations can also register to participate in the eHealth record system, and
authorise their employees to access the eHealth record system.
6.82 As the system develops over time, having an eHealth record will give healthcare
providers access to a summary of key health information, as long as the person gives
74 Australian Government Department of Social Security, Charter of Residents Rights and Responsibilities;
Australian Government Department of Social Security, Charter of Rights and Responsibilities for Home
Care. See further, Ch 10.
75 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
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consent in confirming access settings for the eHealth record. This will include
information such as medications, hospital discharge summaries, allergies and
immunisations.76
Individual decision-making and eHealth records
6.83 Under the legislative framework for eHealth, there are protections against the
mishandling of information.77 Individuals can control their own eHealth record by
choosing to restrict which healthcare provider organisations can access it and what
information is included through exercising ‘access controls’.78 Unauthorised collection,
use or disclosure of eHealth record information is both a contravention of the PECHR
Act and an interference with privacy under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).79
6.84 The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) is the privacy
regulator for the PECHR Act. The OAIC regulates the handling of personal
information in the eHealth system by individuals, Australian Government agencies,
private sector organisations and some state and territory agencies (in particular
circumstances).80
6.85 The PCEHR Act contains detailed schemes for ‘nominated representatives’ and
‘authorised representatives’. In the terminology used by the ALRC, the former are
analogous to ‘supporters’ and the latter to ‘representatives’.
‘Nominated representatives’
6.86 The nominated representative provisions are intended to support the
involvement of people other than healthcare professionals in assisting consumers in
managing their healthcare. Nominated representatives may be family members, carers,
neighbours or any other person nominated by a consumer.81
6.87 For  a  person  to  be  a  nominated  representative,  there  must  be  an  agreement
between the consumer and the proposed nominated representative. This agreement
does not have to be in writing. The consumer must also notify the System Operator that
the other person is her or his nominated representative.82
6.88 Consumers remain able to access and control their eHealth records themselves,
and access by a nominated representative is subject to any access controls set by the
consumer.
76 Department of Health, EHealth–General Individuals FAQs <www.ehealth.gov.au>.
77 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) pt 4.
78 See, eg, Ibid s 61.
79 Ibid s 73.
80 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90.
81 Explanatory Memorandum, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011 (Cth) 10.
82 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 7. In practice, notification is
automatically generated by the system. The Secretary of the Department of Health is the System
Operator.
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6.89 For example, in some cases a nominated representative may have ‘read-only’
access to a consumer’s eHealth record. In other cases, a consumer may allow a
nominated representative to do anything the consumer can do, including setting access
controls, and granting access to healthcare provider organisations.
This flexibility in setting access controls is designed to take into account the many
circumstances where a person may not be able to,  or  may not wish to,  manage their
own [eHealth record] but where they do not have a formal legally recognised
representative to act on their behalf.83
6.90 A nominated representative must always act in the ‘best interests’ of the
consumer, subject to the consumer’s directions.84 A consumer may have more than one
nominated representative.85
‘Authorised representatives’
6.91 People who may have impaired decision-making ability are able to have an
eHealth record. To facilitate this, an authorised representative is able to register a
consumer for an eHealth record and manage the access controls on behalf of the
consumer.
6.92 A person may be an authorised representative of a person over 18 years old if
the System Operator is satisfied that a consumer is not capable of making decisions for
themselves, and that another person is authorised by an Australian law, or by a decision
of an Australian court or tribunal, to act on behalf of the consumer.86
6.93 If there is no such person, the System Operator may appoint someone else if
satisfied that the person is an appropriate person to be the authorised representative. 87
This provision is said to allow the System Operator, in making appointments, to ‘take
into account a range of other circumstances for people without capacity, or with only
limited capacity’.88
6.94 For the purposes of the PCEHR Act and the eHealth system, an authorised
representative is treated as if they were the consumer. That is, the authorised
representative can do anything authorised or required of the consumer, and anything
done by an authorised representative in relation to the system is taken as if it were done
by the consumer.89
6.95 An authorised representative must always act in the best interests of the
consumer, having regard to any directions from the consumer expressed when they had
capacity to act on their own behalf.90 A consumer may have more than one authorised
representative.91
83 Explanatory Memorandum, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011 (Cth) 10.
84 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 7(6).
85 Ibid s 7(5).
86 Ibid s 7(4).
87 Ibid s 6(4)(b).
88 Explanatory Memorandum, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011 (Cth) 10.
89 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 6(7).
90 Ibid s 6(9).
91 Ibid s 6(8).
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The Commonwealth model and eHealth records
Recommendation 6–3 The Personally Controlled Electronic Health
Records Act 2012 (Cth) should be amended to include provisions dealing with
supporters and representatives consistent with the Commonwealth decision-
making model.
6.96 The existing scheme for authorised and nominated representatives contained in
the PCEHR Act is detailed and tailored to the operation of the voluntary national
system for the provision of access to electronic health information.
6.97 The scheme is designed, among other things, to ensure that people who have
impaired decision-making ability are able to have an eHealth record, and to enable
people to share their health information with those who need it. For example, an older
person may want their son or daughter to be able to view key health information, such
as currently prescribed medications and test results, in order to provide care and
assistance to them.
6.98 The ALRC does not prescribe any comprehensive new decision-making scheme
for the PCEHR Act. Individual decision-making under the PCEHR Act is relatively
limited—being confined to decisions about the collection, use and disclosure of health
information. This is more confined than, for example, decision-making under the Aged
Care Act, which often involves significant decisions about the provision of residential
and home care services and the entering of contractual arrangements.
6.99 However, the existing PCEHR Act provisions concerning nominated and
authorised representatives should be reviewed and amended in the light of the National
Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.
6.100 Broadly, nominated representatives under the PCEHR Act are analogous to
‘supporters’ in the Commonwealth decision-making model. They are nominated by the
person concerned, and are subject to directions by the consumer, who may also
continue to make decisions under the PCEHR Act.
6.101 Apart from adopting consistent terminology, changes to these nominated
representatives provisions should include providing that, in making decisions,
supporters have obligations to:
· consider the will, preferences and rights of the person represented (rather than
the current best interests test);
· consult with existing appointees, family members, carers and other significant
people;
· perform the role diligently and in good faith.
6.102 Authorised representatives provide substitute decision-making concerning
eHealth records and, therefore, perform a role analogous to that of ‘representatives’ in
the Commonwealth decision-making model. Changes to these PCEHR Act provisions
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should include incorporating the ‘will, preferences and rights’ approach to decision-
making; the recommended guidelines for determining decision-making ability; and the
recommended factors for determining whether a person or organisation is suitable for
appointment.
6.103 There are arguments that no change to existing provisions of the PCEHR Act is
necessary because the system already strikes a balance between safeguards for the
privacy and related rights of the person and allows authorised representatives to be
appointed without undue administrative complexity. The NSW Council for Intellectual
Disability (NSWCID), for example, cautioned that if a decision-making system is not
easy to understand and use,
service agencies and health professionals will tend to either ignore the system or deny
access to services to people with disability. For example, doctors are much less likely
to embrace the system of eHealth records with their patients who have intellectual
disability if the system for supported or representative decision making is complex.
Similarly, complex decision making systems can unduly delay important exchange of
information in relation to a person so that the person suffers detriment.92
6.104 There should be a balance between safeguards and avoiding undue
administrative complexity so that mechanisms are
proportionate to the situation. For example, there should be a straightforward process
for a close family member to become the representative of a person for processes like
Centrelink and eHealth records.93
6.105 The OAIC expressed concern that adopting the ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’
terminology in place of the current terminology could ‘create confusion and additional
complexities within the PCEHR system’ because authorised and nominated
representatives perform functions under the PCEHR Act that are not necessarily
equivalent to the roles of supporters and representatives under the Commonwealth
decision-making model.94
6.106 In the ALRC’s view, it is important to encourage the implementation of
supported decision-making in this area of Commonwealth responsibility but
unnecessary formality should be avoided. Decisions under the PCEHR Act involve
only the handling of personal information. Therefore, there may be a case for
provisions that are more minimal than those recommended in the Commonwealth
decision-making model.
6.107 The ALRC concludes that it would be better if the same terminology were used
as in the NDIS scheme and social security, notwithstanding the more limited role of
supporters and representatives under the PCEHR Act. The main objective is to ensure
that consistent obligations are imposed, especially to consider the will, preferences and
rights of the person being supported.
92 NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 131.
93 Ibid.
94 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 132.
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6.108 The ALRC understands that at present, authorised representatives are generally
the parents of persons under the age of 18, who wish their child to opt-in to the system.
In this context, a review of the PCEHR has recommended transition to an ‘opt-out’
model for the PCEHR scheme.95 Issues concerning the availability and obligations of
representatives will take on a different character, if a representative is needed in order
for someone to be able to opt-out of the scheme.
Information privacy
6.109 The Privacy Act is Australia’s key information privacy law. The Act is
concerned with the protection of personal information held by certain entities, rather
than with privacy more generally. Personal information is defined in s 6(1) of the Act
as information or opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is
reasonably identifiable, whether or not true and whether or not in material form.
6.110 The Privacy Act provides 13 ‘Australian Privacy Principles’ (APPs) that set out
the broad requirements on collection, use, disclosure and other handling of personal
information.96 The APPs bind only ‘APP entities’—primarily Australian Government
agencies and large private sector organisations with a turnover of more than $3 million.
Certain small businesses are also bound, such as those that provide health services and
those that disclose personal information to anyone else for a benefit, service or
advantage.97 Generally, individuals are not bound by the Privacy Act.98
6.111 Privacy of health information may be a special concern for persons with
disability. Health and genetic information is ‘sensitive information’ that is subject to
stronger protection under the APPs.99 Separate Commonwealth legislation protects
healthcare identifiers100 and eHealth records.101
6.112 The major issue for stakeholders was to ensure that personal information is able
to be shared appropriately in order to support persons with disability. National
Disability Services, for example, stated:
The key challenge is often to transfer sufficient personal information (such as
medication requirements or worker safety issues) that will enable the provision of
high quality, tailored and safe support, while also protecting the right to privacy.102
6.113 There is a public interest in families and friends being involved in the care and
treatment of people with a mental illness, for example, and this clearly involves the
95 Subject, among other things, to the establishment of clear standards for compliance for clinical users: see
‘Review of the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record’ (Final Report, Panel on Review of the
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record, 2013) 29, rec 13.
96 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1.
97 ‘APP entity’ is defined in Ibid s 6(1). Small businesses are not, in general, APP entities, with some
exceptions as set out in s 6D.
98 There are some exceptions. For example, an individual who is a reporting entity under the Anti-Money
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), will be treated as an APP entity under the
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
99 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1).
100 Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth).
101 Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth).
102  National Disability Services, Submission 49.
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sharing of information.103 The NSWCID observed that, for a person with an intellectual
disability, there may be ‘numerous times in a month when an agency needs to obtain
information about the person from a range of sources and provide information to a
range of agencies or individuals’.104 The ACT Disability, Aged and Carer Advocacy
Service noted:
If [supported decision-making] frameworks are to reduce or replace the use of
guardianship, consideration needs to be given to how relevant information can be
shared with decision supporters while balancing the right of people with disability to
privacy.105
Individual decision-making and the Privacy Act
6.114 The Privacy Act makes no express provision for supporters or representatives to
be recognised as acting on behalf of an individual in relation to decisions about the
handling of personal information held by APP entities.
6.115 Some state privacy legislation does provide for representatives. The Health
Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), for example, provides for the
position of an ‘authorised representative’ to act on behalf of an individual who is
‘incapable of doing an act authorised, permitted or required’ by the Act.106
6.116 An authorised representative may not do an act on behalf of an individual who is
capable of doing that act, unless the individual expressly authorises the authorised
representative to do that act.107
6.117 An ‘authorised representative’ for these purposes means a person appointed
under an enduring power of attorney, a guardian, a person having parental
responsibility (if the individual is a child), or person who is ‘otherwise empowered
under  law  to  exercise  any  functions  as  an  agent  of  or  in  the  best  interests  of  the
individual’.108 Essentially, therefore, the NSW Health Records and Information
Privacy Act provides recognition for representatives, but not for supporters, as those
terms are used in this Report.
6.118 The ALRC has considered previously whether the Privacy Act should include
provision for representatives. In its 2008 report, For Your Information: Australian
Privacy Law and Practice, the ALRC recommended that the Privacy Act should be
amended to include the concept of a ‘nominee’. An agency or organisation would be
able to establish nominee arrangements and then ‘deal with an individual’s nominee as
103  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41.
104  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.
105  ADACAS, Submission 29.
106 Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) s 7. An individual is defined as incapable ‘if
the individual is incapable (despite the provision of reasonable assistance by another person) by reason of
age, injury, illness, physical or mental impairment of: (a) understanding the general nature and effect of
the act, or (b) communicating the individual’s intentions with respect to the act’.
107  Ibid s 8(3).
108  Ibid s 8.
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if the nominee were the individual’.109 The ALRC recommended that nominee
arrangements should include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(a)  a nomination can be made by an individual or a substitute decision maker
authorised by a federal, state or territory law;
(b)  the nominee can be an individual or an entity;
(c)  the nominee has a duty to act at all times in the best interests of the individual;
and
(d)  the nomination can be revoked by the individual, the nominee or the agency or
organisation.110
6.119 The ALRC concluded that establishing nominee arrangements would ‘provide
flexibility for individuals to decide who can act as their “agent” for the purposes of the
Privacy Act, and also operate as a useful mechanism in situations where an individual
has limited, intermittent or declining capacity’.111
6.120 The rationale for the original ALRC recommendations was to address problems
faced by individuals and their representatives in gaining access to benefits and services
due to perceived or real conflicts with the Privacy Act. That is, organisations refusing
to provide information or deal with supporters ‘because of the Privacy Act’. Similar
concerns were expressed in this Inquiry.112
6.121 The ALRC’s 2008 recommendations would have provided recognition for both
supporters and representatives. The ALRC envisaged that a nominee could be either
nominated by the individual or a substitute decision-maker appointed under some other
law. While it would not be necessary for an authorised substitute decision-maker to be
registered as a nominee for the agency or organisation to recognise that person, the
nominee arrangements were seen as a convenient way for the decision-maker to be
recognised for ongoing dealings with the agency or organisation.113
The Commonwealth model and the Privacy Act
Recommendation 6–4 The Australian Information Commissioner should
develop guidelines consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model
describing the role of supporters and explaining how ‘APP entities’ should
recognise the role of supporters in assisting people to exercise their rights under
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
109  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice,
Report No 108 (2008) Rec 70–1.
110  Ibid Rec 70–2.
111  Ibid [70.96].
112  See, eg, NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33; ADACAS, Submission 29.
113  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice,
Report No 108 (2008) [70.101].
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6.122 Successive Australian Governments have not responded to the ALRC’s
recommendations concerning decision-making arrangements under the Privacy Act.114
There seems good reason to revisit this issue in the context of the present Inquiry.
6.123 The Privacy Act does not prevent a supporter from providing assistance to the
individual where this is done with the consent of the individual. Where the assistance
requires the supporter to have access to the personal information of the individual, the
individual can provide consent for the agency or organisation to disclose the
information to the supporter. Sometimes it should be quite clear, for example, that a
requested disclosure of personal information would be permitted by APP 6.115
6.124 There are concerns, however, that such arrangements are not implemented
consistently, or recognised by agencies and organisations.116 The NSWCID submitted:
So far as possible, people with intellectual disability should be given the support that
they need to make their own privacy decisions. If this is not adequate, there needs to
be a legislative system of substitute consent and/or administrative safeguards that
provides reasonable safeguards on the privacy of the individual whilst also
recognising that other rights of the individual may be imperilled if personal
information cannot be gathered and promptly used as occasions arise.117
6.125 If the privacy rules covering this sort of information exchange are ‘cumbersome
or complex’, then optimal support of people with intellectual disabilities will not
occur.118 Other stakeholders referred to the desirability of uniform Commonwealth,
state and territory privacy regulation.119
6.126 The advantages of recognising supporters in Commonwealth laws are discussed
in Chapter 4. In particular, formalisation of support is likely to create greater certainty
for third parties about the role of supporters, and facilitate the provision of support to
people who need it. In the context of information privacy, this is likely to allow third
parties to interact with supporters with greater confidence, allowing for timely
collection, use and disclosure of information.
6.127 There is a downside to this approach, however, in that legislative arrangements
may work against flexible practices by encouraging the perception that a supporter
must be formally appointed in order to be recognised. On the other hand, more
informal arrangements may not be implemented consistently or recognised by APP
114  Many other recommendations made in the 2008 privacy report were implemented following the
enactment of the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth).
115  That is, the disclosure is for the purpose the information was collected, or the individual has consented to
the disclosure of the information: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1, cl 6.
116  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice,
Report No 108 (2008) [70.104].
117  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.
118  The NSWCID referred to the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) as a good model
for dealing with ‘incapacity issues’: Ibid.
119  See, eg, Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. The ALRC has previously recommended
an intergovernmental cooperative scheme that provides that the states and territories should enact
legislation regulating the handling of personal information in the state and territory public sectors that is
consistent with the Privacy Act: ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice,
Report No 108 (2008) Recs 3–4, 3–5.
6. Supporters and Representatives in Other Areas of Commonwealth Law 183
entities. Some form of legislative underpinning may be more effective in establishing
recognition of supporters.
6.128 Incorporating the Commonwealth decision-making model within the Privacy
Act may facilitate assistance for people in making and communicating decisions
concerning control of their personal information by recognising supporters, including
family and carers, as being able to act on their behalf. At the least, supporters should be
recognised and be made subject to a duty to support an individual’s will and
preferences in relation to the handling of their personal information.
6.129 However, some circumstances will require a more rigorous process for
appointment and verification than others, due to the potential consequences of the
disclosure of personal information or the transaction involved. For example, a bank or
other financial institution might establish an arrangement that has effect for the
purposes of disclosing account balances and banking transactions, but does not extend
to a supporter withdrawing funds from an account on behalf of the individual, without
putting further integrity measures in place.
6.130 While there was some support for the Discussion Paper proposals,120 the OAIC
did not consider amendments to the Privacy Act are needed. In this context, the OAIC
advised that it does not generally support amendments to the Privacy Act unless there
is evidence that the difficulty encountered is as a result of the current legislative
framework. It was suggested that ‘non-legislative measures, such as improved
guidance, should be favoured’ and, if this approach were found to be insufficient,
careful consideration would need to be given to the regulatory impact of any
amendments to ensure that they do not introduce additional complexities for
individuals and APP entities, and meet the objectives of the Privacy Act set out in
s 2A.121
6.131 The Privacy Act does not prevent supported decision-making where the
individual has provided consent to the arrangement. Where the assistance requires the
supporter to have access to the personal information of the individual, the individual
can provide consent for the APP entity to disclose the information to the supporter. 122
The OAIC considered that a consistent application of the Commonwealth supported
decision-making model can be achieved through the development of specific and
targeted guidance for APP entities.123
120  National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
121  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 132.
122   There  are  a  number  of  other  exceptions  in  the  APPs,  which  permit  the  use  and  disclosure  of  an
individual's personal information to a representative, including where the use or disclosure is required or
authorised by law; where a permitted health situation exists and information is disclosed to a responsible
person for an individual; and in certain situations where there is a serious threat to the life, health or
safety of any individual, or to public health or safety: See Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 16A, 16B(5).
123  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 132.
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6.132 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that the Privacy Act should permit
APP entities to establish a supporters and representatives scheme, but stated that this
should not be mandatory.124
6.133 APP entities need to retain the flexibility to develop practices and procedures
consistent with their broader operations. Agencies and organisations are subject to
other obligations—such as the bankers’ duty of confidentiality or particular legislative
provisions—which place limits on decision-making by supporters. Each agency and
organisation needs to consider the extent to which it is able to recognise and act upon
decisions made by a supporter.
6.134 Applying the Commonwealth decision-making model in the Privacy Act would
differ from other contexts, in that provisions would apply potentially to an individual’s
relationships with the full range of APP entities—Commonwealth government
agencies and private sector organisations—and have to be administered by them, rather
than by a single agency, such as the NDIA or Centrelink.
6.135 The ALRC concludes that it is not necessary to amend the Privacy Act itself to
encourage the recognition of supported decision-making in privacy regulation. To
begin with, there is no case for allowing all APP entities to create mechanisms for
appointing representatives, although they should have processes for recognising
substitute decision-makers appointed under state or territory law.
6.136 As suggested by the OAIC, the preferable approach may be to encourage
supported decision-making through guidelines describing the role of supporters and
explaining how APP entities should recognise the role of supporters in assisting people
to exercise their rights under the Privacy Act.
Banking services
6.137 Banking is another area of Commonwealth legislative responsibility,125 in
relation to which the application of the decision-making model might be considered.
Article 12(5) of the CRPD requires States Parties to take all appropriate and effective
measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to control their own
financial affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of
financial credit.126
6.138 In practice, a tension emerges between these rights and the need to protect
people from financial abuse and exploitation in conducting their banking and financial
activities. There is also a need to ensure the legal validity of financial transactions.
124  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposal 6–4, [6.109].
125  See, eg, Banking Act 1959 (Cth); Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth); Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).
126 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 12(5).
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6.139 An issue in relation to banking is the refusal of some banks to allow persons
with disability to access or operate a bank account independently, and hesitancy in
recognising informal supporters. Such refusals may reflect bank concerns about
capacity or financial exploitation.127 In this context, the Australian Bankers’
Association (ABA) has commented that
Financial exploitation of a vulnerable person is a deeply challenging area for banks.
Every customer’s situation is unique and banks have an obligation to protect their
customers’ privacy, maintain the bank’s duty of confidentiality, and to not
unnecessarily intrude into their customers’ lives.128
6.140 The ABA’s Code of Banking Practice recognises the needs of older persons and
customers with a disability to have access to transaction services and commits banks to
taking reasonable measures to enhance their access to those services.129 In addition,
there are a number of industry standards and guidelines to assist banking accessibility.
Individual banks have various customer service commitments, including Disability
Action Plans and other service charters as well as policies, practices, business rules and
product and service solutions to assist certain customers.130
6.141 The ABA issues other non-binding industry guidelines that are relevant to the
ability of persons with disability to engage with the banking industry and to make
decisions in that context.131 In particular, the ABA has issued guidelines on responding
to requests from a power of attorney or court-appointed administrator. These explain
how powers of attorney and court-appointed administrator arrangements apply to
banks’ relationships with their customers; and outline a framework that banks can use
to consistently deal with requests from attorneys and administrators.132
6.142 The ABA guidelines note that it ‘is not the role of bank staff (or a bank) to
determine a customer’s capacity’.133 They outline the roles of administrators and
guardians, how to recognise their authority, and highlight differences in the role,
authority and responsibilities of guardians and administrators between jurisdictions. 134
127  See, eg, Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) 190.
128  Australian Bankers’ Association, Financial Abuse Prevention (12 November 2013).
129  Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (2013) [7].
130  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 128.
131  ABA industry guidelines provide assistance to banks in recognising financial abuse, advocate raising
awareness among bank employees about this risk, and outline strategies for dealing with a situation of
potential financial abuse: Australian Bankers’ Association Industry Guideline, Protecting Vulnerable
Customers from Potential Financial Abuse, June 2013.
132  Australian Bankers’ Association Industry Guideline, Responding to Requests from a Power of Attorney or
Court-Appointed Administrator, June 2013, 1.
133  Ibid 2.
134  Ibid 4–5, 7.
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Encouraging supported decision making
Recommendation 6–5 The Australian Bankers’ Association should
encourage banks to recognise supported decision-making. To this end, the ABA
should issue guidelines, reflecting the National Decision-Making Principles and
recognising that:
(a)  customers should be presumed to have the ability to make decisions about
access to banking services;
(b)  customers may be capable of making and communicating decisions
concerning banking services, where they have access to necessary
support;
(c)  customers are entitled to support in making and communicating
decisions; and
(d)  banks should recognise supporters and respond to their requests,
consistent with other legal duties.
6.143 There  may  be  some reluctance  on  the  part  of  banks  to  allow people  who  need
decision-making support to access banking services independently and to recognise the
role of supporters. Banks may prefer to recognise only formal, substitute decision-
making appointments. The ABA guidelines state, for example:
Banks have a contractual obligation to act in accordance with the customer’s mandate.
If a customer has set up a power of attorney, or a court has appointed an administrator
to represent a customer’s interests, then these authorities are considered to be in line
with the customer’s mandate. It is important to recognise and respond to requests
from these authorities as if they were made from the customer themselves.135
6.144 In the ALRC’s view, people who need decision-making support should not
necessarily have to access banking services only through an administrator or the holder
of a power of attorney.
6.145 Submissions referred to difficulties faced by persons with disability in obtaining
access to banking services, including because supporters are not recognised. Pave the
Way, for example, stated that banks often refuse to allow persons with disability to
have their own bank account:
This is a problem that is regularly experienced by families who are trying to open an
ordinary bank account for their family member who has a disability. We are aware of
numerous examples of banks being willing to open an account for a child without
disability but refusing to open an account for a child with disability. Similarly banks
regularly refuse to open accounts for adults with disability. While it appears that there
is no actual legal impediment to banks offering this service, some banks express
135  Ibid 6.
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concern about capacity and others cite an obligation to protect vulnerable people.
When facing this problem some families decide to seek an administration order.136
6.146 The Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia referred to a decision of
the Equality Opportunity Tribunal (SA), which found that a finance company had
discriminated against a loan applicant on the basis of disability. The Commission stated
that the decision is ‘a reminder of the risk that service providers may take in making
assumptions about a person based on a disability, without adequately assessing a
person’s capacity’.137
6.147 The Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and
Justice Alliance submitted that recognition of supported decision-making arrangements
could better enable people with disabilities to ‘exercise equal legal capacity in their use
of financial services’. While the reluctance of banks to recognise informal
arrangements was said to be understandable, provision for supported decision-making
could help provide certainty for banks, while still ensuring that ‘support for people
with disabilities in the exercise of legal capacity is tailored to their needs, as required
by Article 12 of the [CRPD]’.138
6.148  Banking may not be an area in which the full Commonwealth decision-making
model can easily be applied. It may not be practical, for example, to impose any
legislative requirement on banks to set up their own systems for recognising supporters
and responding to requests from these supporters.
6.149 The nomination of a supporter does not involve the limitations and protective
formalities of, for example, a power of attorney.139 As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  the
‘paradigm shift’ towards encouraging supported, rather than substitute, decision-
making, is a relatively new development. Fully recognising supported decision-making
arrangements would constitute a break with existing banking practices, which are
based on contract and agency law, with potentially unforeseen legal consequences.140
6.150 Nevertheless, there may be room to encourage a more flexible approach on the
part of banks, without being prescriptive, and recognising that banks bear risks in
relation to voidable transactions.
136  Pave the Way, Submission 09.
137  Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia, Submission 28. (Referring to Jackson v Homestart
Finance [2013] SAEOT 13).
138  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission
20.
139  Eg, in relation to an appointment by written instrument, independent witnesses and so on.
140  Relevant legal obligations of banks include privacy laws, responsible lending obligations, duties of
confidentiality towards customers, contractual obligations to act on the instructions of their customers or
others formally appointed to act on behalf of the customer (attorneys or court-appointed administrators).
Other legal obligations which restrict banks from dealing with others not formally appointed include
identification requirements associated with anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing and
obligations to protect customers from fraud, identity theft, financial abuse, and other potential security
risks: Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 128.
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6.151 The ALRC recommends that the ABA provide additional guidance on how
banks may meet the needs of people who require decision-making support to access
banking services. This would be consistent with the ABA’s Code of Banking
Practice.141
6.152 The new guidance should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles,
including the Support Guidelines. In particular, banks should be encouraged to
recognise that customers:
· should be presumed to have the ability to make decisions about access to
banking services;
· may remain capable of making and communicating decisions concerning
banking services, where they have access to necessary support; and
· are entitled to support in making and communicating decisions and banks
should, where possible and consistent with other duties, recognise supporters
and respond to their requests.
6.153 The proposal in the Discussion Paper attracted some support from
stakeholders.142 The OPA (SA and Vic) supported the proposal and highlighted the
importance of legally recognised supported decision-making arrangements in helping
people ‘to better and more easily deal with financial institutions, and other third
parties’. This was said to be particularly important to ‘obtaining and communicating
often complex information which may be an otherwise difficult undertaking for a
person with a cognitive impairment’.143
6.154 However, AGAC noted the ‘very practical’ risk of undue influence in banking
transactions, if banks recognise supporters who do not have some formal status. AGAC
considered that ‘banks are highly unlikely to expose themselves to a contingent
liability that would at least prima facie be so evident’.144
6.155 The ABA submitted that industry guidelines are not necessary to encourage
banks to recognise supported decision making because banks have already
‘implemented policies, practices, and business rules as well as provided products,
services and tools as solutions to assist customers with special needs’.145 Banks may,
for example, provide facilities for co-signing, allowing designated others to conduct
banking along with the account holder.
6.156 The ABA expressed concern about ‘supported decision making or co-decision
making arrangements that do not establish clear boundaries for all parties’ and about
customers entering arrangements with others, especially where customers breach their
contract with the bank (for example, by disclosing PINs) or give up their consumer
rights and protections.
141  Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (2013) [7].
142  Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
143  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
144  AGAC, Submission 91.
145  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 128.
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The ABA believes that supported decision making or co-decision making may expose
individuals to liability and legal risks, rather than provide them with greater financial
independence and autonomy, decision making freedom and flexibility. Additionally, it
is inappropriate for banks and other service providers to be expected to identify or
determine the capacity of their customers. Banks are not in a position (or qualified) to
establish (or question) whether a customer has capacity or not.146
6.157 On the other hand, the ABA confirmed that some banks have introduced
‘product and service solutions to assist customers have supported decision making
without exposing these customers, or their banks, to liability and legal risks’.147 While
some ‘alternative and third party arrangements may present certain liability and legal
risks’ banks have taken these risks in order to assist their customers.148
6.158 These arrangements are consistent with the outcomes envisaged by the ALRC’s
recommendation for ABA guidelines encouraging supported decision-making. These
state that banks should recognise supporters and respond to their requests, ‘where
possible and consistent with other legal duties’.149
6.159 In the ALRC’s view, an ABA guideline and associated commentary could
encourage banks to explore options for further developing forms of supported decision-
making in a flexible way—for example, through contractual means. This should not be
a disjuncture with current approaches, given banks are said to have ‘already embedded
the values of the National Decision-Making Principles into the way in which they deal
with their customers’.150
146  Ibid.
147  The ABA referred to these as ‘instituted supported decision making arrangements’: Ibid.
148  Ibid.
149  Ibid.
150  Ibid.
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Summary
7.1 This chapter discusses issues concerning decision-making ability that have
implications for access to justice. Persons with disability may be involved in court
processes in a number of different roles, including as parties and witnesses in criminal
and civil proceedings.
7.2 In this chapter, the ALRC examines a range of Commonwealth laws and legal
frameworks affecting people involved in court proceedings.1 The issues discussed
affect people as:
1 The issues discussed in this chapter do not arise in the same way in tribunal proceedings, which involve
merits review of government decisions, and are generally less formal and adversarial than in the courts.
There is no equivalent, for example, of rules about the competency of witnesses: see Matthew Groves,
‘Do Administrative Tribunals Have to Be Satisfied of the Competence of Parties Before Them?’ (2013)
20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 133.
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· defendants in criminal proceedings—the concept of unfitness to stand trial;
· parties to civil proceedings—the appointment and role of litigation
representatives;
· witnesses in criminal or civil proceedings—giving evidence as a witness, and
consenting to the taking of forensic samples; and
· potential jurors—qualification for jury service.
7.3 In each of these areas there are existing tests of a person’s capacity to exercise
legal rights or to participate in legal processes. The ALRC recommends that these tests
should be reformed consistently with the National Decision-Making Principles, based
on art 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) and other sources.2
7.4 Generally, the ALRC recommends that these tests be reformulated to focus on
whether, and to what extent, a person can be supported to play their role in the justice
system, rather than on whether they have capacity to play such a role at all. By
providing models in Commonwealth laws, the ALRC also seeks to inform and provide
a catalyst for reform of state and territory laws.
7.5 An important theme is the tension between laws that are intended to operate in a
‘protective’ manner—for example, in order to ensure a fair trial—and increasing
demands for equal participation, in legal processes, of persons who require decision-
making support.
Access to justice issues
7.6 A range of personal and systemic issues may affect the ability of persons with
disabilities to participate fully in court processes. These include:
· communication barriers;
· difficulties accessing the necessary support, adjustments or aids to participate in
the justice system;3
· issues associated with giving instructions to legal representatives and capacity to
participate in litigation;
· the costs associated with legal representation; and
· misconceptions and stereotypes about the reliability and credibility of people
with disability as witnesses.4
2 See Ch 3.
3 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 142. ‘The Law Council considers that lack of appropriate
funding to legal assistance services has severely undermined the capacity of legal assistance providers to
meet the legal needs of specific and vulnerable target groups, particularly people with disabilities’.
4 See, eg, Abigail Gray, Suzie Forell and Sophie Clarke, ‘Cognitive Impairment, Legal Need and Access to
Justice’, (2009) Justice Issues, Law and Justice Foundation, Paper No 10.
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7.7 Article 13 of the CRPD stipulates that States Parties must ensure effective
access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including
by:
· providing procedural and age-appropriate accommodations to facilitate their role
as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal
proceedings; and
· promoting appropriate training for those working in the field of administration
of justice, including police and prison staff.
7.8 In its 2014 report, Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies,5
the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) identified the barriers people with
disabilities face in achieving equality in the criminal justice system. It recommended
that each jurisdiction in Australia, in addressing these barriers, should develop a
Disability Justice Strategy, incorporating the following core set of principles and
actions:
· Appropriate communications—Communication is essential to personal
autonomy and decision-making. Securing effective and appropriate
communication as a right should be the cornerstone of any Disability Justice
Strategy.
· Early intervention and diversion—Early intervention and wherever possible
diversion into appropriate programs can both enhance the lives of people with
disabilities and support the interests of justice.
· Increased service capacity—Increased service capacity and support should be
appropriately resourced.
· Effective training—Effective training should address the rights of people with
disabilities and prevention of and appropriate responses to violence and abuse,
including gender-based violence.
· Enhanced accountability and monitoring—People with disabilities, including
children with disabilities, are consulted and actively involved as equal partners
in the development, implementation and monitoring of policies, programs and
legislation to improve access to justice.
· Better policies and frameworks—Specific measures to address the intersection
of disability and gender should be adopted in legislation, policies and programs
to achieve appropriate understanding and responses by service providers.6
7.9 The access to justice issues addressed in the context of this ALRC Inquiry are
narrower in scope. The focus of the Inquiry is on laws and legal frameworks affecting
people who may need decision-making support rather than, for example, on how and
by whom such support should be provided and funded.
5 ‘Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies’ (Australian Human Rights Commission,
2014).
6 Ibid 7.
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7.10 Legal reform is likely to have limited practical impact if people do not have
access to the support necessary to enable them to participate in legal processes. Further,
under the CRPD, Commonwealth, state and territory governments have an obligation
to provide support to people with disability to assist them in decision-making.7
7.11 The significance of the availability of support was emphasised by stakeholders.
The Offices of the Public Advocate (South Australia and Victoria) (OPA (SA and Vic))
submitted that the ‘foremost concern’ in relation to access to justice is ‘the lack of
support available for people with cognitive impairment currently accessing and
interacting with the justice system’.8
7.12 National Disability Services (NDS) said that reform to encourage supported
decision-making makes it ‘imperative for the justice system to draw on disability
expertise in decision support and adjustments’ such as:
· interviewing techniques that address issues associated with recall of information
or a propensity to be led by authorities;
· assistive technology and techniques that addresses communication barriers; and
· support to address circumstances where there are reduced social networks and
fear of retribution if experiencing carer abuse.9
Eligibility to stand trial
7.13 In the ALRC’s view, the current legal test for unfitness to stand trial needs to be
reformed to avoid unfairness and maintain the integrity of criminal trials, while
ensuring that people with disability are entitled to equal recognition before the law, and
to participate fully in legal processes.
7.14 At common law, a person who is considered ‘unfit’ to stand trial cannot be tried.
The justification for this rule has been stated in various ways, including as being to:
· avoid inaccurate verdicts—forcing the defendant to be answerable for his or her
actions when incapable of doing so could lead to an inaccurate verdict;
· maintain the ‘moral dignity’ of the trial process—requiring that a defendant is fit
to stand trial recognises the importance of maintaining the moral dignity of the
trial process, ensuring that the defendant is able to form a link between the
alleged crime and the trial or punishment and be accountable for his or her
actions; and
7 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 12(3).
8 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95. ‘For example, our experience is that
accommodation for people with disabilities in court processes such as cross-examination is not being
made’. The OPA (SA and Vic) considered a ‘comprehensive Disability Justice Plan is required, that
considers the needs of people with disability who are victims, witnesses and offenders, across civil and
criminal law’.
9 National Disability Services, Submission 92.
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· avoid unfairness—it would be unfair or inhumane to subject someone to the trial
process who is unfit.10
7.15 Also, the Law Commission of England and Wales (Law Commission) has
observed that it would be ‘an abuse of the process of the law to subject someone to a
trial when he or she is unable to play any real part in that trial’.11
7.16 At common law, there is a ‘presumption’ of fitness to stand trial. That is, if the
defence raises the issue, the onus is on the defence to prove, on the balance of
probabilities, that the defendant is unfit to stand trial.12 If  the  issue  is  raised  by  the
prosecution, and contested, then the issue must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.13
In addition, some Australian jurisdictions have enacted express statutory presumptions
of fitness.14
The test of unfitness
7.17 The presumption of fitness means that it is more correct to refer to a test of
‘unfitness’ to stand trial.15 The  test  may  arise  as  an  issue  before  or  during  the  trial.
When the defendant is present for trial, it may appear that he or she is unfit to plead.
Alternatively, he or she may enter a plea and thereafter, it may appear that he or she is
unfit to be tried. All Australian jurisdictions have enacted legislation dealing with
fitness to stand trial.16
7.18 At common law, the test of unfitness to stand trial is, simply stated, whether an
accused has sufficient mental or intellectual capacity to understand the proceedings and
to make an adequate defence.17 The Victorian Supreme Court in R v Presser set out six
factors relevant to the test:
· an understanding of the nature of the charges;
· an understanding of the nature of the court proceedings;
10 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 52. See also Law Commission of England and Wales,
Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 3–5.
11 ‘This goes further than merely requiring that a person understands the trial process; it is concerned with
whether or not he or she can meaningfully engage in the trial’: Law Commission of England and Wales,
Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 4.
12 R v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325. QAI observed that the diversion scheme under ch 7, pt 2 of the Mental
Health Act 2000 (Qld) ‘presumes incapacity’ in relation to people on existing Forensic Orders or
Intensive Treatment Orders and ‘therefore (some would argue positively) discriminates against people
with mental illness and intellectual disability’: Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Submission 45.
13 R v Robertson (1968) 3 All ER 557.
14 Eg, Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 269I; Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be
Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) s 7(1); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 312. The Commonwealth has not enacted such a
statutory presumption: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20B.
15 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to
Be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 53.
16 See, Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [9.3.1960].
17 In R v Pritchard,  the  test  was  stated  as  being  whether  the  defendant  is  ‘of  sufficient  intellect  to
comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a proper defence—to know that he
might challenge any of [the jury] to whom he may object—and to comprehend the details of the evidence
...’: R v Pritchard (1836) 173 ER 135, [304].
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· the ability to challenge jurors;
· the ability to understand the evidence;
· the ability to decide what defence to offer; and
· the ability to explain his or her version of the facts to counsel and the court.18
7.19 The common law test of unfitness to stand trial has been criticised in a number
of recent inquiries in Australia and overseas. In particular, the common law may place
an undue emphasis on a person’s intellectual ability to understand specific aspects of
the legal proceedings and trial process,19 and too little emphasis on a person’s decision-
making ability. The rules on unfitness to stand trial are characterised as ‘protective’20—
ensuring that a person cannot be tried for a crime unless capable of defending
themselves.
7.20 However, in practice, the rules can lead to adverse outcomes for individuals
found unfit to stand trial, who may be subject to detention, for an uncertain period, in
prison or in secure hospital facilities.21 The risk is that incentives exist for innocent
people to plead (or be advised to plead) guilty, in order to avoid the consequences of
unfitness.
7.21 As a result of being determined unfit to stand trial, a person may ‘end up in a
secure mental health facility for periods well in excess of those expected if their case
had progressed through the courts’. They ‘will often find themselves in a situation
where they are not able to exercise legal capacity, even when the circumstances
surrounding the making of the order have changed’.22
Once a person is issued with a forensic order that follows a finding of being unfit to
plead it is extremely difficult to be discharged from the order. This is due in part to a
medical approach to disability and a view that if you have an illness for life, you will
have an order for life.23
7.22 In some cases, the defendant’s interests may not be served in being found unfit
to stand trial if the outcome is that they are put on a supervision order, particularly for
less serious offences. Such defendants may later be unable to have their supervision
orders revoked because they continue to breach the conditions of the order or commit
offences. Further, they remain at risk of the order being varied from non-custodial to
custodial if they continue to pose a danger to the community.24
18 R v Presser [1958] VR 45.
19 But is not comprehensive in this regard—eg, there is no reference in common law tests to the defendant’s
ability to give their own evidence: Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead,
Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 29.
20 Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [9.3.1950].
21 Although most jurisdictions have legislated to divert such people away from the criminal justice system:
See Ibid [9.3.2010]–[9.3.2030].
22 Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71.
23 Ibid.
24 Office of Public Prosecutions Victoria, Submission No 8 to Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review
of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1990 (Vic), 2013.
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A person who is able to understand the process involved in a plea of guilty will often
be better off being dealt with by a criminal sanction, rather than being placed on an
indefinite supervision order.25
7.23 The key criticisms raised in recent inquiries into this issue have included that:
· the test, by focusing on intellectual ability, generally sets too high a threshold
for unfitness and is inconsistent with the modern trial process;26
· the test is difficult to apply to defendants with mental illness because the criteria
were not designed for them;27
· a defendant may not be unfit to stand trial even where the court takes the view
that he or she is not incapable of making decisions in his or her own interests.28
7.24 The Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) has conducted a review of the
Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) (CMI Act).29
This review included consideration of the Presser test, which is incorporated in the
CMI Act.30
7.25 In relation to the criticisms highlighted above, the VLRC observed:
An accused person with a mental illness, for example, may have no trouble having a
factual or an intellectual understanding of their right to challenge a juror, but their
delusional beliefs may hinder them from making decisions to exercise that right (or
having a ‘decision-making capacity’). On the other hand, an accused person with a
cognitive impairment or intellectual disability may have more trouble than an accused
person with a mental illness to understand this right. This raises the question of
whether the current criteria are suitable for people with a mental illness and whether
the threshold for unfitness to stand trial is currently set at the right level for these
people.31
7.26 The VLRC asked, among other things, whether the test for unfitness to stand
trial should include a consideration of a defendant’s decision-making capacity,
effective participation in the trial, or capacity to be rational.32
7.27 Similar questions are being examined by the Law Commission.33 In its 2010
Consultation Paper, the Law Commission made provisional proposals for reform of the
test  of unfitness.  These proposals would replace the current test  with a new legal test
25 Ibid. For such people, a higher threshold of unfitness to stand trial may therefore be advantageous.
26 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 27.
27 Rather, it was developed through experience with defendants who were deaf and mute and, by extension,
defendants with an intellectual disability: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes
(Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 59.
28 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 28.
29 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be
Tried) Act 1997, Report 28 (2014).
30 Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) s 6.
31 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 59.
32 Ibid Questions 1–7.
33 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010); Law
Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Issues Paper (2014). A final report is expected in
2015.
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which assesses whether the defendant ‘has decision-making capacity for trial’ and
takes into account ‘all the requirements for meaningful participation in the criminal
proceedings’:34
The legal test should be a revised single test which assesses the decision-making
capacity of the accused by reference to the entire spectrum of trial decisions he or she
might be required to make. Under this test an accused would be found to have or to
lack decision-making capacity for the criminal proceedings.35
7.28 In determining the defendant’s decision-making capacity, the court would be
required to take account of the ‘complexity of the particular proceedings and gravity of
the outcome’ and, in particular, how important any disability is likely to be in the
context of the decisions the defendant must make in the proceedings.36
7.29 The Law Commission proposed a new test, under which a defendant would be
found unfit to stand trial if he or she is unable:
(1)  to understand the information relevant to the decisions that he or she will have to
make in the course of his or her trial,
(2)  to retain that information,
(3)  to use or weigh that information as part of decision making process, or
(4)  to communicate his or her decisions.37
7.30 In its 2014 Issues Paper, the Law Commission stated that there appeared to be
‘considerable support from legal and clinical practitioners for a legal test which
incorporates both effective participation and decision-making capacity’.38 It  asked  a
number of further questions—which serve to illustrate the complexity of law reform in
this area—including whether:
· a reformed legal test for fitness to plead should incorporate a consideration of
both decision-making capacity and the capacity for effective participation;
· a ‘participation test … with an additional decision-making capacity limb’ would
represent the most appropriate formulation for such a combined legal test;
· incorporating ‘an exhaustive list of decisions for which the defendant requires
capacity’ would assist in maintaining the threshold for unfitness at a suitable
level; and
34 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010)
Provisional Proposal 1.
35 Ibid Proposal 3.
36 Ibid Proposal 4.
37 Ibid 54. The Law Commission anticipated that if a person meets its proposed test, the person would also
satisfy the requirements of the existing test, based on the criteria in R v Pritchard (1836) 173 ER 135.
This is because the common law criteria set a higher threshold for unfitness to stand trial than a test based
on decision-making ability: Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation
Paper No 197 (2010) 62.
38 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Issues Paper (2014) 11.
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· a ‘diagnostic threshold’ would be unlikely to assist in maintaining the threshold
of unfitness at a suitable level.39
7.31 In  contrast,  the  NSW Law Reform Commission  (NSWLRC)  recommended,  in
2013, that the common law criteria for unfitness to stand trial40 should not be
fundamentally changed. In response to stakeholder concerns, it recommended that the
standards simply be updated and incorporated into statute,41 as in most Australian
jurisdictions.42
7.32 However,  the  NSWLRC recommended  that  the  test  for  unfitness  to  stand  trial
should expressly refer to a person’s ability to use information as part of a ‘rational’
decision-making process.43 While the criminal justice system rightly places weight on
‘the right of defendants to make their own decisions (even if those decisions might
appear misguided to an impartial observer)’, the NSWLRC said that defendants cannot
be said to be effectively participating in a trial if they are unable to make rational
decisions, for example ‘because they cannot distinguish between delusion and
reality’.44
7.33 The NSWLRC also recommended that the test for unfitness to stand trial should
include reference to the ‘overarching principle’ that the defendant must be able to have
a fair trial. This was said to be the ‘touchstone’ for assessing whether or not the
defendant’s degree of incapacity is sufficient to do those things required by the test.45
7.34 This approach could be a significant step away from the common law because
the defendant would not necessarily be required to be meet all the criteria in the test:
If the defendant was unable, for example, to give evidence effectively, he or she might
still be fit for trial if it is possible for a fair trial to be held. Conversely, the list of
considerations need not be comprehensive. If the court considers that the defendant
lacks an essential capacity that is not listed in the statutory considerations, and cannot
be afforded a fair trial, then the defendant can be found unfit.46
Assistance and support
7.35 Existing tests of unfitness to stand trial do not consider the possible role of
assistance and support for defendants.
7.36 The Law Commission proposed that decision-making capacity should be
assessed with a view to ascertaining whether a defendant could stand trial ‘with the
39 Ibid 12–14.
40 As represented by the R v Presser standards.
41 In the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW).
42 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in
the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138 (2013) xv–xvi.
43 In the UK, the Law Commission considered, but rejected, the idea that it should be required that any
decision made by the defendant be rational: Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead,
Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) Proposal 2.
44 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in
the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138 (2013) 31.
45 Ibid xvi.
46 Ibid 26.
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assistance of special measures and where any other reasonable adjustments have been
made’.47 It explained:
The inclusion of the consideration of special measures as part of the test will serve to
further the development of special measures on a case by case basis and ensure that
the courts adapt to the needs of a particular defendant.48
7.37 The Law Commission observed that, if the possibility of having ‘special
measures’ to assist the defendant, were to be a factor in a reformed test of unfitness,
this would ‘presumably increase the prospects of some defendants who would currently
be found unfit to plead being able to stand trial’.49
7.38 In its Issues Paper, the Law Commission stated that the ‘incorporation of special
measures into the legal test received significant support from legal practitioners,
clinicians and representative groups’.50
7.39 In this context, issues concerning the availability and resourcing of support were
highlighted. The Law Commission asked whether it would be ‘desirable and
practicable for defendants to have a statutory entitlement to the support of a registered
intermediary’ for the proceedings, where the court is of the view that such assistance is
necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.51
7.40 The NSWLRC made a similar recommendation about the role of modifications
to trial processes in assessing unfitness. It recommended that, in determining whether a
person is unfit for trial, the matters that a court must consider should include:
(a)  whether modifications to the trial process can be made or assistance provided to
facilitate the person’s understanding and effective participation
(b)  the likely length and complexity of the trial, and
(c)  whether the person is legally represented.52
Reform of the test
Recommendation 7–1 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to
provide that a person cannot stand trial if the person cannot be supported to:
(a) understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to
make in the course of the proceedings;
(b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make decisions in the
course of the proceedings;
47 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010)
Provisional Proposal 5.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid 88.
50 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Issues Paper (2014) 25.
51 Ibid 29.
52 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in
the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138 (2013) rec 2.2.
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(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions;
or
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way.
7.41 The common law test of unfitness to stand trial is based primarily on a person’s
intellectual ability to understand specific aspects of the legal proceedings. The Law
Commission described the existing criteria as placing ‘emphasis on an ability to
understand rather than the ability to function or to do something (in other words,
mental capacity)’. At common law, fitness to stand trial is
a global concept which can be said to cover a general state, and is not context-specific
or time-specific. It has tended to be construed as being about the accused’s cognitive
ability which is, to all intents and purposes, seen in the abstract.53
7.42 This comes close to requiring that a person must be considered as lacking
capacity on the basis of having an (intellectual) disability—and is therefore
inconsistent with the approach taken by the CRPD and the National Decision-Making
Principles. Rather, any test for eligibility to stand trial should be based on a person’s
decision-making ability in the context of the particular criminal proceedings which he
or she faces—that is, a functional approach.
7.43 It is not practicable to completely do away with functional tests of ability that
have consequences for participation in some legal processes. Even where a person has
clearly expressed a will and preference to be subject to a criminal trial, the integrity of
the trial (and, arguably, the criminal law itself) would be prejudiced if the person does
not have the ability to understand and participate in a meaningful way.
7.44 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed a test similar to that originally
suggested by the Law Commission. The Law Commission’s formulation was based on
provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), which defines capacity for the
purposes of decisions about a person’s personal welfare, property and financial affairs
and the appointment of substitute decision-makers.54
7.45 Interestingly, similar conclusions about the primary importance of decision-
making ability in this context have been reached by other law reform bodies that have
considered the issues—even though these bodies were not expressly informed by the
approach reflected in art 12 of the CRPD. The focus of these inquiries was more on the
need to ensure fair trials55 and the effective participation of defendants.56
53 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 38.
54 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 3.
55 See, eg, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health
Impairments in the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138
(2013) 25–26.
56 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to
Be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 59.
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7.46 The VLRC explained the way in which such a new test might operate in practice
for people with disability:57
The new test would require an accused person to:
· Understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make
in the course of the trial—for example, an accused person with an acquired
brain injury who has very low cognitive ability and is unable to understand new
or unfamiliar information would be unfit to stand trial.
· Retain that information—for example, someone with Attention-Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) who cannot focus and finds it almost
impossible to remember any new information given to them would be unfit to
stand trial.
· Use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process—for
example, an accused person who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia who has a
factual understanding of the charge, but indicates to the court that he wants to
plead guilty because he sees no point in pleading not guilty as everyone in court
is part of a conspiracy, would be unfit to stand trial.
· Communicate their decisions—for example, an accused person with autism who
is able to understand information and process it but does not acknowledge
others, may be unfit to stand trial.58
7.47 The general approach proposed by the ALRC received support from some
stakeholders,59 subject to reservations. The Law Council of Australia (Law Council),
for example, agreed with the ALRC’s proposed functional test, but considered that the
term ‘rationally’ should be included to condition its elements. This was seen as
necessary to cover the situation where, for example, a person is able to understand
information and use it in a decision-making process, but the process itself is not
rational. Arguably, some level of rationality is implicit in the ideas of understanding,
using and weighing information. However, referring expressly to the concept of
rationality may lead to a person’s decision-making ability being assessed on its likely
outcome, which would be inconsistent with the National Decision-Making Principles.
7.48 The Queensland Law Society submitted that the ‘basic definition of capacity
should remain, with any evidence of diagnosis and the impact on a person’s
understanding, memory and reasoning process to be used as evidence’.60
7.49 A formulation based on decision-making ability may operate too widely because
it may have the potential to include defendants who have ‘no recognised mental illness
but are unable to use or weigh information as part of a decision-making process, for
57 Referring to the similar criteria in the Law Commission’s provisional proposal: Law Commission of
England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 54.
58 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 60.
59 Law Council of Australia, Submission 142;  NACLC  and  PWDA, Submission 134; KinCare Services,
Submission 112; National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100; Offices of the
Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
60 Qld Law Society, Submission 103.
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example, because of stress, overwhelming tiredness or poor education or social
background’.61
7.50 For this reason, some commentators have suggested that the test should include
some threshold requirement that, for example, impaired decision-making ability is due
to ‘mental or physical illness, whether temporary or permanent’,62 or some clinically
recognised condition.63
7.51 In  the  Discussion  Paper,  the  ALRC  asked  what  other  elements  should  be
included in any new test of eligibility to stand trial—including, whether there should be
some threshold requirement that unfitness be due to some clinically-recognised mental
impairment.64
7.52 Dr Fleur Beaupert, Dr Piers Gooding and Linda Steele submitted that, if legal
tests are based on decision-making ability (which they opposed) there should be no
threshold requirement. Such an approach would ‘negatively impact on the realisation
of legal capacity because it is not focused on the needs, wishes and views of the
individual’. Rather, determinations of eligibility to stand trial
will inevitably hinge on assessments carried out by clinicians such as psychologists,
psychiatrists and neuropsychologists—similar to existing approaches to assessing a
person’s capacity and risk level for the purposes of mental health and guardianship
laws.65
7.53 An obvious problem with a threshold based on any concept of mental
impairment is that some people who are clearly unsuitable to stand trial would not be
captured by the test—for example, a person with a physical illness may not be able to
follow the course of a trial, but would not necessarily have a definable mental
impairment—although there are processes to postpone trials on compassionate
grounds.
7.54 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that the new test of eligibility to
stand trial be implemented through rules of court. However, because rules of court
generally reflect, and are consistent with, the common law, legislation seems necessary
to implement this change.
61 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 61.
62 Helen Howard, ‘Unfitness to Plead and the Vulnerable Defendant: An Examination of the Law
Commission’s Proposals for a New Capacity Test’ (2011) 75 Journal of Criminal Law 194, 201–202
cited in Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to
Be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 61.
63 Scottish Law Commission, Insanity and Diminished Responsibility, Discussion Paper No 122 (2003) 49.
64 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 7–1.
65 F Beaupert, P Gooding and L Steele, Submission 123. However, clinicians might play a role in assessing
a person’s support needs and providing support to people with disabilities provided the provision of
support is not ‘narrowly focused around medical-therapeutic interventions’ and includes ‘measures that
address social, economic, cultural and systemic barriers to the exercise of legal capacity’. Other
stakeholders also expressed concern about any undue emphasis on clinical reports Vicdeaf, Submission
125. KinCare submitted that unfitness should ‘be determined through assessment of mental (cognitive)
impairment’: eg KinCare Services, Submission 112.
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The role of support
7.55 The National Association of Community Legal Centres and People with
Disability Australia (NACLC and PWDA) submitted that the focus of the test should
be on the adequacy of the supports available to the individual to enable them to express
their will and preference and, as a result, participate in the legal process.66
7.56 The wording of the ALRC’s recommendation concerning the test for eligibility
to stand trial, as set out above, now explicitly incorporates the concept of support. It is
desirable, as much as possible, to ‘shift the emphasis to an assessment of the supports
that are available to a person, rather than an assessment of the person’67—but does not
remove a threshold functional requirement.
7.57 This aspect of the recommendation reflects the National Decision-Making
Principles in that any assessment of decision-making ability should be considered in
the context of available support.
7.58 At present, the test for unfitness does not allow for this. The fact that a person
may be able to be supported in understanding trial processes, and making decisions
about, and participating in, the proceedings cannot affect their fitness to stand trial.
From one perspective:
the introduction of support measures to potentially increase the level of fitness of an
accused person is desirable… the provision of support and education about court
processes to an accused person who falls ‘just short’ of meeting the test for fitness is a
humane option that may ultimately enable them to participate fully in their trial.68
7.59 In practice, resources may be too limited to support a defendant who needs
decision-making support through a criminal trial.
7.60 If the available support is taken into account in determining eligibility to stand
trial, in some circumstances, this may be seen as working against equality before the
law. That is, a person with support may be able to stand trial but another, with similar
ability but without support, may not be tried.69 The  OPA  (SA  and  Vic),  while
supporting the ALRC’s proposal, anticipated that ‘inequities will arise in relation to the
quality of support provided and potentially inconsistent application’ of determinations
about decision-making ability. The Law Council also agreed with the proposal in
principle, but expressed concerns that taking into account the ‘support available to a
person who would otherwise be determined unfit to stand trial may water down the test
for unfitness’ and the practical difficulties associated with avoiding undue influence.70
7.61 Stakeholders also recognised that, while a new test based on decision-making
ability would be fairer and more principled than the existing ‘status-based’ test, it may
66 NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134.
67 Ibid.
68 Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health, Submission No 19 to Victorian Law Reform Commission,
Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1990 (Vic), 2013.
69 Of course, as discussed below, it may or may not be in the interests of the defendant to be found unfit to
stand trial.
70 Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
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be even more difficult to apply in practice—for example, experts may need to advise
on a defendant’s decision-making ability in the light of the nature and complexity of
the particular decisions the defendant is likely to face.
7.62 The ALRC recognises that the new test of eligibility to stand trial raises many
issues that may need to be resolved before implementation, including in relation to the
process for determining eligibility.
7.63 As discussed below, if the matter is being heard in a state or territory court, the
issue would be determined in accordance with the procedures applicable under state or
territory law.71 The VLRC final report may provide leads for law reform in this area, as
it considered how the process for determining unfitness to stand trial can be
improved.72 The Law Commission of England and Wales is also continuing to examine
what evidential requirements might form part of assessing unfitness to stand trial,
including in relation to expert medical advice.73
7.64 The recommended test would introduce into the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) a new
test of when a person is not able to stand trial. The test is consistent with the National
Decision-Making Principles and associated Guidelines. There seems no need to retain
the language of ‘fitness’ or ‘unfitness’, which could be considered pejorative in the
current context. The question is simply whether or not a person can be required, or is
entitled, to stand trial for a criminal offence.
7.65 Other provisions of the Crimes Act dealing with unfitness to stand trial should
also be reviewed for consistency with the new test of eligibility to stand trial. For
example, s 20BB sets out procedures for dealing with persons who have been found
unfit to be tried, but likely to become fit within 12 months. These provisions will also
need amendment to ensure that eligibility to stand trial can be re-assessed if forms of
support become available that may enable the person to meet the test.
Modelling in Commonwealth law
7.66 The  ALRC  recommends  that  the  reformed  test  of  unfitness  to  stand  trial  be
modelled in Commonwealth law through amendments to the existing legislative
provisions in the Crimes Act, which set out the processes for finding federal offenders
unfit to be tried, and the consequences of such a finding.74
7.67 The ALRC recognises that, in practice, such a provision would have limited
application. First, most criminal prosecutions occurring in Australia fall within the
responsibilities of the states and territories. Secondly, most federal offenders are tried
in state and territory courts.75
71 Kesavarajah v R (1994) 181 CLR 230.
72 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be
Tried) Act 1997, Report 28 (2014).
73 Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Issues Paper (2014) 30–36.
74 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 20B–20BI.
75 The use of state courts is made possible by ss 71 and 77(iii) of the Australian Constitution. The judicial
power of the Commonwealth is vested in the High Court, in such other federal courts as the Parliament of
Australia creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction: Australian Constitution
s 71. Parliament may make laws investing state courts with federal jurisdiction: Ibid s 77(iii).
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7.68 The Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) invests state courts with federal jurisdiction in
both civil and criminal matters, subject to certain limitations and exceptions.76 The Act
makes specific provision for the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction by both state
and territory courts.77 Importantly, under the Act, state and territory laws, including
those relating to ‘procedure, evidence and the competency of witnesses’, are applied to
federal prosecutions in state and territory courts.78
7.69 Essentially this means that, even if the Crimes Act were amended to introduce a
new test of eligibility to stand trial, if the matter is being heard in a state or territory
court, the issue of unfitness would still be determined in accordance with the
procedures applicable under state or territory law.79
7.70 The ALRC nevertheless considers that modelling a new approach to eligibility
to stand trial in Commonwealth law will provide an opportunity to guide law reform at
state and territory level and reflect a new approach to determining decision-making
ability in criminal justice settings.
Limits on detention
Recommendation 7–2 State and territory laws governing the
consequences of a determination that a person is ineligible to stand trial should
provide for:
(a)  limits on the period of detention that can be imposed; and
(b)  regular periodic review of detention orders.
7.71 A wide range of concerns have been raised about the processes and outcomes of
unfitness determinations. These include concerns about the availability or otherwise of
appropriate accommodation, support services, and diversion from the criminal justice
system.
7.72 For example, Queensland Advocacy Incorporated expressed a range of concerns
about the scheme for diverting offenders to the Mental Health Court under the Mental
Health Act 2000 (Qld).80 Many of these issues do not directly concern decision-making
or were too specific to a particular jurisdiction to be considered in this Inquiry.81
7.73 Some outcomes of unfitness to stand trial rules have generated significant public
concern, including, for example, in the cases of Marlon Noble and Rosie Anne
76 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39(2).
77 Ibid s 68(2).
78 Ibid ss 68(1), 79.
79 Kesavarajah v R (1994) 181 CLR 230.
80 Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Submission 45.
81 Eg, concerns that Queensland  law makes no provision for unfitness to stand trial in relation to summary
offences: Qld Law Society, Submission 53.
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Fulton.82 These concerns have led the AHRC to call for a national audit of people held
in prison after being found unfit to stand trial.83
7.74 The Safeguards Guidelines recommended by the ALRC state that decisions,
arrangements and interventions in relation to people who need decision-making
support should be least restrictive of the person’s human rights; subject to mechanisms
of appeal; and subject to monitoring and review. Some aspects of the limits on
detention, and review of detention orders in relation to persons found unfit to stand trial
are discussed below.
7.75 The consequences of a determination that a federal offender is unfit are set out
in the Crimes Act.84 These  provisions  apply  to  federal  offenders  being  dealt  with  by
state or territory courts—despite the operation of the Judiciary Act discussed above. In
relation to proceedings for federal offences, the provisions of state or territory law give
way to provisions of the Crimes Act to the extent of any inconsistency.85 While state or
territory law regulates the mode of determination of unfitness to stand trial, the
consequences flowing from the determination will be regulated by Commonwealth
law.86
7.76 Under the Crimes Act, where the issue of unfitness is raised on commitment for
trial, the proceedings must be referred to the court to which the proceedings would
have been referred had the defendant been committed for trial. If that court finds the
defendant unfit to be tried, it must determine whether a prima facie case exists. Where
no prima facie case exists, the person must be discharged.87
7.77 If a prima face case exists, the court must dismiss the charge if satisfied that it is
inappropriate to inflict any punishment, or any punishment other than nominal
punishment, having regard to the defendant’s ‘character, antecedents, age, health or
mental condition’, the triviality of the offence and the extent of any mitigating
circumstances.88 Otherwise, the court must determine, after considering medical
82 Marlon Noble was charged in 2001 with sexual assault offences that were never proven. A decade after
he was charged, the allegations were clearly shown to have no substance. Marlon spent most of that
decade in prison, because he was found unfit to stand trial because of his intellectual disability. Rosie
Anne Fulton was held in Kalgoorlie prison for 21 months after being charged with crimes related to a
motor vehicle and being found unfit to stand trial due to her cognitive impairment due to foetal alcohol
syndrome. She was sent to Kalgoorlie prison because no other suitable accommodation was available for
her: Australian Human Rights Commission, Send Rosie Anne Home <www.humanrights.gov.au>. After
public outcry, the WA and NT governments reached an agreement that saw Fulton released into
community care in Alice Springs.
83 Australian Human Rights Commission, Jailed without Conviction: Commissioners Call for Audit
<www.humanrights.gov.au>.
84 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IB div 6.
85 Australian Constitution s 109.
86 R v Ogawa [2011] 2 Qd R 350, [89]–[114]. The Queensland Law Society suggested that consideration be
given to the adoption of state procedures for dealing with defendants charged with indictable
Commonwealth offences, so that consistency of process is achieved: Qld Law Society, Submission 53.
87 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20B(1).
88 Ibid s 20BA(2).
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reports, whether, on the balance of probabilities, the person will become fit to be tried
within 12 months.89
7.78 The court may order a person to be detained in a hospital if they are likely to
become fit to be tried within 12 months. Otherwise the proceedings must resume as
soon as practicable. If the court finds that the defendant is not likely to become fit, it
must determine whether the defendant is ‘suffering from a mental illness, or a mental
condition, for which treatment is available in a hospital’ and, if so, whether he or she
objects to being detained in hospital.90
7.79 The court must order detention in hospital if the person is found to be mentally
ill and does not object to being detained in hospital, or in prison or some other place.
However, this period of detention must not exceed the maximum period of
imprisonment that could have been imposed if the person had been convicted of the
offence charged.91 Further, before that time, the court may order the person’s release
from custody, either unconditionally or subject to conditions lasting not more than
three years, if in the court’s opinion this is more appropriate than continuing
detention.92
7.80 Under the Crimes Act, where a person is found unfit to stand trial, the Attorney-
General of Australia must, at least once every six months, consider whether or not the
person should be released from detention based on medical or other reports.93 The
Attorney-General must not order release unless satisfied that the person is not a threat
or danger either to himself or herself or to the community.94
7.81 These provisions of the Crimes Act were  inserted  in  1989.95 While the ALRC
has no detailed information about how the provisions operate in practice, or the
outcomes they produce for federal offenders who are found unfit to stand trial, the
Crimes Act appears to provide safeguards that do not exist in all state and territory
jurisdictions.
7.82 Some jurisdictions do not provide statutory limits on the period of detention for
those found unfit to stand trial. For example:
· in Western Australia, the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Defendants) Act
1996 (WA), does not place limits on the period of custody orders for persons
detained after being found not mentally fit to stand trial;96
· in the Northern Territory, the Criminal Code (NT) provides that supervision
orders for persons found not fit to stand trial are ‘for an indefinite term’;97 and
89 Ibid s 20BA(4)–(5).
90 Ibid s 20BB(2).
91 Ibid s 20BC(2).
92 Ibid s 20BC(5).
93 Ibid s 20BD.
94 Ibid s 20BE.
95 Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1989 (Cth).
96 Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA) s 19.
97 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) sch 1, s 43ZC.
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· in Victoria, custodial supervision orders are for an indefinite period,98 although
the CMI Act also requires the court to set a ‘nominal term’ for the purposes of
review.99
7.83 Data from Tasmania’s Forensic Tribunal is said to illustrate that, for forensic
patients placed on a mental health order for offences other than murder, the period of
detention under an order is substantially longer than it would have been if they had
been found guilty of the offence.100
7.84 All jurisdictions have review mechanisms for people held in detention because
they are unfit to stand trial, to determine whether a person should be released. Reviews
are conducted by different bodies, including courts, mental health and other tribunals
and, in the case of the Commonwealth, by the Attorney-General.
7.85 However, some jurisdictions may have inadequate review mechanisms for those
detained. For example, in Western Australia, the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired
Defendants) Act 1996 (WA), does not provide for review. Rather, the person is
essentially detained at the ‘Governor’s pleasure’.101
7.86 Regular periodic review of detention orders is also essential. For example, in
Victoria, the CMI Act provides judges with the flexibility to decide how often to
review, or further review, ‘custodial supervision orders’. The VLRC has recommended
that legislation should require regular, automatic review of each custodial supervision
order at an interval of no longer than every two years.102
7.87 Stakeholders said limits should be placed on the period of detention, within the
criminal justice and corrective services systems, of people found unfit to stand trial. 103
The Illawarra Forum stated that, ‘if a person is determined unfit to stand trial, they
should not be incarcerated at all without due process’.104
7.88 Most jurisdictions do provide ‘special hearings’ as a means for determining the
criminal responsibility of a person who has been found unfit to stand trial.105 The
Commonwealth Crimes Act provides that, where there has been a preliminary finding
that  a  person  is  unfit  to  be  tried,106 the court must determine whether there has been
established a prima facie case that the person committed the offence concerned. 107
98 Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) s 27.
99 Ibid s 28. The nominal terms are generally equivalent to the maximum term of imprisonment available for
the offence.
100  Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71.
101 Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA) s 35.
102  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 431.
103  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134; People with Disabilities WA and Centre for Human Rights
Education, Submission 133; Illawarra Forum, Submission 124; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and
Vic), Submission 95.
104  Illawarra Forum, Submission 124.
105 Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) s 15.
106  For a federal offence, on indictment.
107 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20B.
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Where the court determines that there is a prima facie case, the court must either
dismiss the charge or finally determine the person’s fitness within 12 months.108
7.89 People with Disabilities WA and the Centre for Human Rights Education
expressed concern that ‘significant numbers of Aboriginal people with cognitive
impairment are indefinitely incarcerated in prisons in some Australian states, including
WA’.109 It was suggested that community based alternatives to detention should be
considered as far as possible.110
7.90 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that state and territory laws
governing the consequences of a determination that a person is unfit to stand trial
should provide for limits on the period of detention and for regular periodic review of
detention orders.111 The Law Council suggested that the period of detention should be
stated as not exceeding ‘the period for which a court determines the individual would
have been detained if convicted, bearing in mind all the circumstances which the court
would have taken into account in sentencing the individual’.112
7.91 The  ALRC  agrees  that  limits  on  the  period  of  detention  should  be  set  by
reference to the period of imprisonment likely to have been imposed, if the person had
been convicted of the offence charged. If they are a threat or danger to themselves or
the public at that time, they should be the responsibility of mental health authorities,
not the criminal justice system.113 The framework for detention and supervision orders
should be flexible enough to ensure that people transition out of the criminal justice
system, in a way consistent with principles of community protection and least
restriction of rights.
Conducting civil litigation
7.92 At common law, the capacity test for a person to participate in civil proceedings
is the same as the test for a person to enter into legal transactions.114 There  is  a
presumption of capacity ‘unless and until the contrary is proved’.115
108  Ibid s 20BA.
109  PWDA/CHRE observed that the Declared Places (Mentally Impaired Accused) Bill 2013 (WA), which
remains before the WA Parliament, provides for the establishment of ‘declared places’ other than prison
where people found unfit to plead can be detained: People with Disabilities WA and Centre for Human
Rights Education, Submission 133.
110  Ibid. As recommended in a 2014 report by the WA Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services:
‘Mentally Impaired Accused on “Custody Orders”: Not Guilty, but Incarcerated Indefinitely’
(Government of Western Australia, Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services, 2014).
111  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposal 7–3.
112  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
113  In this context, the Crimes Act requires state or territory mental health authorities to be notified when a
person is due to be released because the period of that person’s detention has ended: Crimes Act 1914
(Cth) s 20BH.
114 Goddard Elliot v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87, [555].
115 L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2006) 233 ALR 432, [26].
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7.93 The focus of the test is on the capacity of the person to understand they have a
legal problem, to seek legal assistance about the problem, to give clear instructions to
their lawyers and to understand and act on the advice which they are given.116
7.94 The test is issue-specific. That is, capacity must be considered in relation to the
particular proceedings and their nature and complexity. This contrasts with the test of
unfitness to stand trial in criminal law.
The  civil  test  takes  a  functional  approach  to  capacity  in  that  it  assesses  a  person’s
ability to make a particular decision at a particular moment in time, and not a person’s
ability to make decisions more generally.117
7.95 The  test  is  able  to  take  into  account  the  level  of  legal  representation.  In
particular, the level of capacity required to be a litigant in person is higher than where
the person is required to instruct a lawyer because a litigant in person has to manage
court proceedings in an unfamiliar and stressful situation. Therefore, ‘a person who
does not have the mental capacity to represent themselves may have sufficient capacity
to be able to give instructions to a lawyer to represent them’.118
Litigation representatives
Recommendation 7–3 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth),
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999
(Cth) should provide that a person needs a litigation representative if the person
cannot be supported to:
(a) understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to
make in conducting proceedings, including in giving instructions to their
legal practitioner;
(b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make those decisions;
(c) use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process; or
(d) communicate the decisions in some way.
7.96 Where a person does not have capacity to conduct litigation, a litigation
representative may be appointed. A litigation representative may also be known as a
litigation guardian, case guardian, guardian ad litem, next friend, tutor or special
representative.119 The ALRC chose to use the term ‘litigation representative’, which is
also used by the Federal Court, because the current duties of people acting in this role
are consistent with the use of the term ‘representative’ elsewhere in this Report—
notably, in relation to ‘supporters’ and ‘representatives’ in Chapter 4.
116 Goddard Elliot v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87, [557].
117  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 52.
118 Goddard Elliot v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87, [558].
119   The  term  ‘litigation  guardian’  is  used  in  the  rules  of  High  Court  and  Federal  Circuit  Court,  ‘litigation
representative’ in the Federal Court and ‘case guardian’ in the Family Court.
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7.97 In broad terms, a litigation representative acts in the place of the person and is
responsible for the conduct of the proceedings.120 The circumstances in which a
litigation representative must be appointed are established at common law. The rules of
federal courts make express provision for litigation representatives. Under these rules,
a person may be assessed as needing a litigation representative if the person:
· is ‘under disability’ (High Court);121
· is ‘under a legal incapacity’ because of being a ‘mentally disabled person’ and
‘not capable of managing the person’s own affairs in a proceeding’ (Federal
Court);122
· is ‘with a disability’ and ‘does not understand the nature or possible
consequences of the case; or is not capable of adequately conducting, or giving
adequate instruction for the conduct of, the case’ (Family Court);123
· ‘does not understand the nature and possible consequences of the proceeding or
is not capable of adequately conducting, or giving adequate instruction for the
conduct of, the proceeding’ (Federal Circuit Court).124
7.98 The rules of federal courts make provision for the appointment, removal and
conduct of litigation representatives. In general, a litigation representative is appointed
by the court, on the application of a party or an interested person, such as a parent or
guardian or, sometimes, the person’s own lawyer.
7.99 Litigation representatives can also be removed or substituted by the court, on the
application of a party or on its own motion. There are no other review mechanisms for
the conduct of a litigation representative, except to the extent that the representative’s
conduct may be reviewed under state and territory guardianship laws, if the
representative is also a guardian or administrator.
7.100 The ALRC recommends that—as with the new test in relation to criminal
proceedings—the law concerning the appointment of litigation representatives should
be consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and associated Guidelines.
7.101 Leaving aside the question of support, there is little difference between this
recommendation and the position that applies at common law in determining whether a
person has capacity to conduct civil litigation.125
7.102 However, the way in which some federal court rules are drafted appears
inappropriate and does not fit with contemporary conceptualisations of capacity and
120  The Law Council supported this ‘harmonisation of terminology’: Law Council of Australia, Submission
142.
121 High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 20.08.
122 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.61, Dictionary.
123 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 6.08, Dictionary.
124 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 11.08.
125  The Law Commission of England and Wales has made this point in relation to the similarity between the
capacity test under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) and that which applies at common law: Law
Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 51.
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disability. In particular, some rules seem to adopt elements of a ‘status-based’ approach
that is inconsistent with the CRPD, and references to incapacity and disability should
be removed. The rules should reflect a focus on a person’s ability to conduct litigation
in the particular proceedings, rather than whether they have a ‘disability’.
7.103 The Support Guidelines recognise that ability should be assessed by reference
to the decision to be made, and that ability may evolve or fluctuate over time.
Consistently, orders appointing a litigation representative may be varied—for example,
where the court has evidence that a person originally assessed as needing a
representative due to mental illness is found to have recovered sufficiently to be able to
give instructions.126
7.104 Some stakeholders expressed concern at the similar test proposed in the
Discussion Paper. The Federal Court of Australia observed that ‘greater participation in
proceedings before the Court by litigants with impaired decision-making ability would
impose an additional burden on the Court’. The Court stated that:
This could quickly become unmanageable, particularly in an environment of increased
participation of self-represented litigants generally, diminishing resources and
increasing workload and complexity of litigation.127
7.105 The Law Council submitted that the proposed test focused ‘too narrowly on the
disabled person’s direct engagement with the legal process, and does not address the
capability or otherwise of the disabled person to instruct legal practitioners’.128 It is
implicit that the decisions a person ‘will have to make in the course of the proceedings’
would include decisions about how to instruct legal practitioners, the recommendation
now expressly incorporates this element.
7.106 Other stakeholders supported reform along the lines proposed. Justice Connect
and Seniors Rights Victoria (Justice Connect), for example, stated that they supported a
‘move away from a status based approach to incapacity which is inconsistent with the
CRPD towards a decision specific approach’. However, they counselled that it is
important to retain an objective element in the test—that is, it should be necessary for
there to be ‘some sort of cognitive or mental impairment’ because otherwise
there is a very real risk that the appointment of a substitute decision maker will be
made  in  circumstances  where  a  person  is  perceived  to  be  making  risky  or  unwise
decisions. It can be difficult to divorce the ‘quality’ of a decision from the process of
making the decision, which can have the effect of denying an older person the dignity
of risk. This is particularly relevant for older people who receive formal care. In our
experience, service providers are often concerned about breaching their duty of care
owed to the older person when the older person makes decisions that may be deemed
unsafe or unwise.129
126  Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Submission 140.
127  Federal Court of Australia, Submission 138.
128  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142. Noting that the test for assessing a person’s need for a
litigation representative, in the rules of the Family Court and the Federal Circuit Court, refers to a
person’s ability to ‘conduct’ the proceeding, and ‘give adequate instruction for the conduct’ of the
proceeding.
129  Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
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7.107 The Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) considered that the requirement for
evidence of cognitive impairment is an important safeguard, because evidence of a
causal link between decision-making ability and some form of cognitive impairment is
‘important to protect the right of individuals with capacity to make unwise or risky
decisions’.130 The ALRC is not convinced that such a threshold is desirable and is
concerned that it would leave open a return to status-based approaches to decision-
making ability.
7.108 The Federal Circuit Court of Australia suggested that an understanding of the
‘possible consequences’ of the proceedings should be included in the test  131 but, in the
ALRC’s view, this is encompassed adequately by the reference to using or weighing
information ‘as part of a decision-making process’.
The role of support
7.109 A more significant change than the new test of decision-making ability is to
require courts to consider the available decision-making support in determining
whether a person needs a litigation representative. The wording of the ALRC’s
recommendation concerning the test for eligibility to stand trial now explicitly
incorporates the concept of support.
7.110 Existing law does not expressly enable the availability of support to be taken
into account in assessing whether a litigation representative should be appointed.
However,  in  some  ways  this  concept  can  be  seen  as  a  manifestation  of  the  current
common law approach of assessing capacity in the context of the particular transaction
or proceedings.132
7.111 Implementation of this recommendation would more likely than not result in
more people being involved in civil litigation without having a litigation representative
formally appointed—assuming support is available.
7.112 The Law Council’s Family Law Section advised that the requirement to consider
available support is ‘likely to result in more protracted and costly litigation for all
parties, particularly in family law matters’. The Law Council expressed concern that
‘limited court resourcing, chronic underfunding of legal aid and rising costs of
litigation present serious practical barriers to the implementation’ of the
recommendation.133
7.113 An overarching purpose of federal civil practice and procedure provisions is to
facilitate the just resolution of disputes, according to law, and ‘as quickly,
inexpensively and efficiently as possible’.134 From some perspectives this reform may
be seen as making the resolution of some disputes less ‘efficient’.
130  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129.
131  Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Submission 140.
132  In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that the new test for the appointment of a litigation
representative be implemented through rules of court. Again, however, because rules of court generally
reflect and are consistent with the common law, legislation seems necessary to implement this change.
133  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
134 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M.
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7.114 Arguably, lawyers and courts need to know from whom they should take
instructions and applications—that is, for the interests of a party to be represented by
one voice. Facilitating and ensuring the participation of litigants with impaired
decision-making ability may be considered too complex for lawyers and courts to
manage. For example, the Federal Circuit Court observed that, in courts where there is
an emphasis on negotiation and the use of alternative dispute resolution,
representatives of other parties may have difficulty in dealing with a person who is
unable to understand the nature and possible consequences of the proceeding or any
offer of compromise that might be had.135
7.115 Another relevant factor is that, under an adversarial system, courts are not easily
able to facilitate the participation of persons with impaired decision-making ability in
legal proceedings. In this context, there are parallels with the well-documented
problems faced by unrepresented litigants in civil justice settings; and the challenges
for courts in dealing with such litigants.136
7.116 In the ALRC’s view, concerns about efficiency are outweighed by the need to
promote the dignity, equality, autonomy, inclusion and participation of all people
involved in civil proceedings. As discussed below, additional resources may be needed
to enable supported decision-making to operate.
The role of litigation representatives
Recommendation 7–4 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth),
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999
(Cth) should provide that litigation representatives must:
(a) support the person represented to express their will and preferences in
making decisions;
(b) where it is not possible to determine the will and preferences of the
person, determine what the person would likely want based on all the
information available;
(c) where (a) and (b) are not possible, consider the person’s human rights
relevant to the situation; and
(d) act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural
wellbeing of the person represented.
Recommendation 7–5 Federal courts should develop practice notes
explaining the duties that litigation representatives have to the person they
represent and to the court.
135  Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Submission 140.
136  See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission,  Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice
System, Report No 89 (2000) [5.148]–[5.157]; ‘Access to Justice Arrangements’ (Draft Report,
Productivity Commission, 2014) ch 14.
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7.117 Under federal court rules, a person who is found to need a litigation
representative may only conduct proceedings through that representative. Relevant
rules of court provide as follows:
· ‘A person under disability shall commence or defend a proceeding by litigation
guardian’ (High Court);137
· ‘A person under a legal incapacity may start, or defend, a proceeding only by the
person’s litigation representative’ (Federal Court);138
· ‘A person with a disability may start, continue, respond to, or seek to intervene
in, a case only by a case guardian’ (Family Court);139
· ‘A person who needs a litigation guardian may start, continue, respond to or
seek to be included as a party to a proceeding only by his or her litigation
guardian’ (Federal Circuit Court).140
7.118 There is no obligation under common law or court rules for a litigation
representative to make decisions that reflect the will, preferences and rights of the
person represented. Rather, at common law, a litigation representative has a ‘duty to
see that every proper and legitimate step for that person’s representation is taken’141—
which seems akin to a ‘best interests’ test.
7.119 At present, a litigation representative has no obligation to consult or facilitate
the participation of the person represented, except to the extent that such duties may be
imposed by state or territory guardianship legislation (if the person is also a guardian or
administrator).
7.120 The  Hon  Chief  Justice  Diana  Bryant  AO  of  the  Family  Court  of  Australia
observed that the role of a litigation representative has been described as
an invidious one in the sense that the person is taking on the decision-making
responsibilities of the litigant whilst having to ensure that their own interests do not
conflict with those of the litigant. That means that the case guardian has to make
decisions which are often unpalatable to the individual litigant.142
7.121 Clearly, this is a departure from the preferred will and preferences approach to
supported decision-making recommended by the ALRC. Further, case law makes it
clear that the role of a litigation representative is not only to ‘protect’ the person
represented. The Full Court of the Federal Court has held that the purpose of the power
to appoint a litigation representative is ‘to protect plaintiffs and defendants who would
otherwise be at a disadvantage, as well as to protect the processes of the court’.143
137 High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 21.08.1.
138 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.61.
139 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 11.09.
140 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 6.08.
141 Read v Read [1944] SASR 26, 28.
142  Quoting Anton & Malitsa [2009] FamCA 623, [2]: D Bryant, Submission 22 (emphasis added).
143 L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2006) 233 ALR 432, [25].
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7.122 Case law also emphasises concerns about protecting the rights of the other
parties in the litigation. It has been said that requiring a litigation representative to
conduct litigation helps to ensure, in some cases, that ‘parties to litigation are not
pestered by other parties who should be to some extent restrained’ and that a
‘defendant is entitled to expect that he will not be required to defend proceedings
brought against him by a person of unsound mind acting without a next friend’.144
7.123 In the ALRC’s view, litigation representatives should be required to act,  so far
as is practicable, in accordance with the National Decision-Making Principles.145 To
this end, legislation should provide that, in making decisions, litigation representatives
have a duty to consider the will, preferences and rights of the person represented; and
to promote their personal, social and financial wellbeing.
7.124 A number of stakeholders expressly supported the ALRC’s proposal concerning
the duties of litigation representatives.146 NACLC  and  PWDA  observed  that  the
proposal would work to encourage supported decision-making and the shift from ‘best
interests’ to ‘will, preferences and rights’ decision-making. The Law Council
recognised that the duties promote the optimal participation of represented persons in
litigation, but expressed concern that additional duties and responsibilities may act as a
disincentive to potential litigation representatives.147
7.125 The Federal Circuit Court observed that, in the context of parenting matters,
where  the  best  interests  of  the  child  are  the  paramount  consideration,  ‘it  places  a
considerable burden on the litigation guardian should the wishes of the litigant be
clearly contrary’ to those best interests.148
7.126 The Law Council agreed that court practice notes explaining the duties of
litigation representatives would be desirable, because there is ‘a real likelihood of
conflict of interest arising between a lay representative and the person they represent,
particularly where they are related to the person they represent’.149 In particular, in
family law proceedings, the likelihood that a litigation representative is also a family
member of the person represented means that possible conflicts of interest may arise.
7.127 The Federal Court expressed concern that the proposal may not give adequate
weight to the important role litigation representatives have in ‘protecting both other
parties to the litigation and the process of the court’.150 A practice note, as
recommended above, could help address issues concerning litigation representatives’
duties to the court.
144 Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co (Nos 1 and 2) [2003] 1 WLR 1511, [31], [65].
145  As discussed in Ch 3, the Inquiry is only concerned with issues surrounding the decision-making ability
of adults. The ALRC is not, for example, making any recommendations with respect to the duties of case
guardians representing children in Family Court proceedings.
146  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134; Australian Research Network on Law and Ageing, Submission
102.
147  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
148  Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Submission 140.
149  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
150  Federal Court of Australia, Submission 138.
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7.128 The LIV supported clarification of the scope of the role and duties of litigation
representatives, noting the ‘complexity arising from numerous court rules which
establish different requirements and processes’.151 At a roundtable hosted by the LIV,
participants suggested that guidelines should be developed to assist litigation
representatives, with a focus on:
· What the role of litigation guardian involves;
· The extent to which the litigation guardian should actively participate in the
development of the represented person’s case;
· Setting out activities which a litigation guardian may undertake, for example,
obtaining reports to assist with the case or making contact with service
providers;
· The ability of litigation guardians to challenge their lawyer in ways that any
litigant may challenge their lawyer;
· The authority of a litigation guardian to change their lawyer;
· Whether the litigation guardian needs to act through a lawyer when the litigation
guardian is a lawyer; and
· Whether settlement or consent orders need to be approved by the presiding
Court.152
Appointing litigation representatives
7.129 In the ALRC’s view, the availability of support (and supporters and
representatives) is central to the aim of encouraging more supported decision-making.
Litigation representatives play an important role in providing people with the support
necessary to enable them to bring or defend legal proceedings, facilitating their access
to the justice system on an equal basis with others.153
7.130 In practice, problems relating to the appointment and availability of litigation
representatives may be of equal or greater significance than the applicable legal rules
and duties which are the focus of the Inquiry. Submissions raised concerns about:
· the cost and availability of litigation representatives for people who are unable
to instruct legal counsel;154
· the lack of funding to meet the legal costs of case guardians in Family Court
proceedings;155
151  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129. NACLC and PWDA also highlighted the need for courts to
issue practice notes or other guidance material to explain the role and duties of litigation representatives,
including clarifying the duties owed to any client and to the court and providing information on the
activities a litigation representative might undertake, for example, contact with third parties and service
providers: NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134.
152  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129.
153  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134.
154  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.
155  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142; D Bryant, Submission 22.
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· the difficulties in securing the nomination by the Attorney-General of case
guardians in Family Court proceedings where another suitable person is not
available;156 and
· the availability of legal representatives who are independent of guardians
appointed by state tribunals.157
7.131 A related problem mentioned by a number of stakeholders is the potential legal
costs implications for those acting as litigation representatives.158 Exposure to costs
orders may have a deterrent effect on the willingness of individuals and organisations
to act as litigation representatives. NACLC and PWDA observed that while a litigation
representative should be personally liable for the costs of litigation if they do not act
within the scope of their powers, or conduct the litigation appropriately, it is not
otherwise in the interests of justice for litigation representatives to bear personal
liability in this way.159
7.132 Chief Justice Bryant submitted that, given funding and access are acknowledged
to be of considerable importance in ‘advancing autonomy and respect in decision-
making by people with disabilities’, it was ‘unfortunate’ that the opportunity to make
recommendations with respect to the ‘funding and appointment of case guardians was
not seized’ by the ALRC.160
7.133 The Federal Circuit Court stated that it is not equipped to incorporate the
‘participatory model’ of decision-making proposed by the ALRC; and ‘significant
resources’ would need to be made available to overcome existing problems in the
availability of litigation representatives.161
7.134 There are similar concerns about the adequacy of legal aid funding. The Federal
Circuit Court stated that it was ‘disappointing that little weight is given to the
significant access to justice impediments currently being encountered by persons with
impaired decision making ability when seeking to proceed in the courts’. These
difficulties, it said, are ‘compounded in the context of current limitations on the
availability of legal aid with litigants who might otherwise have sufficient capacity to
instruct a lawyer facing additional impediments’.162
156  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142; D Bryant, Submission 22.
157  Queensland Advocacy Incorporated submitted that ‘a conflict of interest arises when a QCAT-appointed
guardian (wrongly, although lawfully, in our view) rejects an adult’s request to litigate a matter simply
because in the Guardian’s view it is not in that person’s best interests’: Queensland Advocacy
Incorporated, Submission 45.
158  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142; NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134; Qld Law Society,
Submission 103. The Queensland Law Society referred to recommendations made by the Queensland
Law Reform Commission, including that the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) be amended to
the effect that a litigation guardian is not liable for any costs in a proceeding unless the costs are incurred
because of the litigation guardian’s negligence or misconduct: Queensland Law Reform Commission, A
Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Report No 67, 2010 rec 28–4.
159  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134.
160  D Bryant, Submission 22.
161  Federal Circuit Court of Australia, Submission 140.
162  Ibid. See also Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
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7.135 In this context, legal aid funding guidelines could facilitate the provision of
litigation representatives, where necessary. The OPA (SA and Vic) also suggested that
courts should be under an obligation to seek support for litigants and that, if funding is
available to provide litigation representatives, as it currently is by application for some
matters, then it should also be extended to the provision of more informal support.163
7.136 Some stakeholders commented on the appointment mechanisms for litigation
representatives. The LIV noted that, at present, litigation representatives are appointed
under court rules for the relevant court in which proceedings take place. Suggestions
have been made that, while courts should retain the ability to appoint litigation
representatives, they should also have the ability to refer that decision to specialist
bodies, such as the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal.164 Better liaison
between courts and guardianship boards and tribunals might enable litigation
representatives to be more readily available.
7.137 National Decision-Making Principle 2 (the Support Principle) provides that
‘Persons who may require support in decision-making must be provided with access to
the support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in decisions that
affect their lives’.
7.138 Problems concerning the availability of appropriate support have been a
recurring theme during the course of the Inquiry—and not just in the context of
litigation representatives. While it was appropriate to draw attention to the valid and
urgent concerns of leading stakeholders, it was not practicable to address these in any
detail within the scope of an inquiry that required a primary focus on laws and legal
frameworks.
Solicitors’ duties
Recommendation 7–6 The Law Council of Australia should consider
whether the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules and Commentary should be
amended to provide for a new exception to solicitors’ duties of confidentiality
where:
(a) the solicitor reasonably believes the client is not capable of giving lawful,
proper and competent instructions; and
(b) the disclosure is for the purpose of: assessing the client’s ability to give
instructions; obtaining assistance for the client in giving instructions;
informing the court about the client’s ability to instruct; or seeking the
appointment of a litigation representative.
163  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
164  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129. Justice Connect observed that the ability of Victorian courts,
pursuant to s 66 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) to refer the issue of whether a
party before the court requires a guardian or administrator appointed means appointments are ‘subject to
appeal and regular review and can be tailored to the requirements of the litigation’: Justice Connect and
Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
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7.139 In some circumstances, the barriers to obtaining support necessary to conduct
litigation, including the appointment of a litigation representative, may include the
duties solicitors owe to their clients.165
7.140 Solicitors have a duty to act in the best interests of their clients,166 and to follow
a client’s lawful, proper and competent instructions.167 A solicitor who has concerns
about his or her client’s decision-making ability may be unwilling to act for a client
who refuses, or is unable to agree to, investigations in relation to their ability or an
application for the appointment of a litigation representative.
7.141 Solicitors must not disclose any information which is confidential to a client and
acquired by the solicitor during the client’s engagement, subject to limited
exceptions—which do not include seeking decision-making support.168 However,  the
duty of solicitors to the court and the administration of justice is paramount. 169 Once
proceedings are commenced, solicitors have a clear and unambiguous duty to raise
with the court any concerns about a client’s capacity to conduct litigation.170
7.142 There is some case law establishing that concerns about a client’s capacity may
ground an exception to duties of confidentiality. In R  v  P, a solicitor had sought the
appointment of a public guardian to have control of his client’s estate and existing
court proceedings, independently of his client’s wishes. The New South Wales Court
of Appeal held that
the solicitor’s concern for the interest  of the client,  so long as it  is  reasonably based
and so long as it results in no greater disclosure of confidential information than
absolutely necessary, can justify the bringing of proceedings and such disclosure of
confidential information as is absolutely necessary for the purpose of such
proceedings.171
7.143 The Court also stated that the bringing of such actions is extremely undesirable
because it involves the solicitor in a conflict between the duty to do what the solicitor
considers in the client’s best interests and the duty to follow the client’s instructions
(and maintain confidentiality).172
165  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) [7.96]. Citing Lauren Adamson, Mary-Anne El-Hage and Julianna
Marshall, ‘Incapacity and the Justice System in Victoria’ (Discussion Paper, Public Interest Law Clearing
House, 2013).
166  Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (2011) r 4.1.1.
167  Ibid r 8.1.
168  Ibid r 9.
169  Ibid r 3.1.
170 Pistorino v Connell & Ors [2012] VSC 438, [6]. ‘Once the matter is raised the court will inquire into the
question ... In the exercise of jurisdiction the court is acting both to protect the interests of the person with
a relevant disability and to protect the court’s own processes’.
171 R  v  P [2001] NSWCA 473, [66]. The Law Society of NSW has stated that R  v  P is ‘an important
qualification to the duty of confidentiality owed by solicitors to clients’: see ‘When a Client’s Capacity Is
in Doubt: A Practical Guide for Solicitors’ (Law Society of NSW, 2009) 9, App E.
172 R  v  P [2001] NSWCA 473, [64]. ‘It is therefore preferable, if possible, if a family or health care
professional makes the application [for the appointment of a substitute decision-maker]’: ‘When a
Client’s Capacity Is in Doubt: A Practical Guide for Solicitors’, above n 171, 9.
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7.144 It has been suggested that, if there is no clear exception to solicitors’ duties of
confidentiality, they may ‘cease acting for disadvantaged clients’ resulting in clients
‘moving from lawyer to lawyer or worse, being left unrepresented’.173
7.145 However, there are also arguments against reform, including on the basis that, if
a statutory exception were to be introduced,
there may be a risk that lawyers would more readily make applications for the
appointment of a substitute decision maker. Applications could potentially be made
without the lawyer first trying to adequately support the client to enable the client to
provide instructions themselves.174
Solicitors’ conduct rules
7.146 One option for reform would be new legal professional rules to make it clear
that solicitors may disclose information when there is reason to believe the client lacks
the ability to instruct. This would at least ensure that disclosure is not a ground for
professional disciplinary action, but would not remove doubts about liability for breach
of confidence or other liability under the general law.
7.147 One model is provided by the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules
for Professional Conduct. These rules provide that,
When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk
of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot
adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities … and, in
appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or
guardian.175
7.148 The Queensland Law Society submitted that such rules could ‘provide greater
clarity for practitioners along with professional certainty of being able to act to protect
client’s interests’.176 Other stakeholders also supported changes to solicitors’ conduct
rules along the lines proposed by the ALRC.177
7.149 Legal Aid NSW, for example, submitted ‘amendments of this type could
provide some much needed clarification and guidance to solicitors trying to assist
clients who have some degree of diminished capacity’.
The adoption of the proposed rule would provide guidance and encourage solicitors to
explore a variety of options prior to making an application to have a substitute
decision maker appointed. In the event that it was necessary for the solicitor to make
173  Adamson, El-Hage and Marshall, above n 165, 3.
174  Ibid.
175  American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, r 1.14.
176  Qld Law Society, Submission 53. See also Andrew Taylor, ‘Representing Clients with Diminished
Capacity’ Law Society Journal (February 2010) 56, 58.
177  Legal Aid NSW, Submission 137; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129; Vicdeaf, Submission 125.
Vicdeaf supported the proposal providing that solicitors are obliged to first ‘utilise all supports available
to provide the client with access and the ability to be involved in decision making, providing instructions
etc’: Ibid.
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such an application, the proposed amendments to the Rule would make clear that such
action is permissible and ethically responsible.178
7.150 The LIV advised that, at least in Victoria, while the courts have confirmed that,
where proceedings are on foot, lawyers may have a duty to ‘raise the issue of the
client’s capacity’,179 the position is not clear when proceedings have not yet
commenced.180 If a person’s lawyer decides to make an application for the appointment
of a substitute decision maker and the client objects, the lawyers may have no choice
but to cease to act—leaving ‘the client vulnerable and without a means of meaningfully
engaging with the justice system’.181
7.151 The LIV suggested amending r 9.2 of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules
to include a further exception based on the ABA rules. That is, so that ‘where the
lawyer reasonably believes the client has diminished capacity and is at risk of
substantial physical, financial or other harm and the lawyer discloses confidential client
information for the purpose of taking reasonably necessary protective action’:
Phrased in this way, the amendment would not prescribe a set approach, but affords
the solicitor the discretion to choose the most appropriate course of action in the
circumstances. The commentary to the Rules should provide direction as to what
protective action might be contemplated.182
7.152 The LIV also submitted that the commentary to r 9.2 should be amended to
provide that: the new exception should only be used as a last resort where no member
of the client’s family is available or willing to act and alternatives have been explored;
and in determining what protective action to take, the solicitor should be guided by the
wishes and values of the client, the client’s best interests, with the goals of least
intrusion, maximizing client capacities and respecting the family and social
connections.183
7.153 Other stakeholders questioned the necessity or desirability of amendments to the
Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules. The Law Council advised that, while its
Professional Ethics Committee would give further consideration to this issue, ‘at the
present time the Law Council would not support weakening the lawyer’s duty of client
confidentiality to disabled clients’.184 The National Mental Health Consumer and Carer
Forum expressed concern that the proposed amendments may undermine the
relationship between client and solicitor and encourage ‘paternalistic second-guessing’,
which is not an ‘appropriate basis for the professional relationship and is not best
practice’.185
7.154 Similarly, the Australian Research Network on Law and Ageing considered that
‘lawyers might too readily raise capacity issues without the requisite consideration of
178  Legal Aid NSW, Submission 137.
179  Citing Pistorino v Connell & Ors [2012] VSC 438.
180  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 129.
181  Ibid.
182  Ibid.
183  Ibid.
184  Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
185  National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
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the supports necessary for a person to exercise their decision making rights’.186 The
Illawarra Forum stated that a new rule ‘could be open to interpretation and possible
abuse and seems in conflict with the National Decision-Making Principles’.187 NACLC
and PWDA cautioned that, in the light of the importance and complexity of this issue,
further consultation and consideration should occur prior to any ALRC
recommendation.
7.155 The ALRC agrees that further, more detailed, consideration of this issue is
required, especially given the reservations expressed by stakeholders. It would be
appropriate for the Law Council to take the matter forward as part of ongoing review of
the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules and associated commentary.
Witnesses
7.156 People with disability face a range of barriers that may limit their ability to
participate as witnesses. In relation to court processes, the barriers include rules on the
competency of witnesses, and difficulties in accessing the necessary support and
assistance in giving evidence. Aspects of these issues are discussed below.
7.157 More generally, the Judicial Commission of NSW has observed:
People with intellectual disabilities are vulnerable to prejudicial assessments of their
competence, reliability and credibility because judicial officers and juries may have
preconceived views regarding a person with an intellectual disability. For example,
they may fail to attach adequate weight to the evidence provided because they doubt
that the person with intellectual disability fully understands their obligation to tell the
truth. In addition, people with an intellectual disability are vulnerable to having their
evidence discredited in court because of behavioural and communication issues
associated with their disability.188
7.158 In 2012, Disability Rights Now reported to the United Nations that, in Australia,
the ‘capacity of people with cognitive impairments to participate as witnesses in court
proceedings is not supported and this has led to serious assault, sexual assault and
abuse crimes going unprosecuted’.189
7.159 In particular, it was said that people with cognitive disability face barriers to
establishing credibility when interacting with the justice system because of the
assumptions ‘constantly made by police and court officers, such as prosecutors, judges
and magistrates’.190 In this Inquiry, the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania)
submitted:
The perception that a person with disability lacks credibility as a witness to or victim
of crime often leads to the decision not to prosecute alleged perpetrators. This
heightens the vulnerability of people with disability to further harm because the
186  Australian Research Network on Law and Ageing, Submission 102.
187  Illawarra Forum, Submission 124.
188  ‘Equality before the Law Bench Book’ (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 2006) [5.3.1].
189  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) [190].
190  Ibid 78.
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perpetrator is aware that charges are less likely to be brought or prosecuted than if the
victim were a person without disability.191
7.160 Similarly, NACLC and PWDA reported that, in ‘the experience of our members
and members’ clients, allegations made by people with disability are not always
investigated, or criminal charges pursued, in part due to perceptions of people with
disability not being competent to give evidence as a witness to criminal proceedings, or
not being considered to be a credible witness’.192
Competence
Recommendation 7–7 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) should be amended
to provide that a person is not ‘competent to give evidence about a fact’ if the
person cannot be supported to:
(a)  understand a question about the fact; or
(b)  give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact.
Recommendation 7–8 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) should be amended
to provide that a person who is ‘competent to give evidence about a fact’ is not
competent to give sworn evidence if the person cannot understand that he or she
is under an obligation to give truthful evidence, and cannot be supported to
understand.
7.161 At  common law,  as  a  general  rule,  all  witnesses  who  are  able  to  comply  with
testimonial formalities—such as the giving of oaths—are competent to give evidence.
There is no other common law test of physical or psychological competence, but a
judge has discretion, in exceptional cases, to refuse to permit a witness to testify where
the evidence is likely to be unreliable. Otherwise, matters of competence are relevant
only to the witness’s credibility and the weight that may be placed on the evidence
given.193
7.162 The AHRC has observed that people with disabilities frequently experience
prejudicial assessments of their competency to give evidence as a witness to criminal
proceedings.194 This is despite research suggesting that, ‘contrary to public perception,
most people with intellectual disabilities are no different from the general population in
191  Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71. The Commissioner also observed that
‘the best way to ensure prosecution of the charge is to ensure that a person with disability receives
adequate support to participate in the process’.
192  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134. See also Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
QDN stated that a ‘common theme from QDN members is the lack of weight given to their evidence or
account of an event, starting at the police and finishing in the court’.
193  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [16.4.280].
194  ‘Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies’, above n 5, 21.
226 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
their ability to give reliable evidence’ (as long as communication techniques are used
that are appropriate for the particular person).195
7.163 In Commonwealth law, the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) deals with the competence
of witnesses. Similar or identical provisions apply in the other jurisdictions that have
adopted the Uniform Evidence Acts.196 Section 13 of the Evidence Act provides:
(1)    A  person  is  not  competent  to  give  evidence  about  a  fact  if,  for  any  reason
(including a mental, intellectual or physical disability):
 (a)  the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the
fact; or
 (b)  the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be
understood to a question about the fact;
 and that incapacity cannot be overcome.
Note: See sections 30 and 31 for examples of assistance that may be provided to
enable witnesses to overcome disabilities.
7.164 Section 13(1) provides a test of general competence. Section 13(3) provides a
test of competence to give sworn evidence. A person who is competent to give
evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact, if the
person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is
under an obligation to give truthful evidence.197 The test for competence to give sworn
evidence amounts to the capacity to understand the obligation to give truthful
evidence.198
7.165 Under s 13(4), the person may give unsworn evidence after being informed by
the court about the importance of telling the truth (and certain other matters set out in
the Act).199 The probative value of an unsworn statement will be assessed and the court
may refuse to admit evidence that may be unfairly prejudicial to a party, misleading or
confusing, or result in undue delays.200
7.166 The wording of s 13(1) implies that a person’s lack of capacity may be
overcome by forms of support or assistance being provided to them in giving evidence.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Evidence Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth) states that,
when ‘considering whether incapacity can be overcome, the court should consider
alternative communication methods or support depending on the needs of the
195  ‘Equality before the Law Bench Book’, above n 188, [5.3.1]. The Bench Book cites Mark Kebbell,
Christopher Hatton and Shane Johnson, ‘Witnesses with Intellectual Disabilities in Court: What
Questions Are Asked and What Influence Do They Have?’ (2004) 9 Legal and Criminological
Psychology 23.
196  That is, NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW);
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); Evidence (National
Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT).
197 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 13(3).
198  NSW Law Reform Commission, People with an Intellectual Disability and the Criminal Justice System,
Report No 80 (1996) ch 7.
199 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 13(4)–(5).
200  Ibid s 135.
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individual witness’, and the note makes a cross-reference to ss 30 and 31 of the Act
(discussed below).
7.167 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that the Evidence Act—
consistently with the National Decision-Making Principles—should expressly provide
that competence must be determined in the context of the available support.201
7.168 This proposal received some support from stakeholders.202 Others suggested that
the proposal did not go far enough in reflecting the National Decision-Making
Principles. Advocacy for Inclusion, for example, considered that in assessing
competence,
scrutiny should be upon whether the person is being adequately supported to
understand the question, including whether the question was delivered in formats
most appropriate to the person’s understanding, rather than upon determining the
person’s capacity to understand.203
7.169 In contrast, the Attorney-General’s Department submitted that, read as a whole,
general competency must already be determined in the context of the available support
or assistance. In the Department’s view, s 13 of the Evidence Act, as currently drafted,
is ‘sufficiently broad’ to address the ALRC’s concerns.204
7.170 In the ALRC’s view, the test of general competence and competence to give
sworn evidence under the Evidence Act should more explicitly incorporate the concept
of support. This would be consistent with the ALRC’s recommendations in other
access to justice contexts and with the National Decision-Making Principles.
7.171 However, without some obligation being placed on courts to provide support,
and the resources to enable this, reform may have little practical effect. Even at present,
it is not entirely clear whether the people with disability are being determined to be not
competent to give evidence, or sworn evidence, because of legal rules of evidence or
because ‘administrative systems are unable to deliver, by reason of lack of knowledge,
poor resources or attitudinal barriers, services to people with disabilities’.205
Assistance in giving evidence
Recommendation 7–9 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to
provide that a witness who needs support is entitled to give evidence in any
appropriate way that enables them to understand questions and communicate
answers.
201  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposal 7–8.
202  Illawarra Forum, Submission 124; Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
203  Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126. See also NACLC/PWDA—‘the focus of any test should be on
the adequacy of supports available to the individual to support them to give sworn evidence’: NACLC
and PWDA, Submission 134.
204  Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, Submission 113.
205  ‘Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies’, above n 5, 24.
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Recommendation 7–10 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to
provide that a witness who needs support has the right to have a support person
present while giving evidence, who may act as a communication assistant; assist
the person with any difficulty in giving evidence; or provide the person with
other support.
7.172 Stakeholders expressed concerns about the extent to which existing laws and
legal frameworks facilitate support for witnesses. The Office of the Public Advocate
(Qld) submitted that the Australian and Queensland governments should consider
implementing new practices to facilitate the giving of evidence by people with
disability, ‘by allowing questions to be explained and assistance to be given in
communicating the answers’.206 The Office of the Public Advocate (Vic) considered
that greater ‘witness support’ should be provided to assist people with cognitive
impairments and mental illness to navigate the justice system.207
7.173 Sections 30 and 31 of the Evidence Act provide examples of the assistance that
may currently be provided ‘to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities’.208 Section 30
provides that a witness may give evidence about a fact through an interpreter and s 31
relates to ‘deaf and mute witnesses’. Section 31 states that a witness who cannot hear
adequately may be questioned in ‘any appropriate way’; and that a witness who cannot
speak adequately may give evidence by ‘any appropriate means’ and the court may
give directions concerning this.
7.174 Deaf Australia expressed concerns about the dated language209 and drafting of
s 31 and observed that the phrase ‘may be questioned in any appropriate way’ is open
to interpretation and does not specify that the person’s communication needs must be
taken into consideration. It also suggested that use of the term ‘communication
support’ should be considered, so as to include modes of support such as live-
captioning and hearing loops.210
7.175 The Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tas) stated that the Evidence Act 2001
(Tas) does not make adequate ‘provision for regulating or adjusting court processes to
accommodate people with disability’. For example, ‘communication by way of
gestures is not viewed as a witness statement, despite this being the only way some
people can communicate’. The Commissioner observed that the existing provisions,
including ss 30–31, ‘highlight that it is not easy for people with disability to have the
process modified to increase their participation’.211
206  The OPA (Qld) referred to laws in NSW, Western Australia and the UK as providing suitable models,
referring to provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 1986 (NSW); Evidence Act 1906 (WA);  and Youth
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (UK): Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
207  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.
208 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 13 (note).
209  The word ‘mute’ refers to inability to speak. The current appropriate term is ‘speech impaired’: Deaf
Australia, Submission 37.
210  Ibid. See also AFDS, Submission 47.
211  Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71.
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7.176 The ALRC considers that there is no reason to limit the application of provisions
such as ss 30–31 to particular categories of witnesses needing support. Arguably, there
should be express provision for any witness who needs support to give evidence in any
appropriate way that enables them to understand questions and communicate answers.
Courts should be empowered to give directions with regard to this.
7.177 More broadly, witnesses who need support in order to give evidence should be
entitled to the assistance of a supporter. At the Commonwealth level, the Crimes Act
does provide an extensive range of provisions protecting ‘vulnerable persons’ in their
interactions with the justice system.212 These include provisions allowing vulnerable
persons to choose someone to accompany them while giving evidence in a
proceeding.213 In relation to adults, the right applies only to ‘vulnerable adult
complainants’214 and ‘special witnesses’. A special witness includes a person who is
‘unlikely to be able to satisfactorily give evidence in the ordinary manner’, including
‘because of a disability’.215
7.178 Section 15YO of the Crimes Act states only that the person chosen ‘may
accompany the person’ and must not prompt the person or otherwise influence the
person’s answers; or disrupt the questioning of the person. Any words spoken by the
accompanying person must be able to be heard by the judge and jury (if any) in the
proceeding. It is unclear how much the person can support or assist the witness, beyond
simply moral or emotional support.
7.179 Some state and territory criminal procedure legislation makes broader provision
for supporting witnesses. For example, in New South Wales, under the Criminal
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), vulnerable persons have a right to the presence of another
person while giving evidence. A vulnerable person for the purposes of these provisions
means ‘a child or a cognitively impaired person’.216
7.180 The Criminal Procedure Act states that, in criminal and certain other
proceedings, a vulnerable person ‘is entitled to choose a person whom the vulnerable
person would like to have present near him or her when giving evidence’.217 The
supporter ‘may be with the vulnerable person as an interpreter, for the purpose of
assisting the vulnerable person with any difficulty in giving evidence associated with
an impairment or a disability, or for the purpose of providing the vulnerable person
with other support’.218
212 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IAD.
213  Ibid s 15YO.
214  A vulnerable adult complainant is a person who is a victim of slavery or human trafficking: Ibid
s 15YAA.
215  Ibid s 15YAB(1).
216 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 306M. ‘Cognitive impairment’ is defined to include: (a) an
intellectual disability; (b) a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder); (c) a
neurological disorder; (d) dementia; (e) a severe mental illness; (f) a brain injury.
217  Ibid s 306ZK(2).
218  Ibid s 306ZK(3).
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7.181 The ALRC recommends that the Crimes Act be amended to include more
comprehensive provisions giving witnesses who need support the right to have a
support person present while giving evidence. It should be made clear that such a
person may act as a communication assistant, assisting the person with any difficulty in
giving evidence associated with a disability. Again, courts should be empowered to
give directions with regard to the provision of support.
7.182 Proposals to provide more support for witnesses with disability met with
approval.219 The  Illawarra  Forum,  for  example,  submitted  that  such  changes  would
allow people with disability to fully participate in giving evidence ‘in a manner that
best suits the individual’, allow a support person to assist and ‘acknowledge the ability
of a person with disability in being able to provide accurate and valuable evidence’.220
7.183 There may be concerns about the effect of supporters on the fairness of
proceedings—including perceptions that evidence is essentially being communicated to
the court by the support person, rather than the witness, and about the opportunities to
influence evidence. However, as with other rules of procedure and evidence, the
permissible role of a supporter in the giving of evidence should be subject to judicial
discretion and the overriding duty of the judicial officer to ensure that court
proceedings are fair.
7.184 The ALRC acknowledges that the recommendation does nothing to ensure that
support is actually available. In South Australia, the Attorney-General has proposed
that the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) be amended to ‘give people with complex
communication needs a general entitlement to have a Communication Assistant present
for any contact with the criminal justice system’; and to ‘increase access to appropriate
support persons for vulnerable witnesses’. For these purposes, a service, available
throughout the criminal justice process, is proposed to be established in the non-
government sector.221
7.185 In its 2013 report on the justice system and people with intellectual disability,
the Parliament of Victoria’s Law Reform Committee222 highlighted the witness
intermediary scheme in the United Kingdom, established under the Youth Justice and
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (UK). Under this scheme, the function of an intermediary
is to assist intellectually disabled and other vulnerable witnesses by effectively acting
as a ‘go-between’ to facilitate communication between the witness and the court. An
Intermediary Registration Board oversees registration and standards for
intermediaries.223
219  Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126; Illawarra Forum, Submission 124; National Disability Services,
Submission 92.
220  Illawarra Forum, Submission 124.
221  Government of South Australia Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Draft Disability Justice Plan 2014–
2016’ (2014) Priority Actions 2.1–2.2.
222  Law Reform Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Access to and Interaction with the Justice System by
People with an Intellectual Disability and Their Families and Carers, Final Report (2013).
223  Ibid 283. Intermediaries may include speech and language therapists, clinical psychologists, mental health
professionals and special needs education professionals.
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Guidance for judicial officers
Recommendation 7–11 Federal courts should develop bench books to
provide judicial officers with guidance about how courts may support persons
with disability in giving evidence.
7.186 The Evidence Act and Crimes Act contain a range of other provisions that may
be used to assist people who need support in giving evidence. In addition to those
discussed above, the Evidence Act includes provisions protecting witnesses from
improper questioning, and allowing the giving of evidence in narrative form.224
7.187 The Crimes Act also contains protective provisions that, among other things,
may disallow inappropriate or aggressive cross-examination of vulnerable and special
witnesses;225 allow for the use of alternative arrangements for giving evidence, such as
closed-circuit television226 and the exclusion of members of the public from the
courtroom;227 and ensure vulnerable persons are not compelled to give further evidence
unless it is necessary in the interests of justice.228
7.188 Legislative provisions are, however, only part of the solution to facilitating the
participation of persons with disability in the justice system. Flexibility should be
encouraged in Commonwealth court and tribunal proceedings to adapt procedures:
It is important for courts and tribunals to recognise and be sensitive to the challenges
that people with disabilities face when interacting with the justice system. Procedural
breaches by a person with an intellectual disability should be met with inquiry into the
circumstances behind that breach. Registry staff, judicial officers and tribunal
members should be educated about the difficulties facing those with a disability and
encouraged to exercise discretion in excusing trivial breaches and dispensing with
standard protocols where appropriate.229
7.189 The law may be flexible enough to allow support to be provided but, in practice,
the willingness or ability of courts to respond is likely to be circumscribed by limited
resources and lack of awareness in the court and community about available options.230
7.190 Greater awareness of the measures that courts and judicial officers may take to
support witnesses who need support giving evidence may be desirable. One model is
the Equality before the Law Bench Book developed by the Judicial Commission of
NSW.231 This publication contains a section on people with disability and, among other
things, discusses the implications of different types of disability for people involved in
224 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 41, 29(2).
225 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YE.
226  Ibid ss 15YI, 15YL.
227  Ibid s 15YP.
228  Ibid s 15YNC.
229  Legal Aid Victoria, Submission 65.
230  ‘Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies’, above n 5, 23.
231  ‘Equality before the Law Bench Book’, above n 188.
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court proceedings, examples of the barriers for people with disabilities in relation to
court proceedings, and making adjustments for people with disability.232
7.191 The Equality before the Law Bench Book is intended primarily to provide
guidance for NSW judicial officers in performing their duties. Bench books may,
however, serve a broader educative function within the justice system, as lawyers and
parties may also refer to them as a guide to the available options.
7.192 The ALRC recommends that federal courts develop bench books to provide
judicial officers with guidance about how courts may support people with disability in
giving evidence. This will mainly apply to civil matters because, as discussed earlier in
relation to eligibility to stand trial, most federal offenders are tried in state and territory
courts.
7.193 The Federal Court acknowledged that bench books can assist to ensure that the
judiciary, lawyers and all other relevant agencies and organisations are aware of
existing communication facilities and techniques.233 NACLC and PWDA strongly
supported the further development of guidance for judicial officers about how courts
may support people with disability in giving evidence, in consultation with people with
disability and their representatives.234
Forensic procedures
7.194 Barriers to obtaining consent for the taking of DNA and other forensic samples
under Commonwealth, state and territory forensic procedures legislation,235 may
prejudice the investigation and prosecution of crimes against persons with disability.
7.195 In particular, some legislation regulating the taking of intimate forensic samples
from people deemed unable to provide consent may result in undue delay, which may
compromise the value of DNA samples as evidence. This may be of particular concern
where persons with disability are victims of sexual assault.
7.196 Forensic procedure legislation generally provides that, where forensic samples
are needed from a person who is not a suspect, and who is incapable of giving consent,
the starting point is that the consent of a parent or guardian is required. However, the
taking of DNA samples may be outside the scope of ‘medical treatment’ for the
purposes of a guardian’s decision-making powers.
7.197 Problems in obtaining forensic samples from victims may arise where:
· there is no guardian, and parents are unable or unwilling to consent; and
· there is a guardian, but the guardian does not have authority to authorise consent
to the forensic procedure.
232  Ibid s 5.
233  Federal Court of Australia, Submission 138.
234  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134. See also Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
235  Eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt ID; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)  ch  17; Forensic
Procedures Act 2000 (Tas).
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7.198 At a Commonwealth level, forensic procedures are regulated by pt ID of the
Crimes Act. Under the Crimes Act, a magistrate may order the carrying out of a
forensic procedure on an ‘incapable person’236 if the consent of a guardian cannot
reasonably be obtained; or the guardian refuses consent and the magistrate is satisfied
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the parent or guardian is a suspect and
the forensic procedure is likely to produce evidence tending to confirm or disprove that
he or she committed an offence.237 In  determining  whether  to  make  the  order,  the
magistrate must take into account, among other things, the seriousness of the alleged
offence; the ‘best interests’ of the incapable person; and ‘so far as they can be
ascertained, any wishes’ of the incapable person with respect to the forensic
procedure.238
7.199 Procedures in other jurisdictions may require investigators to obtain an
emergency order from the state or territory guardianship tribunal, resulting in
significant delay.
7.200 The existing Commonwealth provisions may help to address problems with the
timeliness of obtaining consent, by allowing a state or territory magistrate to order a
forensic procedure. Other approaches might involve amending:
· forensic procedures legislation to adopt a hierarchy of decision-makers similar
to that found in some guardianship legislation dealing with medical treatment;239
or
· guardianship legislation dealing with consent to medical treatment to include
reference to the taking of forensic samples.
7.201 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked whether Commonwealth, state and
territory laws should be amended to avoid delays in obtaining consent to the taking of
forensic samples from people who are incapable of giving consent, and who have been
victims of crime.240
7.202 In response, some stakeholders expressed concern that avoiding delay might be
used as a rationale for not making full efforts to obtain consent, for example, by
determining how a person communicates and providing the support they require to do
so.241
236  An ‘incapable person’ is defined to mean an adult who is incapable of understanding the general nature,
effect and purposes of a forensic procedure; or of indicating whether he or she consents to it: Crimes Act
1914 (Cth) s 23WA.
237  Ibid s 23XWU(1).
238  Ibid s 23XWU(2).
239  That is, consent may be given for a person incapable of doing so, by a ‘person responsible’—including a
spouse or de facto partner; a parent; public advocate or guardian; or ‘another person who has
responsibility for the day-to-day care of the incapable person’. An example of this approach is found in
Western Australian legislation dealing with ‘identifying procedures’: Criminal Investigation (Identifying
People) Act 2002 (WA) s 20(1)(b).
240  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 7–3.
241  Vicdeaf, Submission 125; KinCare Services, Submission 112.
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7.203 In the absence of any firm indication that Commonwealth forensic procedures
legislation is responsible for undue delay in obtaining forensic samples, the ALRC
makes no recommendation for reform.
Jury service
7.204 Trial by jury is an important element of the justice system in Australia. Juries
are made up of citizens randomly chosen from the electoral roll.242 They  serve  as  a
means for members of the community to participate in the administration of justice,
and to ensure that the application of the law is fair and consistent with community
standards.
7.205 An essential characteristic of juries, as an institution, is that they be
representative of the wider community.243 Their representative nature depends on all
those capable of serving, whatever their individual characteristics, having an
opportunity to serve, unless there are defensible reasons for excluding them from jury
membership.244 There are longstanding concerns that, in practice, persons with
disability are prevented from serving on juries in Australia without sufficient reason:
The exclusion of people with disability from jury service means that juries are not
composed of the full diversity of the Australian community. This means that the
experience of disability is not available to the jury for consideration during trials, and
defendants with disability cannot face a trial by peers.245
7.206 For example, in May 2014, the Supreme Court of Queensland ruled that a
woman with a hearing impairment, who can lip-read but needed an Auslan interpreter,
was ‘incapable of effectively performing the functions of a juror and therefore
ineligible for jury service’.246
7.207 State and territory legislation generally refers to disability as a ground for
disqualification from serving as a juror, or implies that persons with disability may be
disqualified on the grounds that they are not capable of performing the duties of a
juror.
7.208 These legislative and other barriers to jury service have been examined as part
of a number of inquiries, including by the NSWLRC, the Law Reform Commission of
Western Australia (LRCWA), and the Queensland Law Reform Commission
242  In Ch 9, the ALRC recommends that the ‘unsound mind’ provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 (Cth), which relate to disqualification for enrolment and voting on the basis that a person is of
‘unsound mind’, be repealed.
243  NSW Law Reform Commission, Jury Selection, Report No 117 (2007) 49, citing the High Court in
Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541, 560.
244  See Ibid 9–10.
245  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) [223].
246 Re: the Jury Act 1995 and an application by the Sheriff of Queensland [2014] QSC 113. Earlier in 2014,
another hearing impaired woman, Gaye Lyons, lost a discrimination case against the Queensland
Government over being excluded from jury service at Ipswich District Court in 2012: Lyons v State of
Queensland (No 2) [2014] QCAT 731.
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(QLRC).247 In South Australia, the Attorney-General has proposed ‘further research
and investigation on identifying and overcoming barriers to jury duty for people with
disability’.248
7.209 Inquiries have recommended various legislative changes to facilitate jury service
by persons with disability and, in particular, amendments to provisions that implied
disqualification on the basis of physical disability. For example:
· The  NSWLRC  recommended  that  people  who  are  blind  or  deaf  should  be
qualified to serve on juries, and not prevented from doing so on the basis of that
physical disability alone; but that the Court should have power to stand aside a
blind or deaf person if the person is unable to discharge the duties of a juror
notwithstanding provision of reasonable adjustments.249
· The LRCWA recommended that a person should not be disqualified from
serving on a jury on the basis that he or she suffers from a physical disability;
but a physical disability that renders a person unable to discharge the duties of a
juror should constitute a sufficient reason to be excused under the Juries Act
1957 (WA).250
· The QLRC recommended that the Jury Act 1995 (Qld)  should  be  amended  to
remove the ineligibility of persons with a physical disability, and should instead
provide that prospective jurors should inform the Sheriff of any physical
disabilities and special needs that they have; but that a person who has an
intellectual, psychiatric, cognitive, or neurological impairment that makes the
person incapable of effectively performing the functions of a juror is ineligible
for jury service.251
7.210 More recently, Disability Rights Now has recommended to the United Nations
that, in Australia, ‘all people with disability be made eligible for jury service’252 and an
Individual Communication has claimed that law and practice concerning jury
qualification constitutes a violation of rights guaranteed under the CRPD, including
rights to equal recognition under the law and access to justice.253
247  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors,  Final  Report  No  114  (2006);  Law  Reform
Commission of Western Australia, Selection, Eligibility and Exemption of Jurors, Report No 99 (2010);
Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Jury Selection, Report No 68 (2011).
248  ‘Draft Disability Justice Plan 2014-2016’, above n 221, Priority Action 1.5.
249  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors, Final Report No 114 (2006) rec 1(a)–(c). At the
time of writing, these recommendations had not been implemented.
250  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Selection, Eligibility and Exemption of Jurors, Report No
99 (2010) rec 56.1. This recommendation was implemented: see Juries Act 1957 (WA) s 5.
251  Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Jury Selection, Report No 68 (2011) recs 8–8, 8–9,
8–14. These recommendations have not been implemented.
252  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) [223].
253  Alastair McEwin, Individual Communication under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, Communication to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in
McEwin v Australia G/SO 214/48 AUS (1) 12/2013. (Referring to CPRD arts 12, 13, 21, 29).
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7.211 Submissions have highlighted this issue as being of continuing concern,254 and
expressed support for earlier law reform commission recommendations for change. 255
The Disability Discrimination Legal Service, for example, stated that
current national and state jury laws should be reformed to avoid exclusion of people
with disabilities from participating in jury duty … the law should allow potential
jurors with disabilities to participate in jury duty where such disabilities can be
reasonably accommodated. This should replace the current legal position where
prospective jurors with auditory and visual disabilities are readily challenged or stood
down from a panel.256
Juries in the Federal Court
7.212 At the Commonwealth level, only the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
has provisions dealing with jury qualification and membership, and it is the focus of
the discussion below.
7.213 Historically, juries have not been constituted in Federal Court proceedings. As
discussed above, most federal offenders are tried in state and territory courts, and the
Federal Court has not dealt with indictable criminal offences.
7.214 This position changed, however, with the criminalisation of ‘serious cartel
conduct’ in 2009,257 when  jurisdiction  to  try  indictable  cartel  offences  by  jury  was
conferred on the Federal Court. A procedural framework for the Federal Court to
exercise jurisdiction over indictable offences—including jury provisions—was
enacted.258
7.215 The Federal Court also has the power, in civil proceedings to direct trial of
issues with a jury.259 Because the ordinary mode of trial is by judge alone,260 this would
only occur in an exceptional case and, in any event, state or territory law relating to the
qualification of jurors would generally apply in Federal Court civil proceedings.261
7.216 Even though juries remain ‘extremely rare’ in Federal Court proceedings,262 the
ALRC recommends that reform of jury qualification provisions be modelled in
Commonwealth law through amendments to the Federal Court of Australia Act.
254  See, eg, Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55; Qld Law Society, Submission 53; Public
Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41;  Centre  for  Rural  Regional  Law and  Justice  and  the  National
Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20; The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.
255  Supporting NSWLRC recommendations: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. Supporting
consideration of QLRC recommendations: Qld Law Society, Submission 53.
256  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55.
257  Introduced by the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth)—
now Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt IV, div 1, subdiv B.
258 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt III, div 1A, subdiv D.
259  Ibid s 40.
260  Ibid s 39. The exercise of this power has been considered in Federal Court defamation proceedings:
Steven Rares, ‘The Jury in Defamation Trials’ (Paper Presented at the Defamation & Media Law
Conference, Sydney, 25 March 2010).
261 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 41(1).
262  Federal Court of Australia, Submission 138.
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Qualification to serve on a jury
Recommendation 7–12 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should provide that a person is qualified to serve on a jury if, in the
circumstances of the trial for which that person is summonsed, the person can be
supported to:
(a) understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to
make in the course of the proceedings and jury deliberations;
(b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make these decisions;
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the jury’s decision-making
process; or
(d) communicate the person’s decisions to the other members of the jury and
to the court.
7.217 Under the Federal Court of Australia Act, the Sheriff must remove a person’s
name from the jury list263 if satisfied that: the person is not qualified to be a juror; or
the Sheriff would excuse the person from serving on the jury if the person were a
potential juror.264
7.218 The Sheriff may, either on application or on his or her own initiative, excuse a
potential juror from serving on the jury, if satisfied that they are, ‘in all the
circumstances, unable to perform the duties of a juror to a reasonable standard’.265 In
coming to a conclusion about a person’s ability to perform the duties of a juror, the Act
requires that the Sheriff must have regard to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992
(Cth).266
7.219 On their face, the jury provisions of the Federal Court of Australia Act are an
advance on most state and territory legislation because they do not identify disability
specifically as a ground for disqualification.
7.220 For example, the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) disqualifies people who are unable to
‘communicate in or understand the English language adequately’ or who have a
‘physical disability that renders the person incapable of performing the duties of jury
service’.267 The Disability Discrimination Legal Service observed that, while ‘this is
263  A jury list is prepared for particular proceedings and contains the names and addresses of persons that the
Sheriff selects from the jury roll for the applicable jury district, see, eg Federal Court of Australia Act
1976 (Cth) s 23DM.
264  Ibid s 23DO.
265  Ibid ss 23DQ, 23DR.
266  Ibid s 23DQ (Note). See, in particular, Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 29 (Administration of
Commonwealth laws and programs).
267 Juries Act 2000 (Vic) sch 2, cl 3(a),(f).
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not an express exclusion of persons with sensory disabilities’, there have been no
instances of blind or deaf jurors in the history of the Victorian justice system.268
7.221 Similarly, under the Jury Act 1977 (NSW), persons who are ineligible to serve
as jurors include ‘a person who is unable, because of sickness, infirmity or disability, to
discharge the duties of a juror’.269 The practice appears to be that information
indicating a potential juror is blind or deaf is considered sufficient to ground a
determination that a person is ineligible to serve as a juror.270 In particular, blind and
deaf jurors may be excluded from serving on juries because of concerns about
comprehension and the presence of a ‘13th person’ in the jury room where an
interpreter is used.271
7.222 It is not clear whether similar results would occur under the Federal Court of
Australia Act. However, the fact that the Act provides little guidance on standards for
juror qualification may work against the participation of people with disability. That is,
people with disability may still be prevented from serving on a jury, depending upon
the Sheriff’s interpretation of the duties of a juror and factors considered in assessing
whether these duties can be performed to a ‘reasonable standard’.
7.223 The ALRC recognises there is likely to be ‘some difficulty establishing a more
specific objective standard’ for determining juror qualification.272 However,  an
approach consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles may facilitate a
more inclusive approach to jury service, and help ensure that people with disability are
not automatically or inappropriately excluded from serving on a jury. That is, the
qualification of jurors should be assessed by reference to a person’s actual decision-
making ability. Clearly, there should be no presumption that any particular physical or
mental disability should be a disqualifying factor.
7.224 In particular, people who require communication devices or communication
supporters to ‘expressively communicate’ may be subject to assumptions about their
ability to serve on juries.273 The Disability Discrimination Legal Service observed:
With today’s technology and continuing product development that addresses or alleviates
sensory limitations, it is neither reasonable nor necessary to permit arbitrary exclusion from
jury service on grounds of disability, English incapacity, or an imputed inability to discharge
their duties as a juror, or satisfaction of the Sheriff.274
268  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55.
269 Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 6(b), sch 2.
270  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors, Final Report No 114 (2006); Alastair McEwin,
Individual Communication under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Communication to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in McEwin  v
Australia G/SO 214/48 AUS (1) 12/2013.
271  See, eg, Alastair McEwin, Individual Communication under the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, Communication to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in
McEwin v Australia G/SO 214/48 AUS (1) 12/2013.
272  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83.
273  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55.
274  Ibid.
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7.225 At present, the fact that a person may be supported in performing the duties of a
juror does not seem able to be taken into account in determining whether a person is
eligible to serve.
7.226 The  ALRC  recommends  that  the Federal Court of Australia Act should
explicitly incorporate the concept of support into the test for serving as a juror. The test
is consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and associated Guidelines.
The ALRC’s proposal for reform of the test for qualifying to serve as a juror 275
received support from a number of stakeholders.276
7.227 Again, the recommendation may be criticised on the basis that, unless support is
actually available, there will be no change in jury selection practices. Nor does the
recommendation deal with jury challenges on the basis of perceived disability (that is,
peremptory challenges and challenges for cause). No reason need be stated for
peremptory challenges, and where a person with a disability is challenged because of
that disability, this will be subject to a ruling from the judge, who would have regard to
the legislative provisions concerning qualification.
Assistance for jurors
Recommendation 7–13 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should be amended to provide that the trial judge may order that a
communication assistant be allowed to assist a juror to understand the
proceedings and jury deliberations.
7.228 The National Decision-Making Principles require that people should be
provided with the support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in
decision-making. In some cases, this support will include the involvement of an
assistant in the courtroom and in the jury room.
7.229 The 2006 recommendations of the NSWLRC referred to ‘interpreters and
stenographers’ being allowed to assist a blind or deaf juror, including in the jury room
during jury deliberations.277 ‘Interpreter’ in this context was intended to extend to sign
languages, such as Auslan, and other communication support, and ‘stenographer’ to
include a person providing ‘computer-aided real time transcription’.278
7.230 The ALRC’s recommendation uses a more open-ended term, introducing the
concept of a ‘communication assistant’. The exact parameters of the permissible role of
a communication assistant would need to be defined in the Act.
275  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposal 7–12.
276  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134; Vicdeaf, Submission 125; Queenslanders with Disability Network,
Submission 119.
277  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors, Final Report No 114 (2006) rec 1(d)–(e).
278  Ibid 17–18.
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7.231 There  is  research  suggesting  that  communication  assistants  would  be  able  to
effectively facilitate the participation of some deaf jurors. The NSWLRC and
Macquarie University jointly funded a short pilot study to investigate whether people
who are deaf could access court proceedings through sign language interpreters.279 The
2007 report of the study concluded that it had demonstrated that:
· legal facts and concepts can be translated into Auslan;
· Auslan interpreting can provide effective access to court proceedings for a deaf
juror;
· hearing people misunderstand court proceedings without being disadvantaged by
hearing loss; and
· deaf people are willing and able to serve as jurors.280
7.232 The practicality of allowing deaf people to serve as jurors with the assistance of
Auslan interpreters in the court and during deliberations continues to be investigated by
researchers, most recently at the University of NSW.281
7.233 NACLC  and  PWDA  expressed  strong  support  for  the  ALRC  proposal  to
introduce communication assistants. This suggestion, they said, ‘recognises the
centrality of supports in ensuring that people with disability who require such support
are  able  to  serve  as  a  juror’.282 Vicdeaf observed that it should also be the court’s
responsibility to ensure supports are provided so that the person can communicate their
decisions to the other members of the jury and to the court.283
Jury secrecy
Recommendation 7–14 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should be amended to provide that communication assistants, allowed by the
trial judge to assist a juror, should:
(a) swear an oath or affirm to faithfully communicate the proceedings or jury
deliberations; and
(b) be permitted in the jury room during deliberations without breaching jury
secrecy principles, providing they are subject to and comply with
requirements for the secrecy of jury deliberations.
279  The study used a judge’s summing up in a criminal trial to determine the accuracy of the interpretation
and the level of comprehension of potential deaf jurors as compared with a control group of hearing
jurors: Ibid 14–15.
280  Jemina Napier, David Spencer and Joseph Sabolec, ‘Deaf Jurors’ Access to Court Proceedings via Sign
Language Interpreting: An Investigation’ (Research Report 14, NSWLRC and Macquarie University,
2011) 62.
281  Ignorantia Juris, Deaf Jurors in Mock Trial Experiment <http://ignorantiajuris.com>.
282  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134.
283  Vicdeaf, Submission 125.
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Recommendation 7–15 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
should provide for offences, in similar terms to those under ss 58AK and 58AL
of the Act, in relation to the soliciting by third parties of communication
assistants for the provision of information about the jury deliberations, and the
disclosure of information by communication assistants about the jury
deliberations.
7.234 A common reason given for excluding people who require support from jury
service is that an assistant may be seen as an ‘additional’ or ‘thirteenth’ member of the
jury, in breach of the secrecy of jury deliberations.284
7.235 The rule of jury secrecy, also known as the exclusionary rule, prohibits a juror
from discussing the deliberations in the jury room, based on public policy
considerations requiring that the verdict of the jury should be final, ensuring that jurors
are not subjected to pressure or harassment. The rule is a convention or rule of conduct
rather than a rule of law,285 and it is reinforced by statutory provisions that make it an
offence to disclose or solicit information about jury deliberations.286
7.236 In 2014, Douglas J in the Queensland Supreme Court noted that even if
‘deafness as a disability’ can be overcome by the use of interpreters to assist jurors,
further potential difficulties arise in respect of deliberations by the jury during and after
the hearing:
Communication or discussion between jurors has been emphasised as an integral part
of the jury system because of their collective duty to pool their experience and
wisdom in coming to a verdict … In the absence of legislative provision, it is clear
that the jury is bound to deliberate in private287
7.237 Douglas J observed that it was not clear under the Jury Act 1995 (Qld)  that  a
judge is able to give leave to permit the presence of an interpreter in the jury room
during the jurors’ deliberations—and there is no explicit power to require such an
interpreter to swear an oath or to make an affirmation to maintain the secrecy of the
jury’s deliberations.288 He held that,
while it may be possible to assist this individual to participate in the trial itself, by the
use of an Auslan interpreter, and, for example, written jury directions, it would not be
appropriate to permit such an interpreter to perform a similar role in the jury room as
284   Deaf  Australia  referred  to  a  2013  case  in  Queensland,  in  which  a  deaf  person  lodged  a  discrimination
complaint against the Queensland Government after being excluded from jury duty. The Queensland
Civil and Administrative Tribunal dismissed the complaint because of the ‘thirteenth person’ objection:
Deaf Australia, Submission 37.
285  See R  v  K (2003) 59 NSWLR 431, [16]. The position is otherwise in the United States: see Peter
McClellan ‘Looking Inside the Jury Room’ (Paper Presented at the Law Society of NSW Young Lawyers
2011 Annual Criminal Law Seminar, Sydney, 5 March 2011).
286  Eg, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 58AK, 58AL.
287 Re: the Jury Act 1995 and an application by the Sheriff of Queensland [2014] QSC 113, [3].
288  Ibid [4]–[5].
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a ‘13th juror’ in the absence of specific legislative provision, including the power to
require the interpreter to swear or affirm to keep the jury’s deliberations secret.289
7.238 In the ALRC’s view, concerns about maintaining the secrecy of the jury room
and allowing a communication assistant can be addressed, and this suggestion was
supported by stakeholders.290
7.239 The NSWLRC recommended new legislative provisions requiring the taking of
oaths by interpreters and stenographers, extending duties of secrecy to them, and
creating new offences. The ALRC recommendations above adapt this model, in the
context of the Federal Court of Australia Act.
289  Ibid [6].
290  NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134; Illawarra Forum, Submission 124; Public Interest Advocacy
Centre, Submission 41.
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Summary
8.1 The term ‘restrictive practices’ refers to the use of interventions that have the
effect of restricting the rights or freedom of movement of a person in order to protect
them. Examples include lap belts, hand mitts, removing mobility aids such as walking
frames and sedation of a person to control their behaviour.1 Serious concerns have been
expressed about inappropriate and under-regulated use of restrictive practices in a
range of settings in Australia.
8.2 Current regulation of restrictive practices occurs mainly at a state and territory
level. However, the Commonwealth, state and territory disability ministers endorsed
the National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive Practices
in the Disability Service Sector (National Framework) in March 2014 to forge a
consistent national approach.2
8.3 The National Framework is intended to reduce the use of restrictive practices,
including by informing the development of the National Disability Insurance Scheme
quality assurance and safeguards system (NDIS system).3 In developing the NDIS
system, the ALRC recommends that the Australian Government and the Council of
1 Department of Health, Decision-Making Tool: Supporting a Restraint Free Environment in Residential
Aged Care <www.health.gov.au>; Department of Health, Decision-Making Tool: Supporting a Restraint
Free Environment in Community Aged Care <www.health.gov.au>.
2 Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive
Practices in the Disability Service Sector (2014).
3 Ibid.
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Australian Governments (COAG) should take the National Decision-Making Principles
into account to regulate restrictive practices in the context of the NDIS.4
8.4 The ALRC also recommends that the Australian Government and COAG adopt
a similar, national approach to the regulation of restrictive practices in other relevant
sectors such as aged care and health care.
The use of restrictive practices in Australia
8.5 Restrictive practices involve the use of interventions by carers and service
providers that have the effect of limiting the rights or freedom of movement of a person
with disability, with the primary purpose of protecting the person or others from harm.
These include restraint (chemical, mechanical, social or physical) and seclusion.5
8.6 Persons with disability who display ‘challenging behaviour’ or ‘behaviours of
concern’ may be subjected to restrictive practices or medical intervention in a variety
of contexts, including: supported accommodation and group homes; residential aged
care facilities; rehabilitation centres; mental health facilities; hospitals; prisons; and
schools.6
8.7 The limited available data from the Victorian Office of the Senior Practitioner
accords with the international research that an estimated 10–15% of persons with
disability will show ‘behaviours of concern’ and between 44–80% of them will be
administered a form of chemical restraint in response to the behaviour.7
8.8 The Office of the Senior Practitioner found chemical restraint to be the most
commonly used form of restraint.8 Chemical restraint is reportedly widely used on
people with dementia. The Department of Health and Ageing told the Senate Inquiry
4 See Ch 3.
5 See, eg, definitions in: Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the
Use of Restrictive Practices in the Disability Service Sector (2014) 4; Disability Act 2006 (Vic) s 3(1).
For comment, see also: Philip French, Julie Dardel and Sonya Price-Kelly, ‘Rights Denied: Towards a
National Policy Agenda about Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of Persons with Cognitive Impairment’
(People with Disability Australia, 2009) [2.48]–[2.51]. See also submissions in relation to proposed
changes to the definitions under the Proposed National Framework: NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission
81; NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33; Physical Disability Council of NSW,
Submission 32.
6 See, eg, Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120; PWDA and Disability Rights
Research Collaboration, Submission 111; National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others,
Submission 78; Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68; Central Australian Legal Aid Service,
Submission 48; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic),
Submission 06; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. See also Victorian Law Reform
Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) 318.
7 Eric Emerson, Challenging Behaviour: Analysis and Intervention in People with Severe Intellectual
Disabilities (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Kathy Lowe et al, ‘The Management and Treatment of
Challenging Behaviours’ (2005) 10 Tizard Learning Disability Review 34, cited in ‘Chemical Restraint:
What Every Disability Support Worker Needs to Know’ (Office of the Senior Practitioner, Victoria,
August 2008) 1. Victorian figures on behaviour support plans cited in Paul Ramcharan et al, ‘Experiences
of Restrictive Practices: A View from People with Disabilities and Family Carers’ (Research Report,
Office of the Senior Practitioner, 2009) 12.
8 ‘Chemical Restraint: What Every Disability Support Worker Needs to Know’, above n 7.
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into dementia that the use of drugs in dementia is higher than would be expected on
clinical grounds alone:
In February 2013 [the drug utilisation subcommittee] found that there is a high and
inappropriate utilisation of antipsychotics in the elderly, especially in the case of two
drugs: quetiapine and olanzapine, which are prescribed at a rate inconsistent with the
age-specific prevalence of bipolar disease.9
8.9 Between 50–60% of people presenting challenging behavior in the United
Kingdom are subjected to physical restraint;10 those with multiple impairments and
complex support needs may experience much higher levels of restrictive practices.
8.10 Surveillance may, in some circumstances, amount to a restrictive practice. The
Office of the Public Advocate (Qld) reported that, in a census survey of 861 disability
accommodation sites in 2013, 13% of them used some form of electronic monitoring of
their residents. The majority of the residents subject to audio or visual surveillance had
an intellectual disability and the reasons for surveillance included monitoring of the
residents’ health, the desire to safeguard residents from accidental harm, and the
residents’ challenging behaviours and self-harming behaviours.11
Improper use of restrictive practices
8.11 While restrictive practices are used in circumstances to protect from harm the
person with disability or others around them, there are concerns that such practices can
also be imposed as a ‘means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retaliation by
staff, family members or others providing support’.12
8.12 Many stakeholders raised systemic issues across various sectors which result in
inappropriate or overuse of restrictive practices.13 A  key  explanation  for  the  use  of
restrictive practices may be the lack of resources for positive behaviour management
and multi-disciplinary interventions to ‘challenging behaviours’. Such behaviours may
be better understood as a ‘legitimate response to difficult environments and situations’
or ‘adaptive behaviours to maladaptive environments’.14
9 Commonwealth, Committee Hansard, Senate, 17 July 2013, 40–41 (Ms Adriana Platona).
10 Eric Emerson, ‘The Prevalence of Use of Reactive Management Strategies in Community-Based Services
in the UK’ in David Allen (ed), Ethical Approaches to Physical Interventions: Responding to
Challenging Behaviour in People with Intellectual Disabilities (BILD, 2003).
11 Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 110. See, attachment to the submission, ‘Inquiry into the
Use of Electronic Monitoring at Disability Accommodation Sites in Queensland’ May 2014.
12 Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) [241].
13 See, eg, NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81; Australian Psychological Society, Submission 60;
Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55; Central Australian Legal Aid Service,
Submission 48; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. See also National Mental Health
Commission, ‘A Contributing Life, the 2013 National Report Card on Mental Health and Suicide
Prevention’ (2013).
14 Paul Ramcharan et al, ‘Experiences of Restrictive Practices: A View from People with Disabilities and
Family Carers’ (Research Report, Office of the Senior Practitioner, 2009) 2. See also Physical Disability
Council of NSW, Submission 32.
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8.13 As the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Alzheimer’s Australia explained to the
Senate Inquiry into dementia,15 it is important to look beyond behaviours to understand
the reasons for them:
I think the secret to dementia care is actually very simple, and that is to look at the
cause  of  a  person’s  symptoms  and  not  to  respond  to  the  symptoms  themselves.  If
somebody is violent, they are not being violent because they are a nasty person. They
are being violent because they are frustrated. They feel no purpose in life ... They do
not know where they are. They feel disoriented. They may feel very depressed. They
may be suffering psychosis. They may be losing their words. They may not be able to
communicate. You put all those things together and think of how you would react and
then you can start to translate it into your own behaviours.16
8.14 There is also evidence that what constitutes a restrictive practice is contested,
which may result in inadvertent and misguided use of restrictive practices. A
representative of the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners told the Senate
Inquiry into dementia:
Many facilities have a locked dementia unit so people cannot actually get out, where
there might be a busy road or something like that. For the night people may be put in a
low bed that is a little bit difficult to get out of so that they cannot wander easily. It is
not actually a restraint as such but it does provide a physical barrier to wandering. So
there are some things like that that do not feel anything like being tied up but that do
minimise behaviour that might cause that resident some harm.17
8.15 In contrast, Caxton Legal Centre described a similar scenario in a dementia unit
as  a  clear  instance  of  restrictive  practices,  submitting  a  case  involving  ‘Mrs  H’,  a
woman in her mid-70s and of a culturally and linguistically diverse background, who
called the centre to complain that she had been misdiagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease
and had spent 10 months in ‘prison’.18
8.16 High level definitions in the National Framework have set out the agreed
understanding of restrictive practices and clarify that a restraint need not be physical,
mechanical or chemical, but can also be psychosocial and involve the use of ‘power-
control’ strategies.19 A case study submitted by Justice Connect illustrated this point:
An older man was frustrated with a rehabilitation facility that would not allow him to
return home in circumstances where his children did not support his desire to do so.
The man’s capacity was not impaired, but the facility was concerned about their duty
of care. The man was told that if he attempted to leave the facility, the police would
be called.20
15 Senate Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger
and Older Australians Living with Dementia and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia
(2014).
16 Commonwealth, Committee Hansard, Senate, 17 July 2013, 31 (Mr Glenn Rees).
17 Commonwealth, Committee Hansard, Senate, 16 December 2013, 36 (Professor Constance Dimity
Pond); see also evidence by the General Manager of Residential Care, HammondCare: Commonwealth,
Committee Hansard, Senate, 17 July 2013, 17 (Ms Angela Raguz).
18 Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.
19 Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive
Practices in the Disability Service Sector (2014).
20 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
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Australia’s international obligations
8.17 Australia, as a State Party, has obligations under the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities21 (CRPD)  and  the United Nations
Convention against Torture.22
8.18 The Australian Civil Society Response, as part of Australia’s appearance before
the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD)
in 2013, expressed concern that persons with disabilities, especially cognitive
impairment and psychosocial disability, are ‘routinely subjected to unregulated and
under-regulated behaviour modification or restrictive practices such as chemical,
mechanical and physical restraint and seclusion’.23
8.19 Following this report, the UNCRPD recommended that Australia
take immediate steps to end such practices, including by establishing an independent
national preventive mechanism to monitor places of detention—such as mental health
facilities, special schools, hospitals, disability justice centres and prisons—in order to
ensure that persons with disabilities, including psychosocial disabilities, are not
subjected to intrusive medical interventions.24
8.20 Article 12 of the CRPD protects the right of persons with disabilities to have
equal recognition before the law. Articles 14, 15 and 16 provide their right to liberty
and security of person, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment and freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse.
8.21 Stakeholders suggested that some forms of restrictive practices could even
amount to torture.25 Australia is a party to the United Nations Convention against
Torture26 and also a signatory to the Optional Protocol on the Convention against
Torture (OPCAT).27 However, Australia has not yet ratified the OPCAT which requires
States to establish a national system of inspections of all places of detention to ensure
compliance with the Convention against Torture.28
21 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
22 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened
for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).
23 Disability Rights Now, ‘Australian Civil Society Parallel Report Group Response to the List of Issues,
CRPD 10th Session Dialogue with Australia, Geneva’ (September 2013) 13.
24 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of
Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its 10th Session (2–13 September 2013)’ (United Nations,
4 October 2013) [35]–[36].
25 See PWDA and Disability Rights Research Collaboration, Submission 111; Queensland Advocacy
Incorporated, Submission 45; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
26 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened
for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).
27 Optional Protocol to United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for
signature 30 March 2007, UN Doc A/61/611 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
28 Australian Human Rights Commission, Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT)
<www.humanrights.gov.au>.
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8.22 A national approach to restrictive practices that includes monitoring of detention
and other deprivations of liberty could assist in meeting Australia’s obligations under
OPCAT, if it were to ratify the agreement.
8.23 The Offices of the Public Advocate (South Australia and Victoria) (OPA (SA
and Vic)) noted the omission of detention as a restrictive practice from the National
Framework.29 Stakeholders emphasised that disability accommodation with locked
doors—where people cannot leave unless they are escorted—should be considered
places of detention.30 Arguably, detention constitutes a criminal offence or otherwise
fits within the high level definition of ‘seclusion’ in the National Framework as the
sole confinement of a person with disability in a room or physical space at any hour of
the day or night where voluntary exit is prevented, implied, or not facilitated. 31
8.24 The ALRC considers that a national approach should clarify the circumstances
under which detention would be a crime or restrictive practice. The ALRC commends
the existing Victorian32 and South Australian33 models, which prevent restrictions on
people’s liberty or freedom of movement, as useful in informing a national approach to
restrictive practices that explicitly addresses detention in schools, residential treatment
facilities and correctional institutions.
8.25 The People with Disability Australia and Disability Rights Research
Collaboration proposed that ‘a national dialogue’ with people with disability and their
representatives be held to consider all issues relating to the ‘use of and protection from
restrictive practices’.34 Such a dialogue would include examination of the relationship
between restrictive practices and torture, Australian’s international obligations under
OPCAT and the utilisation of evidence of restrictive practices administered on children
with disability that may be produced in the Royal Commission into Institutional
Responses to Child Sexual Abuse.35 Noting the dearth of empirical studies of the views
of people with disability and family carers, the joint submission contended that a
nationally consistent framework on restrictive practices must be shaped by their lived
experiences.36
A patchwork of existing laws and policies
8.26 Stakeholders expressed significant concerns about the unregulated use of
restrictive practices37 and were supportive of the ALRC’s proposal for national
reform.38
29 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
30 See, eg, PWDA and Disability Rights Research Collaboration, Submission 111.
31 See, French, Dardel and Price-Kelly, above n 5, 64–65; 97–98.
32 Disability Act 2006 (Vic) pt 8.
33 See policies of Disability Services and OPA (SA); Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA).
34 PWDA and Disability Rights Research Collaboration, Submission 111.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78; Central
Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33;
Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06;
Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
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8.27 Regulation of restrictive practices occurs at a state and territory level under
disability services and mental health legislation, and under a range of policy directives,
statements and guidance materials. There is substantial discrepancy in the regulation of
restrictive practices across jurisdictions, and the numerous frameworks ‘conspire to
make the legal framework in this area exceedingly complex’.39
8.28 Robust regulation that applies specifically to restrictive practices occurs in
Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania through disability services legislation.40 The
approach in other jurisdictions includes policy-based frameworks, voluntary codes of
practice, and regulation as an aspect of guardianship .41
8.29 In the context of the mental health system, Victoria and Queensland have
detailed provisions relating to restrictive practices, combined with minimum standard
guidelines42 and a policy statement.43 Legislative provisions are less prescriptive in
other jurisdictions.44 In NSW, the use of restrictive practices is regulated by a lengthy
policy directive.45 Mental health legislation is an area of ongoing review and reform,
with implications for the regulation of restrictive practices.46
38 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission
126;  National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100; Office of the Public Advocate
(SA and Vic), Submission 95; Central Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; Public Interest
Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20;
Carers Queensland Australia, Submission 14.
39 Michael Williams, John Chesterman and Richard Laufer, ‘Consent vs Scrutiny: Restrictive Liberties in
Post-Bournewood Victoria’ (2014) 21 Journal of Law and Medicine 1.
40 Disability Act 2006 (Vic); Disability Services (Restrictive Practices) and Other Legislation Amendment
Act 2014 (Qld); Disability Services Act 2011 (Tas).
41 For example, in NSW, guidelines govern the use of restrictive practices in relation to adults: NSW
Department of Family and Community Services, Behaviour Support Policy, Version 4.0 (March 2012). In
addition, the use of a distinct number of restrictive practices requires completion of a documented plan,
involving authorisation by an internal Restricted Practices Authorisation mechanism. Guardians
appointed under the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) may be authorised to consent to the use of restrictive
practices for people over 16 years of age. Restrictive practices in relation to children are governed by
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) and Children and Young Persons
(Care and Protection) Regulation 2012 (NSW). The WA Disability Services Commission is reviewing its
2012 Voluntary Code of Practice for the Elimination of Restrictive Practices in 2014.
42 Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) ss 81–82; Victorian Chief Psychiatrist’s Guideline, Seclusion in Approved
Mental Health Services (2011).
43 Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) pt 4A; Queensland Health Department, Policy Statement on Reducing and
Where Possible Eliminating Restraint and Seclusion in Queensland Mental Health Services (2008). See
also, Queensland Health Department, Mental Health Act 2000 Resource Guide (2012).
44 See, eg, Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) ss 7(h), 90, 98; Mental Health Act 1996 (WA) ss 116–124; Mental
Health and Related Services Act 1998 (NT) ss 61–62; Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994
(ACT).
45 NSW Health, Aggression, Seclusion & Restraint in Mental Health Facilities in NSW, Policy Directive
(June 2012).
46 In Tasmania, the Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) which regulates restrictive practices, commenced on
17 February 2014; and the new Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) commenced on 1 July 2014. There are also
several reviews of mental health legislation in a number of jurisdictions: in ACT, the second exposure
draft of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) was drafted in 2013; in WA, the Mental
Health Bill 2013 (WA) was adopted by the Legislative Assembly on 10 April 2014; review of the Bill in
the Legislative Council is pending; in SA, the Department of Health has completed public consultation on
the Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) and its report to Parliament is expected in June 2014; in Queensland,
submissions to a review focusing on areas for improvements to the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) closed
in August 2013; in NSW, a report was tabled in Parliament in May 2013: ‘Review of the NSW Mental
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8.30 Since March 2014, there is also a national agenda for consistency and
standardisation in the regulation of restrictive practices in the form of the National
Framework. The National Framework represents a united commitment ‘to the high-
level guiding principles and implementation of the core strategies to reduce the use of
restrictive practices in the disability service sector’.47
8.31 The National Framework is intended to work within existing legislative
arrangements to establish minimum standards in relation to the regulation of restrictive
practices. It embodies the agreement by all jurisdictions that, by 2018, all disability
service providers with NDIS funding will implement six core strategies to reduce the
use of restrictive practices.48 The COAG Disability Reform Council indicated that
these core strategies will guide governments in the development of national quality and
safeguards system for the NDIS.49 Until such a system is developed, state and territory
quality assurance and safeguards frameworks will apply.50
8.32 The NDIS system will be underpinned by the revised National Standards for
Disability Services.51 It is expected that, from 2018, this national system will govern
the use of restrictive practices affecting NDIS participants to ensure their access to
disability services is in accordance with human rights principles.
8.33 There are also relevant guidelines at a national level including those issued by
the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists,52 the Australian
Psychological Association,53 Alzheimer’s Australia54 and the Australian Government
Department of Health with respect to aged care.55
8.34 The complex web of state, territory and national laws, policies, codes and
guidelines has been much criticised. The OPA (SA and Vic) described the existing
Health Act 2007: Report for NSW Parliament, Summary of Consultation Feedback and Advice’ (NSW
Ministry of Health, May 2013). See also Ch 10.
47 Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive
Practices in the Disability Service Sector (2014) 2.
48 The six core strategies are: person-centred focus; leadership towards organisational change; use of data to
inform practice; workforce development; use of restraint and seclusion reduction tools; and debriefing
and practice review. See further Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and
Eliminating the Use of Restrictive Practices in the Disability Service Sector (2014).
49 COAG Disability Reform Council, Meeting Communiqué, 21 March 2014.
50 Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive
Practices in the Disability Service Sector (2014) 2–3; Intergovernmental Agreement on the NDIS Launch,
7 December 2012.
51 National Disability Insurance Scheme, Quality and Best Practice Framework <www.ndis.gov.au>. The
revised National Standards for Disability Services were endorsed by all governments on 18 December
2013. The six standards are: Rights; Participation and Inclusion; Individual Outcomes; Feedback and
Complaints; Service Access; and Service Management.
52 Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, Statements and Guidelines
<www.ranzcp.org>.
53 ‘Evidence-Based  Guidelines  to  Reduce  the  Need  for  Restrictive  Practices  in  the  Disability  Sector’
(Australian Psychological Society, 2011).
54 Alzheimer’s Australia, Quality Dementia Care Papers <www.fightdementia.org.au>.
55 See, eg, Department of Health, Decision-Making Tool: Supporting a Restraint Free Environment in
Residential Aged Care (2012). See also Senate Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of
Australia, Care and Management of Younger and Older Australians Living with Dementia and
Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia (2014).
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regulatory efforts as being ‘piecemeal’ across the country and insufficient ‘to protect
and promote the rights of people who are subject to restrictive interventions’.56
8.35 However, recent initiatives at a national level—the National Framework; the
development of a national quality and safeguards system for the NDIS; the National
Seclusion and Restraint Project57 and an Australian Research Council Linkage
Project58—provide a timely opportunity to inform and ground a uniform approach to
regulating restrictive practices that applies in a broader range of settings than just the
disability sector.
A national approach to regulation
Recommendation 8–1 The Australian Government and the Council of
Australian Governments should take the National Decision-Making Principles
into account in developing the national quality and safeguards system, which
will regulate restrictive practices in the context of the National Disability
Insurance Scheme.
The National Framework and the NDIS
8.36 The ALRC recommends the development of the NDIS system take into account
the National Decision-Making Principles. Among other things, this would mean that
provisions regulating restrictive practices would: encourage supported decision-making
before the use of such practices; provide for the appointment of representative
decision-makers only as a last resort; and require that the will, preferences and rights of
persons direct decisions about any use of restrictive practices.59
8.37 The ALRC recognises the complexity of incorporating supported decision-
making into regulation of restrictive practices, but considers that art 12 of the CRPD
should help inform any future national approach to restrictive practices—in particular,
by ensuring that decisions about restrictive practices are based on the ‘will, preferences
and rights’ of the person subjected to them.
8.38 The National Framework is an important platform for reform and embodies the
commitment of all jurisdictions to collaborate and evaluate progress against a set of
principles and strategies. The National Framework is based on the human rights
encapsulated in the CRPD, a person-centred focus and international research on best
practice.
56 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
57 National Mental Health Commission, National Seclusion and Restraint Project
<www.mentalhealthcommission.gov.au>.
58 Associate Professor Renata Kokanovic of Monash University is leading an ARC Linkage Project for
2013–2016 investigating options for supported decision-making to enhance recovery of people with
severe mental health problems.
59 See Ch 3.
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8.39 The National Framework incorporates guiding principles, including reference to
a ‘Person-Centred Focus’, which states that
people with disability (with the support of their guardians or advocates where
required) are the natural authorities for their own lives and processes that recognise
this authority in decision making, choice and control should guide the design and
provision of services.60
8.40 The National Framework also provides for ‘maximum respect for a person’s
autonomy’, including:
i.  recognising the presumption of capacity for decision making;
ii.  seeking a person’s consent and participation in decision making (with support if
necessary) prior to making a substitute decision on their behalf; and
iii.  engaging the appropriate decision maker and seeking consent where appropriate,
where a decision must be made on behalf of a person.61
8.41 The corresponding core strategy states that one of the key implementation areas
is the ‘availability of tools to assist people with disability and their guardians or
advocates (where appropriate) to participate in decision making’.62
8.42 However, the National Framework has been criticised for omitting reference to
art 12 of the CRPD and, in particular, the obligation on Australia to ‘take appropriate
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require
in exercising their legal capacity’.63
8.43 The National Decision-Making Principles are a vehicle for the Australian
Government and COAG to give effect to the right of persons with disability to have
equal recognition before the law captured in art 12 of the CRPD. The National
Decision-Making Principles make prominent the need to respect the will, preferences
and rights of persons with disability in making decisions affecting their lives.
The National Decision-Making Principles
8.44 Taking the National Decision-Making Principles into account in the context of
restrictive practices would mean that, as far as possible, decisions about restrictive
practices should ultimately be those of the person potentially subject to them.
8.45 The National Decision-Making Principles can be interpreted as being consistent
with best practice alternatives to restrictive practices, which consider the causes of
behaviour and plan for positive behaviour support.64 For example, a person may
require support to make decisions about the use of restrictive practices under a
behaviour support plan.
60 Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive
Practices in the Disability Service Sector (2014) 7.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid 10.
63 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 12(3); Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic),
Submission 95.
64 See, Paul Ramcharan et al, ‘Experiences of Restrictive Practices: A View from People with Disabilities
and Family Carers’ (Research Report, Victorian Officer of the Senior Practitioner, May 2009).
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8.46 The story of ‘Vincent’ demonstrates the importance of providing for supported
decision-making and complaint mechanisms:
Vincent is 32 and lives in a major city. He has an intellectual disability with complex
behaviour. He has lived in supported accommodation since he was a teenager. His
parents, Maria and Carl, are increasingly frail and visit him as often as they can. One
visit, they become concerned about the amount of medication used for Vincent. They
raise their concerns with the support worker who says that the behaviour management
recommended is too hard as there aren’t enough workers on the evening shifts ...
Maria and Carl begin to worry that making a complaint may make matters worse for
Vincent, but the manager explains that the formal process helps the service understand
issues and make improvements. They call Hannah (an independent advocate) for
advice. At their request, Hannah joins them for a meeting with the service. The staff
say that Vincent has become increasingly violent and they are concerned about their
safety and the safety of other residents.65
8.47 The management of Vincent’s behaviour of concern requires a considered,
multi-pronged response:
The family and the service agree that they need to update Vincent’s behaviour support
plan, to support him earlier. The service agrees that workers need extra  training on
behaviour management, to avoid the use of medication. The service reviews its use of
restrictive practices and organises training to improve behaviour support planning and
implementation, and working with families to plan and review behaviour support.66
8.48 An NDIS system that is informed by the National Decision-Making Principles
may enhance the prospects for Vincent to directly express his will and preferences,
through having the right to communication support from anyone of his choice—
parents, carers, fellow residents or independent advocates.
8.49 Supported decision-making could also help reduce and avoid the use of
restrictive practices for persons with disability. Research has found that many persons
with disability feel unsafe in the situations and environments they are faced with. 67
Many find it challenging to maintain their privacy and safety where staff numbers are
low or where there is no active engagement.68 They may rightly feel angry when
services are not delivered but often feel powerless in disability and mental health
facilities. Therefore, they may communicate their views about their environments and
situations through their challenging behaviours.69
8.50 If the NDIS system is consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles,
a family member or carer of an NDIS participant with intellectual disability could help
to communicate to the disability service provider, for instance, the reasons behind any
‘behaviours of concern’—such as, discomfort in an environment, boredom with an
65 Department of Social Services, National Standards for Disability Services Stories (January 2014)
<http://www.dss.gov.au>.
66 Ibid.
67 Ramcharan et al, ‘Experiences of Restrictive Practices: A View from People with Disabilities and Family
Carers’, above n 64.
68 PWDA and Disability Rights Research Collaboration, Submission 111.
69 Ibid.
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activity or strong aversions to certain food. Adjusting the environmental factors or
stimuli may eliminate or moderate the need for any restraints or seclusion to be used.
Communication of will and preferences
8.51 Communication is crucial to a supported decision-making model.70 Loretta
Woolston identified the lack of specialised communication support as a decisive issue
for people with complex communications needs in relation to restrictive practices:
complex communications consumers of Disability Restrictive Practices (RP),
seclusion, containment and chemical restraint have little to no systemic
communication systems to assist and support them to participate in their health, legal
and complaint systems decision making. They are discriminated against by the
omission or lack of professional interpreter and translating services as currently
provided by the Australian, states and territories governments to aboriginal, deaf or
linguistically challenged persons.71
8.52 Silence from or acquiescence by persons with disability is taken as consent
when this behaviour may in fact be the effect of disempowerment, institutionalisation
and social isolation. Jo Watson’s research on the communication of people with severe
and profound disability demonstrates that it is possible to discern their wishes and
preferences through the investment of time and effort.72
8.53 Support should also be available for people who do not have family or friends
who can assist them in communicating their will and preferences. In some decision-
making, the ‘representative’ of the person—a state guardian, administrator or a
Commonwealth representative should be directed by the person’s will, preferences and
rights in making decisions for them.
8.54 Advance care directives may help determine a person’s will and preferences.
The OPA (SA and Vic) submitted that having support measures in place would be
useful in the care management of people with disability.
A person with a mental illness who has a Ulysses agreement may be calmer because
of an  effective pre-planned strategy to deal with distress when unwell; and a person
with an intellectual disability who can plan and control their life and has necessary
supports will be  less likely to be in the types of situation that lead to restrictive
practices, such as overcrowding and boredom.73
8.55 The OPA (SA and Vic) expressed some concerns about how supported decision-
making in relation to consent to the use of restrictive practices will be applied under
state and territory mental health law or disability legislation.74 The ALRC recommends
review of these state and territory laws.75 The principal aims of such a review would be
70 See Ch 3.
71 L Woolston, Submission 89; Loretta Woolston, Submission No 303 to the Senate Committee on
Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Prevalence of Different Types of Speech, Language and
Communication Disorders and Speech Pathology Services in Australia, 2014.
72 Scope, Submission 88.
73 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95; John Brayley, ‘Your Right to Know:
Consumer and Carer Participation and Involuntary Mental Health Care’, MIFSA News, April–May 2011.
74 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
75 See Ch 10.
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to encourage supported decision-making, and to shift from a best interests test to one
directed by a person’s will, preferences and rights.76
8.56 In the ALRC’s view, a distinction should be maintained between lawful
substitute consent to the use of the restrictive practice by a guardian or other authorised
person and the support provided by a family member or carer to the person with
disability in determining their will and preferences.
8.57 It is expected that, in a majority of cases, supporters will help discern a person’s
will and preferences concerned with restrictive practices. However, the NDIS system
and any other national approaches must also make provision for situations where a
person does not have informal support or it is otherwise impossible to determine their
will and preferences. The ALRC recommends that in these cases, the human rights
relevant to the situation apply in making decisions regarding restrictive practices. 77
8.58 The ALRC disputes the assertion that if a person can be supported to give
consent to a restrictive practice, then they may not be in need of restraint or seclusion. 78
The ‘level of insight’ into one’s behaviour,79 often understood as mental capacity, is
not determinative of a person’s capacity to consent to or refuse decisions about their
bodily integrity, liberty, freedom, wills and preferences. This is because a person with
an intellectual, cognitive or psychosocial disability may clearly express their will and
preferences directly themselves at the time of the proposed use of the restrictive
practice, have done so previously or through communication support, without needing
to meet a certain level of mental capacity. The National Decision-Making Principles
embody this stance.
8.59 PWDA and the Disability Rights Research Collaboration expressed concern that
the initiatives to regulate, rather than eliminate, restrictive practices legitimise
potentially serious breaches of human rights.80 They cautioned that ‘a perverse
outcome’ may result if a national framework enabled people with disability to consent
to very serious breaches of their fundamental rights.81
8.60 The ALRC agrees that ‘reforms to the legal framework regarding legal capacity
should be aiming to reduce and limit the potential for these further rights violations to
occur’.82 A national approach to regulating restrictive practices is the first phase in a
longer-term, iterative process towards the elimination of any rights violations against
persons with disability. A stepped model is needed, along with rights education and
resources devoted to guidance and training of persons with disability, their supporters
and representatives.
76 For prior consideration of the role of state and territory appointed decision-makers in relation to
restrictive practices, see, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship,  Final  Report  No  24
(2012); French, Dardel and Price-Kelly, above n 5; Michael Williams, John Chesterman and Richard
Laufer, above n 39.
77 See Ch 3.
78 NSW Government, Submission 135.
79 Ibid.
80 PWDA and Disability Rights Research Collaboration, Submission 111.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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8.61 Many stakeholders emphasised the importance of safeguards in the use of
restrictive practices.83 PIAC proposed that any national or nationally consistent
approach should ensure that restrictive practices
are only implemented as a last resort; are implemented for the least amount of time
possible; are recorded, monitored and reviewed; have tight safeguards in place that are
focused on minimising risk to staff, patients, carers and family; and are undertaken
with a focus on ensuring decency, humanity and respect at all stages.84
8.62 Taking the National Decision-Making Principles and the Safeguards Guidelines
into account in the regulation of restrictive practices would mean that any
representative decision-making would be in a form least restrictive of the person’s
human rights; appealable; and subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring
and review.
A national approach in other sectors
Recommendation 8–2 The Australian Government and the Council of
Australian Governments should develop a national approach to the regulation of
restrictive practices in sectors other than disability services, such as aged care
and health care.
8.63 The National Framework currently applies only to the disability services sector.
The ALRC acknowledges the ongoing work of the Disability Reform Council,85 but
recommends that the Australian Government and the COAG also develop a national
approach to restrictive practices across other relevant sectors.
8.64 Stakeholders were very supportive of the ALRC’s proposal for a national or
nationally-consistent approach to restrictive practices.86 The National Mental Health
Consumer  and  Carer  Forum  and  the  Mental  Health  Council  of  Australia  (NMHCCF
and MHCA), for example, recommended the development and adoption of
nationally consistent legislation governing restrictive practices, of which seclusion
and restraint are included, be developed and adopted across all states and territories.
This legislation should include standardised terminology and definitions and set clear
and effective practice standards.87
83 NACLC and PWDA, Submission 134; Illawarra Forum, Submission 124; National Association of
Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78.
84 Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. See also Senate Committee on Community Affairs,
Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger and Older Australians Living with Dementia
and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia (2014) recs 14, 15.
85 The Disability Policy Group is developing a national framework for quality and safeguards and is
expected to report to the Disability Reform Council and the COAG by early 2015: NSW Government,
Submission 135.
86 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Proposal 8–1.
87 NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81.
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8.65 The Disability Discrimination Legal Service (DDLS) recommended that a
national framework or approach ‘be binding on organisations that receive federal
funding, via inclusion in service agreements’.88 The OPA (Vic) suggested the creation
of a National Senior Practitioner (mirroring the role of Victoria’s Senior Practitioner)
to monitor and audit the use of restrictive practices in aged care facilities.89
8.66 The OPA (SA and Vic) identified the challenge of reducing and eliminating the
use of restrictive practices in Australia is exacerbated by ‘the lack of uniform
legislative controls and reporting requirements and the absence of equivalent key
players across all jurisdictions’.90 The solution may lie in ‘clear, uniform legislative
controls and reporting requirements’ for the use of restrictive interventions in all
government funded and supported accommodation services, modelled on provisions of
the Disability Act 2006 (Vic).91 The OPA (SA and Vic) called for coverage of both
federal and state funded and supported accommodation, including aged care facilities,
schools and prisons.92
8.67 Stakeholders stressed the need for a national approach beyond the disability
services sector and the NDIS.93 Disability Rights Now recommended that, due to the
use of restrictive practices in a range of contexts, ‘any framework on restrictive
practices needs to recognise this, and be part of a wider overarching strategy
addressing violence and abuse of people with disability in general’.94
8.68 The ALRC recommends the regulation of restrictive practices cover the use of
restrictive practices in a range of settings.95 This is particularly important given that
persons with disability may experience restrictive practices in a variety of contexts,
including: supported accommodation and group homes; residential aged care facilities;
mental health facilities; hospitals; prisons; and schools.96 Harmonising laws and
reducing red-tape related to restrictive practices in all relevant sectors, and not just
disability services, may result in cost benefits for service providers around Australia.97
88 Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55 attachment 1. See also National Association of
Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95;
National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78; Carers Queensland Inc,
Submission 14.
89 Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.
90 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
91 Claire Spivakovsky, ‘Restrictive Interventions in Victoria’s Disability Sector: Issues for Discussion and
Reform’ (Office of the Public Advocate, Victoria, August 2012); Disability Act 2006 (Vic) pt 7.
92 Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
93 See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
94 Disability Rights Now, above n 23, 14.
95 See, eg, Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55 attachment 1. See also P French,
J Dardel and S Price-Kelly, ‘Rights Denied: Towards a National Policy Agenda about Abuse, Neglect and
Exploitation of Persons with Cognitive Impairment’ [2009] People with Disability Australia.
96 See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78; Children with
Disability Australia, Submission 68; Central Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; Public Interest
Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06;  Office  of  the
Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
97 See, KinCare Services, Submission 112.
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8.69 Concerns about restrictive practices in aged care were highlighted by several
stakeholders, as well as the Senate inquiry into dementia.98 The Senate inquiry
recommended ‘the Commonwealth develop, in consultation with dementia advocates
and service providers, guidelines for the recording and reporting on the use of all forms
of restraints in residential facilities’.99 Similarly, the Office of the Public Advocate
(Vic) highlighted concerns about ‘the high use of restrictive interventions on residents
of aged care facilities’ and stated that it ‘would like to see greater regulation and on-
site auditing of this practice’.100
8.70 Justice Connect and Senior Rights Victoria supported national regulation in aged
care ‘due to the failure of current laws to provide a comprehensive framework’ for
decisions affecting people with ‘disabilities solely related to ageing’.101
8.71 The OPA (SA and Vic) submitted there is an ‘alarming lack of Commonwealth
oversight’ over the high use of restrictive interventions, particularly chemical
restraints, on residents of aged care facilities. They urged the ALRC to
carefully consider how the Commonwealth decision-making model can both provide
for supported decision-making arrangements, and establish protective mechanisms in
relation to the use of restrictive practices in aged care facilities.102
8.72 There are two comprehensive guidelines issued by the Department of Health in
relation to supporting restraint-free practices in residential aged care and community
aged care.103 However, stakeholders expressed strong support for binding national
regulation rather than just guidelines.
8.73 The use of restrictive practices on people with mental illness in a variety of
situations is recognised by the National Seclusion and Restraint Project. The Project
extends beyond hospitals and health facilities to include community, custodial and
ambulatory settings.104 The national study seeks to capture best practice in reducing or
eliminating seclusion and restraint around Australia and it may help produce an
evidence base upon which a national approach could be developed.105
98 Senate Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger
and Older Australians Living with Dementia and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia
(2014) rec 14.
99 Ibid.
100  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
101  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
102  Office of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95. See also Office of the Public Advocate (SA),
Submission 17.
103  Department of Health, Decision-Making Tool: Supporting a Restraint Free Environment in Residential
Aged Care, above n 1; Department of Health, Decision-Making Tool: Supporting a Restraint Free
Environment in Community Aged Care, above n 1.
104  National Mental Health Commission, National Seclusion and Restraint Project, above n 57.
105  The Project was established by the National Mental Health Commission in partnership with the Mental
Health Commission of Canada and a number of key Australian bodies, including the Australian Human
Rights Commission. The National Mental Health Commission has also ‘engaged an interdisciplinary
team of researchers from the University of Melbourne to look at best practice in reducing and eliminating
the use of seclusion and restraint in relation to mental health issues and help identify good practice
treatment approaches. The research team aims to identify what factors drive current practice in service
delivery to evaluate how these factors can lead to best practice’: National Seclusion and Restraint Project,
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8.74 Smoke-free hospitals may be environmental restraints on people with mental
illness, particularly involuntary patients, if no exemption for them applies.106 The
NMHCCF asserted that any service that imposes smoking bans on consumers at a time
when they are acutely unwell are ‘engaging in cruel and inhumane treatment and
demonstrating a complete indifference to the distress of this consumer group’.107
Furthermore, non-compliance with anti-smoking policies by patients appears to trigger
the use of restrictive practices and rates of seclusion.108
Other issues
8.75 The ALRC does not recommend specific mechanisms for enforcing regulation
of restrictive practices, recognising the many options for reform and the expertise held
by Australian Government departments and agencies, COAG and others in this area.
8.76 However, it is worth noting that stakeholders expressed various views on the
form a national approach should take.109 Many of them submitted that some binding
form of regulation is preferred or necessary. For example, the DDLS submitted that it
would be ‘insufficient’ to simply have a framework and hope that the relevant
organisations will abide by its ‘guidelines’.110
8.77 The NMHCCF warned against ‘the illusion of compliance’ in applying a
national framework to service agreements that are not enforced.111 People with
Disabilities WA and the Centre for Human Rights Education preferred regulation over
voluntary codes, like that in Western Australia,112 because voluntary codes provide
useful guidance but cannot guarantee implementation by all service providers.113
8.78 Legal Aid Queensland favoured a legislative scheme which imposed a positive
duty on carer organisations to provide all practical help to support an adult with
impaired capacity with respect to decisions about restrictive practices.114 This is
because, without such an obligation, there has only been a ‘minority of cases’ where
Project Information <www.socialequity.unimelb.edu.au>. See also, the ARC Linkage Project on options
for supported decision-making to enhance recovery of people with severe mental health problems.
106  National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100. An estimated 32% of people with a
mental illness smoke tobacco compared to 18% of the general population: Sane Australia, Smoking and
Mental Illness: Factsheet 16 (2014) <www.sane.org>.
107  ‘Advocacy Brief: Smoking and Mental Health’ (National Mental Health Consumer and Carer Forum,
February 2014).
108  National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100; Senate Committee on Community
Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger and Older Australians Living with
Dementia and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia (2014).
109  People with Disabilities WA and Centre for Human Rights Education, Submission 133; National
Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; PWDA and Disability Rights Research
Collaboration, Submission 111;  Offices  of  the  Public  Advocate  (SA  and  Vic), Submission 95; Mental
Health Coordinating Council, Submission 94; Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55.
110  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55 attachment 1.
111  National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
112  ‘Voluntary Code of Practice for the Elimination of Restrictive Practices’ (Disability Services Commission
of Western Australia, September 2012).
113  People with Disabilities WA and Centre for Human Rights Education, Submission 133.
114  Citing the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(3): Legal Aid Qld, Submission 141.
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their lawyers have successfully advocated for funded carers to consider the proposed
use of restrictive practices and develop supported decision-making for the adult.115
8.79 The OPA (SA and Vic) supported a comprehensive approach that addresses
current gaps across sectors and jurisdictions which incorporates legislation and national
guidelines, codes of practice or policy directives, as well as education, training and
guidance.116 Other submissions called for laws to incorporate key principles117 or to
mandate training that will complement the use of strategies to reduce restrictive
practices such as positive support behaviour plans.118
8.80 Monitoring the use of restrictive practices is an essential element of any
regulatory framework. The Australian Government and COAG’s commitment to
implement a data monitoring system, that integrates existing arrangements by 2018
under the National Framework, may form the basis for the design of a national
mechanism for enforcement in relation to restrictive practices in Australia.
Stakeholders suggested some ‘touchstones’ for monitoring the use of restrictive
practices may relate to the veracity of the data, specifically, the accuracy in staff
recognition of restrictive practices and in recording instances following clear data
collection principles.119
115  Legal Aid Qld, Submission 141.
116  Offices of the Public Advocate (SA and Vic), Submission 95.
117  For example, 10 Principles are identified in the National Safety Priorities in Mental Health: a National
Plan to Reduce Harm: Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 94.
118  For example, Nonviolent Crisis Intervention Training: L Woolston, Submission 89.
119  National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
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Summary
9.1 Australia is obliged, under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), to guarantee that persons with disability can
‘effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with
others, directly or through freely chosen representatives’, including the right and
opportunity to vote and be elected.1
9.2 The ALRC recommends that the ‘unsound mind’ provisions of the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (the Electoral Act),  which  relate  to
disqualification for enrolment and voting, be repealed. The removal of the unsound
mind provisions is consistent with the recommendation by the United Nations
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) that Australia ‘enact
legislation restoring the presumption of the capacity of persons with disabilities to vote
and exercise choice; and to ensure that all aspects of voting in an election are made
accessible to all citizens with a disability’.2
9.3 The ALRC recommends a new exemption to compulsory voting based on a
functional test consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles. A person
without decision-making ability in relation to voting should be exempt from the
penalties arising from failure to vote. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)
1 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 29. See also Ibid arts 4, 12; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force
23 March 1976) art 25; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 art 21.
2 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of
Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its 10th Session (2–13 September 2013)’ (United Nations,
4 October 2013).
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should provide guidance material, consistent with the National Decision-Making
Principles, to assist Divisional Returning Officers (DROs) to determine whether or not
a person with disability had a valid and sufficient reason for not voting at an election.
A person should be able to claim an exemption, or an exemption should be granted by
a DRO.
9.4 Where a person with disability requires assistance to vote, they should be
supported by all available means. The ALRC recommends that current provisions of
the Electoral Act concerning permissible support be broadened, and that the AEC
provide its officers with guidance and training to improve support in enrolment and
voting  for  persons  with  disability.  As  the  right  to  a  secret  vote  is  fundamental  to  the
right to vote, but may be compromised by some forms of support, the AEC should also
investigate methods of maintaining the secrecy of voting.
Repeal of the ‘unsound mind’ provisions
Recommendation 9–1 The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth)
should be amended to repeal:
(a) s 93(8)(a), which provides that a person of ‘unsound mind’ who is
‘incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment or
voting’ is not entitled to have their name on the electoral roll or to vote in
any Senate or House of Representatives election; and
(b) s 118(4), which relates to objections to enrolment on the basis that a
person is of ‘unsound mind’.
Recommendation 9–2 State and territory governments should repeal
‘unsound mind’ provisions in their electoral legislation and make other changes
consistent with those recommended by the ALRC with respect to the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).
9.5 Under the Electoral Act, persons of ‘unsound mind’ are not entitled to have their
names on the electoral roll or to vote in elections, and may be removed from electoral
roll following objection. The ALRC recommends that these provisions be repealed.
9.6 Section 93(8)(a) and pt IX of the Electoral Act provide for a person’s
entitlement to enrolment, their right to vote and objections to enrolment. Section
93(8)(a) provides that a person is not entitled to have their name placed or retained on
the electoral roll, or to vote at any Senate or House of Representatives election, where
they are a person ‘who by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of
understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’.
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9.7 There are several steps involved in removing a person from the electoral roll:
· a written objection must be lodged by an enrolled elector;3
· the objection must be supported by a medical certificate;4
· the AEC must give the individual an opportunity to respond to the written
objection;5 and
· the Electoral Commissioner determines the objection after making necessary
inquiries.6
9.8 In 2012, the AEC submitted evidence to the Joint Standing Committee on
Electoral Matters that 28,603 people were removed from the electoral roll on the basis
of the unsound mind provision from 2008–2012.7 People with Disability Australia
(PWDA), the Australian Centre for Disability Law (ACDL) and the Australian Human
Rights Centre (AHR Centre) criticised provisions of this type, which ‘all too often’
seek to remove or limit a person’s legal agency to exercise their rights:
Frequently, this is due to a conflated understanding of legal capacity with mental
capacity. For example, provisions which make exception for people with ‘unsound
mind’, ‘disability’, ‘mental incapacity’ or ‘incompetence’ are expressing the view that
the existence of a cognitive impairment permits a limitation on the exercise of legal
agency and thus recognition of legal capacity as a whole.8
9.9 The policy objective of the provision is protective, to allow some persons with
disability to be excused from the compulsory duty to vote. The Australian Government
has stated that ‘these arrangements and review rights ensure that the rights of people
with disability are not encroached’ and that the provisions are ‘considered to be
consistent with Article 29 of the Convention [CRPD]’.9 Most democratic countries
have some capacity-related qualification for voting.10
3 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) ss 114–116.
4 Ibid s 118(4).
5 Ibid ss 116–118.
6 Ibid s 118. There are also avenues to challenge a decision to remove a person’s name from the electoral
roll. These include internal review and review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) pt X; Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth); and by the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
7 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, ‘Advisory Report on the Electoral and Referendum
(Improving Electoral Procedure) Bill 2012 (Cth)’ (August 2012) [2.66].
8 PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66.
9 Australian Treaty National Interest Analysis, United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities [2008] ATNIA 18 [11].
10 In 2001, only four (Canada, Ireland, Italy and Sweden) out of 63 democratic countries had no restrictions
on voting by adults with mental incapacities. In 2010, the European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights found 13 of 27 European Union member states had denied voting rights to adults under measures
for an intellectual disability or a mental health problem: cited in The University of Cambridge—
Cambridge Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities Research Group, Submission to the Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the Participation of Persons with Disabilities in Political and
Public Life, 15 October 2011.
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9.10 In Roach v Electoral Commission, the High Court found s 93(8)(a) of the
Electoral Act to be constitutionally valid and stated that:
It limits the exercise of the franchise, but does so for an end apt to protect the integrity
of the electoral  process.  That end,  plainly enough, is  consistent  and compatible with
the maintenance of the system of representative government.11
9.11 The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters reviewed the unsound mind
provision in s 93(8)(a) and concluded that, given Australia’s system of compulsory
enrolment and voting, it provides a useful mechanism ‘to protect the integrity of
elections and assist those who might otherwise have to deal repeatedly with the AEC as
to why they are not complying with their enrolment and voting obligations’.12
9.12 Stakeholders pointed to recent commentary on art 29 of the CRPD, indicating
that a person’s capacity should not affect their right to vote. In particular, in April
2014,  the  UNCRPD  stated  that,  in  order  to  realise  the  legal  capacities  of  persons  to
participate in public and political life:
a person’s decision-making ability cannot be a justification for any exclusion of
persons with disability from exercising their political rights, including the right to
vote, the right to stand for election and to serve as a member of a jury. 13
9.13 The Human Rights Law Centre suggested that this statement is a consolidation
of the movement ‘away from a medical and protectionist view of disability towards a
social and rights based approach in which people with disability have a right to enjoy
equal legal capacity’.14
9.14 This move towards a social theory of disability is illustrated by a 2013 decision
of the UNCRPD. In Zsolt Bujdosó v Hungary, the UNCRPD held discriminatory and
invalid a Hungarian law which sought to comply with the CRPD by assessing the
capacity to vote of individuals with intellectual disabilities who were previously
automatically disenfranchised as subjects of guardianship. In doing so, the UNCRPD
reiterated that:
Article 29 does not provide for any reasonable restriction or exception for any group
of persons with disabilities. Therefore, an exclusion of the right to vote on the basis of
a perceived or actual psychosocial or intellectual disability, including a restriction
pursuant to an individualized assessment, constitutes discrimination on the basis of
disability, within the meaning of article 2 of the Convention.15
11 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, [88] (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ).
12 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, above n 7, [2.93].
13 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014 [44].
14 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139.
15 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Views: Communication No 4/2011, 10th Sess, UN
Doc CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011 (2-13 September 2013) (’Zsolt Bujdosó, Jánosné Ildikó Márkus, Viktória
Márton, Sándor Mészáros, Gergely Polk and János Szabó v Hungary’) [9.4].
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Entitlement to enrol and vote
9.15 Section 93(8)(a) of the Electoral Act has attracted criticism.16 The  Human
Rights Law Centre stated that the exclusion of persons of ‘unsound mind’ from the
franchise ‘is vague, stigmatising and overly broad, and does not reflect the true
capacity of people with disabilities to make decisions about voting’.17 Other
stakeholders considered the provision to be ambiguous.18
9.16 Stakeholders supported removing the unsound mind provision on the basis that
it is not consistent with Australia’s international law obligations.19 For example, the
National Association of Community Legal Centres (NACLC) argued that the ‘most
appropriate approach, and one consistent with international law, is to repeal s 93(8)(a)
in its entirety and remove any restriction on eligibility for enrolment connected to
capability’.20
9.17 The ALRC concludes the unsound mind provision in s 93(8)(a) of the Electoral
Act should be repealed. The phrase ‘unsound mind’ is considered ‘derogatory,
judgemental and stigmatising’.21 As discussed in Chapter 2, words and terms should
not be used that tend to lower the dignity of people with disabilities. Arguably, repeal
would also be consistent with Australia’s obligations under art 8 of the CRPD.22
9.18 In upholding universal suffrage for persons with disability, the ALRC
recognises concerns about maintaining the integrity of the electoral system, especially
in the context of compulsory voting. That is, there may be concern about the ‘harm that
may be caused by votes cast by persons who are not able to understand the nature and
significance of voting’.23 However, in practice, no test is conducted when a person
seeks to enrol or vote.
In practice the provision is ‘used’ when a person raises a concern with the AEC about
another person, initiating a formal process which may result in the removal of the
second person from the electoral roll. These concerns are generally raised by persons
close to the elector in question, and motivated by what they see as the best interests of
16 See, eg, Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139; PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 66;
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32.
See also People with Disability Australia and the NSW Disability Discrimination Law Centre,
Submission No 90 to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s
Democracy, 2009.
17 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139.
18 Ibid; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission
32. See also People with Disability Australia and the NSW Disability Discrimination Law Centre,
Submission No 90 to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s
Democracy, 2009.
19 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139; PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 136.
20 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
21 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139.
22 Article 8 contains a duty to undertake to adopt immediate, efficient and appropriate measures to combat
stereotypes and prejudice in relation to persons with disability in all areas of life: UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force
3 May 2008) art 8.
23 Australian Government, Electoral Reform Green Paper—Strengthening Australia’s Democracy (2009)
42.
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the person concerned, for example protecting them from having to respond to repeated
penalty notices for failure to vote at successive elections.24
9.19 There is no evidence that reform to remove the unsound mind provisions would
cause any new problems with regard to the integrity of the electoral system, undue
influence or fraud. If the concern is protecting persons with disability from having to
respond to penalty notices, there are solutions that do not involve removing the person
from the electoral roll.25
No new threshold test
9.20 Stakeholders were uniformly against adopting any new ‘capacity test’ of the
kind proposed by the ALRC in the Discussion Paper.26 The Human Rights Law Centre
argued that the proposed threshold was both too high and made false assumptions
about the decision-making ability required to vote:
Many people with dementia, for example, may have impaired decision-making ability
regarding day to day decisions, but nonetheless maintain long-held firm views on
which person or parties should be in government.27
9.21 The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) highlighted that, in some
circumstances, people of ‘sound mind’ do not understand the ‘nature and significance
of enrolment and voting’,28 but are still entitled to vote.29 This perspective was echoed
by the Human Rights Law Centre:
Regardless of disability, not all voters cast their vote by understanding, retaining and
weighing information relevant to an election (as required by the ALRC’s proposed
decision-making test). Requiring individuals with impaired decision-making ability to
vote in this way imposes a burden upon people with a disability that is not imposed
upon the general population.30
9.22 Trevor Ryan favoured repeal of s 93(8)(a), but argued that the ALRC should
‘focus instead on strengthened regulation of voter fraud and coercion, and greater
flexibility in the enforcement of compulsory voting’:
While the proposed amendments (including the criteria, the machinery, and the
persons involved in assessing capacity) adopt some of the more progressive elements
of the modern, de-medicalised adult guardianship regime, this seems to be premised
upon (and entrenches) a problematic conflation of the civil guardianship system and
the exercise of political rights.31
24 Ibid.
25 Compare the denial of legal capacity to married women prior to the 19th century. Married women were
denied testamentary power in relation to real property because it was regarded they might be overborne
by their husbands: Henry Swinburne, A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills (John Windet, 1590).
The woman’s capacity was denied, rather than the husband’s power checked.
26 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139; Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126; National Mental
Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100; Trevor Ryan, Submission 99.
27 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139.
28 Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41.
29 See also, People with Disability Australia and the NSW Disability Discrimination Law Centre,
Submission No 90 to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s
Democracy, 2009.
30 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139.
31 Trevor Ryan, Submission 99.
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9.23 The Australian Government Electoral Reform Green Paper acknowledged there
are some concerns about the provision, but considered it as necessary to protect the
integrity of the electoral system. It emphasised that
in practice however, no test for ‘soundness of mind’ is conducted when a person seeks
to enrol or approaches a polling booth on election day. In practice the provision is
‘used’ when a person raises a concern with the AEC ... These concerns are generally
raised by persons close to the elector in question.32
9.24 There has been some parliamentary consideration of the unsound mind
provision.33 The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Improving Electoral
Procedure) Bill 2012 (Cth) presented amendments which would have removed the term
‘unsound mind’ and broadened the range of qualified persons to provide a statement
(and not a medical certificate by a doctor) about the elector’s capacity to understand
the nature and significance of voting. However, the Australian Government accepted
the recommendation of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, which was
not satisfied that there was any ‘pressing need to remove or substitute the phrase
“unsound mind” or that it breaches any international obligations in relation to rights to
electoral participation’.34
Removal from the electoral roll
9.25 A person may only be removed from the electoral roll based on an objection
supported by a certificate from a medical practitioner.35 The medical certificate must
state that, in the opinion of the medical practitioner, the elector, because of
‘unsoundness of mind’, is incapable of understanding the nature and significance of
enrolment and voting.36
9.26 The ALRC recommends that this provision of the Electoral Act should also be
repealed. However, while there should be no new threshold test for enrolment or
voting, there should be a new exemption from compulsory voting for those who lack
decision-making ability relating to voting.
9.27 State and territory governments should consider repealing comparable
provisions in their electoral legislation,37 consistently with recommendations relating to
the review of state and territory laws.38
32 Australian Government, Electoral Reform Green Paper—Strengthening Australia’s Democracy (2009)
42.
33 At a state level, in relation to an equivalent provision, the Victorian Electoral Matters Committee
encouraged the Victorian Electoral Commission to work directly with the Department of Justice and
Chief Parliamentary Counsel (Department of Premier and Cabinet) ‘to develop an appropriate
terminology’: Electoral Matters Committee, ‘Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2010 Victorian State
Election and Matters Related Thereto’ (May 2012) [7.49].
34 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, above n 7.
35 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 118(4).
36 Ibid.
37 See, eg, unsound mind provisions contained in the following legislation: Parliamentary Electorates and
Elections Act 1912 (NSW) s 25(a); Electoral Act 1907 (WA) s 18(1)(a); Electoral Act 1985 (SA)
s 29(1)(iv).
38 See Ch 10.
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Valid and sufficient reason for failure to vote
Recommendation 9–3 Section 245 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
1918 (Cth) on compulsory voting should be amended to provide that it is a
‘valid and sufficient reason’ for not voting if a person cannot:
(a) understand information relevant to voting at the particular election;
(b) retain that information for a sufficient period to make a voting decision;
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of voting; or
(d)   communicate their vote in some way.
Recommendation 9–4 The Australian Electoral Commission should
provide Divisional Returning Officers with guidance and training, consistent
with the National Decision-Making Principles, to help them determine if a
person with disability has a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote.
A new functional exemption
9.28 Section 245 of the Electoral Act provides voting is compulsory. Section 245(4)
provides that a DRO is not required to send or deliver a penalty notice if satisfied that
the elector: is dead, was overseas, was ineligible to vote or ‘had a valid and sufficient
reason for failing to vote’. Electors with a valid and sufficient reason for not voting do
not have to pay a fine.
9.29 The ALRC recommends amendment of the Electoral Act to specify that  it  is  a
valid and sufficient reason for not voting, if the person cannot understand, retain and
weigh information relevant to voting, or communicate their vote in some way. The
wording of the recommendation is intended to be consistent with other instances in
which the ALRC has recommended that some form of functional test of ability needs
to be retained.39
9.30 Exemption from compulsory voting would ensure there is a mechanism so that
people who lack decision-making ability relating to voting are not unfairly penalised.
Some form of functional test is needed to determine whether someone has a ‘valid and
sufficient reason’ not to vote because, otherwise, persons with disability who are on the
electoral roll may be fined for not voting when they are not able to understand what it
means to vote.40
39 See, eg, in relation to eligibility to stand trial: Ch 7.
40 Stakeholders also noted exemptions may need to apply where persons with disability did not understand
when or where booths were open, could not get to a polling station, or for some other reason associated
with their disability: see, eg, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; People with Disability
Australia and the NSW Disability Discrimination Law Centre, Submission No 90 to the Minister of State,
Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009.
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9.31 Some stakeholders said disability should be included as a specific criterion
excusing failure to vote. In particular, PIAC endorsed a submission by the PWDA and
the NSW Disability Discrimination Legal Centre (DDLC) on the Electoral Reform
Green Paper that s 245(4) should be amended to ‘include people with an intellectual or
psychiatric disability who are unwell at election time’ as a valid and sufficient reason
for failing to vote.41 The ALRC has not examined in any detail whether exemptions
along these lines would be desirable, but observes that such status-based approaches
may not accord with the CRPD.
9.32 The recommended exemption would cover situations where a person’s intended
support failed them, or where support was not able to facilitate an expression of the
person’s will and preference with respect to voting.42 A person should not necessarily
be removed from the electoral roll in these circumstances, and the potential to vote in
future elections should not be removed.43
9.33 Persons with disability should not be required to provide a medical certificate
when seeking an exemption from laws requiring them to vote. At present, an
exemption may be given by a DRO for any valid and sufficient reason, and no
particular form of proof is required. To require a medical certificate in order to claim
the exemption would place too great a burden on individuals or their families. 44
Further, the AEC needs flexibility to decide that, having accepted that a person has a
valid and sufficient reason not to vote in one election, subsequent failures to vote will
also not be penalised—where the reason for not voting is likely to be ongoing.
However, the person should remain on the electoral roll and be entitled to vote, if they
can be supported to do so.
Guidance for Divisional Returning Officers
9.34 Under the Electoral Act, the DRO for each electorate has discretion to determine
what constitutes a valid and sufficient reason for not voting.45 The AEC states that
the original decision of the DRO as to whether a reason for not voting is valid and
sufficient is based on the merits of each individual case, in accordance with the law as
previously interpreted by the courts, and within the boundaries of administrative
guidelines developed by the AEC to assist DROs.46
9.35 Administrative guidelines developed by the AEC, in consultation with its
Disability Advisory Committee,47 may provide additional guidance to DROs in relation
41 Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; People with Disability Australia and the NSW
Disability Discrimination Law Centre, Submission No 90 to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform
Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy,  2009  rec  9.  See  also  Human  Rights  Law  Centre,
Submission 139.
42 PWDA, ACDL and AHR Centre, Submission 136.
43 Ibid 136.
44 Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 2.1 to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters,
Advisory Report on the Electoral and Referendum (Improving Electoral Procedure) Bill 2012 (Cth),
(2012) [2.86].
45 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 245(4)(d).
46 Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Backgrounder: Compulsory Voting (April 2010) [30].
47 Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 10.
270 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
to the potential impact of disability on electors’ ability to vote. In the Electoral
Backgrounder on Compulsory Voting, the AEC cites some practical examples given by
the High Court of valid and sufficient reasons not to vote, including ‘competitive
claims of public duty’, and:
Physical obstruction, whether of sickness or outside prevention, or of natural events,
or accident of any kind, would certainly be recognised by law in such a case. One
might also imagine cases where an intending voter on his way to the  poll was
diverted to save life, or to prevent crime, or to assist at some great disaster, such as a
fire.48
9.36 The ALRC recommends the AEC provide DROs with appropriate guidance and
training, consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles, to help them
determine if a person with disability has a valid and sufficient reason for failing to
vote.
Support in voting
Recommendation 9–5 Section 234(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral
Act 1918 (Cth) should be amended to provide that if any voter satisfies the
presiding officer that he or she is unable to vote without assistance, the presiding
officer shall permit a person chosen by the voter to assist them with voting.
Recommendation 9–6 The Australian Electoral Commission should
provide its officers with guidance and training, consistent with the National
Decision-Making Principles, to improve support in enrolment and voting for
persons who require support to vote.
Recommendation 9–7 The Australian Electoral Commission should
investigate methods of maintaining the secrecy of votes of persons who require
support to vote.
9.37 The  ALRC recommends  that  the Electoral Act be amended to allow for broad
support in voting. Australia’s obligations under the CRPD include ensuring the
accessibility of voting procedures, facilities and materials; protecting the right to vote
by secret ballot; and where necessary, and at their request, allowing persons with
disability assistance in voting by a person of their choice.49
48 Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 380 cited in Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Backgrounder:
Compulsory Voting (April 2010).
49 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3  (entered  into  force  3  May 2008)  arts  29,  4,  12.  See  also International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March
1976) arts 2, 25, 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 1948 art 21.
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9.38 Section 234(1) of the Electoral Act currently provides:
If any voter satisfies the presiding officer that his or her sight is so impaired or that the
voter is so physically incapacitated or illiterate that he or she is unable to vote without
assistance, the presiding officer shall permit a person appointed by the voter to enter
an unoccupied compartment of the booth with the voter, and mark, fold, and deposit
the voter’s ballot paper.
9.39 In order to ensure consistency with the ALRC’s overall approach to support, and
compliance with the CRPD, the ALRC recommends that the provision be amended.
Specifically, the section should adopt more appropriate language and be broadened to
offer assistance to more people who may require support in exercising their right to
vote.50 Australia needs to ‘adopt concrete measures to support people with disabilities
to exercise their right to vote on an equal basis with others’.51
9.40 Advocacy for Inclusion argued that a person should be entitled to vote if they
can make their views known via any means of communication, and that they should be
provided with ‘appropriate social and technological supports’.52 It was suggested that,
where there is an objection to a person voting, an independent body should verify
whether or not the person’s voting preference can be ascertained.53 Advocacy for
Inclusion suggested people with disability should have the option of accessing support
from an electoral officer to cast their vote, subject to safeguards and monitoring.54
9.41 NACLC stated that AEC officers should be provided with ‘appropriate
education, training and guidance material’ to assist them to decide whether a person
requires assistance.55
9.42 Guidance material could cover assistance in marking and depositing the ballot
paper at the polling booth, but also support in relation to enrolment and declaration
votes.56 For example, a person may require support to complete enrolment forms,
update their address, or to obtain and understand information about candidates or
voting procedures.
9.43 The AEC and various state and territory electoral commissions have introduced
a range of measures to increase electoral accessibility.57 A self-advocacy group in
South Australia reported positive experiences of assistance at the 2013 federal election:
Most of us had a very good experience voting. Our support workers helped us to get
to a polling booth and ask the volunteers working at the booth to help us make our
vote so our support workers didn’t influence our vote.58
50 See Electoral Act 1992 (Qld)  ss  108–109  for  the  provision  of  help  to  enable  electors  to  vote  at  polling
booths and hospitals.
51 Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 139.
52 Advocacy for Inclusion, Submission 126.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
56 Declaration votes allow an elector to fulfil their obligations by voting before election day or in a different
division from the division in which they are enrolled on election day: Australian Electoral Commission,
Electoral Backgrounder: Compulsory Voting (April 2010).
57 See, eg Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 10.
58 Minda Inc Self Advocacy Group-Express Yourself, Submission 93.
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9.44 One critical issue with respect to voting is the right to a secret ballot. PIAC
submitted that ‘ensuring a secret ballot is an essential element of Australia’s
democracy, yet this is not readily available to people with disability’.59 Case studies
submitted on the Electoral Reform Green Paper illustrated the limitations of the current
system:
One of our (DDLC) clients stated that her closest accessible polling booth was 45
minutes away by electric wheelchair and would cost around $20 to $50 if she caught a
taxi. Consequently, our client decided to vote at her closest polling booth, which was
ten minutes away by electric wheelchair. However, as the polling booth was not
accessible, she was forced to vote outside. She did not have sufficient privacy and felt
very undignified. Furthermore, our client was unable to place the ballot in the ballot
box herself as the ballot box was outside the building and therefore had to rely on
electoral officials to do it for her.
One of our (PWDA) clients stated that at his local polling booth there was no easy
English information available. The polling booth official was unable to communicate
the steps required to fill out the ballot paper. Fortunately he had visited the booth with
his father, and his father provided instructions. Our client did feel pressured to vote
for a particular candidate, as he was aware that his father had voted for that party all
of his life.60
9.45 A number of stakeholders suggested support mechanisms that would allow
persons with disability to vote independently and in secret. Mechanisms might include
the use of logos or symbols; templates; assisted voting; electronically assisted voting
(EAV); and outreach models.61 One man who used EAV during 2007 federal election
described it as an ‘empowering experience’—being the first time in his life that he was
able to vote independently.62
9.46 The AEC is well-placed to examine options for secret voting for persons with
disability, including by reviewing national and international best practice in
technological advances.63 The ALRC recommends that the AEC should investigate
methods of maintaining the secrecy of votes for people who require support in voting.
59 Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41.
60 People with Disability Australia and the NSW Disability Discrimination Law Centre, Submission No 90
to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009.
61 Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41.
62 People with Disability Australia and the NSW Disability Discrimination Law Centre, Submission No 90
to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009 90.
63 The AEC’s roles include research and analysis to improve electoral participation, support the delivery of
electoral services and contribute to electoral policy reform in Australia: Australian Electoral Commission,
Research <www.aec.gov.au>. The Commissioner’s Advisory Board for Electoral Research includes
experts in the Australian electoral system. The AEC is a member of the Electoral Council of Australia, the
Electoral Education Network, the Commonwealth Network of National Election Management Bodies and
other international networks.
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Summary
10.1 This chapter discusses the implications of the ALRC’s recommendation for
review of state and territory laws and legal frameworks that have an impact on the
exercise of legal capacity. The Terms of Reference for the Inquiry focused on
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks, but also asked the Inquiry to consider how
maximising individual autonomy and independence could be ‘modelled’.
10.2 Modelling a new approach to individual decision-making at the Commonwealth
level provides an opportunity to guide law reform at the state and territory level.
Reform at the state and territory level is critical to the implementation of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)1 because many
important areas of decision-making are governed by state and territory law—including
in relation to guardianship and administration, consent to medical treatment, mental
health and disability services.
10.3 The key elements of the ALRC’s approach include the National Decision-
Making Principles and the Commonwealth supporter and representative scheme
(‘Commonwealth decision-making model’), which reflects them.
10.4 The ALRC recommends that state and territory governments facilitate review of
legislation that deals with decision-making by people who need decision-making
support to ensure laws are consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and
1 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
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the Commonwealth decision-making model. This chapter explains some of the
implications of this recommendation and how the ALRC’s recommendations might be
applied in specific areas of state and territory law.
Review of state and territory legislation
Recommendation 10–1 State and territory governments should review
laws and legal frameworks concerning individual decision-making to ensure
they are consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and the
Commonwealth decision-making model. In conducting such a review, regard
should also be given to:
(a)  interaction with any supporter and representative schemes under
Commonwealth legislation;
(b)  consistency between jurisdictions, including in terminology;
(c)  maximising cross-jurisdictional recognition of arrangements; and
(d)  mechanisms for consistent and national data collection.
Any review should include, but not be limited to, laws and legal frameworks
with respect to guardianship and administration; consent to medical treatment;
mental health; and disability services.
10.5 The practical outcomes of the ALRC’s Inquiry will depend, in significant part,
on whether it serves as a catalyst for review of state and territory laws. This is mainly
because guardianship and administration laws are state and territory based, and remain
the primary mechanism in which others are vested with power to make decisions on
behalf of a substantial number of people who need decision-making support.2
10.6 Further, many Commonwealth agencies and Commonwealth funded services,
such as aged care service providers, rely on state and territory appointed substitute
decision-makers in managing their relationships with individuals. In some areas—such
as disability services under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)—while
states and territories will continue to play the major role in providing or overseeing the
provision of services, ‘federal authorities … will likely exercise more direct federal
2 In 2007, there were over 4,000 people under public guardianship in Australia: NSW Office of the Public
Guardian, Submission No 7 to the NSW Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues,
Substitute Decision-Making for People Lacking Capacity, 2010. At the end of August 2009, the NSW
Trustee and Guardian was directly managing the affairs of 9,182 individuals and overseeing the work of a
further 2,795 Private Managers: NSW Trustee and Guardian, Submission No 13 to the NSW Legislative
Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Substitute Decision-Making for People Lacking Capacity,
2010. The Victorian body, State Trustees protects the legal and financial interests of over 9,500 people:
State Trustees, Did You Know? <www.statetrustees.com.au>.
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regulation of, and prescription of, the way states and territories administer disability
funding’.3
10.7 As discussed in Chapter 3, the National Decision-Making Principles and
associated Guidelines are intended to be consistent with art 12 of the CRPD. By
reviewing guardianship and other laws in the light of these principles, states and
territories will advance compliance with the CRPD.
10.8 This is important as, under international law, parties to treaties undertake to
ensure that the terms of the treaty are performed in all parts of federal states. This is a
requirement of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which Australia is a
party,4 and an obligation required expressly by art 4(5) of the CRPD.5 Although it is
the Australian Government that entered into the CRPD, the provisions of the
Convention are binding not only upon the Australian Government, but also upon each
state and territory government.6
10.9 The intention of Recommendation 10–1 is that states and territories would
examine relevant legislation to see how the approaches represented by the National
Decision-Making Principles and associated guidelines might be incorporated—most
fundamentally by facilitating a shift to supported decision-making.
10.10 The process envisaged by the ALRC would involve review of legislation that
deals with decision-making by people who require decision-making support to ensure,
among other things, that:
· legislative tests of decision-making capacity do not provide that people are
assumed to lack capacity on the basis of having a disability, and that ability is
assessed by reference to the decision to be made and the available supports;
· supported decision-making is facilitated by appropriate legislative recognition of
supporters;
· laws providing for the appointment of representative decision-makers do so only
as a last resort and not as a substitute for appropriate support;
· laws providing for the appointment of representative decision-makers provide
for appointments that are limited in scope, proportionate, and apply for the
minimum time; and
3 John Chesterman, ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian Social
Work 26, 33.
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27 January
1980) art 27.
5 ‘The provisions of the present Convention shall extend to all parts of federal states without any
limitations or exceptions’: UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for
signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 4(5).
6 See Philip French, Julie Dardel and Sonya Price-Kelly, ‘Rights Denied: Towards a National Policy
Agenda about Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of Persons with Cognitive Impairment’ (People with
Disability Australia, 2009) 14–15.
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· laws providing for supported and representative decision-making ensure that a
person’s ‘will, preferences and rights’ are respected—including by imposing
appropriate duties on supporters and representative decision-makers.
10.11 To some extent, states and territories have already commenced this process—in
particular, with regard to guardianship, the legislative area of most obvious relevance.
For example:
· the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC), in its review of the
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic), was asked to have regard to
‘the principle of respect for the inherent dignity, individual autonomy including
the freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons, and the
other General Principles and provisions’ of the CRPD;7 and
· the Queensland Law Reform Commission has recommended that the General
Principles in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) be amended
to ‘reflect more closely the relevant articles’ of the CRPD.8
10.12 The Victorian Government has been actively reviewing laws dealing with
decision-making by people who need decision-making support. The Powers of
Attorney Act 2014 (Vic) aims to simplify and consolidate certain aspects of Victoria’s
power of attorney laws, to create the role of a ‘supportive attorney’ and to improve the
protections for vulnerable people.9 A supportive attorney is a new legal mechanism,
which recognises that some people with impaired decision-making ability do not need
a guardian or administrator. The ability to appoint a supportive attorney will
acknowledge family and other relationships of support, while ensuring that the person
retains their right to make decisions.10
10.13 Stakeholders endorsed the idea that the role of this Report should include
influencing reform of state and territory laws.11 Some suggested, however, that review
based on the ALRC’s recommendations would not go far enough towards desired
results.12 Pave the Way described the ideal outcome as a ‘a cohesive national approach’
to the implementation of art 12 of the CRPD, and a national regime of supported
decision-making that no longer permits ‘substitute’ or ‘best interest’ decision-
making.13
7 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) xi.
8 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Report No 67
(2010) i, rec 4–1.
9 Explanatory Memorandum, Powers of Attorney Bill 2014 (Vic).
10 Ibid. The Act implements a number of the VLRC’s recommendations: Victorian Law Reform
Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012).
11 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; Illawarra Forum, Submission 124;
National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100; AGAC, Submission 91; Pave the
Way, Submission 90.
12 F Beaupert, P Gooding and L Steele, Submission 123; Pave the Way, Submission 90.
13 Pave the Way, Submission 90.
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10.14 Dr Fleur Beaupert, Dr Piers Gooding and Linda Steele advocated for the repeal
of all ‘discriminatory mental health legislation, guardianship legislation, and any other
substituted decision-making regimes’ and stated:
When restrictions are placed on the right to exercise legal capacity and the right to
refuse medical treatment on an equal basis with others, the basis for supported
decision-making as a remedy for disability-based discrimination is compromised.
Hence, even if provisions for ‘supported decision-making’ and other measures to
support the exercise of legal capacity were installed into current mental health and
guardianship laws, the violation of core obligations of the CRPD would remain.14
10.15 In relation to the process of reform, the Australian Guardianship and
Administration Council (AGAC) observed that the ‘move to harmonisation of
legislation will take some time to achieve and the complexity of this process cannot be
underestimated’.15
10.16 The Law Council of Australia suggested that a co-operative approach with states
and territories ‘in the form of mirror legislation or for the State and Territories to adopt
model Commonwealth legislation, is the most practical way to achieve consistency
across jurisdictions’.16 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria suggested that there
should be a nationally consistent approach to implementing decision-making principles
and that states and territories retain responsibility for the implementation of supported
decision-making under the oversight of a federal monitoring body.17
10.17 A comprehensive national review process might be coordinated through the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) or its ministerial councils, such as the
Disability Reform Council, Law Crime and Community Safety Council or Health
Council, in consultation with peak bodies such as AGAC.
Application of the National Decision-Making Principles
10.18 The following material discusses, in general terms, how the National Decision-
Making Principles and associated Guidelines may be used to guide review and
amendment of state and territory laws, in the particular areas of:
· guardianship and administration;
· consent to medical treatment;
· mental health; and
· disability services.
14 F Beaupert, P Gooding and L Steele, Submission 123.
15 AGAC, Submission 91.
16 Law Council of Australia, Submission 83.
17 Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
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Guardianship and administration
10.19 As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key debates of central importance to the
Inquiry concerned the extent to which art 12 of the CRPD permits ‘substitute’ or ‘fully
supported’ decision-making.
10.20 A major element of this debate concerns the extent to which the CRPD permits
decision-making in the form of guardianship and administration, as currently provided
for under state and territory laws. However, regardless of the lack of consensus, there is
‘a general acknowledgement’, underpinned by the paradigm shift heralded by the
CRPD, that ‘the focus must move from what a person with disability cannot do to the
supports that should be provided to enable them to make decisions and exercise their
legal capacity’.18
10.21 Some room for fully supported decision-making should remain. This conclusion
is, in part, dictated by the reality that some people will always need decisions made for
them. The AGAC submitted that there needs to be ‘careful development of supported
decision making practices’, but supported decision-making cannot ‘completely replace
substitute decision making and there will be an ongoing need for substitute decision
making in limited circumstances’.19 The Caxton Legal Centre noted:
given the projected exponential increase in the ageing population and the consequent
increase in the incidence of terminal cognitive diseases such as dementia and
Alzheimer’s, coupled with the factor of social isolation and sparse or non-existent
support networks for many older people, the retention of a process of formal
substituted decision making may be essential.20
10.22 Guardianship and administration laws need to be reviewed to ensure, among
other things, that guardianship and administration are:
· invoked only as a last resort and after considering the availability of support to
assist people in decision-making;
· as confined in scope and duration as is reasonably possible;21
· subject to accessible mechanisms for review; and
· consistent with decision-making that respects the will, preferences and rights of
the individual.
10.23 For example, the provisions of state and territory guardianship legislation differ
in the extent to which decision-making that respects the will, preferences and rights of
18 Office of the Public Advocate Systems Advocacy (Qld), ‘Autonomy and Decision-Making Support in
Australia: A Targeted Overview of Guardianship Legislation’ (February 2014).
19 AGAC, Submission 51. See Ch 2.
20 Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. See also NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 131;
Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120.
21 The Office of the Public Advocate (SA) highlighted that ‘there are different rates of full (plenary)
appointments as opposed to limited appointments (limited to one area of decision making) between
jurisdictions, and different rates for the appointments of private guardians’: Office of the Public Advocate
(SA), Submission 17.
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the individual is expressly promoted. In New South Wales, Western Australia and the
Northern Territory, there is an overriding duty of guardians and administrators to act in
the ‘best interest’ of the person.22 In Victoria and Tasmania, the ‘best interest’ of the
person is an equal consideration along with the wishes of the person and the least
restrictive alternative.23 In the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, guardians
are  obliged  to  act  in  a  way  that  least  interferes  with  a  person’s  right  to  make  a
decision,24 or  to  give  effect  to  a  person’s  wishes,  so  far  as  they  can  be  determined.25
South Australia provides for ‘substitute judgment’, where the paramount consideration
is the guardian’s opinion of what the wishes of the person would have been if they
were not mentally incapacitated.26
10.24 Recent reviews give important leads on how guardianship and administration
laws may change. For example, the VLRC review recommended the development of a
supported decision-making and a co-decision-making structure.27
10.25 Briefly, this would provide recognition to supporters—trusted persons providing
support and assistance to an adult who needs help in making a decision—and external
oversight by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). The co-
decision-maker would act jointly with the adult, and decisions would have to be made
with the consent and authority of the represented person, and would be treated as if
they were the acts of the represented person with capacity.
10.26 Appointments would be made by the VCAT and the range of decisions for
which the person needs support could, in principle, range across the areas previously
covered by guardians and administrators. Safeguards against exploitation are detailed
and include registration of co-decision-making orders, regular review on a range of
grounds and the options to renew, amend or revoke the order.
10.27 Stakeholders in this Inquiry called for continuing review of Australian
guardianship laws,28 as has the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (UNCRPD).29 AGAC stated that the principles of supported decision-
making articulated in the Discussion Paper could be ‘incorporated into any review of
state-based guardianship and administration regimes’.30
22 Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4; NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW) s 39; Guardianship and
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 4; Adult Guardianship Act 1988 (NT) s 4.
23 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 4; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas)
s 6.
24 Ibid ss 5–7, sch 1.
25 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) ss 4, 5A. See Ch 2.
26 Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) s 5.
27 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) chs 8–9.
28 See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127; F Beaupert, P Gooding and
L Steele, Submission 123; Justice Connect and Seniors Rights Victoria, Submission 120; AGAC,
Submission 91; National Seniors Australia, Submission 57.
29 United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 on Article
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law, 2014.
30 AGAC, Submission 91.
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10.28 In addition to highlighting the desirability of reviewing state and territory laws
to ensure consistency with the National Decision-Making Principles and the
Commonwealth decision-making model, the ALRC’s recommendation outlines a
number of particular considerations that should inform such reviews. These are briefly
discussed below, with particular reference to guardianship laws.
Interaction with Commonwealth supporter and representative schemes
10.29 As  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  the  ALRC  recommends  that  a  Commonwealth
decision-making model, including ‘supporters’ and ‘representatives’, should be
introduced into relevant Commonwealth legislation, including that relating to the
NDIS, social security, aged care, eHealth and privacy.31
10.30 If implemented, the interaction of these Commonwealth schemes with state and
territory guardianship and administration laws may need to be taken into account in
review of the latter.
10.31 Chapter 4 highlights some of the issues involved but they will vary depending
on what approach is taken in Commonwealth laws.
10.32 For example, the ALRC envisages that before a representative is appointed for
someone, the Commonwealth agency would have to be satisfied that the person
actually needs a representative, and that an appointment is not being used as a
substitute for appropriate decision-making support.
10.33 While there should be a presumption that an existing state or territory appointee
should be appointed where a representative is needed under a Commonwealth law,
sometimes there may be both a Commonwealth representative and a state or territory
appointed decision-maker. If they have power to make decisions in the same area,
interaction problems may occur (or be avoided by consultation and cooperation) but
ultimately where a decision is being made for the purposes of the Commonwealth
legislation, the Commonwealth representative is responsible.
10.34 If an existing state or territory appointee is also appointed under Commonwealth
law, other issues may arise, particularly if the appointee’s duties under state or territory
legislation conflict significantly with those under Commonwealth law. Legislative
change may be required to allow state or territory appointees to be appointed under
orders that better align with duties and responsibilities under Commonwealth
legislation—for example, so that they can make both lifestyle and financial decisions
as representatives under the NDIS.
Consistency
10.35 It is clearly desirable for there to be consistency between Commonwealth, state
and territory legislation dealing with individual decision-making, including in relation
to terminology. At present, no such consistency exists:
31 See Chs 5 and 6.
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Terminology varies considerably between state/territory jurisdictions, including terms
such as guardian, manager, administrator, which are inconsistently defined. Powers
held under these appointments may also vary—noting that they are often specified by
orders of a tribunal, within the scope of powers outlined in legislation; and cross-
recognition is, at best, arbitrary.32
10.36 Such inconsistency causes problems, in particular because the criteria and scope
of state and territory appointments vary; and appointments may not be recognised in
other jurisdictions.
10.37 Stakeholders supported a nationally consistent approach.33 National Disability
Services, for example, said that unless there are ‘nationally consistent definitions,
processes and safeguards around legal capacity assessment and decision support’,
people with disability and their families can experience inconsistent and additional
administrative hurdles across different jurisdictions or areas of their lives.34
10.38 The Queenslanders with Disability Network (QDN) highlighted the opportunity
the NDIS may provide to promote a more consistent approach to the appointment and
powers of decision-makers, in order to prevent ‘confusion in the appointment of
nominees with regard to disability supports for the NDIS’.35 That  is,  where  the
appointment of NDIS nominees may not correlate with existing guardianship
arrangements at a state level, the ‘NDIS should be used as a catalyst for systemic
change in this area’.36
Cross-jurisdictional recognition
10.39 A related issue is the need to maximise cross-jurisdictional recognition of
appointments and other decision-making arrangements. Stakeholders emphasised this
need—especially as people commonly travel between jurisdictions or live in towns
which straddle jurisdictional boundaries.37 QDN, for example, stated that:
One of the great advantages of the NDIS will be that it will allow people with
disability more freedom to move interstate, without having to be concerned with
different support systems across jurisdictions. It would be a terrible shame for such
significant reforms to be undermined by other inter-jurisdictional hurdles such as legal
capacity definitions.38
10.40 Bruce Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython submitted that the ‘rise of yet another
class of substitute decision-makers or power-holders’ appointed under Commonwealth
legislation may lead to problems if it ‘creates uncertainty about the validity of pre-
emptive appointments made by people in anticipation of future loss of capacity,
32 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
33 See, eg, National Seniors Australia, Submission 57; National Disability Services, Submission 49; Office
of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
34 National Disability Services, Submission 49. With respect to the impact on movement interstate, see also:
AFDS, Submission 47; Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
35 QDN, Submission 59.
36 Ibid.
37 See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
38 QDN, Submission 59.
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particularly if they lose capacity outside the jurisdiction the appointment was made in,
or if they hold assets in multiple jurisdictions’.39
10.41 There are some provisions permitting cross-jurisdictional recognition. However,
these arrangements are not comprehensive and should be improved. For instance, while
the Victorian legislation makes provision for the recognition of interstate guardianship
and administration orders,40 Queensland has no corresponding law.
Data collection
10.42 Stakeholders raised concerns about difficulties associated with obtaining
consistent data in relation to the appointment of substitute decision-makers. They
emphasised the need for improved data collection to facilitate comparisons across
jurisdictions and inform policy development.41 Arnold and Bonython observed that,
although data is often collected by service providers, regulatory bodies and third
parties that data is often held within institutional silos and is not readily accessible.
That inaccessibility militates against informed policy-making.42
10.43 State and territory review of guardianship and administration legislation may
provide an opportunity to promote mechanisms for consistent and national data
collection about supported and fully supported decision-making.
Consent to medical treatment
10.44 At common law, all competent adults can consent to and refuse medical
treatment. If consent is not established, there may be legal consequences for health
professionals. Under the law of trespass, patients have a right not be subjected to an
invasive procedure without consent or other lawful justification, such as an emergency
or necessity. The CRPD expresses this in terms of a ‘right to respect for his or her
physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others’.43
10.45 As part of their duty of care, health professionals must obtain ‘informed
consent’ by providing such information as is necessary for the patient to give consent
to treatment, including information on all material risks of the proposed treatment.
Failure to do so may lead to civil liability for an adverse outcome, even if the treatment
itself was not negligent.44
10.46 The common law recognises that there are circumstances where an individual
may not be capable of giving informed consent, for example, due to requiring decision-
making support with respect to medical treatment. However, except in the case of
children—where the High Court has recognised the courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction
39 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
40 Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) pt 6A.
41 See, eg, B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38; Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.
42 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
43 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 17.
44 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479.
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in authorising treatment45—it does not provide significant guidance on supported
decision-making in health care settings.
10.47 State and territory guardianship and mental health laws provide detailed rules
for substitute decision-making concerning the medical treatment of adults who are
deemed incapable of giving consent.46
10.48 Guardianship legislation outlines criteria for appointing substitute decision-
makers, the hierarchy of possible decision-makers and the scope of their powers, which
depend on the age of the patient and the type of treatment proposed.
10.49 In all jurisdictions, except the Northern Territory, guardianship legislation
provides for a decision-maker who is chosen (for example, an enduring guardian),
assigned by the legislation (for example, a spouse, close friend or relative) or appointed
(for example,  by a court)  to make health decisions for an adult  who is not capable of
giving consent.47
10.50 Currently, in exercising their powers, substitute decision-makers are required to
adopt one of two tests (or a combination of both in some jurisdictions) in reaching their
decision for the person with impaired decision-making capacity. One is the best
interests test, which requires a balancing of the benefit to the patient against the risks of
the proposed treatment, and the other is the substituted judgment test, which involves
making a decision which is consistent with what the person would have decided if they
had the capacity to do so. Evidence of such wishes may be provided by advance care
directives, religious beliefs and previous history of treatment.48
Supported decision-making in health care
10.51 Stakeholders expressed opposition to existing substitute decision-making
mechanisms in health care and favoured supported decision-making.49 NSW Council of
Social Service (NCOSS) stated that ‘quality of life decisions should be made by the
affected person’. 50 The Illawarra Forum submitted that ‘every effort should be made to
support people to make informed decisions and choices’, including in relation to
healthcare.51
45 Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175
CLR 218.
46 Eg, Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) ss 32B, 32D; Mental Health Act 2009
(SA) ss 56, 57.
47 At the time of writing, in the Northern Territory, there was no provision for consent to medical treatment
without an appointment being made. South Australia has legislation specific to consent to medical
treatment, which provides for medical powers of attorney: Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative
Care Act 1995 (SA).
48 See, eg, Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. The Supreme Court of
NSW confirmed a person’s advance care directive to refuse medical treatment is valid if it is made by a
capable adult, is clear and unambiguous and applies to the situation at hand.
49 See, eg, NCOSS, Submission 26; The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Office of the Public Advocate
(SA), Submission 17.
50 NCOSS, Submission 26.
51 The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.
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10.52 Stakeholders suggested that a supported decision-making framework would be
more likely to result in health care decisions that accord with an individual’s personal
beliefs and values.52 The Carers Alliance asserted the primacy of the family who know
of a person’s beliefs and values in supporting people with disability to exercise
capacity.53 On the other hand, Family Planning NSW considered that encouraging
supporters who are not family members but health care workers may help overcome a
lack of understanding about what constitutes informed consent in reproductive and
sexual health and any discomfort between family members to discuss such matters.
A supported decision making framework needs to encompass the requirement for
clinicians, other health and support workers to take on the role of assisting a person to
make decisions. This means that they need to develop the skills necessary to talk
about reproductive and sexual health in ways that encourage the person to make their
own decisions.54
10.53 Under the Commonwealth decision-making model, the person requiring support
chooses who their supporter should be when making medical decisions, such as a
family  member,  friend,  carer,  health  care  worker  or  a  group  of  these  people.  If  a
representative is appointed for the person under the model, the representative may
make decisions about medical treatment for the person in accordance with that person’s
will, preferences and rights.
10.54 A number of stakeholders expressed concerns about the current laws on
sterilisation procedures. Women with Disabilities Australia submitted the ‘best
interest’ approach to the sterilisation of women and girls has been used in a
discriminatory way and that a lack of education and accessible services can prevent
women from making choices regarding their fertility and conception.55 Organisation
Intersex International Australia argued that, in the absence of a national policy
framework, ‘intersex-related medical interventions must be subject to legal scrutiny
within a human rights framework’.56
10.55 Children with Disability Australia submitted that the criminalisation of forced
sterilisation may be justified, as existing requirements for court authorisation have
failed to protect the rights of people with disability, under the CRPD, to be free from
violence and to retain their physical integrity.57 Several other stakeholders supported
legislative prohibition of sterilisation without informed consent.58
52 See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.
53 Carers Alliance, Submission 84. It was suggested that there is currently insufficient recognition of the role
and contribution of carers and family members who possess ‘intimate knowledge and understanding of
the cognitively impaired person’: N Widdowson, Submission 31.
54 Family Planning NSW, Submission 04.
55 WWDA, Submission 58.
56 Organisation Intersex International Australia Limited, Submission 97.
57 Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68.
58 Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 76; ADACAS,
Submission 29.
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Review of the law
10.56 The law on decision-making in health care is complex. Inconsistency in
language, and different tests of decision-making ability and processes across the
jurisdictions may cause difficulties for health service providers and consumers.
10.57 A number of recent reports have suggested reforms. The VLRC’s guardianship
report recommended consolidating existing laws into new legislation distinguishing
‘health decision makers’ from ‘guardians’, as well as differentiating between
‘significant’ and ‘routine’ medical procedures.59 In the context of developing a national
code of conduct for unregistered health care workers, the Australian Health Ministers’
Advisory Council (AHMAC) has queried whether a national ‘minimum enforceable
standard’ for informed consent should be introduced.60
10.58 In 2011, AHMAC developed a national policy framework for advance care
directives to address challenges posed by divergent laws affecting consent to medical
treatment.61 The ALRC received submissions noting the desirability of nationally
consistent and enforceable laws on advance care directives.62
10.59 The Mental Health Council of Australia and the National Mental Health
Consumer and Carer Forum expressed support for a legal framework for assessing
health care decision-making ability in line with developments in the United Kingdom
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK).63 This would place a focus on the ability of
people to understand information relevant to a health care decision; retain that
information; use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process; or
communicate the decision.64
10.60 The ALRC recommends that state and territory governments review legislation
relating to informed consent to medical treatment, including in relation to advanced
care directives,65 with a view to reform that is consistent with the National Decision-
Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.
10.61 Reform encouraging a supported decision-making model might involve
recognition that a person may be able to give informed consent to medical treatment
with the assistance of a supporter. The implications of such a change, including in
relation to the legal liability of health practitioners, would need to be carefully
assessed.
59 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) recs 12, 199–219, ch 13.
60 ‘Consultation Paper: A National Code of Conduct for Health Care Workers’ (Australian Health Ministers’
Advisory Council, March 2014) 16. Most state and territory health departments issue guidelines on
consent to health care.
61 Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council, National Framework for Advance Health Care
Directives, September 2011.
62 Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; ADACAS, Submission 29; Mental Health Coordinating
Council, Submission 07.
63 NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81.
64 See Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 3.
65 See Best Practice Standards in Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council, National Framework for
Advance Health Care Directives, September 2011.
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10.62 Any new approach to consent to medical treatment would need to be reflected in
guidance such as the Australian Charter of Rights in Healthcare, the National Safety
and Quality Health Service Standards, the National Framework on Advance Care
Directives, publications on communication with patients66 and the national codes of
conduct for health practitioners.67
Mental health
10.63 All states and territories have mental health laws that regulate consent to
medical treatment, including the involuntary detention and treatment of people with
severe mental illness. Generally, mental health laws have provided for treatment based
on a person’s need for treatment and the risk of harm posed to themselves and others.68
10.64 New mental health legislation in Tasmania and Victoria has changed the focus
of criteria for the involuntary detention and treatment from the risk of harm to a
person’s capacity to consent to treatment.69 There are active mental health reviews and
legislative initiatives in other jurisdictions.70
10.65 The Mental Health Coordinating Council (MHCC) submitted that the Mental
Health Act 2007 (NSW) is ‘problematic’, because there is little detail about the basis of
decisions made by doctors on the treatment of detained psychiatric patients,
particularly those who retain decision-making capacity in relation to certain treatment
decisions and who have a view about the preferred treatment or wish to forgo certain
treatments.71
10.66 The MHCC stated that the law should outline the rights of patients to refuse and
receive treatment and deal with how patients’ preferences can be taken into account in
medical decisions—including by way of advance care directives—to ensure that
doctors override patients’ preferences only in limited circumstances, where a patient
lacks capacity to make that decision, and the proposed treatment is ‘manifestly in the
person’s best interests’.72
10.67 New legislation in Tasmania and Victoria protects the rights of mental health
patients through statements of rights. In Tasmania, the rights of involuntary patients are
outlined in statute and whenever a person is admitted to, or discharged from, an
66 ‘General Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Providing Information to Patients’ (National Health and
Medical Research Council, 2004); ‘Communicating with Patients: Advice for Medical Practitioners’
(National Health and Medical Research Council, 2004).
67 The codes of conduct for the 14 national boards of health practitioners are available at Australian Health
Practitioner Regulation Agency, National Boards <www.ahpra.gov.au>.
68 See, eg, Mental Health and Related Services Act (NT) s 14; Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) s 14.
69 The Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) factors in a person’s decision-making capacity, and not just the mental
illness or a risk of harm in the assessment criteria: s 8; the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) defines ‘capacity
to give informed consent’ and provides a statutory presumption of capacity: (Vic) ss 68, 70.
70 See, eg, ACT Second Exposure Draft Bill to amend the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994
(ACT); Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA); SA Department of Health review of the Mental Health Act 2009
(SA); Queensland review of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld);  NSW review of  the Mental Health Act
2007 (NSW).
71 Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
72 Ibid.
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approved facility, its controlling authority must give the person a statement of their
rights.73 In Victoria,  a statement of rights must be explained to people being assessed
or receiving treatment in relation to their mental illness.74
10.68 A person’s rights under the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic)  include  the  right  to
communicate, make advance statements and have a nominated person to support them
and help represent their interests.75 The role of a nominated person is to receive
information about the patient; be one of the persons who must be consulted in
accordance with the Act about the patient’s treatment; and assist the patient to exercise
any right under the Act.76 A person can only nominate another person in writing and
the nomination must be witnessed.77 A nomination can be revoked in the same manner
by the person who made the nomination or if a nominated person declines to act in the
role.78
10.69 A similar model for supported decision-making in mental health services is
contained in the Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) (the WA Bill).79 Under the proposed
legislation, mental health services are obliged to comply with a charter of mental health
care principles. The charter recognises the involvement of other people such as family
members and carers.80 In addition, the WA Bill would give effect to the carers’ charter
provided for in the Carers Recognition Act 2004 (WA).81
10.70 The WA Bill provides for a ‘nominated person’, someone chosen by the person
with mental illness to assist them in ensuring their rights under the Act are observed
and their interests and wishes are taken into account by medical practitioners and
mental health workers.82 A nominated person is entitled to ‘uncensored’
communication with the person with mental illness, and to receive information related
to that person’s treatment and care.83
10.71 Under the WA Bill, a nominated person may exercise the rights of the person
with mental illness under the legislation, but is not authorised to apply for the
admission to or discharge by a mental health service.84 Unless the provision of
information is not in the best interests of the patient, a nominated person has a right to
be involved in matters relating to the treatment and care of the patient, including the
73 Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) ss 62, 129, sch 1.
74 From 1 July 2014: Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) ss 12, 13.
75 Ibid pt 3.
76 Ibid s 23.
77 Ibid s 24.
78 Ibid ss 25–27.
79 The Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) was adopted by the WA Legislative Assembly in April 2014 and at
the time of writing was expected to progress to the Legislative Council for review. If enacted, it will
replace the Mental Health Act 1996 (WA).
80 Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) sch 1.
81 Ibid cl 319(2)(g), 332(3)(e).
82 Ibid cl 263.
83 Ibid cl 264(2). This includes information about the grounds on which an involuntary treatment order was
made, the treatment provided to the patient and the patient’s response to that treatment, and the seclusion
of, or use of bodily restraint on, the patient: Ibid cl 266(1)(a).
84 Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) cl 264(5)–(6).
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consideration of the options that are reasonably available for the patient and the
provision of support to the patient.85
10.72 The ALRC recommends that state and territory governments review mental
health legislation, with a view to reform that is consistent with the National Decision-
Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model. This might
involve, for example, moving towards supported decision-making models similar to
those contained in the Victorian legislation and in the WA Bill.
10.73 COAG’s Standing Council on Health has long overseen developments in mental
health laws, and may be able to advance such an initiative. The AHMAC, a component
committee of the Standing Council, commissioned a national project on model mental
health legislation, which was completed in 1994.86 This project propelled review of
mental health laws in every state and territory in Australia in the late 1990s.87
Disability services
10.74 States and territories legislate for the provision of supports and services to
persons with disability.88 The role of disability services legislation in regulating
restrictive practices is discussed in Chapter 8, where the ALRC recommends the
development of a national approach to restrictive practices in disability services.
10.75 As a national quality and safeguards system for the NDIS is being developed by
COAG,89 the ALRC considers it desirable for state and territory governments to review
their disability services legislation, with a view to reform that is consistent with the
National Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.
This might involve, for example, moving towards compliance with the CRPD, as well
as preparing for the implementation of the NDIS.
10.76 The Disability Inclusion Act 2014 (NSW) is an example of legislation which
moves towards more complete recognition of the right of persons with disability to
make decisions that affect their lives and to have those decisions respected.90 The Act
includes an objective to ‘enable people with disability to exercise choice and control in
the pursuit of their goals’91 and a general principle that ‘people with disability have the
same rights as other members of the community to make decisions that affect their
lives (including decisions involving risk) to the full extent of their capacity to do so and
to be supported in making those decisions if they want or require support’.92
85 Ibid cl 266(1)(b).
86 The University of Newcastle, ‘Model Mental Health Legislation’ (Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory
Council, 1994).
87 Chris Sidoti, ‘Mental Health for All: What’s the Vision?’ (Speech delivered at the National Conference
on  Mental  Health  Services,  Policy  and  Law  Reform  in  the  Twenty  First  Century,  Newcastle,  13–14
February 1997).
88 Disability Act 2006 (Vic); Disability Inclusion Act 2014 (NSW); Disability Services Act 2006 (Qld);
Disability Services Act 1993 (SA); Disability Services Act 1993 (WA); Disability Services Act 1993 (NT);
Disability Services Act 1991 (ACT).
89 COAG Disability Reform Council, Meeting Communiqué, 21 March 2014.
90 Disability Inclusion Act 2014 (NSW).
91 Ibid s 3(c).
92 Ibid s 4(5).
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Summary
11.1 This chapter discusses a number of issues that are relevant to other
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks that have an impact on the exercise of legal
capacity. These relate to:
· the common law relating to incapacity to contract;
· consumer protection laws;
· consent to marriage;
· the nomination of superannuation beneficiaries;
· acting in the role of a board member and in other corporate roles; and
· holding public office.
11.2 The ALRC recommends amendments to the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and
associated guidelines for marriage celebrants, and some provisions of the Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth), to better reflect the National Decision-Making Principles. It also
recommends that the Australian Government should review and replace provisions in
Commonwealth legislation that require the termination of statutory appointments by
reason of a person’s ‘unsound mind’ or ‘mental incapacity’.
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11.3 The ALRC received submissions on a number of other areas which are not a
focus of the Inquiry. While the ALRC does not make recommendations in these areas,
some of the key concerns are outlined.
Incapacity and contract law
11.4 The assumption underlying any contract is that each party has freely entered into
a binding agreement, having assessed whether or not the terms are in their best
interests. Some categories of person—including minors and people with impaired
mental capacity—have traditionally been regarded by the law as being incapable of
looking after their own interests, and through various rules, a ‘legal disability’ has been
imposed on them.1
11.5 Generally, if a person with a legal disability attempts to make a contract, that
contract can be declared ineffective.2 Contract law does not, however, require a
person’s ability to understand the implications of a contract to be assessed. Instead, the
common law developed a complex set of rules categorising transactions, especially by
minors, in terms of whether there is a legal disability.
11.6 In practice, the existing law of contract may work for the benefit of persons with
impaired decision-making ability. A contract may be avoided on the ground that a
person lacked the capacity to understand the consequences of entering into it. It has
been said that:
This rule (probably by accident), reflects the modern realisation that mental incapacity
has a wide variety of forms with very different degrees of impairment. The idea that
people should be presumed to be capable unless shown to be otherwise enhances their
dignity and capacity to manage their affairs. The treatment of contracts as binding
unless avoided complements this approach.3
11.7 In order to avoid the contract on the ground of incapacity, the onus is on the
party seeking to have the contract avoided to first establish that: (a) the contracting
party was unable, due to mental impairment, to understand the contract at the time of
formation; and (b) that the other party either knew or ought to have known of the
impairment. This is said to be very similar to the law relating to unconscionable
conduct4—which is given statutory recognition in the Australian Consumer Law
(ACL).5
1 See Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [7.3.160]. Much of the background discussion of
contractual incapacity below is taken from Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia, Contract Law edited
by Dr Nicholas C Seddon (1994–2003) and Emeritus Professor JLR Davis (1994–). See also Ch 2.
2 There are exceptions to the general rule, under which persons who lack legal capacity to contract may
contract for the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter and education or training for work: see
Ibid [7.3.230]–[7.3.260].
3 Ibid [7.3.580].
4 Ibid [7.3.590]–[7.3.600].
5 The  ACL  is  contained  in  sch  2  of  the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth):  sch  2,  s  20
‘Unconscionable conduct within the meaning of the unwritten law’.
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11.8 Effectively, the common law recognises a presumption of capacity—legal
agency—and treats contracts as binding unless avoided. Arguably, any reform that
required more scrutiny of capacity may work against the interests of persons with
impaired decision-making ability to enter into contracts.
11.9 For example, introducing any new functional test of decision-making ability (as
recommended in other areas of law) into contract law may be counterproductive—it
would not necessarily assist people, and may deprive them of the ability to contract, or
make contracting so risky for the other party, that they will refuse to enter into
contractual relations.
11.10 Arguably, abolishing the common law relating to contractual incapacity in its
entirety would have no adverse consequences, as questions about the validity of a
contract could be dealt with satisfactorily by the laws relating to unfair and
unconscionable contracts, undue influence and misrepresentation.6
11.11 However, in practice, such a reform may have limited benefit as the likely
outcomes of legal disputes about the validity of contracts would be the same. Any
reform would be constitutionally problematic as there is no head of Commonwealth
legislative power dealing specifically with contract law. Reform covering all contracts
would likely require the cooperation of states and territories either under a referral  of
power to the Commonwealth Parliament (s 51(xxxvii)) or through the enactment of
model laws in all jurisdictions.7
Consumer protection laws
11.12 There are a range of consumer protection laws that allow contracts to be
challenged, including under the ACL and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act
2009 (Cth).
11.13 The ACL contains provisions under which contracts or contractual terms may be
avoided. These include provisions in relation to misleading or deceptive conduct,
unconscionable conduct, unfair contract terms and unsolicited consumer agreements.8
11.14 Legal Aid Queensland submitted that the existing consumer law framework
‘effectively encourages people with a disability to participate in society to the fullest
extent possible without being denied goods or services because it might be more
difficult  to  ensure  they  are  aware  of  their  legal  obligations’  and  reflects  the  CRPD
approach to capacity. That is, applying this to consumer law specifically, ‘a person
may have the ability and understanding to engage with simple consumer products or
transactions but may not have the capacity to understand or engage with more complex
consumer products’.9
6 Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [7.3.180].
7 ‘Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper to Explore the Scope for
Reforming Australian Contract Law’ (Discussion Paper, Australian Government Attorney-General’s
Department, 2012).
8 See, eg, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, ss 18, 20, 22–24; pt 3–2, div 2.
9 Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64.
292 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws
11.15 The National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) contains provisions on
responsible lending conduct.10 These essentially require credit providers to assess the
capacity of all consumers—not only consumers with disabilities—and assist them to
understand consumer credit and financial products being offered.
11.16 Legal Aid Queensland submitted that the consumer credit provisions offer
‘adequate protections for people with disabilities without the need to adopt an
overarching definition of capacity or disability in the legislation’—an approach, it said,
that may serve as a useful model for other legislation in the Commonwealth
jurisdiction.11
11.17 For example, the National Association of Community Legal Centres (NACLC)
submitted that, to improve protection for people with disability entering into contracts,
companies and retailers should be subject to regulations requiring them to ‘ensure that
consumers have the capacity to understand and fulfil the terms of contracts’.12 This
may involve, for example, through asking a ‘mandatory list of questions to ensure that
a consumer has understood the contract’.13
11.18 Similarly, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre suggested that there is a need for
‘greater protection of people with disabilities in signing up for consumer contracts,
particularly when this is done over the phone and through door-to-door sales’.14
11.19 On the other hand, reforms that place undue focus on assessment of a person’s
abilities, including by imposing positive obligations to make inquiries about the
understanding consumers have of particular transactions, may end up disadvantaging
some people because goods and services may not be made available to them.
11.20 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked whether provisions similar to the
responsible lending provisions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act should
apply to other consumer contracts.15 That is, should businesses have obligations to
ensure that a consumer contract is suitable for the consumer, including making all
reasonable inquiries and ensuring that the consumer fully understands the contract
terms?
11.21 Some stakeholders considered that such obligations should underlie consumer
contracts,16 but recognised concerns about the practical implications of law reform in
this direction. KinCare Services, for example, stated that while it supported the notion
that ‘all interactions with people with disability should take place under conditions
where the customer’s decision-making capability is assured’, this could be costly and
would increase market regulation. It suggested that the aims of the United Nations
10 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ch 3.
11 Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64.
12 National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78.
13 Ibid.
14 Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41.
15 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 11–1.
16 Illawarra Forum, Submission 124; KinCare Services, Submission 112.
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Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)17 may be pursued more
effectively through ‘the development of recommended standard contract clauses or
improved availability of accessible communication tools’.18
11.22 The Queenslanders with Disability Network (QDN) observed that the ‘potential
for some people with disability to sign a contract that is unsuitable for their needs is
high’ and welcomed ‘any attempt to protect consumers from financial commitments
that they may not fully understand’.19 However, it expressed concern that reform in this
area will ‘lead to an overly conservative approach in the offering of services to people
with disability’.20
11.23 NACLC submitted that, rather than any broader reform,
The introduction of very targeted and basic suitability requirements only in certain
high-risk consumer contracts may be a preferable approach. This could, for example,
apply to contracts such as purchasing a car without finance, high value phone
contracts, and other high value consumer contracts and require a basic consideration
of affordability and suitability.21
11.24 Similarly, Legal Aid NSW considered that there is a need for reform in relation
to ‘financial products, particularly insurance, as well as reforms that target particular
product types and business models such as life insurance, funeral insurance and door to
door and telephone sales’.22
11.25 The ALRC considers that it would not be appropriate to make any
recommendations in consumer protection law without further consideration of the
possible ramifications for persons with disability who do not have decision-making
vulnerabilities.
Marriage
11.26 Article 23 of the CRPD recognises the right of persons with disabilities to marry
and found a family. The focus of this Inquiry is on the Commonwealth legal
framework for marriage, namely the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and the Guidelines on
the Marriage Act 1961 for Marriage Celebrants (the Guidelines), to ensure that
persons with disability are ‘not unnecessarily prevented from entering a marriage’.23
11.27 Stakeholders supported the ALRC’s proposal for amendment to the threshold
under the Marriage Act for ‘real consent’ to marriage,24 to provide that, instead of a
17 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
18 KinCare Services, Submission 112.
19 Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 119.
20 Ibid. See also Vicdeaf, Submission 125.
21 National Association of Community Legal Centres, Submission 127.
22 Legal Aid NSW, Submission 137.
23 National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
24 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 23B(1)(d)(iii).
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reference to mental incapacity, the consent of either of the parties may be void where
that party did not have decision-making ability with respect to the marriage.25
11.28 The Victorian Deaf Society raised concerns about difficulties facing the people
who would assess a person’s decision-making ability with respect to marriage and of
discerning ‘real consent’ as ‘there are people who don’t get the concept of marriage but
do enjoy the time they spend together’.26
11.29 To assist in the role of marriage celebrants to determine real consent, the ALRC
recommends that existing guidelines for marriage celebrants also be amended.
Real consent to marriage
Recommendation 11–1 Sections 23(1)(iii) and 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) should be amended to remove the references to ‘being
mentally incapable’ and instead provide that ‘real consent’ is not given if ‘a
party did not understand the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony’.
11.30 The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) provides that a marriage will be void in a number
of circumstances. Specifically, ss 23(1)(iii) and 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the Marriage Act
states that a marriage is void where ‘the consent of either of the parties was not a real
consent because ... that party was mentally incapable of understanding the nature and
effect of the marriage ceremony’.27
11.31 Before a marriage is entered into, the person solemnising the marriage must
determine that the parties to the marriage are mentally capable of understanding the
nature and effect of the marriage ceremony.28 It  is  an  offence  for  a  celebrant  to
solemnise a marriage where they have reason to believe that one of the parties does not
meet this standard.29
11.32 Disability Rights Now has expressed the view that these provisions effectively
exclude ‘some people with disability, particularly those with cognitive impairments
from entering into marriage’.30 Similarly, the Illawarra Forum submitted that the
‘terminology must be reviewed to reflect a clear distinction between intellectual
25 National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100; Family Planning NSW, Submission
109; Illawarra Forum, Submission 124.
26 Vicdeaf, Submission 125.
27 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 23(1)(iii) applies to marriages solemnised on or after 20 June 1977 and before
the commencement of s 13 of the Marriage Amendment Act 1985 (Cth) and s 23B(1)(d)(iii) applies to
marriages solemnised after the commencement of s 13 of the Marriage Amendment Act.
28 A number of categories of people are authorised celebrants for the purpose of solemnising marriages
under the Marriage Act. Ministers of Religion are registered with states and territories to solemnise
marriages for a recognised denomination. Certain state and territory officers are also entitled to solemnise
marriages: for example, officers of the relevant registry of births, deaths and marriages. There are also
Commonwealth registered marriage celebrants, who are registered under the Commonwealth Marriage
Celebrants program: Ibid pt IV div 1.
29 Ibid s 100.
30 Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012).
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disability and mental capacity ... people with disability should be assessed on their
mental capacity as opposed to their disability’.31
11.33 However, academics Bruce Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython submitted that,
as a binding legal agreement, inherent with responsibilities as well as rights, it is of
fundamental importance that parties entering a marriage understand what it is they are
binding themselves to. For people who lack the capacity to understand this, marriage
should not be available.32
11.34 Sections 23(1)(iii) and 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the Marriage Act reveal a tension
between the need to protect persons with disability from exploitation or forced
marriage, while ensuring that any person with disability who is able to understand and
consent to marriage should be entitled to marry freely.
11.35 This formulation of the test was first introduced in the Matrimonial Causes Act
1959 (Cth).33 There have only been three reported decisions with respect to this test. 34
In 2014, Foster J in Oliver and Oliver concluded that the test
not only required a capacity to understand ‘the effect’ but also refers to ‘the marriage’
rather than ‘a marriage’ ... taken together the matters require more than a general
understanding of what marriage involves.35
11.36 Foster J also stated that ‘the relevant point of time in proving mental incapacity
is the time of the marriage ceremony’.36
11.37 This interpretation of the provision reflects the ALRC’s approach to decision-
making ability being context and time specific, and relevant to the particular decision
to be made. However, in order to ensure clarity, and consistency with the ALRC’s
approach to language in this Inquiry,37 the ALRC recommends amendment of
ss 23(1)(iii) and 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the Marriage Act to  void  a  marriage  if  ‘a  party  did
not understand the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony’.
11.38 The ALRC does not, however, make recommendations to include a statutory test
of decision-making ability in the Marriage Act, or to require consideration of the
available decision-making supports. This is because of concerns about such provisions
31 The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.
32 B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
33 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) was then repealed by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), and the
test was later incorporated into the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). See, eg, Oliver and Oliver [2014] FamCA
57, [241]–[243].
34 Brown and Brown (1982) 92 FLC 232; AK and NC (2003) 93 FamCA 178; Oliver and Oliver [2014]
FamCA 57.
35 Oliver and Oliver [2014] FamCA 57, [255].
36 Ibid [201].
37 Section 23B(1)(d)(iii) is similarly worded to s 93(8)(b) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth)
which provides that people are not entitled to have their name placed or retained on the Electoral Roll, or
to vote, where they are a person ‘who by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of understanding
the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’. See further, Ch 9.
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unintentionally resulting in a higher threshold for real consent to marry for persons
with disability.38
Guardians and consent
11.39 In some jurisdictions, under guardianship legislation, a guardian of a person
with disability cannot consent or refuse to consent to a marriage, but may give an
opinion as to whether the guardian thinks the marriage should proceed.39
11.40 Disability Rights Now has suggested this may give guardians ‘undue influence
over the extent to which a person with disability can realise their right to freely
marry’.40 Similarly, Family Planning NSW expressed the view that ‘the opinion of a
person with disability’s guardian should not be taken into account when determining a
person’s capacity to consent to marriage’.41 The ALRC suggests this may be an issue
that could be considered in the course of review of state and territory guardianship
legislation.42
Guidelines on the Marriage Act
Recommendation 11–2 The Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for
Marriage Celebrants should be amended to reflect the removal of the reference
to ‘mental incapacity’ in the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and to provide further
guidance on determining whether or not a person can ‘understand the nature and
effect of the marriage ceremony’.
11.41 Commonwealth registered marriage celebrants may solemnise marriages under
the Marriage Act and Marriage Regulations 1963 (Cth) and must comply with the
Code of Practice for Marriage Celebrants and ongoing professional development
obligations.43 There are a number of guidelines for celebrants44 and celebrants must
undergo performance reviews by the Registrar of Marriage Celebrants.45
38 The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) currently only requires ‘a very simple or general understanding ... of the
marriage ceremony and what it involves’: Australian Government, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961
for Marriage Celebrants, July 2014 pt 8.6.
39 See, eg, The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Family Planning NSW, Submission 04.
40 Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) 152.
41 Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. See also The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.
42 See Ch 10.
43 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 39G.
44 Australian Government, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for Marriage Celebrants, July 2014;
Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on Advertising for Commonwealth-
Registered Marriage Celebrants, 2012; Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants,
Guidelines on Conflict of Interest and Benefit to Business for Commonwealth-Registered Marriage
Celebrants, 2012. The Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 were updated in July 2014 to reflect changes
brought about through the Marriage Amendment (Celebrant Administration and Fees) Act 2014 (Cth), the
Marriage (Celebrant Registration Charge) Act 2014 (Cth)  and  the Marriage Amendment (Fees and
Charges) Regulation 2014 (Cth).
45 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 39(H).
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11.42 As outlined above, it is an offence for a celebrant to solemnise a marriage where
they have reason to believe there is ‘a legal impediment’.46 The Guidelines state that, if
a celebrant believes the consent of one or both parties is not a real consent, they
‘should refuse to marry the couple, even if the marriage ceremony has commenced’.47
11.43 The Guidelines suggest that to determine whether a party’s consent is real, a
celebrant should speak to the party in the absence of the other party, speak to third
parties and keep relevant records.48 The Guidelines state:
in  cases  where  there  is  doubt  about  whether  a  party  has  the  mental  capacity  to
understand the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony, a very simple or general
understanding will be sufficient. A high level of understanding is not required. The
authorised celebrant should ask questions of the person about whom they have
concerns in order to gauge the level of their understanding of the marriage ceremony
and what it involves.49
11.44 The Guidelines also provide a list of questions to assist celebrants to identify
situations where consent issues may arise.50 However, stakeholders considered the
existing guidance to be inadequate. The Physical Disability Council of NSW submitted
that a celebrant who may not have any knowledge of disability should not be
authorised to make a judgement about a person’s capacity to consent to marriage.51
11.45 Further, the Physical Disability Council of NSW highlighted that the Guidelines
do not ‘consider communication needs and augmented communication used by people
with disability’.52 The Council recommended amendment to clauses of the Guidelines
which relate to obtaining a translator or interpreter53 in order to ensure compliance with
art 21 of the CRPD, which requires acceptance and facilitation of the use of ‘sign
languages, Braille, augmentative and alternative communication, and all other
accessible means, modes and formats of communication of their choice by persons
with disabilities in official interactions’.54
11.46 The revised 2014 Guidelines provide for ceremonies conducted in a sign
language such as Auslan55 and for vows to be exchanged in a sign language.56 The
ALRC acknowledges this positive development and encourages provision of additional
46 Ibid s 100.
47 Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for
Marriage Celebrants, 2012 pt 8.6.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. See also The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.
52 Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32.
53 Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for
Marriage Celebrants, 2012 pt 5.9.
54 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 21(b).
55 Australian Government, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for Marriage Celebrants, July 2014 pt 5.9.
56 Ibid pt 5.7.
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guidance for marriage celebrants in relation to determining real consent, including
ensuring different communication needs are met.57
Other concerns
11.47 In Australia, persons with disability may experience discrimination or
difficulties in exercising their rights to marry and to form intimate relationships. In
particular, the Disability Rights Now report asserted that persons with disability
experience paternalistic and moralistic attitudes from support staff and service
providers and their needs for assistance in developing and maintaining relationships
and friendships and their decisions to enter into marriage or partnerships receive little
or no support at a policy or service delivery level.58
11.48 The ‘subject of sexuality and intimate relationships are [a] generally silent,
ignored and invisible aspect of the lives of people with disability’.59 Some stakeholders
emphasised that many persons with disability may be denied the right to engage in
intimate relationships. Stakeholders outlined a range of difficulties including:
legislative barriers under state and territory law;60 attitudes of family, carers and
service providers;61 risk management processes and policies;62 limited access to
information;63 difficulty accessing sex workers;64 and the need for education and
awareness raising in relation to persons with disability and sexual and reproductive
health.65
11.49 While important, many of these issues arise at a state or territory level. The key
to addressing them extends beyond the limits of law or legal frameworks and into other
levers for attitudinal and cultural change.66 The ALRC does not make
57 The NSW Capacity Toolkit is another useful model: New South Wales Attorney General’s Department,
Capacity Toolkit: Information for Government and Community Workers, Professionals, Families and
Carers in New South Wales (2008).
58 Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) 15–16. See also Family Planning NSW, Submission 04.
59 Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. See also Family Planning NSW, ‘Love & Kisses: Taking Action
on the Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights of People with Disability 2014–2018’ (December
2013).
60 For example, provisions that make it an offence to have sexual intercourse with a person who, for
example, does not have the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse because of ‘cognitive incapacity’:
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(4)(a) and the broad definition of cognitive impairment under s 61H(1A);
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 50–52. See also Touching Base, Submission 40.
61 See, eg, Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59; B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission
38; Family Planning NSW, Submission 04.  See  also  Disability  Rights  Now, Civil Society Report to the
United Nations on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2012) 158. Michael Kirby, ‘Adult
Guardianship: Law, Autonomy and Sexuality’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 866, 873.
62 Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (2012) 158.
63 Vicdeaf, Submission 56.
64 Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59; Touching Base, Submission 40; Physical
Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32.
65 Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. See more generally The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Senate
Standing Committee on Community Affairs, ‘The Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with
Disabilities in Australia’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013).
66 See, eg, B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission 38.
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recommendations in relation to these issues but notes that they may be considered in
the review of state and territory legislation.67
Superannuation
11.50 Many decision-making issues in relation to superannuation concern the
operation and powers of state and territory appointed decision-makers, including under
powers of attorney. The focus of this chapter is confined to decision-making issues that
may require amendment to Commonwealth legislation and legal frameworks.
11.51 The Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth)  (SIS  Act)  and  the
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) (SIS Regulations)
govern the operation of superannuation funds in Australia.68 The Australian Securities
and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(APRA) and the Commissioner of Taxation supervise superannuation funds.69
Individual superannuation funds are also administered by their trust deeds and in
accordance with governing rules.
11.52 Superannuation is generally provided through a trust structure in which trustees
hold the funds on behalf of members. The SIS Act and SIS Regulations provide
mechanisms to allow superannuation fund rules to permit a member of the
superannuation fund to complete a binding death benefit nomination of a beneficiary.
The SIS Regulations require that the notice nominating a beneficiary must:
· be in writing;
· be signed and dated by the member in the presence of two witnesses, each of
whom have turned 18 and neither of whom is mentioned in the nomination; and
· contain a declaration signed and dated by the witness stating that the notice was
signed by the member.70
11.53 A member can nominate a legal personal representative, or a dependant or
dependants as their beneficiary.71 Nominations are generally only binding for three
years, but can be renewed.72 On  or  after  the  member’s  death,  the  trustee  of  the  fund
67 See Ch 10.
68 The SIS Act makes provision for the prudent management of certain superannuation funds and applies to
all private sector funds and certain public sector funds that have elected to be regulated by the SIS Act:
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 3(1).
69 Ibid.
70 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.17A. There is also provision for a
non-binding death benefit nomination: although not binding on the trustee of the superannuation fund, the
trustee will take the member’s wishes into consideration when making a decision as to whom to pay the
benefit: Ibid reg 6.22.
71 Superannuation law restricts who is an eligible dependant to receive a death benefit payment to a spouse
(including same-sex and de facto), child, or person with whom the member has an interdependency
relationship: Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 10, 10A.
72 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.17A(7). When a binding nomination
lapses there is some confusion about whether the death benefit becomes part of the estate or the
nomination just becomes non-binding. Although it is outside the terms of reference this has been raised as
an issue of concern.
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must then provide the member’s benefits to the person or people mentioned in the
notice.73
11.54 ‘Legal personal representative’ is defined under the SIS Act to mean ‘the
executor of the will  or administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the trustee of
the estate of a person under a legal disability or a person who holds an enduring power
of attorney granted by a person’.74
11.55 One area of contention identified in the ALRC’s Discussion Paper was whether,
when a member of a superannuation fund has appointed a state or territory decision-
maker, that decision-maker should be able to nominate a beneficiary on behalf of the
member.75
11.56 As a matter of law, there does not appear to be any restriction in the SIS Act or
SIS Regulations themselves that would prevent a person acting under a power of
attorney from completing and signing a binding death benefit nomination. The issue
arose for consideration by the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal in 2007. In
Determination D07–08\030, the sister of the member of the relevant superannuation
fund (the Deceased Member) was also his legal personal representative. She also held
an enduring power of attorney on behalf of the Deceased Member. Exercising the
power of attorney, the sister had made a binding death benefit nomination on behalf of
the Deceased Member as follows: 25% to herself and 37.5% each to the member’s
daughter and son. The Trustee of the fund advised the sister that it had decided to
accept the validity of the nomination and pay 37.5% each to the member’s daughter
and  son,  and  25%  to  the  sister as the legal personal representative. By his will, the
Deceased Member left one quarter of his estate to his sister and the remaining three
quarters to his son and daughter in equal shares. The sister lodged a complaint with the
Tribunal that the decision of the trustee to pay 25% of the death benefit to her as the
legal personal representative, and not directly to her, was unfair or unreasonable.
11.57 The Superannuation Complaints Tribunal stated that, in principle, the enduring
power of attorney would have permitted the sister to complete and sign the binding
death nomination, but the nomination would ‘only have been valid if the person
nominated to receive the benefit was an individual who was either a dependant, or the
Legal Personal Representative acting in that capacity, rather than as an individual’. 76
The trustee decided that she was not a ‘dependant’ and therefore ineligible under the
scheme, hence the only capacity in which she could receive a benefit was as the legal
personal representative of her brother.
73 This is subject to a trustee of the entity complying with any conditions contained in the regulations, and
the member’s notice being given in accordance with the regulations. See Superannuation Industry
(Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 59; Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth)
reg 6.17A.
74 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 10(1).
75 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Questions 11–1, 11–2.
76 Determination No D07-08\30 (Unreported, Superannuation Complaints Tribunal, 3 September 2007)
[34].
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11.58 The Tribunal said that it was unclear on what basis the sister named herself in
the nomination and the trustee should have clarified this ‘before accepting the
nomination’.77 Further, the nomination was ambiguous because there were in fact two
legal personal representatives appointed in the will. The Tribunal pointed to the power
in the trust deed of the fund to refuse to accept or give effect to a binding nomination,
if it is not sufficiently clear to allow the trustee to pay it according to the nomination.78
11.59 The Tribunal decided that the trustee should not have accepted the nomination
and that the trustee’s decision should be set aside. Instead, the Tribunal determined that
100% of the death benefit should be distributed to the Deceased Member’s estate. As
the Tribunal did not decide the matter on the basis of the binding nomination, its
comments are not of direct application.
11.60 As a matter of current practice the Law Council of Australia (Law Council)
pointed to the different practices of funds:
some funds accept nomination by a person holding an enduring power of attorney
granted by the member, generally without inquiring as to the wishes of the member.
Some funds do not accept a nomination by a person holding an enduring power of
attorney, with the result that binding nominations cannot be made by these
members.79
11.61 The Law Council suggested that superannuation funds would adopt a more
consistent approach if there was greater clarity in legislative provisions governing
superannuation death benefits.80
11.62 This policy issue is a difficult one, given the difference between a nomination,
as a lifetime act, and its effect, which is will-like in nature—as it affects property after
the death of the person who holds the superannuation interest.81 In this context, in the
Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked whether a person holding authority under an
instrument such as an enduring power of attorney should be restricted from nominating
a beneficiary on behalf of the person for whom they were acting—assuming that such
action was not prevented by the power of attorney itself.82
11.63 The Law Council agreed that the main issue around binding death benefit
nominations is that there is currently no clear policy position on whether a nomination
should be considered similar to a will or simply an instruction in relation to a person’s
assets. The Council also agreed with the ALRC’s analysis that nominations are will-
like in nature and they should be treated in policy terms ‘similarly to wills’.83
77 Ibid [35]. Other issues were argued by the son and daughter, including that to exercise the power of
attorney in favour of herself was a breach of fiduciary duty by the sister: [21].
78 Ibid [37].
79 Law Council of Australia, Submission 83.
80 Ibid.
81 See, eg, Rosalind Croucher and Prue Vines, Succession: Families, Property and Death (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 4th ed, 2013) [3.10]–[3.12].
82 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws,
Discussion Paper No 81 (2014) Question 11–3.
83 Law Council of Australia, Submission 142.
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11.64 Until recently, a will could only be made by the testator themselves, and not, for
example, an enduring guardian. Under strict conditions, wills can now be authorised by
the court in some jurisdictions (‘statutory wills’), where a person is regarded as having
lost, or never having had, legal capacity.84 In the succession context it is a relatively
new jurisdiction and exercised cautiously, given the importance accorded to
testamentary freedom as a valued property right. Generally speaking, the conditions for
such statutory wills reflect the changes in emphasis in approaches to legal capacity and
support for those who may require decision-making assistance, discussed in Chapter 2.
The standard to be applied by the courts reflects the time the relevant state or territory
legislation was introduced.85 For example, the courts have to ask variously whether the
proposed will would ‘accurately reflect the testator’s likely intentions’; is a will that is
‘reasonably likely’ to be one that the testator would have made; ‘is or may be a will ...
that the person would make’; or ‘is one which could be made by the person’.86
11.65 While a limitation on the power of an enduring guardian is a matter that goes
beyond the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry, the ALRC concludes that, as a policy
matter, the role of an enduring guardian is one focused on the lifetime needs of the
person. It is not appropriate for an enduring guardian to make a binding death benefit
nomination, which is like a will in effect. The Law Council submitted that the SIS Act
and SIS Regulations could be amended to make this clear so that a nomination
‘generally cannot be made on behalf of a member by a person exercising powers under
an EPA’.87
Board membership and other corporate roles
Recommendation 11–3 Sections 201F(2), 915B and 1292(7)(b) of the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) should be amended to remove references to
‘mental incapacity’, ‘being incapable, because of mental infirmity’ and ‘mental
or physical incapacity’. Instead, the provisions should state that a person is not
eligible to act in the roles of director, auditor or liquidator, or a financial services
licence holder, if they cannot be supported to:
(a)  understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to
make in performing the role;
(b)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make those decisions;
84 Succession Act 2006 (NSW) ss 18–26; Succession Act 1981 (Qld); ss 21–28; Wills Act 1936 (SA)  s  7;
Wills Act 2008 (Tas) ss 21–28; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) ss 21–30; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 40; Wills Act 1968
(ACT) ss 16A–16I; Wills Act 2000 (NT) ss 19–26.
85 See the discussion in Croucher and Vines, above n 82, [6.11]–[6.20]; R Croucher, ‘“An Interventionist,
Paternalistic Jurisdiction”? The Place of Statutory Wills in Australian Succession Law’ (2009) 32
University of New South Wales Law Journal 674.
86 Croucher and Vines, above n 82, [6.11].
87 Law Council of Australia, Submission 142. The Law Council’s submission was supported by National
Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
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(c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions;
or
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way.
11.66 Stakeholders expressed concern about under-representation of persons with
disability on corporate, government and non-government boards; and about the
operation of legal provisions allowing the removal of directors or board members
because of intellectual disability or mental illness.88
11.67 The Mental Health Coordinating Council submitted that the language of laws
should change to ‘eradicate any stigmatising and discriminating practice towards
people with a mental health condition’—including in relation to some provisions
concerning board membership.89
11.68 For example, the Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) applies model
rules to the constitutions of associations, if appropriate provision is not otherwise
made.90 These default rules provide that a casual vacancy in the office of a member of
the committee occurs if the member ‘becomes a mentally incapacitated person’.91 In
turn, the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) defines the term ‘mentally incapacitated
person’ to mean a person who is ‘an involuntary patient or a forensic patient or a
correctional patient within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2007, or a protected
person within the meaning of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009’.92
11.69 Such a broad provision is inconsistent with the National Decision-Making
Principles because it makes status-based assumptions about decision-making ability,
and does not recognise that ability may fluctuate over time.93 The fact that someone is
briefly an involuntary patient, or is subject to some form of administration or
guardianship order, should not automatically require them to vacate a position on an
association’s committee.94 In this Inquiry the ALRC recommends a move away from
such a status-based approach.
11.70 At a Commonwealth level, a number of provisions in the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) apply tests of capacity in relation to acting in various corporate roles,
including as a director, auditor, liquidator and financial services licence holder:
· Directors. If a person who is the only director and the only shareholder of a
proprietary company ‘cannot manage the company because of the person’s
88 See eg, J Meagher Submission 79; Hobsons Bay City Council, Submission 44; Centre for Rural Regional
Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20; The Illawarra Forum,
Submission 19; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
89 Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
90 Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 25.
91 Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) sch 1, cl 18(2)(f).
92 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 21.
93 See Ch 3.
94 The Mental Health Coordinating Council proposed that the wording should be changed to ‘permanently
incapacitated’ rather than ‘mentally incapacitated’: Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07.
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mental incapacity’, the person’s personal representative or trustee may appoint
another person as director.95
· Auditors and liquidators. The Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary
Board must, on an application by ASIC or APRA, cancel the registration of an
auditor or liquidator if the person ‘is incapable, because of mental infirmity, of
managing his or her affairs’.96
· Financial services licence holders. ASIC may suspend or cancel an Australian
financial services licence held by a person who ‘becomes incapable of managing
their affairs because of mental or physical incapacity’.97
11.71 The existing tests of a person’s capacity to act in roles regulated by the
Corporations Act are inconsistent with the principles of supported decision-making. In
particular, they are status-based—referring to concepts such as ‘mental infirmity’ and
‘mental incapacity’. Further, the functional aspect of some of the tests refers broadly to
a person’s ability to manage ‘their affairs’ rather than to make particular categories of
decision or perform particular duties.
11.72 Such tests, to the extent they are necessary, should be based on a person’s
decision-making ability in the context of a particular role or duties. In the ALRC’s
view, the Corporations Act should be amended to introduce provisions based on the
National Decision-Making Principles and Guidelines.
11.73 Some stakeholders, while supporting a move in this direction, pointed out some
of its implications.98 The National Mental Health Consumer and Carer Forum observed
that the legal process around the appointment and removal of directors or board
members needs ‘to take account of the protection of the interests of the governed and
an underlying goal of enhancing diverse representation of boards’.99 Ian Watts raised a
number of questions about the possible obligations of the company to provide support,
and the duties and obligations of any supporter.100
Holding public office
Recommendation 11–4 The Australian Government should review and
replace provisions in Commonwealth legislation that require the termination of
statutory appointments by reason of a person’s ‘unsound mind’ or ‘mental
incapacity’.
95 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 201F(2).
96 Ibid s 1292(7)(b).
97 Ibid s 915B.
98 I Watts, Submission 114; National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
99 National Mental Health Consumer & Carer Forum, Submission 100.
100  I Watts, Submission 114.
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11.74 Persons with disability are significantly under-represented in public office. 101
The main barrier to holding public office for persons with disability may be the
negative assumptions about their ability. The Law Council acknowledged that this
social disadvantage, rather than any legal restriction, affects the capacity of people to
hold public office, as well as to engage in a profession, vocation or other activities.102
11.75 There are a considerable number of other provisions in Commonwealth
legislation concerning public office holders that refer to the concept of ‘unsound mind’
or ‘mental incapacity’. In most cases, these provide that the appointment of a person
who becomes of unsound mind or acquires a mental incapacity may be terminated.103
For example:
· Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) ss 17, 18—members of the
ALRC;
· Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 207—
Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of ASIC;
· Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth) s 119—Gene Technology Regulator;
· Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) s 35—Inspector-General of
Taxation;
· National Blood Authority Act 2003 (Cth) s 35—General Manager of the
National Blood Authority; and
· Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) s 164—members of the Veterans’ Review
Board.
11.76 The ALRC suggests that these provisions be replaced over time with functional
tests similar to those recommended by the ALRC in other contexts, including in
relation to board membership, above. That is, an appointment should be able to be
terminated if the person cannot be supported to: understand the information relevant to
the decisions that they will have to make in performing the role; retain that information
to the extent necessary to make those decisions; use or weigh that information as part
of the process of making decisions; or communicate the decisions in some way.
Members of Parliament
11.77 The qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and Senators are
set out in the Australian Constitution.104 They include eligibility as an elector under the
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).105 As  discussed  in  Chapter  9,  the  ALRC
101  In 2010, the Hon Kelly Vincent MLC, South Australia, from the ‘Dignity for Disability’ party was the
first Member of Parliament in Australia to be elected on a disability platform.
102  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83.
103  Most of these provisions include the words ‘proved misbehaviour or physical or mental incapacity’.
104 Australian Constitution ss 16, 34.
105  Similar provisions exist at state level and, in Victoria, the constitution itself explicitly provides that a
person who ‘by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and
significance of enrolment and voting is not entitled to be enrolled’: Constitution Act 1975 (Vic)
s 48(2)(d).
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recommends removing the ‘unsound mind’ provision contained in the Commonwealth
Electoral Act.106
Judicial officers
11.78 Under the Australian Constitution, a Commonwealth judicial officer may be
removed on an address from both Houses of the Parliament on the ground of ‘proved
misbehaviour or incapacity’.107 A statutory process for assisting the Parliament to
consider removal has been established by the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity
(Parliamentary Commissions) Act 2012 (Cth). Under this Act, the Parliament may
establish a commission to investigate and report on an allegation of misbehaviour or
incapacity, so that the Parliament is well-informed about the decision at hand.
11.79 The Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Act 2012 (Cth)
modified various related laws such as the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Federal
Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to provide a statutory basis for the heads of
jurisdiction108 to deal with complaints about judicial officers, including establishing a
conduct committee.
11.80 The ALRC does not recommend any change to these laws because they appear
to provide for an impartial and considered approach to the assessment of decision-
making ability in their relevant contexts. At the time of writing, these 2012 laws had
not yet been tested. In time, the ALRC’s National Decision-Making Principles may
inform the decisions of Parliament and the heads of jurisdictions of Commonwealth
courts.
Other issues
Employment
11.81 There are many concerns about the employment of persons with disability in
Australia, including those arising from lower levels of labour force participation and
higher unemployment, compared to others;109 and the lowest employment participation
rate for persons with disability among OECD countries.110
11.82 Stakeholders raised concerns about:
· the relationship between employment and social security systems;
· the operation of the Job Services Australia and Disability Employment Services
system, including the conduct of employment services assessments;
· the operation of Australian Disability Enterprises;
106 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 93(8)(b).
107 Australian Constitution s 72.
108  The heads of jurisdiction are the Chief Justices of the Federal Court and the Family Court and the Chief
Federal Magistrate.
109  See, eg, Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australian Social Trends’ (Cat No 4102.0).
110  Organisation for Economic Co–Operation and Development, ‘Sickness, Disability and Work’
(Background Paper for High–Level Forum, Stockholm, 14–15 May 2009).
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· the operation of the supported wage system and business service wage
assessment tool (and proposed changes); and
· the declining rate of employment of persons with disability in the
Commonwealth public service.111
11.83 While these are important issues in the lives of persons with disability, the issues
do not relate directly to concepts of legal capacity or decision-making ability, and the
ALRC does not make recommendations in these areas.
Anti-discrimination
11.84 The nature and operation of Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation
raises a range of significant issues for persons with disability. These issues relate to
factors which may limit the ability of persons with disability to access the anti-
discrimination complaints system, including:
· the individualised nature of the system;
· issues of standing;
· failure to cover intersectional discrimination;
· costs associated with proceeding past the conciliation stage of complaints;
· reliance on, and the operation of, exceptions in legislation;
· coverage of laws;
· positive duties;
· remedies and enforcement; and
· the role, powers and resourcing of the Australian Human Rights Commission.112
111  See, eg, People with Disabilities WA and Centre for Human Rights Education, Submission 133; Legal
Aid Qld, Submission 64; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 46; Deaf Australia, Submission 37; Centre for
Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20.
112  See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; National Association of Community Legal Centres and
Others, Submission 78; Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71; Children with
Disability Australia, Submission 68; Coordinating Committee of Women’s Legal Services Australia,
Submission 70; Legal Aid Victoria, Submission 65; Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64; Spinal Cord Injuries
Australia, Submission 63; Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59; National Seniors
Australia, Submission 57; Vicdeaf, Submission 56; Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission
55; Mental Health Council of Australia, Submission 52; National Disability Services, Submission 49;
Central Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 46; MDAA,
Submission 43; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; B Arnold and W Bonython, Submission
38; Cairns Community Legal Centre, Submission 30; Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia,
Submission 28;  Deaf  Society  of  NSW, Submission 24; Carers NSW, Submission 23; Centre for Rural
Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20; Insurance
Council of Australia, Submission 08; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07; Office of the
Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05; Family Planning NSW, Submission 04.
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11.85 These are systemic concerns about anti-discrimination law and practice and, in
the light of this and the significant work that has been undertaken in this area in recent
years,113 the ALRC does not make recommendations in this area in this Report.
Insurance
11.86 In the Issues Paper,  the ALRC asked what changes,  if  any, should be made to
the insurance exemption under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), and for
submissions on other issues relating to insurance. The key concerns expressed by
stakeholders with respect to persons with disability and insurance related to:
· the availability of, information about, and the cost of insurance;
· the operation of policy exclusions, including for example in relation to pre-
existing conditions and mental illness;
· the relevance, transparency and accessibility of the actuarial and statistical data
on which disability-based insurance underwriting and pricing occurs; and
· reliance on the insurance exemption under the Disability Discrimination Act.114
11.87 Conversely, some stakeholders submitted that ‘laws and legal frameworks
concerning insurance do not reduce the equal recognition of people with disability’ and
that it is unnecessary to examine the operation of the underwriting process or the
exemption under the Disability Discrimination Act.115
11.88 Again, some of the issues highlighted by stakeholders do not relate directly to
concepts of legal capacity or decision-making ability, and the ALRC does not make
recommendations in these areas. This approach was endorsed by the Insurance Council
of Australia, which expressed its willingness to discuss with disability organisations
ways of improving access to general insurance for those with a disability.116
11.89 There have been a number of recent inquires which have dealt with these
matters. For example, in many respects the concerns mirror those expressed in the
ALRC’s Age Barriers to Work Inquiry. The conclusions reached in the report, Access
All Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws,117 may also be applicable in the
context of disability, including in relation to:
· the need for clear and simple information about available insurance products;
113  See, eg, Exposure Draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 (Cth); Senate Legal and
Constitutional Affairs Committee, Review of Exposure Draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill
2012 (Cth), February 2013 (and submissions to the Senate Committee); Attorney-General’s Department,
Consolidation of Commonwealth Anti-Discrimination Laws, Discussion Paper (2011) and submissions in
response to the Discussion Paper.
114  See, eg, Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71; Mental Health Council of
Australia, Submission 52; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32.
115  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 08. See also Financial Services Council, Submission 35.
116  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 105.
117  Australian Law Reform Commission, Access All Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws, Report
No 120 (2013).
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· the desirability of an agreement between the Australian Government and
insurers requiring the publication of data upon which insurance offerings based
on disability rely;
· review of insurance exceptions under Commonwealth, state and territory anti-
discrimination legislation as they apply to disability as well as the development
of guidance material about the application of any insurance exception under
Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation; and
· amendment of the General Insurance Code of Practice and the Financial
Services Council Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct to include diversity
statements or objects clauses that encourage consideration of the needs and
circumstances of a diverse range of consumers, including persons with
disability.
Parenthood and family law
11.90 The Terms of Reference identify parenthood and family law as an area for
consideration in this Inquiry. Some of the issues which arise are referred to in other
parts of this Report. For example, issues concerning the appointment of case and
litigation representatives and protecting vulnerable witnesses arise in family law
proceedings and are discussed in Chapter 7. Similarly, issues relating to sterilisation
are discussed in Chapter 10.
11.91 Another issue raised by stakeholders was concern about the removal of children
from parents with disability, particularly through the operation of the child protection
system in states and territories.118 However, as outlined in Chapter 1, the focus of the
ALRC’s work is on Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks, and the examination
of the operation of state and territory child protection systems extends beyond the
Terms of Reference for this Inquiry.
11.92 Some stakeholders also raised issues relating to the effect that a parent having
disability may have on parenting proceedings in the Family Court.119 However, the
Hon Chief Justice Diana Bryant AO of the Court expressed the view that,
insofar as it is being suggested that the Act discriminates against parents with an
intellectual disability, or that the presence of an intellectual disability is of itself a
disqualifying factor in an application in which a parent is seeking to spend substantial
time with their child, I believe those views are misconceived.120
11.93 In any event, these concerns focus on the application by judges of the primary
and secondary considerations in parenting matters under ss 60CC(2) and 60CC(3) of
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and are outside the scope of this Inquiry.
118  See, eg, G Llewellyn, Submission 82; Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71;
ADACAS, Submission 29; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.  See  also  Office  of  the
Public Advocate (Vic), ‘What Even Happened to the Village? The Removal of Children from Parents
with a Disability’ (Report 1: Family Law—Hidden Issues, December 2013).
119  See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), above n 119. See also ADACAS, Submission 29; The
Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.
120  D Bryant, Submission 22.
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